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Analytical article written by James Sherr, member of the Supervisory Board of the Institute of World Policy, Associate Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)The full publication Ukraine-NATO: Diagnosing the Partnership” is available here.

There is a consensus among the NATO member states on perception of the threats coming from Russia’s aggression. However, Ukraine should realize that the Alliance does not have the same level of certainty regarding providing Kyiv with membership. Instead of falling into the new wave of the “NATO-mania”, Ukrainian government should focus on implementing the real reforms in the field of security. Those reforms require neither accession to the Alliance, nor the Membership Action Plan.

A soft spot in Ukraine’s integration into NATO

There have been profoundly significant changes in the global political landscape since the seminal year 1997: the year in which the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership was concluded and the NATO-Ukraine Commission established. It was also the year in which the Russia-Ukraine State Treaty and three intergovernmental agreements on the Black Sea Fleet were signed. With these steps, Ukraine secured legally binding recognition of its territorial integrity, existing borders and sovereignty, including that part of its territory where Russia’s fleet was based. Whilst there was no official relationship between this cluster of agreements, the political linkage was clear. Boris Yeltsin sought to ‘keep Ukraine out of NATO’s embrace’ and believed this would be achieved by conciliation rather than threat. By conceding Ukraine’s most fundamental demands, he vindicated Leonid Kuchma’s ‘multi- vector policy’. He also demonstrated NATO’s importance as a means of regulating Russia’s relationship with its far weaker neighbour.

In those years both NATO and Ukraine were careful to distinguish between ‘deepening cooperation’ and membership. To Kuchma and Ukraine’s military establishment, the object of the multi-vector policy was to anchor Ukraine into the Euro- Atlantic system by stages and with Russia’s acquiescence. De facto integration was the goal. De jure integration, i.e. membership, risked imposing pressures on a new and weak state that it would not be able to withstand. This policy demonstrated cool judgement not only of Yeltsin’s Russia, but of Ukrainian public opinion and lines of division inside NATO.

By comparison, the Yushchenko years present a cautionary tale. Following the Orange Revolution, NATO membership was no longer subject to cost-benefit analysis. It became an end in itself. The judgement of a former head of the NATO Liaison Office in Kyiv is worth quoting: ‘the focus on MAP [Membership Action Plan] proved to be the Achilles’ heel of Ukraine’s westward integration policy’. The preoccupation with NATO in the years of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency deepened established divisions across Ukraine and diverted energy and attention from the internal reforms demanded by the Maidan’s supporters. It showed a misunderstanding of NATO itself, which made no secret of its view that Ukraine’s highest security priority should be success in internal policy. By the end of 2006, Moscow concluded that the ‘Orange threat’ had crumbled. Putin’s Russia became revanchist in action as well as in spirit, and when it dismembered Georgia in August 2008, it provided a warning of what could happen elsewhere.

The difference between consensus and unanimity in the NATO

The times we live in now are the product of the times that existed then. Those who make NATO policy and guide it are burdened by this recent history and still struggle to absorb its lessons. Those who ignore them will do so at their peril and endanger others. The differences (and similarities) between Putin’s Russia and Yeltsin’s Russia should have been known well before 2008, but hopefulness was more appealing and comfortable than realism. The architects of the US-Russia ‘reset’ (and its European analogues) after 2008 did not welcome health warnings and, after Crimea’s annexation in March 2014, they pretended that none were given.

It is well understood that NATO makes decisions by consensus. But inside NATO the distinction between consensus and unanimity is also understood. The admission of any member state requires unanimity. If Greece under the leadership of Syriza is sufficiently determined to block Ukraine’s membership, it can do so, But other decisions, including many vital to Ukraine’s future, require consensus: the agreement of a preponderant majority of stakeholders with a direct and active interest. These include joint planning, coordination and operational level collaboration.
Still other decisions fall within the prerogatives of individual members. Neither Lithuania nor the United States require agreement of the NATO Council to provide military assistance to Ukraine, lethal or non-lethal. These are national decisions.

Today there is a robust Alliance consensus on several key points:

Russia is pursuing a war of aggression against Ukraine in violation of its treaty obligations and the conventions and agreements that underpin the post-Cold War security order; Its military intervention constitutes a mortal threat to Ukraine and a significant threat to Europe as we know it and wish to preserve it;

• The conflict poses dangers that are systemic in character. Vladimir Putin cannot afford 
to lose in Ukraine, yet he cannot be allowed to win. An escalation of hostilities beyond 
Ukraine cannot be ruled out; 


• In response, NATO must bring the tools and techniques of deterrence into conformity with 
‘new generation’ requirements, including ‘informational struggle’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ 
scenarios in vulnerable states susceptible to penetration, provocation and subversion; 


• Deterrence and defence in Europe as a whole will prove significantly more difficult if Russia achieves its objectives in Ukraine. For this reason, all feasible steps must be 
taken to prevent Ukraine’s territorial disintegration or its descent into chaos; 


• The ‘Russia challenge’ is likely to be long-term. Success and a sustainable political settlement will demand firmness, wisdom and patience. 


So long as this consensus endures, dissenters inside NATO (whether they be states or networks within states) will be marginalised and constrained. Yet such dissenters do exist, and they are well credentialed and vocal. A failure by Ukraine to meet general Alliance expectations – capable national leadership, internal reform and fidelity to European values – will strengthen their credibility and influence. For this reason if none other, even its most dedicated supporters believe that Ukraine must shoulder the principal burden of its own defence and the preservation of its hard won democratic freedoms.

On one vital issue, there is little consensus or none: providing Ukraine with the tools to defend itself. At the humanitarian level, the supply of military assistance ruffles no feathers. Supply of food ration packs, winter clothing, durable footwear and uniforms is not a subject of discord. Even the provision of advisory groups and training arouses little controversy, particularly when such assistance is provided under a national rather than a NATO flag.

But how does one distinguish between ‘assistance’ and ‘arms’? Secure communications are not arms, yet even a well-armed force can be annihilated without them. Infrared sites, night vision goggles, counter-battery radar and counter-battery strikes all serve the same purpose: to protect one’s forces and defeat the enemy. Because these distinctions are easily blurred, lines of argument are also blurred.

NATO should provide Ukraine with 
“as much assistance, as it can swallow”

It is easy to forget that armament, like war, is a tool of policy. What is our political objective? To many, including the present author, it is to deter further Russian aggression, render the existing occupation regime untenable and create, by stages, a political solution that restores Ukraine’s territorial and constitutional integrity. To these ends, a structure of deterrence must be established inside Ukraine and not only on its western borders.

For many proponents of arming Ukraine, principle as well as policy is involved. The right of a state to bear arms and purchase them is an inalienable attribute of sovereignty. Yet even some who dispute this principle’s universality nonetheless argue that without a credible threat to arm Ukraine, there can be no credible diplomacy. This view has latterly been advanced by Wolfgang Ischinger, perhaps Germany’s most distinguished Russlands Versteher.

The opponents of arming Ukraine are also diverse. They include those, like Angela Merkel, who are determined that Russia fail, yet believe that sanctions offer the best hope of achieving this end. Nevertheless she, like President Obama, also harbours the apprehension that armament will produce escalation, rather than deterrence, and open the path to war between Russia and NATO.

The danger of a NATO-Russia conflict has been present since Russia annexed Crimea. It is intrinsic to the present conflict and the Kremlin’s febrile view of the world. Western ‘reasonableness’ will not diminish it. Hints to the effect (in Lavrov’s words) that ‘Moldova and the Baltic states need to consider events in Ukraine and draw conclusions’ underscore the wider significance of what is taking place.

Psychologically, Russia is already in a state of war with NATO. By strengthening deterrence in the Baltic States, NATO is acknowledging this fact, as well as the Roman axiom: ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’. Yet inside NATO member states no war fever exists, and there is no appetite for one.

NATO’s cohesion derives from the interests and values that unite its members. Yet NATO is a security organisation, not an ethical project. No state will be invited into the Alliance unless it is clear that its membership will strengthen NATO’s security as well as its own. In present or readily foreseeable conditions, Ukraine’s membership would not meet this requirement. It would confront the Alliance with the immediacy of an Article 5 situation and a palpable risk of nuclear war. It is beyond common sense to imagine that an Alliance divided about the merits of arming Ukraine would unite in favour of Ukrainian membership.

But if membership is not possible in today’s conditions, it also is not necessary. NATO and Ukraine share a common strategic interest in denying Russia the fruits of aggression, supporting Ukraine’s recovery and restoring its sovereignty throughout its territory. To these ends, NATO and Ukraine must establish a structure of containment and deterrence inside the country (and not only on its western border); they must work together to reform Ukraine’s defences and improve them, and ensure that Ukraine is provided (in Yeltsin’s celebrated words) with ‘as much assistance as it can swallow’. Neither MAP nor membership are required to accomplish these goals. A fresh round of NATO mania in Ukraine will only divert attention from these challenges and weaken the consensus that currently exists.

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Analytical article written by Sergiy Solodkyy, First Deputy Director of the Institute of World PolicyThe full publication “Ukraine-NATO: Diagnosing the Partnership” is available here.

Never before had Ukrainians support their country’s integration into NATO so massively. According to some opinion surveys, the rate of support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO has recently crossed the 50% mark. However, this increase in number of supporters of the country’s accession to the organization has not managed to bring the both sides together. The Alliance keeps emphasizing the lack of consensus among the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, even 90% of Ukrainians supporting the government’s course towards NATO would be unlikely to force the Western countries to actually open their doors to Ukraine in the short run.

UKRAINIANS’ EUROATLANTIC SYMPATHIES: WHAT HAS CHANGED AFTER RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION?

If a referendum on Ukraine’s accession to NATO was held at the end of 2014, virtually half of Ukrainians would vote «for», and no more than a third would vote «against». Another quarter of the population could not decide or would not participate in the referendum (Rating Group). Last year has shown a rapid increase of support for Euro-Atlantic integration among the Ukrainians. By the end of 2014, the survey research companies have recorded unprecedented figures of more than 45%.

The debates, organized by the Institute of World Policy in Southern and Eastern regional centers of Ukraine, have revealed an increased interest in Ukraine’s course towards the Alliance among the opinion leaders. Journalists, social activists and local politicians, who were advocating Ukraine’s non-alignment six months before, have revised their positions today and have turned into ardent supporters of integration into NATO. The Institute of World Policy organized an indicative mini-referendum in Zaporizhzhia among the local opinion leaders; none of its participants expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the Russia-centric Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Meanwhile, support for NATO is expressed during the debates (it was particularly noticeable during the Strategic Discussion Club session in Odesa) through not only statements of approval, but also criticism. Odesa’s opinion leaders most frequently question the member states not providing Ukraine with armaments, NATO as a whole denying Ukraine’s accession into its ranks and the Alliance refraining from constant military training exercises on Ukraine’s territory. The shift in discourse in Southern and Eastern regions is obvious: while two years before, the majority of local leaders in Odesa, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia would have criticized NATO for its intention to «force Ukraine into its ranks», nowadays most journalists and activists criticize the Alliance for its lack of resolve in supporting Ukraine.

Without a doubt, such criticism should not be clearly interpreted as a support for Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. On the contrary, there is one very popular argument among the «anti-Westernists» that «Ukraine is not welcome there». Moreover, the lack of adequate support from NATO could be used by the advocates of pro-Russian discourse as a proof that «Ukraine has been betrayed». This may confuse the Ukrainians further and discredit the very idea of a close partnership between NATO and Ukraine.

The «pro» and «contra» arguments regarding NATO are not that much different this year compared to the times before Russian aggression, although it is obvious that the factor of war waged by Russia is a prevailing motivation for supporters of the Alliance. Therefore, the main argument of those favoring at least close cooperation with NATO or full membership in the Alliance is that «cooperation with NATO would allow Ukraine to modernize its defense sector rapidly. The Alliance’s experience would be useful for swift strengthening of national security. Ukraine needs allies in its fight against Russia’s aggression, and alone it would not be able to counter Russian military machine».
So far, the Russian factor was not that noticeable, although it has been considered among the motives for the Euro-Atlantic integration. Since the very first statement declaring the course towards NATO in 2002, Ukrainian authorities have been constantly emphasizing that the country’s vector of integration into the Alliance is in no way aimed against Russia. Moreover, we could recall that Ukrainian government has taken its first decision on integration into NATO amidst an unexpected rapprochement between the Alliance and Russia (specifically, after establishment of the NATO-Russia Council in May 2002 at the summit in Rome). Ukrainian authorities kept stressing that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would strengthen security in the region and across the whole continent. The argument regarding Ukraine’s presence among equal members of the Alliance as the best guarantee that the organization would never have accepted any decisions that could threaten Russia was among the most commonly cited by Ukrainian government officials at the times of Leonid Kuchma’s and Viktor Yushchenko’s presidencies.

Moreover, the old version of the Law «On the Principles of National Security of Ukraine» stressed that one of the main vectors of Ukraine’s policy on national security is «ensuring full participation of Ukraine in European and regional systems of collective security, gaining membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization while maintaining good relations and strategic partnership with the Russian Federation». This section was present in the document since 2003 (Leonid Kuchma’s presidency) and it remained unchanged in the later version of 2006 (Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency). NATO reference had been removed in 2010; however, integration into the EU remained linked with good neighbor relations with Russia (Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency).

The latest version of the law has, naturally, no reference to Russia; the priority of Ukraine’s national security is «integration into European political, economic and legal space aimed at gaining membership in the European Union and integration into the Euro-Atlantic security space».

The Russian factor has mobilized the public opinion by more than doubling the number of supporters of accession to NATO, while having diminished the number of the Alliance’s opponents twofold

Nevertheless, the Russian factor has turned to be the most effective in mobilizing public opinion, since Russia’s annexation of Crimea has more than doubled the number of supporters of accession to NATO, while having diminished the number of the Euro-Atlantic choice’s opponents twofold. Ukrainian society had witnessed the case of increasing support of integration into NATO against the background of fear of Russia before, during the Tuzla crisis of 2003. It should be noted, however, that the increase of support (although it was relatively small, only 4%) had occurred in spite of prevailing massive anti-Western hysteria initiated by the team of internationally isolated President Leonid Kuchma. In 2002, according to the Razumkov Centre’s data, the number of supporters and opponents of NATO in Ukraine was approximately equal, with both having 32%.

Since then, a steady increase in public opposition to the Alliance has been observed in Ukrainian media on the background of harsh criticism by the Western countries. In November 2004 (before the Orange Revolution), support for NATO had dropped to 15%, which was the lowest rate in previous 15 years. Since then, the level of positive attitude towards NATO had not exceeded 25-27%.

Instead, the number of opponents had been expanding: in the last year of Kuchma’s presidency almost 56% of Ukrainians did not want their country to join the alliance, and later, during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency (in September 2005), that rate had reached 60%. It was Russia’s aggressive actions that have changed this trend, lasting for a decade (see chart 1).
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According to the poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre, in April 2014, the number of supporters of Ukraine’s accession to NATO has increased to unprecedented 36.7%, while in March 2015, the respective figure was 43.3%. Meanwhile, the number of opponents of the Alliance has decreased to 41.6% in the spring 2014 and 31.6% 2015. The opponents of NATO in general have changed their arguments against the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. As noted by the regional experts from Southern and Eastern regions, the strongholds of Ukrainian opposition, older people are still captivated by the “NATO-USSR” dualism stereotype. The opponents of the Alliance also comprise a substantial group among the young people, the so-called supporters of «Anti-Maidan» viewing the events of the past year as a result of «the Western scenarios» or a «conspiracy aimed at provoking the feud between the two ‘fraternal nations’» on a «popular geopolitics» level. The main argument in this context is that Ukraine’s accession to NATO would provoke Russia’s large-scale aggression. Many Ukrainian opponents of NATO deny Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and insist that cooperation and especially integration into the Alliance would «enslave our country».

The segment of citizens, unable to decide if they are already disappointed with Russia and ready to trust the West, is growing among Ukrainians of Southern and Eastern regions

Regional experts note that the segment of citizens, unable to decide if they are already disappointed with Russia and ready to trust the West, is growing among Ukrainians of Southern and Eastern regions. For those Ukrainians, Russia is already not a friend, while the West is not yet a friend. They understand the futility of supporting integration into any Russia-centric block; however, recent events did not prove them necessity of integration into the EU and more so into the NATO. At best, those Ukrainians align with supporters of Ukraine’s neutrality; still, they are most likely to join the «have not decided yet» category.

According to the survey conducted by «Rating» sociological group, Southern and Eastern regions of Ukraine are populated with the most citizens who have not yet decided, or would not participate in the referendum on the country’s accession to NATO. In Donbas, the rate is 39% (21% of the region’s inhabitants have chosen «cannot answer» option and 18% would not vote). In the South, the rate is 29% (11% of «cannot answer» and 18% of «would not vote»). In Western regions, the rate of citizens unable to answer did not exceed 15% (see chart 2).
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DEMOCRACY MATTERS, BUT NOT IN ALL CASES
However, the increase in Ukrainians’ support for joining NATO does not make the country closer to it. The public attitude is a relatively new factor taken into account in the process of new member’s accession. At least during the Cold War, the principle of strict interest had been predominant, and the anti-Soviet camp did not focus on the attitudes of the ordinary citizens. The Western political elites acted with an understandable logic: public opinion in many Western countries tended to be leftist, which in turn was perceived by the policy makers as a threat to security due to close contacts with the Communist Moscow. For instance, in 1948, there was a serious risk of Communists’ coming to power in Italy, which was considered a serious risk to the transatlantic security.

Nevertheless, the Allies could not completely ignore the «voice of the people» even during their confrontation with the Warsaw Pact. In particular, after massive protests against Spain’s membership in the Alliance the local authorities had eventually held a referendum on that issue in 1986, four years after the country’s accession to the organization. In the end, 57% of population voted in favor of Madrid’s membership in NATO. The example of Spain is also indicative in the context of the US’s offer to accept the country into the Alliance at the times of Francisco Franco’s regime, while other members of the organization stood against that offer due to Spanish government’s neglecting democracy. Therefore, Madrid’s case is a vivid evidence of the fact that the role of democratic standards mattered even in times of bipolar confrontation, although it was probably not as crucial as it was after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The project of democratization, having defined the agenda of international relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, had lead to appropriate adjustments in the informal list of criteria for the NATO’s enlargement. Hungary and Slovenia have held their referendums on joining NATO: the former in 1999, and the latter in 2003. Since their declaration of Euro-Atlantic course in 2002, Ukrainian authorities have been also stressing that a referendum on the country’s membership in NATO will be conducted. Though a referendum is not a condition for membership in the Alliance (NATO officials confirm that survey results are sufficient), the issue of public attitude towards NATO in candidate countries has been considered essential in the last 20 years.

NATO’s interest to public opinion is not accidental. On the one hand, it fits into paradigm of the democratization project: according to it, important political decisions should be made with high public awareness, while, consequently, the political elites have to build their position on the will of the majority of their citizens. There is also another, more rational motive: NATO cannot afford to expose itself to the threat of any country’s joining and subsequently leaving the organization following the change of its political regime. Moreover, disapproval of government’s decision to join NATO by the citizens may limit the scope of Euro-Atlantic security related decision-making or simply delegitimize those decisions. (Although NATO’s history knows some cases of its member’s secession that did not impact the effectiveness of the organization substantially; it was with France’s secession from the NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, as well as with Greece’s short-term secession (1974-1980) due to Turkish army’s intervention in Cyprus).

All the countries that joined the Alliance in the post-Cold War times have conducted public awareness campaigns on the benefits of transatlantic partnership among their citizens. In that way, on the one hand, NATO sought to democratize the process of its enlargement, while on the other, the Alliance had actually played safe, as the governments of new member states could be constrained in their decisions on cooperation with NATO without broad public support.

UKRAINIANS’ SYMPATHIES VS FEAR OF RUSSIA
The low level of public support for Ukraine’s course towards NATO has been previously considered a significant obstacle to successful integration. In 2008, when the issue of providing Ukraine with the Membership Action Plan has been discussed at NATO summit in Bucharest (Romania), the lack of public support had been mentioned among the main obstacles to the progress in relations between the two sides51. The observers, however, had every confidence that the main reason was a harsh reaction of Russian authorities to the rapprochement between Ukraine and NATO, as Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux states have hoped to develop a «new security architecture in Europe» based on respecting Russia’s position. Although all leaders of NATO member states claimed officially that Russia would have no veto right on the Alliance’s enlargement, in fact, it seemed like Moscow had actually gained such preference. Moreover, nowadays Russia’s informal veto right has been even strengthened by its aggression against Ukraine.

The diplomats representing NATO member states, as well as the officials of the Alliance Headquarters keep emphasizing that Ukraine still lacks consensus on the issue of joining NATO, and this issue effectively divides the country’s population52. However, none of the NATO’s representatives has yet explained which consensus would be considered relevant: would it be 60% of support, or a level of 70% has to be achieved. In time, obviously, NATO may offer additional arguments advocating the bad timing for talks on the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in the organization, including claims on situatedness of support for the Alliance among Ukrainian public opinion. Historical experience proves that Ukrainians’ commitment to NATO depends proportionally on Russia’s aggressive policy. This dynamics have first become evident, specifically, amidst the aforesaid Tuzla crisis; however, the level of support had diminished after its resolution. Therefore, we could assume that normalization of relations between Ukraine and Russia might lead to decrease in NATO’s popularity.

NATO is currently adhering to the ambivalent position regarding Ukraine’s membership prospects: on the one hand, representatives of the Alliance’s declare the «open doors» policy; on the other, certain influential member states’ politicians refer to such a step as untimely. Some of NATO member states are even seriously considering adopting the idee fixe of Russian foreign policy regarding the «privileged interests» and the «sphere of interest» in the post-Soviet region. This can lead to a situation when even the will of 90% of the citizens to see Ukraine as a part of the Alliance would not meet any understanding among the Euro-Atlantic partners. Even one vote against among the member states is enough to block Ukraine’s accession into the transatlantic security space. One of the most vivid examples is Georgia, where the majority of citizens are supporting the country’s membership in NATO, while other arguments (e.g. frozen conflicts or Russia’s reaction) keep blocking any further steps.

Amid the absence of any clear answer from NATO on the prospects of its relations with Ukraine, the increase in number of neutrality supporters or those unable to decide among the citizens of Ukraine is possible. According to one of the sociologists’ hypothesis, the popularity of NATO in Ukraine has reached its peak, and thus, further public awareness activities should be conducted among the citizens who never trusted and still do not trust the West. Indeed, such activities will have little effectiveness, given the inability of the West to provide Ukraine with clear signals. The position of many Ukrainians opposing integration into the Western structures is strongly affected by the low self-esteem factor: «We are not welcome there anyway». The deepening of such attitudes could lead to a threat of increasing popularity of the populist political movements taking advantage of anti-Western or even anti-democratic slogans.
Deepening disappointment among the Ukrainians could lead to a threat of increasing popularity of the populist political movements taking advantage of anti-Western or even anti-democratic slogans

Subsequently, within the framework of partnership between Ukraine and NATO, both sides are substantially responsible for maintaining positive assessments of closer cooperation. Ukrainian authorities should seize any available opportunity to reform the country’s security sector with the support of the Alliance. NATO, in turn, should demonstrate greater commitment to supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s aggression. More examples of effective cooperation would more likely deprive the anti-Western pro-authoritarian populists of public support. NATO should treat the statements of Ukrainian officials on the membership prospects with greater patience. Neither stacking old grudges, nor distrust or fear of Russia should hinder the activation of the «Special Partnership» that would ultimately not strip the Ukrainians of a chance to become a part of the Euro-Atlantic space.

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Alyona Getmanchuk, Director of the Institute of World PolicyThe fact of dropping its non-aligned status has not led to a definitive1 declaration of Ukraine’s course towards NATO membership. Instead, a cautious wording has been used to meet the criteria required for the accession.
Despite political statements that Ukraine must join NATO, there are still some doubts concerning which process, indeed, has been launched by the renunciation of non-aligned status – integration into NATO or a transition to Ukraine’s undeclared neutrality.
In Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council Staff they are considering the Swedish model of relations with NATO as an example for Ukraine in the short and medium term2; the implementation of this model is to create conditions for full membership in the future. Namely, Ukraine must achieve complete compatibility of its security and defence sector with NATO structures. Therefore, if political conditions are appropriate, Ukraine would be ready to join NATO immediately, without any NATO Membership Action Plan and other preparatory documents. In fact, in that case we can speak of the hidden integration.
From another side, Ukraine’s government circles are rather pessimistic about the existence of political conditions for Ukraine’s NATO membership in the foreseeable future. There are serious doubts about the fact that the process of joining the Alliance can start before 2020. And not only Ukraine’s readiness, but, predominantly, NATO’s readiness for this process is in question. Kyiv understands that the consensus about Ukraine in NATO is an extremely distant prospect.
Ukraine has never been so close and so far at the same time from NATO as today. On the one hand, probably for the first time in Ukraine’s history, the society supports rather strongly Ukraine’s integration into NATO. After the annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war in eastern Ukraine inspired by Russia, Ukrainians have reconsidered the threats the state is facing and understood what actually the advantage of collective security is. However, it is not evident whether this support is sustainable. It is not known to what extent this is a conscious choice, or whether it is just a reaction to an external threat.

On the other hand, Russia has significantly complicated the potential integration of Ukraine into NATO by its military aggression against Ukraine. First, the so-called NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement stresses that unresolved conflicts or external territorial disputes may be an obstacle to the Alliance membership. Occupied territories and a threat of further escalation in Europe make the prospect of NATO membership especially remote for Ukraine.
Secondly, Russian aggression in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has turned Ukraine from a security contributor, who participated in all, without exception, Alliance’s peacekeeping operations, into its user; and, moreover, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a threat to European security. However, there are some things that Ukraine could offer NATO, first of all its valuable experience in counteracting a hybrid war. In particular, it would be worthwhile to open a Hybrid War Study Center in Ukraine.
Ukraine has found itself in a kind of a vicious circle. On the one hand, NATO insists to reiterate that Ukraine has the right to choose on her own, particularly in regard to integration into NATO. On the other hand, the fact that NATO reacts to the very discussion of Ukraine’s membership in NATO demonstrates that, indeed, Ukraine does not have such a choice today.
Instead, there is a kind of geopolitical double-dealing: there is a choice, but this choice is impossible to implement. Both Brussels and Kyiv are aware of that. At the same time, we must understand another thing as well. For Ukraine today the membership in NATO is not an issue for the sake of which she would be willing to question the European and transatlantic unity. Especially, it concerns the current critical issues such as a unified Western position on the Russian aggression in Ukraine in general and, in particular, the extension of the sanctions. In this context Russia should be more interested in promoting actively Ukraine’s membership in NATO than Ukraine itself.
Giving up accession to NATO and fixing neutrality in the Constitution is one of three key concessions the majority of Ukrainians are ready for in order to gain peace (the other two are: providing the territories controlled by DNR and LNR with a special status for a certain period with partial control by Kyiv and recognition of Russian as an official language on the entire territory of Ukraine. For comparison, twice less respondents (only 6%) are ready to reconsider the Association Agreement with the EU at Russia’s request and to refuse further rapprochement with the EU. However, it should be noted that only 11% of Ukrainians are ready to refuse NATO, while 21% support providing DNR and LNR with a special status.
“Membership or nothing”
Since the signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO in 1997, Ukraine has passed through a cycle during which she tested different formats within the Distinctive Partnership: from integration to non-alignment. None of these formats did fully justify itself, but the format of non-alignment turned out to be the most dangerous
one. It is during that format a part of Ukraine’s territory was annexed, and another part – de facto occupied. During the period of non-alignment Ukraine, in fact, has already tested on a model of “finlandization” when abandoning at the request of Russia its intention to integrate into NATO.
Obviously, the distinctive partnership with NATO in 2015 cannot be only a strengthened version of the distinctive partnership with NATO of the year 1997. At least due to the level of threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the urgent need for effective external guarantees for the security of Ukraine, as the Budapest Memorandum has not met its goal.
Over the past year Ukraine has comprehended that even a very distinctive partnership with NATO is unable to respond to the current level of threats. Only a membership in NATO provides for such security guarantees in line with the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That is why the Ukrainian society since the beginning of the Russian aggression has been leaning to perceive relations with NATO through the prism of “membership, or nothing”. Such formula puts the question squarely: what is the added value of the distinctive partnership with NATO?

Partnership Challenges
However, the lack of membership perspective for Ukraine is not the main challenge for an effective partnership with NATO. Moreover, such a prospect was already recorded in the final declaration of the Bucharest NATO summit in 2008 and did not significantly impact Ukraine’s achievement of criteria for NATO membership.
An obvious lack of mutual trust is the main obstacle, what was proved by the last year cooperation with NATO. By the way, it concerns not only the lack of trust between Ukraine and NATO, but also inside Ukraine itself – between various core agencies.
The lack of confidence has caused, in turn, the lack of communication. Obviously, due to that we can hear different estimations of certain elements of Ukraine-NATO partnership in the Ministry of Defence, National Security and Defence Council and Foreign Ministry.
A skid of the reform process at the middle and low bureaucracy level is common for all Ukrainian departments. It is at this level we can still observe the attitudes to NATO formed during the Cold War. It is difficult to believe, but mid-level officials during talks with NATO can still let themselves to ask questions like: «Are you willing the Americans to have us down?” Different views on current priorities are another challenge for developing an effective partnership. It was felt most acutely during active hostilities in eastern Ukraine in a dialogue with the Ministry of Defence. NATO’s strategic focus on systemic reforms fell into apparent conflict with tactical objectives of the defence department. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine believe that the current priority in the cooperation with NATO is not to achieve interoperability but to increase as soon as possible operational capabilities of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to repel aggression. The Ministry of Defence’s appeal to the hostilities in eastern Ukraine does not insure anymore against the Allince’s critics concerning the unsatisfactory pace of the military reform.
The irony of the situation is that it is the war in the East which was to persuade the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the need of systemic reform of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. Some representatives of the defence department really talk about the creation of the Armed Forces with a fundamentally new philosophy, which means to introduce Western operational standards, to form a new military-administrative division and areas to station troops, to improve the structure itself and forces strength etc.
Due to the warfare in the East the most vulnerable points have been identified as well as those areas in which the Ukrainian armed forces are in need of urgent reforms. In particular, these are command and control system (C3), logistics.
Still, over the past year a process of change in the defence department has been triggered. Extensive reforms have been commenced, but there is an urgent need for intensive reforms. In order to speed the process and make it more coordinated, the Ukrainian side decided to appoint a civil Deputy Minister of Defence, who, in particular, will deal, also, with relations with NATO. The former Head of the Mission of Ukraine to NATO, Igor Dolgov, will become that deputy. Ambassador Dolgov is to be reinforced by a number of collaborators invited from outside.

If NATO’s assistance, than which one?
Mistrust and a lack of coordination are present today in all key areas which can fill the partnership between Ukraine and NATO with practical results and not with speeches in joint working groups’ general meetings.
The provision of advisory assistance to Ukraine was one of, perhaps, the most striking examples of mistrust in relations between Ukraine and NATO. It concerned an allocation of 8 advisors by NATO member states who would assist the Ministry of Defence in implementing reforms. The advisors approval process lasted, in total, about 5 months. NATO’s officials claim that they had often limited access even to the information that could be hardly called confidential. Although, the official denial of access to any documents were recorded. They were also not entirely satisfied with a remote approach to work because of a limited access to the premises of the Ministry of Defence, where they have to get in with an escort.
The Ukrainian side has some reservations too. The first it is a misunderstanding by some advisors that they are to provide advisory assistance to a country which is facing an ongoing military aggression. That is why a trip to the ATO area was initiated to let NATO’s officials to feel the particularity of their work.
Second, the professionalism and relevance level of some advisors raises certain questions, not only among Ukrainian military, but also among their colleagues from NATO. For now, only two or three advisors get unambiguous appreciations from all departments (in particular, the Logistics Advisor, a representative of the Czech Republic and the Cyber Defence Advisor, a representative of Turkey).
Third, сurrently we see willingness of the Ministry of Defense to resolve all present issues related to the advisors’ activities, including their access to the Ministry’s premises. According to certain sources, a relevant instruction has been issued by the Minister willing to take this issue under his personal control. 5 Trust Funds can establish a basis of NATO’s practical assistance.
Despite the approval of a number of NATO countries to allocate resources to fill these funds, they have not begun to work yet due to a lack of a formal framework. When this brief was being prepared, the corresponding Agreements had not been ratified jet in the Verkhovna Rada. A government representative has noted in this context that the regulation procedures of the Cabinet of Ministers are the worst enemy of a practical cooperation with NATO.
Filling the trust funds lacked an effective expectations management as some Ukrainian departments awaited a specific logistical support, while some member countries decided to spend their contribution primarily on advisory assistance and missions of their representatives.
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In general, today, there are two attitudes to NATO’s assistance in Ukraine. Some prioritize the logistical assistance. Others believe that NATO is not a charitable organization and that a mutual cooperation is much more important for Ukraine in relations with the Alliance, particularly in the form of joint military exercises and staff training.
A fortiori, the efficiency of joint military exercises with NATO member countries has been proved also when introducing Ukrainian Armed Forces to perform tasks as a part of the Anti-terrorist operation in eastern Ukraine. Namely, those units that were regularly involved in multinational military exercises and NATO-led operations have demonstrated a high level of training and combat readiness. The most telling example is the 95th Airmobile Brigade.
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Reforms through a strategy
At this stage Ukraine prepares and revises strategic documents that will govern relations, NATO included, since they will shape a vision of how to reform the armed forces. Strategic documents preparation has been significantly accelerated after the National Security and Defence Council assumed a coordinating role. An interagency working group to prepare strategic documents has been created, the National Security Strategy – approved. It is significant that in the final text of the document some wording on NATO have been noticeably strengthened. When the draft of the Strategy’s objectives contained a blurred formula on «ensuring European future of Ukraine», the final version refers specifically to «ensure Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and the creation of conditions for joining NATO.»
A particular challenge is the Comprehensive Security and Defence Review, the previous work on which was found to be unsatisfactory at the highest level. At this moment the work is de facto completed on other documents, in particular the Security and Defence Sector Development Concept, the Military Doctrine (Military Security Strategy).
Strategic documents preparation was another test of confidence-building between partners from NATO and between different departments in Ukraine itself. The fact of the involvement, by the Presidential Administration, of a well-known international organization in the preparation of some strategic documents (including the Comprehensive Security and Defence Review) is quite eloquent by itself, and once again demonstrates the level of confidence in the internal expertise. A positive aspect is that eventually a mechanism of coordination has been built, both between Ukrainian authorities and at the level of involvement of NATO’s representatives in strategic documents development.
The efficiency of the implementation of the Annual National Programme between Ukraine and NATO is still in question. Some ministries frankly admit that this document will be executed only formally, until “a more rigid system for monitoring its implementation appears”.
Therefore, today we can affirmatively state the following:
• The fact of the dropping the non-aligned status in principle is not able by itself to shift the relations between Ukraine and NATO to a qualitatively new level. The same applies to the increase in defense spending to 5% of GDP
• The key challenges for establishing effective cooperation between NATO and Ukraine are the lack of trust between Ukraine and NATO, and the lack of proper coordination and communication within Ukrainian government
• The events in the East have discovered the weakest spots in Ukraine’s Armed Forces. There is an understanding that the process of reforming the security and defence sector of Ukraine is irreversible and should proceed in accordance with NATO standards
• Communication efforts are needed to explain the benefits of Ukraine’s partnership with NATO. The formula “membership or nothing” is not able to fill relations with practical content.