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Stefan Wolff on the key ingredients of inclusive citizenship

Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham (England)The key ingredients of a successful establishment of inclusive citizenship practises I think lie in the recognition that this applies to a number of different areas in society. First of all I would argue, that it is very important to have a proper constitutional and leader framework, that ensures in a very broad sense equal rights and obligations for citizens that makes sure that there is no discrimination on what ever glance whether it’s ethnic, religious, gender, linguistic discrimination. None of that should be permissible.
The second issue I think is that it’s very important for citizens to have equal rights of political participation and political representation. This is very important in order to make sure that there is a general sense, that citizenship means that individual people actually have an opportunity to participate in the decision making process. But it’s also important in many ways, that legal and constitutional framework is properly enforceable through the court system. That means that no inclusive citizenship really is possible without a strong foundation, based on the rule of law. Another important dimension of inclusive citizenship also is the issue that people have economic opportunities, that there is a proper material bases of people’s livelihoods and wellbeing. This is very important in the sense that without economic opportunity the danger is that people will very quickly become disillusioned with the political system in which they are living. Loyalty to the state and its institutions will decrease and that has the potential to degenerate into a potentially violent conflict.

And the final point that I would like to emphasize is that a lot of that requires a broad political culture, which embraces the need and the utility of democratic institutions. And here what I thing is particularly important, is also the issue, that this is broadly propagated through the education system in the country. And then again we can come to a sort of circle and recognize that obviously in the country which is very diverse in terms of its different ethnic, religious and linguistic communities that education needs to cater towards the need of these different communities as well.

So education then clearly intersects with issues of culture and cultural rights, so that in the end inclusive citizenship really means the opportunity for people, to be politically, socially, economically, culturally integrated into that country, to get a sense of loyalty to the state in which they are living, a state that gives everybody equal opportunities and does not discriminate against anyone on the basis of real or imagined differences between citizens.

Martin Sieg: EU integration can only succeed as a modernization project

Martin Sieg, Director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (Chisinau)The European integration of Ukraine can only succeed as a modernization project. It is about not so much foreign policy, or geopolitics; it is firstly about building a competitive economy, creating the opportunities. This is a very ambitious domestic reform program, and it can not be done by one part of the society against the other one. So the geopolitical division in the process of European integration must be bridged by bringing all parts of the society together and this is why it is so important also to include the minorities.

Ukraine and Moldova so far had a lot of divided identities and that made it so difficult to embark on really national projects. Now, to develop European integration, it needs to be turned into a national project and it needs to be made sure that minorities follow that path, too. That’s a work of convincing, but that’s also a work of engaging minorities. You should not just pretend, but this needs to be explained. They need to be actually actively included in that project to participate, in the political decision making, in the implementation, so to make it in the end a successful project for everybody.

Ukraine-Russia: Scenarios for the Development of Bilateral Relations

Policy paper was prepared under the joint project of the Institute of World Policy and Caucasian House “Ukraine: out of the crisis through dialogue”, supported by the British Embassy in Ukraine.To download the full publication, please, click here.

Scenarios of development with regard to the relations between Ukraine and Russia on the one hand, and between Russia and the West on the other, are currently in demand on the analytical market. In this report, the authors would like to complete a traditional scenario pertaining to these interstate relations with the analysis of the inter-public relations because we are sure that societies of both states can take the position different from an official one, and are able to demonstrate flexibly while responding to the changes in a political environment. We consider the inter-societal relations to be an important independent factor or variable in the given circumstances.

SCENARIO I. ESCALATION.
Development of a political situation
Renewal of military operations in eastern Ukraine is certainly the worst of the possible scenarios. The open participation of the Russian Federation in fighting on the side of the LPR-DPR, as well as large-scale offensive, remains an improbable scenario, considering the price which Russia will pay from political, economic and reputational point of view. However, even limited military operations with the purpose of broadening the territory under control of the separatists, will significantly aggravate an economic and political situation in the Ukraine that will in turn lead to the radicalization of Ukrainian society, and the strengthening of confrontational rhetoric at the level of officials and in the mass media. Russia’s support to fostering viability to the separatist republics in Donbass will become a main target of this rhetoric.
Although combat capacity and level of supply of the Ukrainian army significantly improved during the last year, the military and economic capacity of both Ukraine and Russia which is supporting insurgents of DPR and LPR are disparate. The further increase in military expenses, decrease in business activity and destruction of infrastructure, an inevitable consequence of renewal of military operations, and a new flow of internally displaced persons will put the weakened economy of Ukraine on a brink of collapse. At the same time, the events of 2014 showed that during moments of crisis, Ukrainian society was ready to unite and mobilize all available resources to fight back the disintegration of the Ukrainian state. Current level of patriotism, and the consolidation of Ukrainian society allow Ukrainian authorities to be able to mobilize considerable human and financial resources for the needs of army if combat operations are to resume. In case of implementation of the escalation scenario, radicalization and militarization of political discourse in Ukraine will become inevitable. In light of escalated confrontation, Ukrainian citizens, presumably, will expect more determined actions from their leader, including official recognition of the fact that Ukraine is in a situation of war, and its main opponent is the Russian Federation. In such conditions, the Ukrainian government, seeking to maintain legitimacy in the minds of its citizens, will be forced to replace the reconciliatory rhetoric with something more aggressive. Thus, a possible change of government in Ukraine, which cannot be excluded in case of prolonged confrontation, will only bring more radical politicians to leading positions.

Development of a situation at the level of societies
The dynamics of the public mood of Ukraine’s population show that the continuation of confrontation leads to the growing number of supporters to Ukraine’s independent foreign policy, European course and, what is especially indicative, Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia turns from “strategic partner” to “strategic enemy”, and for a survival in the neighborhood with Russia, Ukraine has, by an example of Israel, to constantly strengthen the army and intelligence services and, perhaps, even to build walls. The tendency of decreasing of the Ukrainian-Russian relations observed today (from culture to trade) will only amplify which in turn will lead to even bigger reorientation to the strengthening of ties with EU member states, and first and foremost, with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Currently the negative feelings of Ukrainians are directed towards the Russian authorities and Russia as a state. However, the continuation of the military confrontation, along with a misunderstanding between representatives of the two nations, which will only deepen due to the radical differences in perceptions and analysis of the conflict, could lead to the isolation and alienation of Ukrainians in relation to Russians. As a result, aggression and hatred will prevail. Similar developments in the long term can lead to the breakup of relations between the two countries, and the emergence of a sharp inter-ethnic hostility at the household level. Such a scenario is the most probable with the aggressive promotion of nationalism in the media from both sides.

SCENARIO II: FROZEN CONFLICT
Development of a political situation
Incomplete compliance to the Minsk agreements of February 2015, with unwillingness of one of the parties or all parties to hold further negotiations can lead to the actual freezing of the conflict and, in the long term, transformation of part of the territory of Donbass into an analogue of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldavian Republic. Currently even in light of compliance to a ceasefire regime (that, however, doesn’t exclude possibility of incidental clashes on the front line), realization of a political part of the plan for peaceful settlement of the conflict is causing serious doubts both in expert community, and in political circles. It is possible to assume that leaders of the self-proclaimed republics will want to remain in power which cannot be automatically guaranteed by carrying out the procedure of elections provided in the Minsk agreements. Procedure of elections and control of their legitimacy will become the main subject of dispute with the Ukrainian authorities. In its turn, Kiev possesses such powerful tool of influence on Donbass as an economic blockade. As well as in a case of other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union, economic blockade as a reaction to the preservation of current leaders of DPR-LPR in power will mean, probably, further economic decline and a devastation of Donbass, its transformation into the center of constant instability and threats to the safety of the region as a whole. At the same time, in case of such a scenario Donbass, presumably, can count on a certain economic support from Russia. However, this potential support probably will be rather limited, considering deterioration of a macroeconomic situation in Russia caused by low prices of energy resources and economic sanctions introduced by the western countries against Russia.

We should note that potential UN peacekeeping operation on the line of separation in Donbass will rather lead to freezing of the conflict than to its settlement because presence of the peacekeeping contingent will mean that there are two recognized parties of the conflict – the central power and separatist units. In that case Kiev will have to rather replace the discourse of anti-terrorist operation with a discourse about the internal conflict, which is politically unacceptable for the Ukrainian authorities.
The Russian-Ukrainian relations in the scenario of frozen conflict can be described as “cold peace”. Unlike the confrontational scenario described above Kiev will abstain from radical steps, and support cooperation in a number of directions which are important for Kiev authorities. Actually, such approach is supported by Russia which has been offering to separate problems in bilateral relations from the rest of the spectrum of interaction. However, for Ukraine it will be the forced and unreliable cooperation, and therefore, in parallel with maintaining dialogue, Kiev will make efforts to minimize dependence on Russia, first of all in economic and energy fields. Without having enough resources for resolution of problems and disputes in a bilateral format, Kiev will seek an expansion of a role of the western states in joint talks with Moscow (as a mediator, an arbitrator and a source of moral support).
Freezing of the conflict instead of its settling means for Ukraine that it will have to live in conditions of continuous threat of renewed military operations or possible terrorist attacks, thus, strengthening the defensive sector as well as its eastern borders will remain among the main priorities of the Ukrainian government. The parties, each with its own motives, will try to keep the existing uncertainty in the Russian-Ukrainian relations at the official level. However, there is no doubt that the Ukrainian leadership will consider the Russian Federation as a major foreign policy threat and formulate a new military and political doctrine accordingly to the circumstances. In general, the dynamics of the Ukrainian-Russian relations will largely depend on conjectural factors and the situation in the conflict zone.

For Russia, the scenario of conflict freezing, to some extent, can be considered as a more favourable one than for Ukraine. Russia’s goal is to support the aspiration of the Donbass to achieve autonomy from Kiev. If autonomy is not possible within the framework of an all-Ukrainian political process of decentralization, Moscow will choose to freeze the conflict to ensure that Donbass will have if not official legitimate autonomy, but at least de facto illegitimate autonomy.

Development of a situation at the level of societies
In the Russian society conflict freezing will be perceived rather as the positive decision because it will allow to stop full-scale military operations. Surely, in case of economic blockade of Donbass from Ukraine it is probable that the number of separatist regions’ residents who want to relocate to Russia temporarily or permanently for economic or safety reasons, will increase. Such situation will create certain tensions in the borderline of Russian regions, which have been accepting immigrants from a conflict zone. Nevertheless, if the armed conflict, was deemed by Russians as temporary, freezing of the conflict creates conditions in which residents of Donbass can relocate to Russia for longer terms for economic reasons. At the same time, the irritation of Russians will be rather localized in border regions and the Russian society in general will rather gradually and positively change the attitude to Ukraine considering that the termination of armed conflict is a positive result.
The attitude of Ukrainians towards freezing will be rather negative because the risk of economic and political destabilization will remain. Existence of unresolved territorial conflict will significantly complicate European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, and also hinder its economic development. In this regard it is possible to assume that growth of discontent of Ukrainians with the authorities which allowed freezing, and Russia which opposes rapprochement of Ukraine with the West will be observed. Freezing will be perceived by Ukrainians not as a way to provide a political autonomy of the eastern Ukraine but as a tool for Russia to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, it should be noted that in condition of relative stabilization in a conflict zone attention of the Ukrainian society will be completely concentrated on achievements of the authorities in the sphere of fighting against corruption, carrying out internal reforms according to the European model. Hesitation of the Ukrainian leadership and a delay in keeping these same promises will definitely lead to the growth of protest moods among the population, and as a result, the aggravation of the political situation in the country. However, the progress in the path of reforms will increase the number of supporters of Ukraine’s European integration, both within the country and in the EU.

SCENARIO III. RESTORATION OF COOPERATION
Development of a political situation
In case of the most optimistic long-term forecasts, resumption of cooperation and partnership between Russia and Ukraine after the turmoil in 2014 is only possible in the long run. Even with the change of power in Russia and in Ukraine (in Ukrainian public discourse personally Vladimir Putin appears to be as the main cause of the crisis, in Russian one – respectively, Poroshenko personally), the restoration of confidence will be a difficult and lengthy process for both states. Even if the settlement of the conflict in Donbass will take a course acceptable both for Russia, and Ukraine, particularly, in case of full implementation of the Minsk arrangements, Crimea will remain the factor which will set a tone, define contents and character of the Ukrainian- Russian relations for many years to come. Strong support among the population of the Russian Federation to the “reunion with the Crimea” (as it is represented in an official Russian discourse), the emotional component of this step and an extensive use of historical argumentation make the return of the peninsula to Ukraine extremely improbable, regardless of who will be president of Russia in future.
Restoration of cooperation will require not only overcoming differences, but also identifying what uniting factors are. While elaborating scenarios of development of the Russian-Ukrainian relations in 2010-2020, the Ukrainian expert Katerina Shinkaruk came to a conclusion that the leading role in determination of nature of development of the Russian-Ukrainian relations will be played by strategy (rivalry or cooperation) to be chosen by Russia in the relations with the West. Events of 2014 confirmed this thesis. In Ukraine dominating perception, both at the level of the elites, and at the level of society, is that Russia has been forcing Ukraine to choose between rapprochement with the EU and partnership with Russia. Wider problem of compatibility of formats of regional cooperation for the countries of the former Soviet Union in case of Ukraine and Russia leads to deterioration of the bilateral relations. In a situation whereby it was impossible to solve a problem of simultaneous participation of Ukraine in the Russian-centered formats and the EU-focused formats at the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian level, Ukraine, after events of 2014, made a choice in favor of a European path. Thus, regional integration at the former Soviet Union is being discredited more and more in Ukraine both at the official level, and at the level of public perception, as a form of interaction based on shadow communications between political elites and business elites of the different countries. Therefore, European experience seems to Ukraine as opportunity to get out of an economic crisis and to create a more effective system of government. Respectively, Ukrainian’s demand for Russia to respect the European choice of Ukraine will get stronger. In turn, the attitude of Russia to the European choice of Ukraine will be defined by the relations of Russia with the European Union and by the policy of EU regarding sanctions and energy cooperation.

Development of a situation at the level of societies
Polls show that the attitude of Russians and Ukrainians towards each other still remains rather positive. It should also be noted that in the previous years, percentage of the surveyed Ukrainians who treated Russians kindly exceeded the percentage of the Russians who had positive opinion about their neighbors. At the same time the attitude towards the authorities of the neighboring country both in Ukraine, and in Russia is rather negative. The bilateral relations have also been evaluated by respondents as bad for many years. The Level of mutual goodwill of the two societies, at the same time, needs to be reinforced. The official bilateral relations will apparently remain cool at least in mid-term perspective. Respectively, improvement of the relations at the level of different societies remains the responsibility of Ukrainians and Russians who, judging by polls, are able to distinguish between personal and kinship ties from the interstate relations.
For realization of the third favorable scenario it is necessary to develop contacts on the level of public diplomacy and to provide venues for societies to interact directly with each other without participation of governmental institutions. So, mutual rapprochement is promoted not only through bilateral relations but also by joint educational programs with issuance of double-degree diplomas, exchanges at the level of students and the lecturers, joint scientific projects of the research centers. Exchange of experience among volunteers of the two states can become the new direction of interaction: both in Ukraine, and in Russia the volunteer movements are rather recent tendency which needs to be supported. The main achievement that the Ukrainian and Russian societies can attain today is to take the responsibility for the mutual relations through overcoming a fear to be perceived “unpatriotic” in their respective countries.

What do Ukrainians Think about Ukraine?

Institute of World Policy has presented the results of the opinion poll on Ukrainians’ perceptions of their country and her European aspirations.To download the publication “What do Ukrainians Think about Ukraine?” please click here.
72.3% of Ukrainians would like our homeland to be associated with a wealthy state; at the same time, they understand that corruption is the main obstacle on Ukraine’s path towards the EU (84.7%). Those are the findings of the On-line TRACK survey conducted by TNS within the “New European Policy. Filling the Awareness Gap” project initiated by the Institute of World Policy.
In June 2015, the Institute of World Policy (IWP) had presented the results of the survey on perception of Ukraine by citizens of six most populated countries of the EU: France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland. The main findings of the survey were as follows: Ukraine is primarily associated with war, Russia, and poverty; the main obstacles to Ukraine’s accession to the European Union are corruption and oligarchy. However, one third of the citizens of the aforesaid countries believe that protecting Ukraine from Russia’s aggression is a valid reason to provide Ukraine with membership in the EU in the future.
The IWP decided to find out whether the perception of Ukraine by its own citizens is different from perception of the EU residents as well as to understand whether we perceive the requirements for opening the door to the European Union before Ukraine in the same way. The results of these two “mirroring” surveys could allow us to identify the differences in understanding of European integration processes by Ukrainians and the EU citizens and thus to formulate a more realistic European agenda for Ukraine.

What are your main associations with Ukraine?
Ukraine is mostly associated with corrupted, inefficient authorities by its own citizens (24.6%), with the highest rate among the residents of central Ukraine. Therefore, several high-profile corruption processes, adoption of a number of anti-corruption laws and individual reforming efforts of the authorities have not convinced the society that the country had begun changing for real. Ukrainian citizens demand positive results, transparency and better reporting. On the other hand, this figure can be explained by lack of understanding of the processes of reforming the country, priorities for reforms, and the demand for popular and instant results.
The war is one of the top two associations with Ukraine among both Ukrainians and the EU citizens. However, while the war had been mentioned by almost half (46%) of the EU citizens, only one in five Ukrainians (20.5%) has chosen that association. It is quite clear that the association with war is predominant among the residents of Eastern Ukraine (24.4%).
The top three also includes one positive association, the homeland (16%). In general, in Ukrainian respondents’ answers, the positive associations are intertwined with the negative ones virtually evenly.
It should be noted that while the negative associations (such as poverty or instability) occur in both Ukrainians’ and the EU citizens’ answers, such positive associations as Ukrainian symbols, independence, love of freedom, goodness, and joy have been mentioned only by Ukrainian respondents. It is also noteworthy that the ratio of such association as independence/love of freedom in Kyiv (14.1%) doubles the overall result (7.7%). In general, the survey has shown that despite the realistic or negative assessment of present situation in the country (corruption and war) many Ukrainians have positive views on their homeland.
As for the Ukrainians’ European aspirations, the perception of Ukraine as a country that has a great potential or a European country has hit the top ten (7.3%), with the highest rate among the residents of the Southern regions (13.7%) and the lowest rate in central ones (2.9%). Every fifth Ukrainian respondent (20.5%) could not name any association with Ukraine (with the highest rate in the Northern regions, 28.6%).

In your opinion, what are the main associations with Ukraine in the EU?
The top two Ukrainians’ associations with their homeland almost coincide with their ideas about the EU citizens’ associations with Ukraine: corrupted, inefficient authorities (21.2%), and the war (21.1%). The highest percentage of those who believe that Ukraine is associated with corruption in the EU is observed among the residents of Central Ukraine (they make up a third of all respondents). Quite many Ukrainians believe that the Europeans perceive relations with Ukraine from a purely economic perspective. For instance, answering the question on what do the EU citizens associate Ukraine with, 12.8% have named cheap land, work force and raw materials, 9.5% have chosen debts and credits, 7.3% have picked market, and 7% have selected fertile land.
If we compare these data with the results of the IWP’s survey in the EU, it appears that these ideas have a valid basis, though only partially: Ukrainians are associated with maids solely in Italy (with a rate of 10%). 11.8% of Ukrainians have expressed a valid assumption that in sights of the EU member states’ residents our country is associated with poverty. According to the IWP’s previous survey, 9% of the European Union citizens actually associate Ukraine with poverty (that association is one of the top three), and 22% view it as a reason to deny Ukraine’s membership prospects. A merely insignificant percentage of Ukrainian citizens (3.4%) believe that our country is associated in the EU with the Maidan (which correlates
 with results of the survey in the European Union, 2%).
The survey in Ukraine shows, that nearly 7% of Ukrainians are aware that to a great extent, Ukraine still remains in Russia’s shadow. For instance, 6.8% of our fellow citizens believe that the EU residents view Ukraine primarily as a buffer zone and Russia’s neighbour.
In general more than a third (35.3%) of Ukrainian had no idea about possible associations with Ukraine in the EU (with highest percentage in the Northern and Eastern Ukraine, over 38%).

What would you like the EU citizens to associate Ukraine with?
Ukrainians show an impressive unanimity in determining the desired image of Ukraine. When asked the aforesaid question, 72.3% (the vast majority) have chosen “a wealthy state” option. Although this figure is quite high in all regions, it reaches its peak in Central Ukraine. In addition, this option has been quite frequently mentioned by the aged respondents.
The European values (42.6%) are the second top desirable association. From a geographical perspective, this association is the least preferable among the residents of Southern and Eastern Ukraine (less than 40%). One third of respondents (29.8%) have expressed a wish that “Ukraine is Europe”, which is one of the Maidan’s most prominent slogans, would become a consistent association with their homeland among the EU citizens. 37.4% of Ukrainians would like to see their homeland associated with tourism, which indicates their willingness to open their country to the world and their awareness of Ukraine’s great tourist potential. Interestingly, tourism has been mostly mentioned by the younger respondents. Despite the fact that most Ukrainians do not associate Ukraine with the Euromaidan, a significant percent (22%) of them would like to see Ukraine associated with the Revolution of Dignity by the EU citizens. The Maidan as a desired association with Ukraine has been mostly named by the residents of the Western regions. Approximately the same fraction shares a strategic view on the future of Ukraine and would like to see their homeland as a regional leader (21.5%).
Despite the fact that the European Union citizens named Russia as one of the key associations with Ukraine, Ukrainians themselves haven’t chosen that option when answering the question on the desirable associations with their motherland.

In your opinion, what are the main obstacles on Ukraine’s path towards the EU?
Just as the EU citizens, Ukrainians view corruption (84.7%), oligarchs (72.5%) and insufficient economic development (56.9%) as the main obstacles on Ukraine’s path to the European Union. On top of that, Ukrainians are considerably more critical towards themselves, compared to the citizens of the European Union: those reasons have been mentioned by almost twice as much Ukrainian respondents. The first two reasons have the highest rate among the residents of central regions. Surely, we could not expect the results of the survey in the EU member states to be completely consistent with the answers of Ukrainian respondents. After all, our fellow citizens view Ukraine primarily as their homeland, while the image of Ukraine from the perspective of the European Union’s citizens depends on us. The majority of Ukrainian respondents were synchronous with their European counterparts in defining the problems in Ukrainian context. Both sides agree that without tackling corruption, oligarchy and poverty the membership prospects are very remote. There is also an understanding that our country in its present state would be perceived by the EU members as an economic burden. We hope that a realistic awareness of the obstacles on Ukraine’s path towards the European future would become another momentum into acceleration of the implementation of the European agenda.

This survey has been conducted online on the basis of the TNS On-line TRACK project from July 14 to 21, 2015 among urban population across the whole territory of Ukraine, except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the territories currently affected by the Anti-terrorist Operation. The survey engaged 1 000 respondents aged 18 to 55. The first two questions were open ones, while the other two were semi-open. The Institute of World Policy would like to express gratitude to the TNS Company for conducting this survey in Ukraine within the “New European Policy. Filling the Awareness Gap” project realized with support of the Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) project, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and administered by Pact Inc.

MAIN FINDINGS
• Ukraine is mostly associated with corrupted, inefficient authorities by its own citizens (24.6%),
• Respondents from central Ukraine chose association of Ukraine with corruption most frequently (34%), while their counterparts from the Eastern regions displayed the highest rate of association of their homeland with war (24.4%).
• The vast majority of Ukrainians (72.3%) would like Ukraine to be perceived as a wealthy state.
• Almost half of Ukrainians would like their homeland to be associated with the European values.
• Both citizens of the EU and Ukrainians
 are unanimous on the fact that 
corruption and oligarchy are the main obstacles on Ukraine’s path towards the European Union.

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This report was conducted by the Institute of World Policy as part of its project implemented under Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) program, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact Inc. This information product is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Institute of World Policy would like to express gratitude to the TNS Company for conducting the poll.
The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, Pact Inc. or the United States Government. No part of this research may be reproduced or transferred in any form or by any means, graphic, electronic, or including photocopying or by any information storage retrieval system, without the proper reference to the original source.

Knaus: the EU Should not Become Another ‘Time-Thief’ for Ukraine

Gerald Knaus, Member of the IWP’s Supervisory Board and President of the European Stability Initiative, is sharing his views on the role that the EU should play in the reforms’ process of Ukraine, based on its previous experience in Central Europe and the Balkans.According to Mr. Knaus, the core lesson learned from reforms elsewhere in Europe is that very few reforms are strategic, and being strategic means being accurate as possible regarding how to use the most precious resource: the time.

In this situation, Mr. Knaus stresses that the EU should not make the life of the reformers more difficult, but to help them to focus on the right issues. In the pre-accession process of Central European countries, the EU was effective by helping reformers to ask the right questions. Afterwards, civil servants, and not external consultants, had to find answers to these questions, of course, with the support of the EU.

The role of think tanks and intellectuals who really want to support Ukraine in its reforms should be to make sure the EU does not become another ‘time-thief’.

Gerald Knaus explains how the EU can bring changes in Ukraine. Video