Publication

By Kateryna Zarembo, deputy director of the Institute of World Policy for Analytical Center CIDOB (Barcelona, ​​Spain).Abstract
Having turned 20 years of independence, the countries in the EU Eastern neighbourhood, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, not only failed to become democratic states but actually reversed or stalled their democratic achievements. The article provides the analysis of the political trends in the three countries, arguing that their rapprochement with the European Union coexists with some Russian-style models of governance and societal moods. The author argues that while the region’s democratic transition is not certain in short to middle term, the European integration and embrace of European values in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus is highly likely in longer perspective.

INTRODUCTION
Three closest states to the European Union (EU) East – Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus have celebrated their 20th birthdays as independent states. All three countries are authoritarian or hybrid regimes, having failed to convincingly embrace the democratic norms of the Western world. The literature dealing with the topic suggests there are three main reasons for this. The first one is the failure of conditionality on behalf of the EU (Schimmelfenning et al,2005; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfenning and Scholtz,2008), meaning that Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, unlike other Central and Eastern European states were not offered a membership perspective and thus lacked an incentive to democratize. Another corpus of academic research suggests that Russian foreign policy tactics prevented the countries in the EU Eastern neighbourhood from democratization (Cameron and Orenstein 2010). Finally, a certain group of scholars argue that this is the lack of national identity, alongside other internal factors like lack of independent upper and middle class, that work against full democratic development of the countries in question (Kuzio 2002, Di Quirico 2011). While all these factors are true to an extent, it is important to realize that Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus lie between two poles of influence, the EU and Russia, whose soft and in some cases hard power works on them continuously. The absence of a regional role model – e.g. Ukraine if it succeeded in becoming a democratic and prosperous state – only adds to the difficulty of the quest for a state model, which Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are currently in.
This article aims at taking stock of where Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus stand now in terms of their democratic development and what lied ahead for them. This article provides the analysis of the current state of democratic development in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, their perspectives for integration with the European Union in the foreseeable future and the role of these countries for the EU-Russia relations.
THE EU EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: EU-RUSSIA BATTLEFIELDM
The region is the object of influence of both the European Union and the Russian Federation. The European Union is by far the biggest democracy promotion actor in the region, making the objective of its European Neighbourhood Policy to export democracy beyond its frontiers.
At the moment it is evident that the EU, and its European Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership initiative in particular, has failed to support and enhance democratic development in its Eastern neighbourhood. Graph 1 illustrates how Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus have been developing in terms of democracy since 2005. In short, having turned 20 years of independence, the countries are in a democratic stalemate, each of them to their own degree. Some EU diplomats already acknowledge the failure of its Eastern policy: “Belarus is the brightest example of [EU’s failed Eastern policy]. Ukraine also does not live up to the expectations of the EU Member States. Only Moldova, to which Brussels’ special hopes are tied, is left, but this is unlikely a proof of the EU’s success in the region” (Solodkyy 2011).
Graph 1. Democratic development of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (2005-2011)

Source: Author’s calculations based on Freedom House Nations in Transit democracy score ratings. Democracy score is measured on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 is the best score and 7 is the worst
It is not within the scope of this paper to analyze in depth the reasons of the EU failure to promote democracy in the region. Suffice it to say that the EU conditionality the way it is present in the region does not work. By conditionality I mean offering the Association Agreements (AA), which include Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), and visa liberalization as main carrots of the Eastern Partnership. However, visa liberalization turned out to be not a straightforward and short-term process, whereas the AAs cannot really be used as carrots even according to some EU officials, since they incur a lot of costs and bring few short-term benefits (Popescu, Wilson, 2011).
The extent to which the European Union is generally ready to incorporate Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in itself became explicit in 2011 during Ukraine-EU negotiations on the Association Agreement. Towards the end of the four-year-long negotiations Ukraine demanded that the membership perspective be included in the text of the Association Agreement. The requirement was viewed by many as an attempt of Ukraine’s government to stall negotiations and tune the public opinion against the EU, since the EU position on mentioning the membership perspective for Ukraine in the AA was negative and known from the start. The EU proved adamant and rejected Ukraine’s requirement point-blank even though the conclusion of the negotiations was at stake. According to unofficial sources, the compromise was reached in that Ukraine would proclaim its European aspirations unilaterally.
However, Ukraine’s plea had a precedent: the Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and the Republic of Poland in 1991 contained the wording “recognizing the fact that the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and that this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve this objective” (European Communities 1991). The EU also failed to provide Ukraine with a membership perspective in 2005, when it was an indisputable leader of the Eastern neighbourhood in terms of the democratic standards.
In addition, at the moment the European Union is engrossed by its own financial crisis and the perspective of enlarging to the East is far from its priorities. So far the Union can only think as far as the EU-36, which means the accession of the Balkans, Iceland and Turkey, and the exact date for this is far from being determined. To sum up, the chances of Ukraine and Moldova, let alone authoritarian Belarus, to become members of the EU in short to middle term are next to none.
The crucial difference between the EU and Russia as two key actors in the region is that, as illustrated above, the EU refuses to accept Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus as integral part of Europe, whereas Russia is more than open to the deepest integration with its “zone of privileged interests”. For this reason Russia treated the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative with suspicion at first, warning that it should not be aimed against Russia. In fact, the mere existence and sovereignty of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus for twenty years in spite of numerous threats to this sovereignty from and heavy dependence on Russia is already an achievement.
The examples of Russian influence are plenty. With Vladimir Putin’s accession to power, Russia offered Belarus full integration or accession to the Russian Federation on the model of East Germany (Trenin 2006). Moscow has been continuously offering integration via the Customs Union which already includes Belarus, and most recently the Eurasian Union to its Western neighbours, especially Ukraine. In fact, Moscow even resorted to blackmailing Kyiv, threatening Ukraine with raising trade barriers in case it opted for DCFTA with the EU rather than the Customs Union with Russia. As for Moldova, Russian troops in Transnistria and de facto control of the Transnistrian leadership put significant obstacles to Moldova on its European integration path. This is not to say about the Russian soft power in the region and the heavy energy dependency on Russia of the countries in question.
Moscow’s direct influence on democracy in the region is also well-documented: Kremlin has been providing continuous support to Lukashenka’s regime and contributed to subverting democracy in Ukraine after the Orange revolution though energy disruptions and consistent interference with Ukraine’s internal affairs (Ambrosio 2009).
Be that a result of the Russian policy or merely a current stage of development of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, it is obvious that the political trends a la Russia are present in all three countries. To be precise, particularly Ukraine and Moldova have arrived at a point when the democratic achievements give way (in Ukraine’s case) or potentially could give way (in the case of Moldova) to disillusionment and willingness for a strong and authoritative ruler. This is actually a duplication of the Russian scenario when Vladimir Putin, having an image of a strong leader, convincingly won presidential elections after the “democratic chaos” of the 90-ies. As for Belarus, Lukashenka’s dictatorship has for years thrived on public consent, much like “United Russia” party in the Russian Federation.
UKRAINE: ORANGE REVOLUTION IN SHATTERS
In Ukraine the idea of a “strong hand” in ruling the country became especially popular after the failure of the Orange revolution. According to Pew Global Attitudes Project, the fall in the democracy popularity from 1991 to 2009 was observed in Ukraine and amounted to -42%. This, in particular, was attributed by experts as the reason why Viktor Yanukovych, the “villain” of the Orange revolution and expressively supported by Kremlin in 2004, won the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine (Getmanchuk 2011). Moreover, an opinion poll conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in March 2010 among Ukrainians indicates only 32% of respondents consider Ukraine more democratic than Russia, while 22% believe that Russia is more democratic than their country. In addition, the popularity of the Russian regime was wider among young and middle-aged people (19-44 years of age). This came out as a striking paradox since it is the older generation who is traditionally associated with nostalgia for the Soviet Union and hence Russia as its primary heir.
The almost two years in power of the Party of the Regions in Ukraine have resulted in a number of steps which have been decried by Western observers as democratic backsliding. In particular, here belongs the Constitutional reform which restored Ukraine as a presidential republic, the local elections which “failed to meet standards for openness and fairness” (Olearchyk, Chaffin, 2010), and the election law which ignored the recommendations of the Venice Commission and favours the Party of the Regions at the upcoming parliamentary elections due in 2012. Finally, Ukraine’s authorities undermined their credibility in full when a number of criminal cases were opened against the opposition members who served in the previous government. The arrest and conviction of ex-premier Yulia Tymoshenko to seven years in prison in October 2011, with charges of the abuse of power, not only provoked a wave of criticism of Ukraine’s judicial system but also put Ukraine’s association with the European Union at stake. The initialing of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, which envisages Ukraine’s political association and economic integration into the EU, have been made conditional by Brussels on the democratic resolution of the Tymoshenko’s case and ability of all key opposition figures to take part in the parliamentary elections (European Parliament 2011).
Ukraine’s future with the EU is therefore uncertain. The Association Agreement, which only in summer 2011 seemed definite to be initialed in December at the EU-Ukraine summit, signed in mid 2012 and then passed on to Member States for ratification, is up in the air. Even before Tymoshenko’s conviction the ratification process was expected to take up to three years, since it requires approval of each Member State parliament. Now the date of the AA coming into force is even more unclear.
On the one hand, it is painful for Brussels to lose the Association Agreement with Ukraine at this stage, when the negotiations are over. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement is the deepest agreement of the kind ever concluded between the EU and a third state. In fact, there is evidence that the Association Agreement with Kiev is viewed by the EU as the only concrete success of the Eastern Partnership (Jarabik 2011b). Besides, it would be a test case for this kind of contractual relationship in the region, with Moldova and Georgia in queue. On the other hand, the Union cannot compromise its values and associate politically with a country which does not share them.
In Ukraine, meanwhile, Party of the Regions is likely to consolidate power at the parliamentary elections even if Yulia Tymoshenko and other members of opposition can take part. The favourable conditions for the ruling party are created by the newly adopted election law. In addition, Viktor Yanukovych is unlikely to adhere to democratic standards during the presidential elections of 2015. Therefore, a consolidation of power for another decade is very likely in Ukraine, unless there is another wave of powerful popular unrest of the kind of the Orange revolution.
MOLDOVA: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AT A PINCH
Similar trends are observed in Moldova. Despite the EU’s lately attempts to portray Moldova as an EU success story, its internal politics prevent it from the desired progress on the European integration path. Since 2009 there have been three parliamentary elections in Moldova and five failed attempts to elect a president. Other early parliamentary elections in case the ruling coalition, Alliance for European Integration, fails to elect a president, cannot be ruled out. Some experts can actually see the resemblance of the Ukrainian scenario in Moldova, when continuous political instability could lead to a quest for stability from the population and an authoritarian ruler coming to power (Shumylo-Tapiola 2011). Such a leader under this scenario would come from the main opposition party in Moldova – the Communists.
Experts observe that the Communist party should not be discounted by the West. This is evident because of the wide support the Communist party enjoyed at the local election in Moldova in June 2011. In fact, the Communist party remains the largest and most popular Moldovan party. European integration of Moldova could therefore be in danger. Vladimir Putin’s idea of the Eurasian Union was eagerly supported by the Moldovan Communists leader Vladimir Voronin (Litra 2011). While this could be part of his playing-EU-against-Russia tactics, drifting towards Russia is not such an improbable scenario for Moldova.
In addition, there has been certain EU fatigue accumulated by the Moldovan population. The Euro-skepticism among Moldova’s inhabitants has hit its record: in 2011 47% of voters would vote for Moldova becoming an EU member while in 2007 this number reached 74%. While choosing between the accession either to the European Union or to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 33,8% would vote for the EU, whereas 45,6% would go for the Customs Union. This is to say nothing of the fact that Vladimir Putin and Dmitriy Medvedev up to 2010 were the most popular politicians in Moldova, their popularity ratings reaching 69,7% and 67,4% respectively . In fact, the way the AEI coalition was brokered is reminiscent of the way Vladimir Putin stepped down to the role of Prime Minister for Medvedev to become a president . Thus, the trends in Moldovan society are unambiguous. Moldovan civil society is lobbying for a visa-free regime being granted for Moldova in order to boost the EU attractiveness among society.
Even if the political deadlock in Moldova is resolved, its future with the European Union is not clear-cut. If the Association Agreement, with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area as a part of it, was concluded between the EU and Moldova, its implementation raises questions. The reason for this is the break-away republic of Transnistria, which recognized by the EU and by Chisinau itself as a part of the Republic of Moldova. The same refers to the Visa Action Plan and a subsequent potential visa free regime with the EU. The latter can come against serious difficulties given the lack of control of the Moldovan state over its borders. Putting DCFTA into practice is likely to be even more complicated, since Chisinau is unable to ensure the implementation of all necessary rules and regulations in Transnistria (Rodkiewicz 2011). As a result, the EU’s EaP “success story” is likely to be stalled when it comes to the practical realization of its most important integration projects.
BELARUS: WAITING FOR A REVOLUTION
Being the “last dictatorship in Europe”, Belarus is probably the most complicated EU Eastern neighbor. The election of Aleksandr Lukashenka as president in 1994 put an end to any democratic developments in the country.
One of the roots of support of the autocracy in Belarus is the population itself. Indeed, Lukashenka would hardly be able to remain in power for 17 years without public consent and independent polls demonstrate that he actually would have won the elections, both in 2006 and even in 2010, amidst severe economic crisis (Potocki 2011, Jarabik 2011a).
The European Union has definitely failed in Belarus so far. The EU’s policy towards Belarus was inconsistent from the start. One of the many examples was the inclusion of Belarus to the European Neighbourhood Policy but failure to provide it with the ENP Action Plan. The policy of the EU towards Belarus went from isolation and sanctions, e.g. visa bans and assets freeze of the top Belarusian officials, to the outward engagement. Both resulted to be futile so far.
The Eastern Partnership initiative is criticized by the government and civil society in Belarus alike. Its slow progress towards all countries and general shortcomings, e.g. small financial support, did not go unnoticed in Belarus. In addition, the EaP especially let down hopes of the Belarusian civil society, having failed to enhance their role in the EU-Belarus dialogue (Ulakhovich 2011). In fact, in November 2011 new legislation came into force, which, inter alia, introduced criminal liability of political parties and NGOs for accepting foreign funds or depositing money in foreign bank accounts. The Belarus civil society is also concerned with the “government comes first” approach of the EaP, which could actually help preserve the existing authoritarian system in the country (ibid.).
Brussels has indeed gone to great length to engage Belarus, having even tried the language of money. German and Polish foreign ministers Guido Westerwelle and Radoslaw Sikorski went to Minsk ahead of the presidential elections 2010, offering 3 bn Euro as the EU aid to Belarus in case the elections would meet the democratic standards. When this attempt to democratize Belarus failed, the “Tusk plan” of the Polish prime minister followed which tripled the EU proposal to Belarus to 9 bn Euro if three conditions were met: to release and rehabilitate the political prisoners, organize a dialogue with the opposition and conduct the next parliamentary elections in compliance with the OSCE standards. The plan could be successful given the difficult economic situation in the country (Melyantsou 2011). Still, until Lukashenka is in power, the EU aid in unlikely to bring dramatic change to Belarus.
However, the mindset of society in the country is changing gradually, and this is probably one of the long-term effects which the EU can expect to see as a result of its policy. The trends are actually reverse to those in Moldova: in 2006, 32% of Belarusians wanted the country to join the EU in contrast to 49% in 2011. Five years ago only 29% of the Belarusian citizens favoured accession to the EU over integration with Russia, while in March 2011 the figure was 50,5% (statistics from Potocki 2011, p. 62).
It is hard to predict when and if a full-scale revolution will occur in Belarus. Ales Michalevic, a candidate in the country’s 2010 presidential elections who fled Belarus in February 2011 and was granted political asylum in the Czech Republic, believes that mass protests will occur in Belarus within next one or two years (Trudelle 2011). Belarus civil society has already been gaining experience of using social networks in order to organize street protests. Former ambassador of Ukraine to Belarus Roman Bezsmertnyi maintains that a revolution would start from prisons, where the political and business elite is gathered (Glavcom 2011). Other experts do not exclude more long-term scenarios connected to natural causes of Lukashenka’s retirement, forced dismissal or other factors which would lead to restarting of privatization and emergence of an economic oligarchy. This would lead to turf wars and subsequent decentralization of power, similar to the Ukrainian scenario in the 90-ies (Di Quirico 2011).
CONCLUSIONS
In the short to middle term perspective Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are likely to remain in the “grey zone” of Europe, oscillating between the EU and Russia. With consolidation of power in Ukraine and continued rule of Lukashenka in Belarus a democratic breakthrough in these countries is an unlikely scenario. As for Moldova, its democratic consolidation is possible but not predetermined. Small possibility of Transnistria conflict resolution in Moldova in short term (Getmanchuk et al. 2011) is, however, likely to stall its European integration. Power consolidation in Russia only adds to the gloomy prospects on democracy in the region.
However, at the end of the day the three countries will have to drift towards the European Union, simply because engagement with Russia would threaten their own independence. Some positive tendency in this respect can be observed in the fact that Moldova and Ukraine have become members of WTO, and Belarus is aspiring to do so in 2012.
So far democracy is appealing to the leadership in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus as a package, but they are not ready to accept all the limitations and responsibilities that come with it. Development of a democratic state is a long-term process and a society, not only leadership, change is required. 20 years of independence is too short a time period to draw conclusions about Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus democratic future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ambrosio, Thomas. Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union. Ashgate, 2009. “Bolster: Russian Support for Authoritarianism in Belarus”. P. 105-130. “Subvert: Undermining Democracy in Georgia and Ukraine”. P. 131-158.
Cameron, David; Orenstein, Mitchell. Russia’s Influence on Democratization in Post-Communist Europe and Eurasia. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington DC, September 2, 2010.
Di Quirico, Roberto. The prospects for democratization in the European Union Post-Soviet Neighbours: An overview. Comparative European Politics 9 (2011). P. 432–447.
European Communities. Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part. 1991.
European Parliament. European Parliament resolution of 1 December 2011 containing the European Parliament’s recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the negotiations of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (2011/2132(INI))
Getmanchuk, Alyona (ed.) Ukraine’s Soft Power in the Region. Kyiv: Institute of World Policy, 2011. P. 12.
Getmanchuk, Alyona; Solodkyy, Serhiy; Yenin, Yevhen; Zarembo, Kateryna. Scenarios for the Development of the Transnistria Conflict. Challenges to European Security. Kyiv, Institute of World Policy, 2011.
Jarabik, Balazs. Belarus Beyond Sanctions. Madrid: FRIDE. #72, April 2011a.
Jarabik, Balazs. “Donetsk rules” and the Looming Crisis in Ukraine. Madrid: FRIDE. #103, November 2011b.
Kuzio, Taras. National Identity and Democratic Transition in Post-soviet Ukraine and Belarus: a Theoretical and Comparative Perspective. East European Perspectives, 24 July 2002, Volume 4, Number 15.
Litra, Leonid. European Integration of the Republic of Moldova: Is It Still a National Consensus? Moldova’s Foreign Policy Statewatch, Chisinau: IDIS “Viitorul”. October 2011, #39.
Melyantsou Dzianis. Eastern Partnership Summit and Belarus: Nothing for Nothing. Minsk: BISS Blitz #4/2011. P. 4.
Olearchyk, Roman; Chaffin, Joshua. US Critisizes Ukraine’s Local Elections. Financial Times, November 3, 2010.
Popescu, Nicu; Wilson, Andrew. Turning Presence into Power: Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood. London: ECFR. May 2011. P. 3.
Potocki, Rodger. Belarus: A Tale of Two Elections. Journal of Democracy. Volume 22, Number 3, July 2011. P. 49-63.
Rodkiewicz, Witold (Ed.) Transnistrian Conflict After 20 Years. Warsaw, Chisinau 2011. P. 17.
Schimmelfenning, Frank; Scholtz, Hanno. EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: Political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange. European Union Politics 9(2), 2008. P. 187–214.
Schimmelfenning, Frank; Engert,Stefan; Knobel, Heiko. “The impact of EU political conditionality”. In: Schimmelfenning, Frank; Sedelmeier, Ulrich (eds.) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. P. 29–50.
Shumylo-Tapiola, Olga. The Moldovan Jigsaw. Brussels: Carnegie Europe. November 21, 2011 (on-line). http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=46029
Solodkyy Serhiy. Arabska vesna, ukrainski prymorozky. Dzerkalo Tyzhnia #9, 11 March 2011 (on-line). http://dt.ua/POLITICS/arabska_vesna_ukrayinski_primorozki-77204.html
Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia’s Policy Towards Belarus: A Tale of Two Presidents”. In: Forbrig, Joerg; Marples, David R.; Demes, Pavol (eds.) Prospects for Democracy in Belarus. P. 79-84.
Trudelle, Alice. On the Brink of Rebellion? Warsaw Business Journal, November 21-27, 2011.
Ulakhovich, Vladimir. Belarus and the Eastern Partnership: Still a Long Way to Go. Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2011, No. 3. P.82-94.
Uroky Bilorusi dlia Ukrainy. Transcript of Press Conference with Roman Bezsmertnyi. Information and analytical agency “Glavcom”, 24 June 2011 (on-line). http://glavcom.ua/articles/4072.html
Vachudova, Milada. Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.