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Andreas Schockenhoff usually voices the real position of German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the eastern direction of German foreign policy. First of all it concerns Russia. In the government of Angela Merkel, Dr. Schockenhoff has served as Coordinator for German-Russian cooperatio, and in the Bundestag is deputy chairman of the ruling CDU.
In the government of Angela Merkel, Andreas Schockenhoff acts as a sort of “bad cop,” who reported criticisms of Berlin on Putin’s policy in certain areas to the Russian side. Recently, Dr. Schockenhoff has got interested in Ukraine. In light of the recent “Ukraine-EU” summit we decided that he could voice some position of Germany on the European future of Ukraine. Given that beliefs of Angela Merkel on Ukrainian integration are considered among key ones.Dr. Schockenhoff, usually IWP communicates with renowned international decision-makers either in the course of public discussions, or in the format of videoconference with world capitals, or in the mode of “off the record”. This time we want to make an exception and to record a full interview with you, because of the influence of your voice in German diplomacy. Mr. Schockenhoff, what is today the key obstacle in relations between Ukraine and Germany?

Germany and the European Union have offered Ukraine a close association with Europe. It is an offer many other countries would crave for: a close alliance with the EU in the framework of an Association Agreement, including a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and the adoption of the EU acquis. It is an offer to support Ukraine on a way to sustainable reforms and comprehensive modernisation. It is the offer for a long-term and far-reaching rapprochement between Ukraine, Germany and the EU as a whole. If Ukraine accepts this offer, we have a framework to solve all open issues and create a better and common future for both our countries.

How do you perceive prospects of the process of Ukraine’s integration in the European Union and, specifically, the signing of the Association Agreement by the end of this year?

2013 is probably the “mother of all years” since Ukraine’s independence. The signing of the Association Agreement presents a great “window of opportunity” for Ukraine. But we all know: such windows are rare and must be used! The EU-Ukraine summit on 25 January should set a clear signal that this window will be used. Ukraine will have to make a clear choice between moving towards association with Europe or re-integration in the post-Soviet space. The road to signing the Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November is set by the benchmarks defined by the conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 10 December 2012. The plan of priority measures adopted by after the visit of EU-Commissioner Fule to Kyiv shows that the Ukrainian government is taking the proposed reforms seriously. But time is pressing. To keep the 2013 deadline, things have to move much more quickly. We need tangible progress until April or May at the latest.

The European Union has repeatedly emphasized that the signing of the Association Agreement is possible only after the release of representatives of the opposition from prison. At the same time, Ukrainian authorities, as it seems to be, are eager to sign the document without meeting this demand. What is your vision of the resolution of this dilemma?

The solution is clear: The EU is asking for “decisive actions” and tangible progress in three areas – elections, selective justice and progress on the association agenda, especially in the rule of law. There is no way around it: the issues of selective justice and legal reforms are central for any association with the European Union. Since 2010, we have seen many steps backwards and too few forward in Ukraine. Selective justice against the political opposition is totally incompatible with European standards. The EU has condemned the trials and sentences against former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko and former interior minister Yuri Luzenko as politically motivated. The European Court of Human Rights has declared Mr. Luzenko’s pre-trial detention illegal, other verdicts are pending. Ukraine is legally bound to implement the decisions by the ECHR.

Could be the issue resolved if the ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko would be transferred to Germany for medical treatment?

Ultimately, the issue can only be resolved if Ukraine takes concrete steps to strengthen the rule of law and reforms its judiciary. Her case is part of a much larger systemic crisis of the Ukrainian judiciary. This can only be solved by systemic reforms. In its verdict on the case of judge Oleksandr Volkov, the European Court for Human Rights has clearly pointed out the spectrum of “systemic problems” in Ukraine’s legal system. These range from politically-motivated pressure on judges to what is ultimately a lack of separation of powers. This is where substantial reforms have to start.

Mr. Schockenhoff, as it claimed in the recent publications in the media, the dialogue between Moscow and Berlin has seen a certain level of alienation. As Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Coordinator for German-Russian cooperation, what impact of this shift could have on Ukraine and its relations with the European Union?

In relations with the Russian Federation, Germany seeks an open dialogue, also on critical issues. This must be possible among partners and in any partnership, also with Ukraine. But our relations are very different. With Moscow we pursue a Modernisation Partnership, with Ukraine a close association with the European Union. We have a clear interest that Ukraine defines its future in a European orientation. In principle, Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty offers Ukraine an EU-perspective. I think that this perspective is still possible. But it will require serious changes and reforms!

You might notice the polemics in the public discourse regarding possible integration of Ukraine into Customs Union which is perceived as a kind of reincarnation of the Soviet Union. Some analysts say it is Ukrainian bluff to get Association Agreement signing. Other observers underline that Ukraine will be inevitably pulled in Customs Union if the EU will reject any European prospect for Kyiv. What is your perception of these debates?

It is not a question of bluffs. As I have said, Ukraine is facing a strategic choice. It has to choose between a close association with Europe or reintegration in the post-Soviet space under Russian domination. I am certain that a large majority of Ukrainian society wants a “return to Europe”, including the adoption of European standards and norms, and not a return under Moscow’s tutelage.

Which integration process of Ukraine is of more interest to Germany – into the European Union or into the Customs Union?

Germany has always made clear where its interest lies: in a democratic, modern and open Ukraine closely associated with the European Union.

In the recent meeting between newly-appointed head of the Ukrainian MFA Leonid Kozhara and his Russian colleague Sergey Lavrov, the latter stated that “Russia sees no contradiction between Ukraine’s rapprochement with the European institutions and the deepening integration in the CIS.” What is your perception on Ukraine retaining two vectors in its foreign policy?

Of course, there is a contradiction. Russia is the first to know. Ukraine is the geo-strategic and economic centre piece for a “Eurasian Union” under Russian dominance. This is why Moscow is putting so much pressure on Kyiv. But Ukraine cannot have the cake and eat it. The two integration processes are incompatible. Ukraine has to make a strategic and systemic choice. A choice about two very different paths for the future of the country. A choice of historic consequence. Only the European choice can guarantee Ukraine’s sovereignty and will lead to a sustained economic and social development.

Ukraine has recently started its chairmanship at the OSCE at the same time being criticized by the ODIHR for abuses in the course of recently held elections. Moreover, Western governments expressed their concerns about Ukraine’s sliding to authoritarianism. How does such perception of Ukraine influence the ability to implement its agenda for the presidency?

Ukraine’s chairmanship of the OSCE is both a chance and a challenge. I hope that Ukraine will be able to use it. In a first step, Ukraine should set its own record straight. We expect Ukraine to apply the 30 recommendations in the OSZE/ODIHR’s report of 2012. We expect the elections to be repeated in five electoral districts to be fair and transparent. The same is true for elections for the Mayor of Kyiv in May. This would strengthen the OSZE chairmanship considerably. It would also be the best option to implement Ukraine’s own agenda for its chairmanship.

One of the key problems of Ukraine’s European integration is the presence of visa regime between the EU and Ukraine. Could Ukraine be sure that after resolving all technical issues there will be political will on the side of Germany to cancel the visa regime?

We have all interest to make substantial progress on visa liberalization with Ukraine. It would be an important signal for Ukraine’s path to Europe, especially for Ukrainian citizens. Important measures were passed by the European Commission in 2012 and are just waiting for ratification by the European Parliament. Now it is in Ukraine’s hands to implement the EU’s action plan. So far, not all legislative conditions for concluding the first phase are fulfilled. But the example of Moldova, which has already achieved the second phase, shows that progress can be made more quickly.

Despite all the above-mentioned criticism, Mr. Schockenhoff, what are three major expectations from Germany on Ukraine’s chairmanship at the OSCE?

The first, of course, is that Ukraine implements the OSCE recommendations on its own election system. Second, to defend fair and independent election monitoring within the OSCE. Third, to take on the issue of press freedom, another important core theme of the OSCE. At the same time, the themes proposed by Ukraine – combating human trafficking, energy security and environment and support for youth initiatives have also great relevance.

In recent years, Germany has been actively involved in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. What exactly do you think could Ukraine do to alter the status quo?

We welcome any active involvement of Ukraine in the settlement of regional conflicts in the CIS. Foreign Minister Leonid Kozhara has said that a breakthrough in the Transnistrian conflicts is a priority of Ukraine’s OSZE chairmanship. But ultimately the key for solving this – and other – regional conflicts in the CIS lies in Moscow. It remains to be seen whether the joint action plan drawn up during the recent meeting the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers can achieve substantial progress. As a direct neighbour of Transnistria, Ukraine has more levers than others. I hope that Ukraine diplomacy can use these levers skillfully.

How would you define the level of soft power of Ukraine in Germany? What would you recommend to increase the level of recognition of Ukraine in Germany and enhance its positive image?

I don’t believe in image campaigns. It is best to let facts speak for themselves. If Ukraine opts for closer association with the European Union it will have no image problem. Visible attempts to apply European standards and norms would be the best soft power tools for Ukraine. Not only in Germany, but in Europe as a whole.