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A policy brief of Leonid Litra, senior research fellow at the IWP, is based on the discussions at the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum’s conference “Strengthening the EaP CSF Platforms’ Participation in AA/DCFTA Implementation”.This paper aims to provide successful tools that were used in Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, and advise on how to improve certain aspects that would lead to a more efficient implementation of the AAs, as well as to demonstrate possibilities for effective monitoring and evaluation with existing examples. Moreover, the document explores the relation between multilateral civil society national platforms created in the framework of the Eastern Partnership initiative and the bilateral civil society platforms created under the Association Agreements. Finally, the paper will highlight the proposals and recommendations from the thematic workshops held in Tbilisi.

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A policy brief written by Ivan Medynskyi research fellow at the Institute of World Policy.The provision of U.S. lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine has been a bone of contention since the onset of the conflict in Donbas. Proponents of the lethal arms supply argued that bolstering Ukraine’s defensive capability is essential in deterring Russia from further challenging the security order in Europe. Opponents believed it will lead to the escalation of the conflict. While the U.S. Congress has consistently advocated for a more resolute support to Ukraine that includes defensive lethal weapons, the Obama Administration has thus far limited U.S. security assistance to training and non-lethal aid. Despite this, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act 2016 that removed the last bureaucratic obstacle for a $300 million security assistance program that would include the supply of defensive lethal weapons. This policy brief focuses on the consequences of how a U.S. decision to bolster Ukraine’s defensive capabilities would affect the conflict dynamics in Donbas. The key argument is that the provision of the U.S. lethal weapons would be unlikely to tip the scales of conflict in favor of Kyiv. However, it would send a clear message to the Ukrainian people and the Russian leadership that the United States is ready to supplement diplomatic efforts with more robust security assistance.

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The views and interpretations expressed in this publication are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Sweden.

This policy brief has been printed within the “Initiative for Development of Ukrainian Think Tanks” conducted by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in association with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Swedish embassy in Ukraine (SIDA).

This is a translation of a story published by the Ukraine Today, written by Bert Maan and Kateryna Zarembo.On April 6, 2016, Dutch citizens for the first time will be able to test the long-awaited “direct democracy” tool they obtained last year – a referendum on legislative decisions.

As some may know, the subject of the referendum has become the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Although, The Netherlands claim it is not about Ukrainian interests, but about the Dutch Euroscepticism.

Anyway, the referendum results will have a direct impact on the Agreement’s fate. The Institute of World Policy (IWP) tried, without fear or favour, to figure out what the Dutch law says about the referendum and what could be its legal consequences.

Some background

The idea of “direct democracy” – voters’ ability to directly influence political decisions – is very popular in the Netherlands. The country’s history records many legislative initiatives of the kind.

The current bill was submitted to the Dutch parliament back in 2005, but voted for only in 2014. However, it took effect on July 1st, 2015. Under the law, a referendum may take place if 300,000 signatures of supporters are gained. The full title of the law is ‘the Law on correcting advisory referendum’.

What does it mean?

The term “advisory” (as opposed to “binding”) in this context suggests the referendum outcome does not cancel the decision directly, yet is the basis for the government and parliament’s future action. However, this does not mean that election results are not important, as many of Ukrainian politicians tend to think mistakenly .

To get the referendum recognized, the voter turnout should be at least 30%. Voters may only answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question.

What will happen on April 6?

Well, on April 6, 2016, the Dutch voters will answer the question: “Do you support or oppose the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement?”

There may be three referendum outcomes:

– The voter turnout is less than 30%, and the results are invalid (but not unimportant).
– The voter turnout exceeds 30%, and most people vote in favour of the Association Agreement.
– The voter turnout exceeds 30%, and most people vote against the Association Agreement.

Thus, the turnout is a matter of high priority. In the Netherlands, it can vary dramatically. When it comes down to national and the EU-related issues, the voter turnout substantially exceeds 30%. However, the Dutch people are not that enthusiastic about taking part in local elections.

63% of voters took part in the EU Constitution vote in 2005, while, for example, only 9% of people took part in the 2007 elections of the mayor for Utrecht – the fourth most populous city in that country.
The referendum on Ukraine goes to the first category of well-attended elections. Today’s polls show the forthcoming referendum turnout will most likely exceed 30%.

Therefore – and this is vital – it is pointless to expect the low voter turnout. Ukraine has either to win the referendum with a majority of votes or otherwise – lose.

What the law says …

If most voters support the Association Agreement, consequences are as simple as it goes: the Agreement comes into force. Therefore, we better consider the negative case. And this is far from simple.

The Referendum Act regulates the government and parliament actions, considering two scenarios. The first one (described in paragraph 11) applies to the Netherlands’ national laws, the second one (a somewhat simplified method, paragraph 15) applies to “international agreements”.

At first glance, it seems that Ukraine is subject of the second scenario, but this is a misconception. The thing is the Netherlands have also a procedure for “tacit approval” of international agreements – if the Parliament fails to put the Agreement to vote for a long time, it is considered ratified. Paragraph 5 lists such cases.

Meanwhile, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was approved under the comprehensive procedure, and if Ukraine loses the Dutch referendum, the Dutch government will have to act according to the first scenario. In this case, the government should submit to the parliament a bill either cancelling or confirming the Agreement.
Consequently, even if Ukraine loses, it depends on the government which “incoming message” will be voted for by the Dutch lawmakers. Thus, the law does not oblige the government to make a proposal for cancellation or termination of the Agreement which was already signed. Even in case of the referendum negative outcome.

“In this case, the referendum will not kill the deal, but will create a legal and political background to make sure it will not come into force in the present form. Although its provisional application will continue,” Ukraine’s Ambassador-At-Large and a representative of Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry Dmitry Kuleba commented on the negative referendum outcome on Tuesday, January 20. “Though its provisional application will continue”.

…and how it will actually turn out

One should not be overly optimistic. In reality, if those who come to the polls on April 6, vote against the Agreement, the government and MPs are unlikely to exercise their right to disregard that. Because, it is not about Ukraine only.

Ignoring the voters’ views may cost the Dutch politicians a high price. Very soon – less than a year after the referendum – the Dutch parliamentary elections are going to take place. Therefore, most Dutch political parties have already publicly stated that the government should act according to the voters’ will.

In fact, it eliminates the “advisory” nature of the referendum. Despite the legal permission to ignore the voting, no doubt the referendum results will be implemented. The political pressure in The Netherlands, does not provide lawmakers with much room for maneuver.

After all, this vote puts to test a “direct democracy” tool in the Netherlands. If the government ignores the results, it will discredit the Dutch decision-makers to a large extent. If the referendum results are not taken into account – right in the very first case – what for the law was adopted then?

Read also Information War: Recent attack on Ukraine ahead of Dutch referendum

Anyway, some room for maneuver still remains. The ratio of those voting “for” and “against” will be vital. If the ratio is small (for example, 45% and 55%), the government will find it easier to defend the need to leave the Agreement in place or explain the necessity for its repeated support in the parliament. Although, they will not be able to avoid re-approval of the Agreement in any case.

Impact on the EU

The results of the referendum will have an impact not only on the Association Agreement, but also on the referendum tool itself – and perhaps not only in the Netherlands but also in other EU member states.

The attitude towards “correcting referendums” in the Netherlands is not straightforward (this, in particular, explained the reluctance of some Dutch citizens to take part in it).

There are those opposed to holding referenda in the Netherlands. They explain that this tool is quite expensive for the national budget, it can become frequently and destabilizing for the Dutch policy. 11 years ago, when this law was developed, no one imagined that in the era of social networks it would be too easy to clock up 300,000 signatures.

If the majority of the Dutch citizens vote “yes” in the referendum on April 6, the tool will more likely lose its attractiveness in the Netherlands in future.

On the other hand, a negative result for Ukraine could become a dangerous precedent for the other EU member states, given Eurosceptic sentiments in various EU countries.

It is probable that due to the idea of referenda, the EU will fail to implement all agreements with the other countries. Because, just 10,000 signatures of the Luxemburg’s residents will suffice to suspend the EU joint decision.

Whatever the referendum results and their consequences are, their far-ranging impact both on Ukraine and the European Union cannot be overestimated.

Authors – Bert Maan, retired judge of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Kateryna Zarembo, deputy director of the Institute World Policy, Ukraine
with comments from Lada Roslycky, director of strategic communication, Ukraine Today

The paper is based on expert discussions on minority issues and construction of inclusive society, organized by the Institute for European Politics and Reforms (Moldova) and the Institute of World Policy in Chisinau and Kyiv.It is a result of a common effort of experts coming from Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Germany. The round table in Kyiv took place on August 26-27, 2016 and in Chisinau on November 23-24, 2016.

Authors:
Natalia Belitser (Ukraine)
Valeriu Chiveri (Moldova)
Vlad Kulminski (Moldova)
Martin Sieg (Germany)

Executive summary
In their difficult transition from post-Soviet to democratic states, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have scored important successes, as well as have met with some far-reaching failures. Among the key issues that have been largely neglected by both states has been the inclusion and integration of their significant minority populations. This issue has not featured prominently in academic and practical policy-making debates in either country. Because of a dearth of focused and sustained policies on the part of respective governments and civil society to include minorities in mainstream political and economic life, life in minority communities evolved in parallel – and oftentimes at loggerheads with – mainstream societal developments. In practice, two parallel worlds have entrenched in these countries, with two parallel historical narratives, two different sets of identities which dictate two different sets of perceptions. In reality, it is as if the identities, historical narratives and the broader outlook of the majority and the minority populations almost exist in two parallel universes which do not necessarily intersect with each other.
The consequences of this state of affairs are unfortunately all too familiar and have played out again and again. Lack of attention to these issues undermines Moldova and Ukraine’s efforts to become functioning and inclusive societies, leads to separation and seclusion and represents a serious threat to societal stability due to “identity entrepreneurs”, who use this separation and division to promote their political purposes and feed on the people’s fears, misperceptions and apprehensions. Inclusive and open-minded policies could quickly address this issue and set the record straight; however, politicians prefer to exploit rather than to heal this division in order to promote their purposes. The divide grows larger, perceptions – almost always erroneous ones – become entrenched, and this turns into a vicious cycle of misperceptions and mistrust.
Addressing minority inclusion in a strategic and sustainable manner will help Moldova and Ukraine to become stronger, more united countries, a home to all of its citizens, whether representing a minority or a majority, and would create stronger societal bonds and cohesion. This study is an attempt to analyze the minority situations and suggest policies and recommendations that would enable both countries to address the issue of minorities inclusions in a sustained and targeted manner, with a focus on practical results and deliverables. This study has been elaborated in close cooperation with a civil society platform created within the project, which included minority representatives and civil society organizations from both countries.

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Table of Contents
Integration of national minorities in the post-soviet space – Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova .
Executive Summary
State of play
Integration of Minorities: the Case of the Republic of Moldova
1. Quality and quantitative analysis
2. International and national legal framework
3. State institutions and their capacities
4. Analysis
4.1 National minorities in governmental structures
4.2 Gagauz-Yeri autonomy, a special case
4.3. The role of political parties in the process of integrating national minorities
4.4 Specific elements in the election legislation in promoting minority candidates
4.5 Languages issues
4.6 Education
4.7 Historical narrative
4.8 Media
Conclusions/Recommendations
Integration of Minorities: the Case of Ukraine
1. Quality and quantitative analysis
2. International and national legal framework
3. Analyses and Policy Recommendations
3.1 Language issues
3.2 Education
3.3 Media
Recommendations

Recommendations
The Case of the Republic of Moldova
 Establish a permanent consultative board for minority representatives and the central-level government in order to promote minorities’ interests, address their concerns, ensure sustained dialogue and lay the ground for inclusion of minorities in mainstream social, economic, political and cultural life. This venue would provide a sustainable mechanism to reflect the interests of minorities within the legislative and administrative frameworks and to resolve the issues that may arise;
 Involve, through this board, minority representatives and organizations, in the drafting and developing national-level legislation such as the Education Code to reflect their interests. This must be a binding part of the process for the government.
 Develop and implement a coherent and multidimensional state policy in relation to national minorities. The Strategy for Integration of Minorities for 2015-2020 elaborated by the Government of Moldova, has left many hopes unfulfilled; and the Consultative Board could provide advice and recommendations on improving this vital document;
 Make the issues of integration of national minorities one of the priorities for any incoming government;
 Design and put into effect policies to attract minorities to government sector jobs;
 Create incentives for political parties to attract minority representatives;
 Revise the legal framework, so as to facilitate integration of persons belonging to national minorities in the social, administrative, cultural, political and economic life of the Republic of Moldova (some pieces of legislation are adopted back in the Soviet period, for instance the Law on functioning of languages on the territory of the Moldavian SSR of 1989);
 Elaborate and put into effect a country-wide program to study the Romanian language as a key prerequisite for enhancing minorities’ access to government positions, seek support of international partners for a program of this magnitude;
 Gradually expand the project “Educational integration of students who speak other languages by expanding the number of school subjects studied in Romanian” to all schools with instruction in minority languages;
 Create the conditions for studying the history and traditions of national minorities for school-age children;
 Set up a permanent dialogue between the central government and the autonomous region of Gagauz-Yeri, based on European practice and standards, in order to harmonize Gagauzia’s status with Moldova’s legislation and to ensure that the autonomous region is able to effectively exercise its powers;
 Strengthen the capacity of the bureau for interethnic relations to effectively address minorities- related issues;
 Create conditions for covering minority-related issues in the media
The Case of Ukraine

To state authorities of Ukraine
 Implement fully and without delays the recently developed National Strategy in the area of human rights until 2020 and those parts of the Action plan relating to national minorities and indigenous peoples (in particular, revise and update national legislation concerning interethnic relations and ethnic minorities, in particular, Concept of Ethnopolitics of Ukraine, new version of the Law on National Minorities, and Law on the Status of the Crimean Tatar People as Indigenous people of Ukraine)
 Elaborate effective mechanisms ensuring minority representation in central and local representative bodies
 Re-establish a central organ of executive power responsible for interethnic relations and minority issues according to the Action plan of the Strategy on human rights
 In a course of decentralisation reforms, enhance and ensure state support for minority educational institutions, culture and media from central and regional budgets
 Include articles on minority and indigenous peoples’ rights into the amended version of the Constitution of Ukraine
 Develop, together with the Mejlis of Crimean Tatar people, independent experts and scholars, comprehensive Strategy of de-occupation of Crimea
To actors of civil society of Ukraine
 Undertake proactive informational campaigns on issues relating to notion of integration as a ‘process involving all’
 Create database on ‘good practices’ and success stories concerning minority integration in Ukraine and neighbouring countries
 In view of public debate on the future of Crimea as Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic, pay special attention to the cases of establishing national-territorial autonomies in the otherwise unitary European states, in particular, in the Republic of Moldova (Gagauz-Yeri)
 Engage media resources and work together for spreading information on national minorities and indigenous people as inalienable structural components of Ukrainian civic/political nation.

Ivan Medynskyi, PhD,
Research Fellow at the IWPIs Ukraine a recipient of or contributor to the regional security? Recently, there have been speculations that Ukraine is becoming a source of insecurity that cannot contribute to the stability and security of the transatlantic region. Over the past few years, however, Ukraine proved that it is not only ableto defend itself, but also willing to share its skills and knowledge with strategic partners. The goal of this memo is to open a discussion about qualitatively new added values for the Alliance that could complement the commonly declared advantages of Ukraine such as unique geostrategic location, high defense expenditures, and economic potential.
Since the inception of bilateral relations in the early 1990s, Ukraine has proved itself as a reliable partner that showed its commitment to values and standards of NATO through joint military operations, counter-terrorism missions, and security sector reforms. For the past two decades, Ukraine demonstrated its commitment to principles of the transatlantic security framework through participating in the wide range of NATO-led operations. Thus, Ukraine took part in a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, ISAF mission in Afghanistan, and training mission in Iraq; contributed its navy to the counter-piracy initiative Ocean Shield off the coast of Somalia and counter-terrorism Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. It became the first non-member country to contribute its troops to the NATO Response Force. Ukraine provided NATO with unique airlift capabilities and actively participated in joint civil emergency exercises. Although the military cooperation has reached a strategic level, a combination of factors including the lack of political will and opposition from Russia prevented the intensification of the dialogue. Two years of conflict in eastern Ukraine has not only rallied the public and governmental support for the deeper integration in NATO structures, but also forged Ukraine into a much stronger partner with a unique set of capabilities that could be crucial for the Alliance.Thus, the added value of Ukraine for transatlantic security framework consists of the following:
• Experience in hybrid warfare. Although the term hybrid war generated much debate, there is little doubt that Russian intervention in Ukraine incorporated the elements of the conventional, cyber, asymmetric, and informational warfare. Two years of trial and error in addressing the separatist entities, incursions of Russian troops without insignia, disinformation, and cyber attacks have given Ukraine a unique experience that can be examined to develop strategies in defense of potential targets within the Alliance and in the region as a whole. Through opening a Hybrid War Study Center in Ukraine, it would be possible to closely study the current conflict and generate insights into potential preventive measures.
• Counter-propaganda.A significant part in the success of the Russian advancement in Crimea and eastern Ukraine was focusing on informational technologies to rally the support before and during the crisis. Blatant disinformationcampaign pouring from the domestic and international media outlets of Russian Federation has cultivated supporters not only in the affected areas, but also among the citizens of the Western countries. Not incidentally, the success of Russian informational warfare was partly due to the shortcomings of the cultural and lingual policies of the Ukrainian government toward the “hearts and minds” of its citizens who now live in the occupied territories. There is a long way ahead, but the response from the Ukrainian media, civil society, and government toward well-geared Russian propaganda machine can provide valuable insights for NATO structures such as Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.
• Rapid military modernization and the impact of civil resilience. Ukraine has transformed in a short period of time its obsolete armed forces into more mobile and better equippedmilitary force that was able to withstand hybrid threats. In no small part the modernization process was shaped by the active participation of the citizen activists that served as volunteers in the times of crisis. Financial assistance from the Diaspora and donations from Ukrainians at home, synergy between the business and society to support the military cause, resilience of Ukrainian armed forces and volunteers can serve as a blueprint for crisis response that can be beneficial for the Alliance members that border Russia.
• Intelligence on the eastern border andthe Black Sea region. Ukraine’s geopolitical position and special relations with its neighbors offer a unique perspective to the security dynamics in the Black Sea region. While cooperation in the sphere of civilian control over intelligence sector between NATO and Ukraine dates back to 2006, the recent security crisis gives an impetus for a new-level of collaboration.
• Energy security. Ukraine remains a strategic partner of the Alliance in addressing the energy security of Europe. Although the oil and gas prices are dwindling and Europe has set a course on renewable energy, natural resources would still play a major role in the short- to mid-term perspective. In the light of uncertainty regarding the alternative routes of energy delivery from Russia, stable and reliable gas-transport system of Ukraine will serve as an indispensable component of the European energy security architecture.