Publication

Analytical article written by Sergiy Solodkyy, First Deputy Director of the Institute of World PolicyThe full publication “Ukraine-NATO: Diagnosing the Partnership” is available here.

Never before had Ukrainians support their country’s integration into NATO so massively. According to some opinion surveys, the rate of support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO has recently crossed the 50% mark. However, this increase in number of supporters of the country’s accession to the organization has not managed to bring the both sides together. The Alliance keeps emphasizing the lack of consensus among the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, even 90% of Ukrainians supporting the government’s course towards NATO would be unlikely to force the Western countries to actually open their doors to Ukraine in the short run.

UKRAINIANS’ EUROATLANTIC SYMPATHIES: WHAT HAS CHANGED AFTER RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION?

If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO was held at the end of 2014, virtually half of Ukrainians would vote «for», and no more than a third would vote «against». Another quarter of the population could not decide or would not participate in the referendum (Rating Group). Last year has shown a rapid increase of support for Euro-Atlantic integration among the Ukrainians. By the end of 2014, the survey research companies have recorded unprecedented figures of more than 45%.

The debates, organized by the Institute of World Policy in Southern and Eastern regional centers of Ukraine, have revealed an increased interest in Ukraine’s course towards the Alliance among the opinion leaders. Journalists, social activists and local politicians, who were advocating Ukraine’s non-alignment six months before, have revised their positions today and have turned into ardent supporters of integration into NATO. The Institute of World Policy organized an indicative mini-referendum in Zaporizhzhia among the local opinion leaders; none of its participants expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the Russia-centric Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Meanwhile, support for NATO is expressed during the debates (it was particularly noticeable during the Strategic Discussion Club session in Odesa) through not only statements of approval, but also criticism. Odesa’s opinion leaders most frequently question the member states not providing Ukraine with armaments, NATO as a whole denying Ukraine’s accession into its ranks and the Alliance refraining from constant military training exercises on Ukraine’s territory. The shift in discourse in Southern and Eastern regions is obvious: while two years before, the majority of local leaders in Odesa, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia would have criticized NATO for its intention to «force Ukraine into its ranks», nowadays most journalists and activists criticize the Alliance for its lack of resolve in supporting Ukraine.

Without a doubt, such criticism should not be clearly interpreted as a support for Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. On the contrary, there is one very popular argument among the «anti-Westernists» that «Ukraine is not welcome there». Moreover, the lack of adequate support from NATO could be used by the advocates of pro-Russian discourse as a proof that «Ukraine has been betrayed». This may confuse the Ukrainians further and discredit the very idea of a close partnership between NATO and Ukraine.

The «pro» and «contra» arguments regarding NATO are not that much different this year compared to the times before Russian aggression, although it is obvious that the factor of war waged by Russia is a prevailing motivation for supporters of the Alliance. Therefore, the main argument of those favoring at least close cooperation with NATO or full membership in the Alliance is that «cooperation with NATO would allow Ukraine to modernize its defense sector rapidly. The Alliance’s experience would be useful for swift strengthening of national security. Ukraine needs allies in its fight against Russia’s aggression, and alone it would not be able to counter Russian military machine».
So far, the Russian factor was not that noticeable, although it has been considered among the motives for the Euro-Atlantic integration. Since the very first statement declaring the course towards NATO in 2002, Ukrainian authorities have been constantly emphasizing that the country’s vector of integration into the Alliance is in no way aimed against Russia. Moreover, we could recall that Ukrainian government has taken its first decision on integration into NATO amidst an unexpected rapprochement between the Alliance and Russia (specifically, after establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002 at the summit in Rome). Ukrainian authorities kept stressing that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would strengthen security in the region and across the whole continent. The argument regarding Ukraine’s presence among equal members of the Alliance as the best guarantee that the organization would never have accepted any decisions that could threaten Russia was among the most commonly cited by Ukrainian government officials at the times of Leonid Kuchma’s and Viktor Yushchenko’s presidencies.

Moreover, the old version of the Law «On the Principles of National Security of Ukraine» stressed that one of the main vectors of Ukraine’s policy on national security is «ensuring full participation of Ukraine in European and regional systems of collective security, gaining membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization while maintaining good relations and strategic partnership with the Russian Federation». This section was present in the document since 2003 (Leonid Kuchma’s presidency) and it remained unchanged in the later version of 2006 (Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency). NATO reference had been removed in 2010; however, integration into the EU remained linked with good neighbor relations with Russia (Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency).

The latest version of the law has, naturally, no reference to Russia; the priority of Ukraine’s national security is «integration into European political, economic and legal space aimed at gaining membership in the European Union and integration into the Euro-Atlantic security space».

The Russian factor has mobilized the public opinion by more than doubling the number of supporters of accession to NATO, while having diminished the number of the Alliance’s opponents twofold

Nevertheless, the Russian factor has turned to be the most effective in mobilizing public opinion, since Russia’s annexation of Crimea has more than doubled the number of supporters of accession to NATO, while having diminished the number of the Euro-Atlantic choice’s opponents twofold. Ukrainian society had witnessed the case of increasing support of integration into NATO against the background of fear of Russia before, during the Tuzla crisis of 2003. It should be noted, however, that the increase of support (although it was relatively small, only 4%) had occurred in spite of prevailing massive anti-Western hysteria initiated by the team of internationally isolated President Leonid Kuchma. In 2002, according to the Razumkov Centre’s data, the number of supporters and opponents of NATO in Ukraine was approximately equal, with both having 32%.

Since then, a steady increase in public opposition to the Alliance has been observed in Ukrainian media on the background of harsh criticism by the Western countries. In November 2004 (before the Orange Revolution), support for NATO had dropped to 15%, which was the lowest rate in previous 15 years. Since then, the level of positive attitude towards NATO had not exceeded 25-27%.

Instead, the number of opponents had been expanding: in the last year of Kuchma’s presidency almost 56% of Ukrainians did not want their country to join the alliance, and later, during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency (in September 2005), that rate had reached 60%. It was Russia’s aggressive actions that have changed this trend, lasting for a decade (see chart 1).
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According to the poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre, in April 2014, the number of supporters of Ukraine’s accession to NATO has increased to unprecedented 36.7%, while in March 2015, the respective figure was 43.3%. Meanwhile, the number of opponents of the Alliance has decreased to 41.6% in the spring 2014 and 31.6% 2015. The opponents of NATO in general have changed their arguments against the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. As noted by the regional experts from Southern and Eastern regions, the strongholds of Ukrainian opposition, older people are still captivated by the “NATO-USSR” dualism stereotype. The opponents of the Alliance also comprise a substantial group among the young people, the so-called supporters of «Anti-Maidan» viewing the events of the past year as a result of «the Western scenarios» or a «conspiracy aimed at provoking the feud between the two ‘fraternal nations’» on a «popular geopolitics» level. The main argument in this context is that Ukraine’s accession to NATO would provoke Russia’s large-scale aggression. Many Ukrainian opponents of NATO deny Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and insist that cooperation and especially integration into the Alliance would «enslave our country».

The segment of citizens, unable to decide if they are already disappointed with Russia and ready to trust the West, is growing among Ukrainians of Southern and Eastern regions

Regional experts note that the segment of citizens, unable to decide if they are already disappointed with Russia and ready to trust the West, is growing among Ukrainians of Southern and Eastern regions. For those Ukrainians, Russia is already not a friend, while the West is not yet a friend. They understand the futility of supporting integration into any Russia-centric block; however, recent events did not prove them necessity of integration into the EU and more so into the NATO. At best, those Ukrainians align with supporters of Ukraine’s neutrality; still, they are most likely to join the «have not decided yet» category.

According to the survey conducted by «Rating» sociological group, Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine are populated with the most citizens who have not yet decided, or would not participate in the referendum on the country’s accession to NATO. In Donbas, the rate is 39% (21% of the region’s inhabitants have chosen «cannot answer» option and 18% would not vote). In the South, the rate is 29% (11% of «cannot answer» and 18% of «would not vote»). In Western regions, the rate of citizens unable to answer did not exceed 15% (see chart 2).
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DEMOCRACY MATTERS, BUT NOT IN ALL CASES
However, the increase in Ukrainians’ support for joining NATO does not make the country closer to it. The public attitude is a relatively new factor taken into account in the process of new member’s accession. At least during the Cold War, the principle of strict interest had been predominant, and the anti-Soviet camp did not focus on the attitudes of the ordinary citizens. The Western political elites acted with an understandable logic: public opinion in many Western countries tended to be leftist, which in turn was perceived by the policy makers as a threat to security due to close contacts with the Communist Moscow. For instance, in 1948, there was a serious risk of Communists’ coming to power in Italy, which was considered a serious risk to the transatlantic security.

Nevertheless, the Allies could not completely ignore the «voice of the people» even during their confrontation with the Warsaw Pact. In particular, after massive protests against Spain’s membership in the Alliance the local authorities had eventually held a referendum on that issue in 1986, four years after the country’s accession to the organization. In the end, 57% of population voted in favor of Madrid’s membership in NATO. The example of Spain is also indicative in the context of the US’s offer to accept the country into the Alliance at the times of Francisco Franco’s regime, while other members of the organization stood against that offer due to Spanish government’s neglecting democracy. Therefore, Madrid’s case is a vivid evidence of the fact that the role of democratic standards mattered even in times of bipolar confrontation, although it was probably not as crucial as it was after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The project of democratization, having defined the agenda of international relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, had lead to appropriate adjustments in the informal list of criteria for the NATO’s enlargement. Hungary and Slovenia have held their referendums on joining NATO: the former in 1999, and the latter in 2003. Since their declaration of Euro-Atlantic course in 2002, Ukrainian authorities have been also stressing that a referendum on the country’s membership in NATO will be conducted. Though a referendum is not a condition for membership in the Alliance (NATO officials confirm that survey results are sufficient), the issue of public attitude towards NATO in candidate countries has been considered essential in the last 20 years.

NATO’s interest to public opinion is not accidental. On the one hand, it fits into paradigm of the democratization project: according to it, important political decisions should be made with high public awareness, while, consequently, the political elites have to build their position on the will of the majority of their citizens. There is also another, more rational motive: NATO cannot afford to expose itself to the threat of any country’s joining and subsequently leaving the organization following the change of its political regime. Moreover, disapproval of government’s decision to join NATO by the citizens may limit the scope of Euro-Atlantic security related decision-making or simply delegitimize those decisions. (Although NATO’s history knows some cases of its member’s secession that did not impact the effectiveness of the organization substantially; it was with France’s secession from the NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, as well as with Greece’s short-term secession (1974-1980) due to Turkish army’s intervention in Cyprus).

All the countries that joined the Alliance in the post-Cold War times have conducted public awareness campaigns on the benefits of transatlantic partnership among their citizens. In that way, on the one hand, NATO sought to democratize the process of its enlargement, while on the other, the Alliance had actually played safe, as the governments of new member states could be constrained in their decisions on cooperation with NATO without broad public support.

UKRAINIANS’ SYMPATHIES VS FEAR OF RUSSIA
The low level of public support for Ukraine’s course towards NATO has been previously considered a significant obstacle to successful integration. In 2008, when the issue of providing Ukraine with the Membership Action Plan has been discussed at NATO summit in Bucharest (Romania), the lack of public support had been mentioned among the main obstacles to the progress in relations between the two sides51. The observers, however, had every confidence that the main reason was a harsh reaction of Russian authorities to the rapprochement between Ukraine and NATO, as Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux states have hoped to develop a «new security architecture in Europe» based on respecting Russia’s position. Although all leaders of NATO member states claimed officially that Russia would have no veto right on the Alliance’s enlargement, in fact, it seemed like Moscow had actually gained such preference. Moreover, nowadays Russia’s informal veto right has been even strengthened by its aggression against Ukraine.

The diplomats representing NATO member states, as well as the officials of the Alliance Headquarters keep emphasizing that Ukraine still lacks consensus on the issue of joining NATO, and this issue effectively divides the country’s population52. However, none of the NATO’s representatives has yet explained which consensus would be considered relevant: would it be 60% of support, or a level of 70% has to be achieved. In time, obviously, NATO may offer additional arguments advocating the bad timing for talks on the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in the organization, including claims on situatedness of support for the Alliance among Ukrainian public opinion. Historical experience proves that Ukrainians’ commitment to NATO depends proportionally on Russia’s aggressive policy. This dynamics have first become evident, specifically, amidst the aforesaid Tuzla crisis; however, the level of support had diminished after its resolution. Therefore, we could assume that normalization of relations between Ukraine and Russia might lead to decrease in NATO’s popularity.

NATO is currently adhering to the ambivalent position regarding Ukraine’s membership prospects: on the one hand, representatives of the Alliance’s declare the «open doors» policy; on the other, certain influential member states’ politicians refer to such a step as untimely. Some of NATO member states are even seriously considering adopting the idee fixe of Russian foreign policy regarding the «privileged interests» and the «sphere of interest» in the post-Soviet region. This can lead to a situation when even the will of 90% of the citizens to see Ukraine as a part of the Alliance would not meet any understanding among the Euro-Atlantic partners. Even one vote against among the member states is enough to block Ukraine’s accession into the transatlantic security space. One of the most vivid examples is Georgia, where the majority of citizens are supporting the country’s membership in NATO, while other arguments (e.g. frozen conflicts or Russia’s reaction) keep blocking any further steps.

Amid the absence of any clear answer from NATO on the prospects of its relations with Ukraine, the increase in number of neutrality supporters or those unable to decide among the citizens of Ukraine is possible. According to one of the sociologists’ hypothesis, the popularity of NATO in Ukraine has reached its peak, and thus, further public awareness activities should be conducted among the citizens who never trusted and still do not trust the West. Indeed, such activities will have little effectiveness, given the inability of the West to provide Ukraine with clear signals. The position of many Ukrainians opposing integration into the Western structures is strongly affected by the low self-esteem factor: «We are not welcome there anyway». The deepening of such attitudes could lead to a threat of increasing popularity of the populist political movements taking advantage of anti-Western or even anti-democratic slogans.
Deepening disappointment among the Ukrainians could lead to a threat of increasing popularity of the populist political movements taking advantage of anti-Western or even anti-democratic slogans

Subsequently, within the framework of partnership between Ukraine and NATO, both sides are substantially responsible for maintaining positive assessments of closer cooperation. Ukrainian authorities should seize any available opportunity to reform the country’s security sector with the support of the Alliance. NATO, in turn, should demonstrate greater commitment to supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s aggression. More examples of effective cooperation would more likely deprive the anti-Western pro-authoritarian populists of public support. NATO should treat the statements of Ukrainian officials on the membership prospects with greater patience. Neither stacking old grudges, nor distrust or fear of Russia should hinder the activation of the «Special Partnership» that would ultimately not strip the Ukrainians of a chance to become a part of the Euro-Atlantic space.