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On May 20, the Institute of World Policy organized its traditional international conference on Ukraine-EU relations. It is annual IWP event held in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the eve of Europe Day.The conference, marking two-year anniversary of signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, brought together diplomats, politicians, researchers, public activists and journalists who are engaged in the process of European integration of Ukraine.

The aim of the event was to discuss and sum up the realization of European integration course with representatives of four key actors: the Government of Ukraine, the EU authorities, the Parliament of Ukraine, and Ukrainian civil society.
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Pavlo KLIMKIN, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
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Jan TOMBINSKI, Head, EU Delegation to Ukraine
I prefer to talk about opportunities than challenges, because Ukraine goes through so many challenges, so we have to move the focus to opportunities. The opportunity is that there is a big public support for this European choice of Ukraine. I guess there is now a mobilization of all Ukrainian forces in order to do it in a way that it corresponds with the needs of Ukraine.
The EU has also gone a long way in order to mobilize its structures. The EU is moving slowly, but then it goes in a systematic way in supporting Ukraine. Every day we are now opening certain projects, aimed at strengthening Ukrainian institutional capacity to cope with everything that means the Association with the EU.
Yesterday we opened a big project for the government in order to help the government to adopt laws that are in, or draft laws, that are compliant with the Ukrainian commitments under the Association. But not only was this the main component of this contract. This contract contains also a very important communication component. This is one of the weak points of Ukrainian authorities to their own population.

This is communication about the policy. The legitimacy of policy depends very much on how people in the country perceive and support, understand what Ukrainian government intends to do and what are the objectives of changes. Changes are never easy. Reforms will only be understood if the goal of it is shown and explained to the Ukrainian citizens, because the citizens are the subjects of all these changes.

I think we have to repeat every day that the difference between this post-Soviet approach and the European approach to citizens is that in the post-Soviet approach, this Mayakovsky formula about the human being is zero- only the collective counts. In the European approach this is really a concern of every individual to be put in the center of their own political well-being. In order for this very person, very citizen supports the policy you have to explain to the person what it is all about. This is a very important feature of everything what we now try to do with the government and as well with the Ukrainian parliament, in aim to improve the reforms of explaining way of reforms to Ukrainians. This will increase the Ukrainian ownership of reforms because what is the goal of it? It is the reform of Ukraine. And the EU is obviously interested in having, as a neighbor, a country that is sovereign, sustainable and able to decide about its own future.

For years Ukrainian policy has been driven by a kind of patchwork policy to do what other countries wanted from Ukraine. What Russia wanted from Ukraine, what the IMF wanted from Ukraine, what the EU wanted from Ukraine, and all this multi-vectoral policy didn’t allow to create the strategy. So the Association Agreement with the EU is a way to shape a well-drafted strategy to move away from short-term policy actions into long-term strategies implemented over time by different institutions. What is needed in order that happens is to set structures not to imitate political actions and obligations, including the fight against corruption, because it’s something that people really do care about and will measure the results of Ukraine against how successful Ukraine is at eradicating monopolist, oligarchic schemes in running the policy and systemic corruption in the country, and from result in this field depends very much the level of international assistance to Ukraine. Second, to set goals for a long-term economic development and for long-term democratic development of the society. These are the main challenges or opportunities in front of Ukraine. Because the implementation of all these political lines is a challenge but it creates an opportunity for Ukraine to make well-functioning and stable sovereign country.

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Geoffrey R. PYATT, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
Remarks by US Ambassador Pyatt

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Carl BILDT, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (2006-14), Member of the IWP Supervisory Board

We are now in the period of history when the European Union is more needed than ever. That sounds strange, because you read in the newspapers that there are more crises than ever. Yes, that’s the point. We are in a situation where we face a number of different, very challenging situations and the only way of dealing with this is to try to do it together.
When Sweden entered the European Union, which was by now more than 20 years ago, we had two EU meetings every year. Then when we decided on the Lisbon Treaty some years ago, we changed that. So in the treaty it says there should be four summit meetings every year. Well, last year there were 12 summit meetings. That is not because the prime ministers and presidents love to go to Brussels, although that might be. It is simply because there is no way in which we can meet the different challenges on our own. The nation states are too small to deal with the challenges of our time. We’ve had three summits so far this year, and are heading for a fourth sometime this month. But this does show that its more needed than ever.
There is a good story in the EU economy that is gradually picking up: you haven’t heard from Greece in quite some time. It’s a problematic case, but it’s not in a huge crisis. Spain is picking up, Portugal is picking up, Ireland is picking up. It’s a slight success story. Refugees, Turkey, terror- very challenging indeed, and dominate the agenda. Digital issues- you don’t hear very much about those. Shaping the framework for the global digital framework for the future is very much on the agenda. One of the effects of this is that issues of the neighborhood and enlargement has gone down slightly on the agenda in Brussels.
Is this a bad or good thing? Well, it’s not necessarily a bad thing, because the framework is in place. In terms of Ukraine, we have the DCFA, we have the Association Agreement. There’s the remaining issue of sorting out the Dutch consequences, and that will be on the table also for the summit meeting in June. Some maneuvering is clearly necessary. But, the framework for the relationship between the EU and Ukraine is in place. It took some time and some trouble, mildly speaking, but it’s there. And that means that, from our side and your side, what counts now is implementation, followed by implementation, followed by implementation. Chapter by chapter, paragraph by paragraph, issue by issue. The EU countries will be there to help as much as we can, but the success of Ukraine is in the hands of Ukraine.
I’m impressed by what’s been done. I think that the Yatsenyuk government was the best government Ukraine ever had. You might say that that’s a fairly low standard, but that’s because it’s probably the worst-governed space in the ex-Soviet Union for the last quarter century. And you’ve picked up with considerable speed, with difficulties, with sacrifice, and with a difficult economic situation. But, you’re on track, and being on track doesn’t mean that you are there. And with a new government, it’s a question both of that government showing its reformed determination within the frameworks and agreements that have been concluded, and for us to be able to give support to that determination of that government that we hope will be demonstrated.
The best guarantee for the long-term stability and security of Ukraine rests in the democratic stability of the country and in its economic and political success. Putin miscalculated gravely in 2014, because he was absolutely convinced that Ukraine was going to unravel in the spring and summer of 2014. That did not happen. And, although what the EU and US did was important, but it was the resistance and resilience of Ukrainian society that was decisive. Ukraine is stronger now than it was then, but Ukraine is not yet strong enough for the future. And that is just an urge to continue on the course – implementation, implementation, implementation, and rest assured that the support of the European Union will be there. Lots of other issues on the EU agenda, as I said, but the framework is there, and our support will be firm and consistent.
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Kataryna WOLCZUK, Professor of East European Politics in the University of Birmingham, Associate Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme in Chatham House, and Andreas UMLAND, Ph. D, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
Kataryna WOLCZUK, Professor of East European Politics in the University of Birmingham, Associate Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme in Chatham House
Unless we understand what we’re dealing with, our expectations may be exaggerated. A library could be filled with books trying to explain what the EU is. It’s not a state, it’s more than an international organization. I would compare it to a train with 28 carriages followed by 10 other states affiliated with the train. And there’s no single decision-making authority, and no single decision-making process. Academics refer to the expectation-capability gap. It’s basically massive expectations that are never quite delivered.
But there is one key word that one any official from the EU knows, and its “competences.” Competences is everything because, as we’ve heard about norms and values, the EU is basically a legal Union, bound by legal norms. Which is great, because when it comes to trade and economic issues, we have some kind of authority, and it means that rules are very, very clear. Then you compare to the Minsk agreement and this is a different story. Why? Because the EU is named an trade superpower and a foreign policy dwarf.
So think about the train which basically stops at the station, has a summit, and then defines what its foreign policy is going to be. And no wonder, this is not the way to do foreign policy, so what we have a delegation to a smaller format, like for example with the Minsk process, we have a delegation to Germany and France. Which is great, but the EU and its member states are outside of its comfort zone. They have been for a long time, but in a way that the so-called Ukrainian crisis exemplifies all too well. That’s because the fundamental challenge for the EU is that it has been devised as a post-geopolitical entity. Basically, to eliminate geopolitics from the European continent. This is great, but the problem is that the world doesn’t work like that. And a way that the EU is not quite institutionally ready is that it has this delegation to individual member states. When it comes to the short Georgia and Russian war, it was France, when it comes to Ukraine’s war in the East, it’s Germany and France.
The EU is a pacifist power. As someone in Brussels said when it comes to dealing with Ukraine and the war, it is almost that the position is peace at any price and as soon as possible. Peace at any price, especially if Ukraine pays the price, because the EU agenda is full. And I’m afraid that I exemplify what’s wrong in the EU. As a Polish citizen, and as a British citizen- two countries that have their own problems- I am also a migrant. So this is sort of, the EU’s agenda is full. And being in a room with 28 ministers and heads of states who have to deal with all the problems inside and outside the EU. I know many people in Ukraine feel Ukraine hasn’t received enough attention, but as an EU watcher I am actually amazed how much attention Ukraine is achieving.
If the EU stops commenting and caring, then Ukraine has a problem. And in a way, that problem is exemplified in today’s Moldova. Moldova was just too small and into too insignificant, and it was artificially elevated to a success story when things in their country were going very badly. And this is, in a way, an example when you did not care enough to pay and make a difference inside the country. So, from that point of view, Ukraine is on the horizon, is on the agenda of the EU, and however big the agenda of the EU is- and, the EU officials, you know, they’re only humans. They have only two or three years, and they don’t want problems, they want solutions. And with Ukraine, there are no quick solutions.
So, there’s no perceived contradiction, for example, between implementing the Minsk as proposed by Russia, vs promoting long-term integration of Ukraine with the EU. And I’m full of respect for Ukrainian diplomacy in general, and Mr. Klimkin in particular, for making sure that in the EU there is understanding that you cannot have peace at the expense of long-term stability and viability of Ukraine. So, I’ve said enough “it’s all doom and gloom” things about the EU, and I don’t expect that things get any easier any time, not least because where we are with the UK, for example. I don’t want to sound apocalyptic, but the Brexit is a big thing for the EU and the consequences, I would like to minimize them, but for the security implications for the European continent, at least, they’re going to be massive. Having said that, I hope that business as usual in this EU-style will continue, but perhaps, what’s maybe unexpected for Ukraine, that British officials may be very soon starting the association agreement, and learning and thinking how to structure relations with the EU. So Ukraine may be already becoming an unexpected role model. Those are my sobering remarks on the EU, and in a way to adjust our expectations so that we understand that we are dealing with an entity with a very short name, yet one that is so very elusive and complex.

Andreas UMLAND, Ph. D, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
I want to focus on three illusions that, in particular, Europe and America have concerning the most fundamental issues that Ukraine is currently facing, namely that of state security. They concern the political risk of foreign direct investment in Eastern Ukraine, the necessity of transitory military administrations in the currently-occupied territories of Donbass and the necessity for Ukraine to enter some sort of international security structure.
Concerning the foreign direct investment I think much of the cessation agreement and the whole reform process is about attracting foreign direct investment, and I think that it’s an illusion to think that public administration reform, better economic governance, and better rule of law compensate for the lack of security and the large political risks that foreign direct investment has in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, which Russia views as “NovoRossiya.” I think one has to face this issue, and in the US Congress there’s currently a law, as far as I know, and if it’s adopted there might be a chapter on Ukraine which will take care of that.
Then I think it’s an illusion to think that there will be a process when Russians are going out and Ukrainians are going in. I’m not sure that OSCE police force is going to be enough; I think only well-armed UN or other international mission will actually solve this issue, if you really want to solve it. And, I think the UN might be a better institution for that than the OSCE, because the weight of Russia and its allied countries in the OSCE might be too high to make such an international mission effective. I think one needs to think about it and not have illusions about a sort of transition in which Russia goes out and Ukraine goes in again.
The third issue is what happens in general with countries like Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine should not count on becoming soon a NATO member. So Ukraine has to think about some alternative security structures. If the current situation does not change, if there is no major change in leadership in Moscow in the next two or three years, I think there will be discussions about alternative security structures.
One of such alternatives is reviving an old Polish project of the interwar period, Intermarium, Междумо́рье, which would be a security alliance of the Eastern European countries, and maybe now including Turkey, in which exactly those countries would form a coalition of the willing that are facing the same problems with Russia, in terms of real war, information war, cyber war, and so on. It is also an illusion just to think that Ukraine will become a success story remaining in the grey zone between Russia and NATO. I think one has to think about it, just to leave Ukraine in this buffer zone will not be a long-term solution, and I think the same goes for Georgia. Moldova is a slightly different case, because Moldova does not aspire to NATO membership, but it may have the same problems.
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Natalia HNYDYUK, Director of the Government Office for European integration, Andriy PARUBIY, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Alexander MARKUS, Hed of the Delegation of the German Economy in Ukraine, and Veronika MOVCHAN, Academic Director of the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting

Alexander MARKUS, Hed of the Delegation of the German Economy in Ukraine
Three things I would like to speak about. First – quota. From my point of view- maybe I’m wrong- it might be a positive result from quotas on the side of the European Union for Ukraine. In the end, for the Ukrainian processing industry it is much more interesting to have commodities here in the country and process them here. Otherwise, your commodities you would sell to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and the value added would take place there, and not in Ukraine. And that’s what we see in the agrarian sector, because big agrarian holdings, they understood that the margin is not earned in agriculture- the margin is earned in processing. And, you know, from the EU point of view, the EU decided for the agro-lobby, and against the processing industry.
The EU is protecting its agroindustry, but actually they are taking away cheaper commodities that could come from Ukraine to their processing industries. It would be much more interesting for example for Polish food processing industries to buy the cheap commodities in Ukraine without customs, so on the mid-term or long term this could be positive for Ukraine, because companies will understand that it is more interesting to make a higher value added product and export it to the EU because there are no quotas on those products.
The second is branding. We all know that brand is the main driver of the economy. And you have two problems. The first is a brand «Ukraine». The perception of Ukraine in Germany is war, conflict, and there is something going on with Russia that is badly influencing on German economy. That’s not really true, not on a statistical level, but nevertheless, that’s how the perception is. What you have to do is go abroad.
I’m always inviting, I go to every governor of your regions, I go to your government, and I invite them to go out and speak about Ukraine in Germany and in the European Union. It’s not taking place. We’re doing single events. We had a big event with Mr. Yatsenyuk and Chancellor Merkel and 700 entrepreneurs there. But one single event? That is not enough. We have thousands of events in Berlin. And you have to be aware that Russian propaganda is working very well. You are not only positioning the Ukrainian brand, but you have to do something against the existing informational field, which is actually working against you.
If I go to Ukrainian companies, the biggest problem is psychological understanding of what kind of brand would be interested in our countries. You have to adapt your brand to an expectations your clients have. You are one of the biggest honey exporters to Germany, but you do not have one single Ukrainian honey brand. It’s a catastrophe. You are serving cheap honey, but it does not say “made in Ukraine.”

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Moderators: Tetyana Danylenko (Channel 5) and Michael Schur (Hromadske.TV)
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At the conference the IWP presented the results of the nationwide opinion poll “The Association Agreement with the EU: 2 Years On”.
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An exihibition of political cartoons “European integration of Ukraine in cartoons” (2011-2016)
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Photos: Natalia Khoroshayeva
The conference was held within “New European Policy: Filling the Awareness Gap” project supported by “Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms” (UNITER) project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine.