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An article written by Gemma Porzgen, German journalist, based on the results of European thought leaders’ visit to Ukraine which was organized by the Institute of World Policy in partnership with CIDOB.The shorter version of this article was published on “Evropeiska Pravda” (in Ukrainian).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy.

If you look into German newspapers these days, you will not find news from the Ukraine on the frontline pages anymore. The NSA-scandal, repeated train-strikes and the situation of refugees in the EU dominate the news. The Ukraine is not a big topic anymore, ever since the Minsk agreement, which helped to calm things down to a certain extent from the German perspective. The fear of a possible escalation leading to a bigger European war has vanished so far.
The narrative of the ongoing Ukrainian war and internal political developments has become more difficult to tell. Very few German journalists are sent to Ukraine to report. The German public seems to have returned to the same indifferent attitude that it had in the past, perhaps with a little more basic knowledge about Ukraine.
Apart from Poland and the Baltic states, the perception of the Ukraine is quite similar in other EU-member states. Internal politics play the major role and conflicts which seem to affect national interests get attention for a little while in crisis-reporting, but there is very little interest in deeper analysis of what is going on in domestic policy in Ukraine.
The German debate about the so-called “Ukrainian crisis” started almost two years ago, a debate about a country that most Germans did not know and the media had not paid a lot of attention to. The Ukraine was still a blank spot to most German newsrooms and the German public.
Experts in Brussels and in Berlin had been discussing the EU-Stabilization and Association Agreement for months in 2013, but there was nearly no media coverage about this political debate in Germany. The “No” of President Janukovic and the start of protests on Maidan came by total surprise to most of the German Media and the population. Nobody was prepared for what was going to happen in Ukraine.
There was a lack of basic historical knowledge, which was evident in many opinion-pieces by famous German journalists or politicians. The most prominent example was former chancellor Helmut Schmidt who claimed that Ukraine was no nation in May 2014. But also Heribert Prantl, one of the prestigious German columnists on internal politics in “Süddeutsche Zeitung” showed his deep lack of historical understanding. He wrote an editorial about President Joachim Gaucks speech on the 1. September 2014 in Poland, called “The reckless president”. Prantl criticized that Gauck did not mention the 30 million Soviet victims of war and the Russian trauma of World War II in his speech. Judging by this article, Prantls failed to understand that there were not only Russians at that time, but also Ukrainians, Belarus and other Soviet citizens among the 30 million victims. Consequently, Prantls view was very typical for the mindset of ordinary Germans, who were raised in Western Germany and for whom Russia was always a synonym for the Soviet Union and later its successor.
25 years after the fall of the iron curtain there is still a lack of understanding and attention for other post-soviet countries than Russia. Just like we had a “Russia First” Foreign Policy in Germany, we had a “Russia First” perspective of many opinion makers in the media, combined with a lack of profound knowledge about the region.
This was also reflected in the lack of willingness to send permanent German correspondents to Kiev. Correspondents had been there in the 1990s for news agency like the dpa or “Spiegel”, but since then it seemed sufficient to the German media houses to cover Ukrainian stories from Moscow or Warsaw. To have a correspondent in Moscow was as important as having a correspondent in Washington for ages. In the last few years even this has changed, because important German media have reduced their correspondent network worldwide. Offices in the Russian capital were closed, correspondents sent home, because of the ongoing media crisis. When the protests on Maidan started, there was not even one permanent correspondent of German media in Kiev. There were only three German freelancers based in the Ukrainian capital who covered the ongoing events from inside the country. A lot of coverage was done by correspondents based in Moscow or Warsaw going in and out of the country, some of them very experienced like Konrad Schuller (FAZ) or Gerhard Gnauck (Welt). When events escalated, there were more freelancers and reporters sent to the region, often not knowing the Ukraine from before the conflict and without any knowledge of languages.
There was also a clear tendency in the German media-coverage to comment on the war from far away without having the proper facts together. Talkshows in the TV showed great interest and dealt with the Ukraine more than they did with other Foreign policy issues, but their inviting policy discriminated against Ukrainian participants. In several shows there were only German experts talking with Russian representatives about the Ukraine. The titles were “Russian Roulette” or “Putins powergame – will there be war?” which showed that the main focus was more about the global confrontation with Moscow than looking inside the Ukraine.
Media played the “war-card”, often with the references to the “Cold war”, which showed that there was not sufficient willingness to deal with the new reality of this dangerous conflict in 21.century. Even serious media made people fear that the “Ukrainian crisis” could evoke a bigger war in Europe. This emotional approach was an important angel to hold Ukraine on the front pages for several months and to attract a lot of attention. Sadly, it was more about us than about the Ukraine itself, have to say today.
Since it has become quiet on the war front, the general attention has decreased and there is only very little interest to report on other topics from the Ukraine, like the difficult economical development or reports on the 1,6 million internally displaced people. The media attention has already shifted to other conflicted regions, like we see with the almost forgotten state of Macedonia these days, which has already been accepted by the EU as a candidate for accession to the European Union since 2005, but has not yet entered into accession negotiations. Even this status does not create more interest in following the internal developments, before it comes to violent clashes within the country.
This shows that the Ukrainians need to be very realistic about the way their country is perceived in Germany and other European states. There should not be too many illusions about European realities. Therefore, it seems dangerous to me that parts of the Ukrainian elite raise too high expectations towards the EU and make promises to their population which are difficult to fulfill.
At the summit in Riga the German Chancellor Angela Merkel made very clear that there is no EU-perspective in the near future for Ukraine. This statement does not sound popular in Kiev, but it reflects what is heard as well from EU-representatives in Brussels. And this position is supported by most EU-citizens, for whom the Ukraine is only one country in deep crisis in waiting in line with others like Greece in the EU or the West Balkan States outside the Union.
People inside the European Union do not have a clear picture of what the EU will look like in future years. What is going to happen with Greece and the Euro? Will there be a possible Brexit of Great Britain in 2016 already? How do we deal with African refuges coming over the Mediterranean Sea to Europe? The EU is very far from fulfilling the high “European values” and promises, which some Ukrainian politicians like to bring into the debate.
The only things Ukraine can expect from EU and from its member states is a certain amount of financial, technical and political support for reforms in the country at this point in time. Apart from this, the EU will hopefully keep its consensus by prolonging its sanctions against Moscow in June. But even these will mainly depend on the belief that the Ukrainian President and the Ukrainian government will be committed to a policy of real change and reform.
The initiative has been implemented due to the support:

“Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms” (UNITER) project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine;

Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine;

“Initiative on the think tanks development in Ukraine”, operated by International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

Sergiy Solodkyy, First Deputy Director of the IWP, took part in the international roundtable, organized by Day Newspaper on ways to effectively counteract the assault of the “Russian World” on EuropeThe roundtable’s theme read: “The Assault of the ‘Russian World’ on Europe. How to Resist It?” Ukrainian and international participants of the discussion were asked to comment on the following questions: a) the promotion of the “Russian World” as a way of diluting Ukraine’s status as an independent actor; b) the information war and Russian propaganda used to distort Ukraine’s image; c) what we have to do together to successfully counteract this distortion; d) examples of successfully counteracting the Russian propaganda.

“RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGIES AIM TO PREVENT UKRAINE FROM BECOMING PART OF EUROPE”

In opening the discussion, Den’s editor-in-chief Larysa IVSHYNA explained the reasons for our choice of topic:

“It is necessary to speak about the assault of the ‘Russian World’ on Europe. Speaking of Europe, we mean that we belong to it, not only geographically, but also historically. We recognize, though, that politically we are not in Europe yet, for we are not EU members, because our political nation, conscious of its Europeanness, has not been fully formed yet. Meanwhile, Russian technologies aim at this very target, as they try to prevent Ukraine from becoming part of Europe.

“The assault of the ‘Russian World’ on Europe is the main threat. It comes from all sides, including through EU countries where they have pre-prepared bastions for a new offensive. The assault comes also through Ukraine, through perennial attempts to prevent the development of competitive elites who would be able to wrest Ukraine from its Soviet past.

“They employ a lot of different technologies to make Ukraine into a hybrid state which would be unable to join any promising project, much less NATO.”

Oleksandr TSVIETKOV, professor, Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine:

“I have a somewhat unconventional approach to the issues you have raised by your statements on Europe’s borders’ location and whether we associate ourselves with it. Look at the younger generation. Our kids, that is, my grandchildren, are comfortable with the fact that they are Europeans. Perhaps, the capital city factor is at play here.

“Previously, people had to go to Moscow or St. Petersburg (Leningrad) to defend their doctoral theses. Our capabilities and orientations have now changed greatly. The more we talk about our genuine interests or goals, and places where people find it easier to work as well as ‘psychologically breathe,’ the faster we will see the system and order arising here that we want to achieve by integrating with Europe.”

“IMPORTANTLY, DEN NOT ONLY RAISES THE ISSUE, BUT ALSO ATTEMPTS TO REPEL THE KREMLIN’S PROPAGANDA STUNTS”

L.I.: “I have never seen anyone raising the issue of the assault of the ‘Russian World’ on Europe in our information space. I want to emphasize that it is ‘Russian,’ not ‘Rus’/Ruthenian’ world that is currently on the attack. Our contributors authored a book called The Power of the Soft Sign on that very topic. ‘Russian World’ is totally different from ‘Rus’/Ruthenian’ world. However, the ‘Russian World’ as a technology is malignant in nature. It aims to bring discord to Europe and kill Ukraine as an independent actor. These are its two main objectives. What ways do you see to counter Russian propaganda?”

Serhii SOLODKY, first deputy director of the Institute of World Policy, Kyiv:

“The Ukrainian authorities are complaining all the time about Russia’s expansion and its penetration of the Europeans’ hearts and minds. Therefore, it is important that Den not only raises the issue, but also acts to repel the Kremlin’s propaganda stunts: it publishes English-language digest The Day, and attracts Europeans as contributors and experts… These are small but necessary steps to break the wall of misunderstanding which surrounds Ukraine.

“I recently returned from Hungary, where the Russian propaganda machine has had a great success. The problem is not only in modern technologies and the ‘Russian World’ imposing a particular worldview. We have to understand that Ukraine was off Europe’s radar in recent centuries. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that Ukrainian lands were occupied by several foreign states. On the other, more than 20 years of independence should have been enough to introduce ourselves to Europeans. Unfortunately, these efforts were not sufficient, if they were made at all. When we read articles by the historian Norman Davies, who tried to compile a one-book history of Europe, we see him complaining that Western Europeans do not give proper attention to Eastern Europe. Western Europeans simply do not know anything about us…”

L.I.: “You are absolutely on the mark. We often talk with Western diplomats, and hear them complaining that Ukraine is not doing enough to promote itself. This is a case of just criticism. In order to have powerful centers, to enable diplomatic missions to work actively, we should prioritize the Diplomatic Academy and pay much attention to personnel training. This is a classic theme, but there is another as well. Our diplomats must work with our partners and neighbors and ask them the questions now asked by Den’s journalists: How is Ukraine covered in your school textbooks? What do your university courses offer on Ukraine?

“I have always said that our politicians ought to undergo exams in history and Ukrainian language before entering politics. Similarly, diplomats must prove that they know the history of Ukraine before getting their agreements. We need it to prevent the practice being continued of our history being taught in accordance with the Kremlin’s and the late USSR’s propaganda, which lingers in the minds of many people. This fully corresponds to the course of denazification and decommunization. The Kremlin propaganda was part of the measures intended at keeping Europe in the area of Soviet influence. This process has not been completed.”

S.S.: “Our institute has seen in person people, particularly from Spain, who were Sovietologists, so to speak, Russia-understanders, back in the Soviet time. They did not like Americans who supported the Franco regime, and believed that the Soviet Union supported the democrats in Spain. They have finally been disappointed with Russia lately. Such people come to us proposing joint projects. In particular, we work with a Spanish organization to bring to Kyiv opinion leaders from nations where the problem of the Russian propaganda machine’s influence is the most acute, like Germany, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Austria, France… Russia’s own actions destroy the ‘Russian World,’ which it tried to build.”

Dmitry SHUSHARIN, Russian political journalist, Moscow, joined the discussion on Skype:

“It is impossible not to resist Putin. Otherwise he will ruin all of us. As far as I understand, people who gathered in the office of the newspaper Den/The Day don’t want to die. Me too.

“Speaking about mass media, I mean the informational resistance. We should say that we cannot follow the way taken by the Kremlin propaganda apparatus. It chose several directions at once, but it is working in a very powerful way and is oriented at the vile side of human nature – both in European elite, and not only it – and the electorate, as well as the Russian diaspora. We should understand that the entire Russian diaspora is for the most part pro-Kremlin.

“Ukraine must be determined with its PR policy. You should begin with the understanding of what image Ukraine wants to advance. The image of a victim-country is a no-win choice. Meanwhile, you should appeal not to the political elite (I don’t trust it), but the electorate, the broad public – with explanation of how Ukraine stood in the breach of the new Russian expansion. This fact must be explained to the Europeans in a very clear manner.

“There is one more, no less important, detail: we see very well which countries are defending Ukraine in the most consistent way. These are Australia and Canada. Inside of these countries political elites depend on a large part of Ukrainian electorate. Therefore you shouldn’t exclude the Ukrainian diaspora, although it may be a local phenomenon.”

O.Ts.: “How well is the difference in the Russian society felt concerning the events in Ukraine? Can we hear your voice, sometimes the voices of journalists who give sober assessment? As for the mass, are any forums taking place where one can express his opinion? It is impossible that people keep silent and don’t notice anything.”

“UKRAINE MUST BUILD ITS IMAGE AND TELL ITS HISTORY”

Gerhard GNAUCK, German journalist:

“Many people in the West have no distinct image of Ukraine. Even if there is some, it is only fragmentary. Ukraine must build its image and tell its story. You should start with this, before starting to fight the other image.

“However, if someone wants to understand the history of Ukraine or Russia, the historical background is necessary. One of such examples is Bykivnia. This is the largest burial of the victims of the Communist system. This is Oswiecim of the Communism.

“This is an important place where not only Ukrainians, but Poles go too. I think the guests from abroad must be shown Bykivnia, because it is a place of the world importance. If someone sees the country with their own eyes, this changes a lot.

“You should speak openly about the painful points, anti-Semitism, collaboration. History won’t change. Everything depends on the fact that people are speaking about it today.

“As for today’s situation in Ukraine, authoritative people could lead a more active dialog with the international community.

“Last year Ukrainian writers Tania Maliarchuk, Yurii Andrukhovych, Taras Prokhasko, and Serhii Zhadan went on tour across Germany. They told to full houses about the situation in Ukraine and near it. You need to look for channels and ways for dialogs where there are no ways for dialogs yet.

“Only societies of journalists and newspapers can resist the propaganda. But you shouldn’t forget that mass media is a free and living organism, and it cannot be said what to do. On the other hand, it would be good to reinforce the information work about Ukraine in Germany or other countries. But this is the task for the civil society. For example, in Berlin there is a group ‘Partners of Eastern Europe.’ It will invite children from the families that have suffered from this conflict in Ukraine for the vacation to Germany. This group organizers trips and meetings.

“I find the Ukrainian project StopFake a successful example of resisting Russian propaganda. Another example is British website Bellingcat. It highlighted in detail the topic of Boeing MH17 which was shot down in the air above Ukraine. On a very professional level and concrete examples, it showed that it was quite possible that Russian and pro-Russian forces brought the Buk missile systems to the territory of Ukraine and shot down this plane. German magazine Der Spiegel created a very good video story as well.”

Edward LUCAS, senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis:

“The first thing I want to say as a Westerner is that we need to learn from you guys. The Ukrainians, just like the Latvians, the Lithuanians, the Estonians, the Georgians, and others, are way ahead of us in the West in the terms of understanding the way in which the Kremlin uses information as a weapon. It is not just that many of you grew up in the Soviet Union, have experience of Soviet propaganda, and also that you can speak Russian mostly much better than we do, but you also have a real fingertip feeling for what’s happening, you can smell stuff that we can’t smell.

“Among the things that I’m working on in my Washington and Warsaw, is trying to get some of your information warfare experts over to Brussels, and Berlin, and London, and Washington, and other Western capitals, so that you can help train our journalists, editors, policy-makers and others to understand what’s going on, because you guys get this in a way that we don’t.

“I do think there are some things you could do more in the West, where Russian propaganda has really done very well, I am afraid to say. And I am ashamed, as a citizen of the United Kingdom, that my country has been one of the places where Russian propaganda has perhaps done massively well. But we need your help, and I think that Ukrainians abroad can do things that embassies can’t do. And I’m going just to suggest a few of them.

“One is social media. I think that we could have a stronger Ukrainian presence in social media, engaging not with the trolls, because it’s a waste of time, but really pushing back, if you have a Western news outlet which says that Crimea is historically Russian, or that there are neo-Nazis in Ukrainian government, or whether it wittingly or unwittingly reproduces these, kind of, Kremlin tropes, these Kremlin lies, Kremlin myths.

“We should call them out. We should object. And I think a good lesson here comes from the Poles who have done a really good job in finding anyone who uses the phrase “Polish death camp.” Obviously, they weren’t Polish death camps, these were in occupied Poland and were run by Nazi Germans. But the Poles decided it was a big problem to them in terms of Poland’s image, that they were being taunted with complicity in the Holocaust. And every Polish embassy, every Polish organization just get stuck in there, it comes on Google news that some local paper, or radio station, or someone has used this phrase. Then they can stalk it and object to it.

“So, that’s one thing to do. I think more generally, the Ukrainian foreign service still has some habits of the old Soviet bureaucracy. People are quite risk-averse, they think they’ll be punished if they make mistakes, it’s better not to make mistakes than to make mistakes in a good cause. And it varies very much: some Ukrainian embassies are fantastic, others are good at some things and worse at others, some are really, I think, shamefully passive. And I think every Ukrainian should say, “I’m paying taxes for this, I want my embassies, my consulates, all my diplomatic missions to be out there in the front line of information warfare, getting engaged, turning up to events, complaining to editors, writing letters, writing op-eds, blitzing social media. And if sometimes things go wrong, it is better to make a few things wrong in a battle that you are winning than to make no mistakes in a battle that you’re losing.

“I think that compared to where Ukraine was two years ago, you’re ahead now. And the people understand that this problem is not about what you did, and is not about anything that the EU did, it’s about something that Putin did. So, the problem is that people see that the war in Ukraine is a symptom of a wider problem, and that problem is a problem for all of Europe, for the whole European community. People understand that reforms are happening, they know that Ukrainians have lots of problems, but they also see that there is some progress.

“I do think you get to do a better job of highlighting the things that are going right in Ukraine. We have a lot of very good reporting from the front line, I think I’d like a little bit more about successes in anti-corruption, successes in public administration. Which is the best run city, the best run town, the best run local district in Ukraine. Let’s have some good examples of how those reforms are happening. Even if they are small ones, they still encourage a sense of hope, optimism, both at home and abroad. So, I can see a front for a bit more there.

“But in general, I think it’s going to be a long, long struggle, it’s not going to be done quickly. You are unfortunately doing most of the work, I’m sorry about that because you are most vulnerable, poorest, mini-wage, weakest of our allies, and you are having to bear the greatest burden, I’m sorry about that. But I do think that if we keep our spirits up and stay determined, we can win this one.”

“THE BEST THING THAT CAN BE OPPOSED TO THE RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA BY UKRAINE IS EUROPEANIZATION OF EVERYDAY LIFE”

Semen NOVOPRUDSKY, independent journalist, Moscow:

“Ukraine has never been independent in Putin’s mind. Moreover, it has never had the right for own statehood. Apart from personal fears for his own fate, the collapse of Yanukovych’s regime made Putin want to take revenge for Ukraine’s step to real political independence from Russia. However, over the past several years, especially when the attempts to create ‘Novorossia’ in eight Ukrainian oblasts failed, Putin is involved not in advancing of the ‘Russian World’ in Ukraine, rather into channeling the collapse of his own home policy and economic course into the logic of war with the West. In this situation the subjectivity of Ukraine is really wiped out in Putin’s logic to a kind of an advanced post in Russia’s struggle with the West. Besides, Putin has many times said that he considers Russia and Ukraine as one state. Apart from that, Russia has recently been changing the rhetoric concerning its role in the Ukrainian conflict. Previously the Kremlin tried to lie openly that it was not involved in the events in the Donbas, but now it is trying to convince the world that it is containing the so-called DNR and LNR and preventing the latter from starting a total war with new energy.

“Now even the concept of the ‘Russian World’ is a way of wiping out the subjectivity of Ukraine. Russia it trying to discredit everything that is going on in Ukraine, the world, and especially internal Russian information space, as much as possible (it is impossible to convince anyone that in DNR and LNR Russia is protecting Russians, because Putin denies that Russian servicemen are present in the Donbas, so, there is no one to defend) and is trying to destroy the Ukrainian economy using all means, waiting for the economic collapse of Ukraine.

“Russian task is not in specially distorting the image of Ukraine, rather in using the war, the information war, and actually the real military actions in the Donbas, as a means to split Europe. Russia is trying to break the united front of the anti-sanctions of the US and the EU, which came as a no less surprise to Putin than for Europe the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the attempt to further dismembering of Ukraine. In this sense I think that for Ukraine there is no more important task than demonstration of the efficiency of power, its honesty and economic reforms. It is impossible to distort your own or someone else’s image for ever. Russia has pretended for a long time to be a negotiable partner of the West and systemic political player, but in fact it is neither of that. But the moment of the truth has come, and the essence of Putinism has been exposed, now current Russian power will hardly be able to convince the leading world states that it is predictable and politically adequate.

“Strange as it would seem, the task of Russian and Ukrainian journalists is not changing because of what has happened in relations between our countries over the past 1.5-2 years. This task is formulated very simply: ‘say and write only the truth, the truth and nothing but the truth.’ In Russia it may be even more important to write not only the truth about Ukraine, but about it as well, rather about Russia and its role in Ukrainian events.

“In Russia examples of resistance are the honest reports from the Donbas made by wonderful military reporter from Novaya Gazeta Pavel Kanygin and the public activity of the deputy of Pskov City Council Lev Shlosberg, who published his own investigation into the death of Russian paratroopers in Ukraine, and many other texts by honest Russian journalists. Slipping into the informational nonsense is fast, and it is always a long and painful process to get out of this information coma. An example of this was Hitler’s Germany, which did not get rid of the propaganda darkness of Nazism overnight, and did so only after its catastrophic defeat in the unjust war. But the fact that there is no way to recover in such cases doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t make any attempts. The best thing Ukraine can oppose to the Russian propaganda is consistent reforms, Europeanization of everyday life, cleansing of the power from the evil of corruption. For the Russian journalists the only thing left is using any opportunity to describe the characteristics of the national catastrophe which will result from the current course of the Kremlin.”

Adrian Karatnycky, Member of the IWP’s Supervisory Board, for The New York TimesIn waging a clandestine war in eastern Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made a bargain with the devil. He has farmed out much of the fighting to warlords, mercenaries and criminals, partly in an attempt to simulate a broad-based indigenous resistance to Ukrainian rule. But Mr. Putin’s strategy of using such proxies has resulted in the establishment of a warlord kleptocracy in eastern Ukraine that threatens even Moscow’s control of events.\
Surrogate fighters were recruited from four sources: local criminal gangs; jobless males who live on the fringes of eastern Ukraine’s society; political extremists from Russia’s far right, including Cossacks; and itinerant Russian mercenaries who fought in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Transnistria and other regional conflicts in the post-Soviet Union. They have been trained and equipped with modern weapons, and are often supported by Russian regular and special troops.

These irregular forces now form the backbone of the armies of Donetsk and Luhansk, two mostly Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine along the border with Russia. Those separatist enclaves are dominated by well-armed criminal networks whose leaders play key roles in local politics, both formally, as government leaders, and informally, as chieftains of gangs with their own turf. These men and women have supplanted the pro-Russian elite that had held sway in the area since Ukraine’s independence in 1991.

By striking a bargain with what are, in effect, local warlords, Mr. Putin is recreating a model Russia first tried in Chechnya more than a decade ago. There, the Russian government made common cause with Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of a prominent Chechen mullah turned separatist president. Mr. Kadyrov, whose clan had once backed the indigenous independence movement, switched sides in 1999 and, with Russian help, seized power in Chechnya. Chechen resistance was defeated, as the Kremlin had hoped, but at the cost of letting a local warlord with his own powerful army gain near-total sovereignty.

While Mr. Kadyrov regularly pronounces his personal loyalty to Mr. Putin, he brooks no intervention from federal Russian authorities. He flaunts Russian law, for example by permitting polygamy. On April 21, he stated his sovereignty with clarity, telling his fighters that if any security officer, “whether from Moscow or Stavropol, appears on your territory without your knowledge, shoot to kill. They have to take us into account.”

The Kremlin is now repeating its reckless policy from Chechnya in eastern Ukraine, with similar results. Although the leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk rely on training and arms from Russia, their crime-based financial independence also gives them incentives to play their own game.

Their influence comes from the trade of weapons, drugs and alcohol, and cash generated from checkpoints on roads. New criminal fortunes are being made through corporate raids, shakedowns of local businesses and the seizure of houses abandoned by residents who have fled the region: As of last month, there were more than 1.3 million internally displaced people inside Ukraine, with the highest rates in the eastern parts of the country, according to U.N. sources. And there were more than 700,000 Ukrainian refugees seeking legal status in Russia.

The mounting criminality in eastern Ukraine is also spilling over into Russia, with both contraband and irregular fighters crossing the porous borders. Rostov Oblast, a Russian province that is a staging ground for the Russian-backed insurgency in eastern Ukraine, has experienced a huge spike in crime: an increase of more than 23 percent in the first four months of this year. It is now the sixth-most crime-ridden of Russia’s 83 regions.

The proliferation of criminality and the emergence of a broad array of well-armed players along Russia’s southwestern border have not been welcomed by the Russian security services, which are accustomed to operating under a strict chain of command. In fact, they are suspected of being involved in a spate of assassinations of some troublesome local chieftains, most recently Aleksey Mozgovoy, who was killed in an ambush on May 23. The head of an insurgent battalion in Luhansk, Mr. Mozgovoy had criticized local separatist leaders for giving up on establishing a larger breakaway region that was to be called Novorossiya, or New Russia.

Mr. Putin’s war in Ukraine has brought death and mayhem to Ukraine, and sanctions, political isolation and an economic downturn to Russia. It has also brought instability to the vast swath of territory that runs from the Donetsk and Luhansk statelets of Ukraine to Russia’s Rostov and Krasnodar regions, linking up with the Caucasus. Mr. Putin’s war in Ukraine, in other words, is slipping out of his control.

An article written by Kristi Raik, Senior Research Fellow at Finnish Institute of International Affairs, based on the results of European thought leaders’ visit to Ukraine which was organized by the Institute of World Policy in partnership with CIDOB.The shorter version of this article was published on “Evropeiska Pravda” (in Ukrainian).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy

The Ukrainians made two revolutions within a decade, both giving a boost to the country’s ‘European choice’. Between the Orange Revolution of late 2004 and Euromaidan of late 2013–early 2014, the EU-Ukraine relationship grew increasingly sour. Nevertheless, it gained much new, concrete substance in fields such as trade, energy and visas. The post-Euromaidan leadership can use the Association Agreement, the Energy Community and visa liberalization as instruments to take Ukraine closer to the EU. And yet, the ‘real thing’ – EU membership – appears to be even further away today than it was ten years ago.
During the past year, a breeze of realism has re-shaped EU talk about the neighborhood in general and Ukraine in particular. The EU has been forced to acknowledge its failure to create an arch of stability in the neighborhood. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has underscored the need to complement the EU’s technocratic focus on domestic reforms with a serious consideration of the geopolitical environment. Brussels is now talking about defending Europe’s interests rather than envisioning a unique foreign policy based on values. The issue of further enlargement is off the agenda.
Altogether, the limits of what the EU can achieve in its Eastern neighborhood are now strongly exposed, although not new. Three handicaps are worth highlighting.
First, the EU is currently not able to agree on a strategy for the Eastern neighborhood. It is hard enough – and hugely important – to maintain the EU’s commitment to the DCFTAs (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements), which means integrating the willing neighbors into the common market. The ratification process of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (including DCFTA) is moving on and the EU has confirmed its intention to implement the DCFTA part of the agreement from 1 January 2016 onwards. Moscow has objected the agreement, but in a recent rhetoric shift declared that it would no longer try to block it. Trilateral consultations between the EU, Russia and Ukraine on the implementation of DCFTA continue. In a favorable reading, the consultations are a necessary diplomatic gesture towards Moscow that shows readiness to discuss the latter’s concerns, but does not derail the EU-Ukraine relationship.
Economic integration (which, after all, lies at the foundation of the EU) could be an important part of a strategy for those neighbors that are interested in closer ties – for the time being Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. At the same time, there are other big strategic questions where a common position shared by the 28 member states is not in sight. One is the perennial issue of offering a membership perspective to Ukraine and other interested Eastern neighbors. Back in 2005, the Orange Revolution was followed by a tense debate on this question in the EU. The outcome was nothing more than repeated acknowledgements of the European aspirations of Ukraine and references to ‘new prospects’ and possible ‘further progress’ of the relationship. In March 2014, the EU stated that the Association Agreement did ‘not constitute the final goal’ in EU-Ukraine relations. This was considered an achievement, and yet, it was just a new formulation of essentially the same old message. Today, in May 2015, some member states are not even ready to repeat that formulation in the declaration of the Riga Eastern Partnership summit. The endless exercises of verbal acrobatics are frustrating for everyone involved and take away time from more concrete substance of the relationship.
Another, more dangerous strategic lacuna is the EU’s relationship with Russia, where the common neighborhood has become the most acute issue. Russia keeps signaling its deep dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War European security order and seeks recognition of its sphere of interest in the post-Soviet space. This constitutes a deep and principled disagreement between Russia and the EU. For the latter it is out of the question to define spheres of influence against the will of the countries concerned. However, the EU has struggled to come up with a response to the Russian tactics of using military force and hybrid forms of pressure to advance its goals in the region.
Hence the second handicap: the EU is not able to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity of its Eastern neighbors. In principle, of course, it does not accept the violations committed by Russia. In practice, Russia maintains separatist conflicts in each Eastern Partnership country that is seeking closer ties to the EU. The raw bottom-line of these conflicts is that Russia is ready to use military force in the region, whereas neither the EU nor the US are willing to do so. The EU’s economic sanctions against Russia are a harsher measure than many had expected, but as sanctions in general, they do not yield quick results. The EU’s strategic patience, which Germany has called for, will face a test in June when a decision on the prolongation of sanctions is due.
Thirdly, the EU is not able to turn neighboring countries into stable democracies with viable institutions. Academic studies on democratization suggest that the success of political transition is primarily determined by domestic conditions. External factors can help or hinder, but are generally not decisive. The promise of EU membership is often said to have worked miracles in the past. However, the Baltic countries, for instance, undertook the most radical reforms during the first half of the 1990s, when their membership in the EU and NATO was seen by many in Western Europe as unrealistic and undesirable. The Balts rushed to use the window of opportunity at the time when the big neighbor in the East was weak. Their inclusion in the EU enlargement was confirmed only in 1998 as a result of hard work on two fronts, domestic reforms and diplomacy.
For Ukraine today, the international environment is obviously less favorable, with a resurgent Russia in the East and wavering EU in the West. What is more, Ukraine has yet to convince its partners in Europe about its commitment to a systemic overhaul. ‘You keep reforming, and we will keep supporting’, as stated by President of the European Commission Claude Juncker in Kyiv in April 2015, is the order of the steps ahead. Considering the mood in the EU and the state of play in Ukraine, President Poroshenko was wise to postpone the issue of applying for EU membership to the year 2020. If Ukraine or its supporters among the member states push too hard at this point, they may get a negative response that will be hard to change later on.

The initiative has been implemented due to the support:

“Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms” (UNITER) project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine;

Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine;

“Initiative on the think tanks development in Ukraine”, operated by International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

Sorry, this entry is only available in Ukrainian.

An article written by Marco DI Liddo, analyst at the Centro Studi Internazionali (Rome), based on the results of European thought leaders’ visit to Ukraine which was organized by the Institute of World Policy in partnership with CIDOB.The shorter version of this article was published on “Evropeiska Pravda” (in Ukrainian).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy

In such a context like the today European one, where the political developments in Ukraine and the war in Donbass have become topics of polarization and conflict between both parliamentary forces and civil society organizations, Italy has shown a marked prudence towards the evolution of relations between Brussels, Washington, Kyiv, Donetsk and Moscow.
The reasons for this moderation are somewhat different.
At first, as for domestic policy, the Italian political forces, which live in a perpetual state of campaigning, have never considered international relations as an effective theme to affect popular support. Of course, such an approach comes from the attitude of the Italian middle voter, generally inattentive to what is happening in the world beyond the Alps.
The second reason is mainly cultural. Indeed, in principle, Italian people and political class have not a thorough knowledge of the history and traditions of Ukraine. On many occasions, Kyiv is simplistically viewed alongside the Russian-Moscow. It is not perceived a sense of diversity between Ukraine and Russia. In this sense, the Ukrainian historical and cultural peculiarity are largely ignored by the majority of the Italian population.
Finally, the third reason relates to the Italian international posture. Until the war of sanctions between European Union and Russia, Rome was the second largest trading partner of Russia, only behind Germany, with common strategic interests in all sectors of economy and finance, first of all the energy field. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the perception of Russian military threat and policy towards Italy has gradually waned. Based on these considerations, it is clear that, for the Italian entrepreneurial and political class is very difficult to give up the benefits of a peaceful relationship with the Kremlin, especially because of the Italian partial dependence on Russian gas and in a time when the global economic crisis burdens on the Italian production system.
However, despite the Italian general lack of attention towards the Ukrainian internal affairs, there is a political, academic and civil society narrow niche focused on the path of reforms undertaken by Ukraine.
In this case, it is possible to identify two main groups: the first, composed by those who support the Yatseniuk government’s reforms and hope in the realization of the project of European integration of Ukraine; the second, composed by those who are indifferent to the Ukrainian reform path and oppose Kyiv’s European integration. Leaving aside the entire ideological, cultural and political spectrum who orient sympathy or indifference to the Ukrainian cause, the reasons that fuel the belonging to a group or to another can be summarized in two main categories: the attitude towards the European Union and the attitude to Russia.
In principle, Europhiles and Russophobes are the biggest supporters of the reform process in Ukraine and hope that Ukraine will soon become a member of the European Union, because it is fully part of the European family. According to their vision, Euromaidan (I use this term to distinguish it from the term used by Ukrainians, ie Revolution for Dignity) was an innovative and revolutionary phenomenon, a demonstration of how the Ukrainian people have been willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their freedom and their European aspiration. These who expresses solidarity with Kyiv are primarily the anti-Russians, including more radical wing of euro-Atlantic movements, eager to deprive the Kremlin of a strategic ally and to rescue from Russia’s orbit a country so symbolically and culturally vital for Moscow. To Europhiles and Russophobes, the Ukrainian government has taken the only right way for modernization of the country. In particular, the greatest praise is directed to the laws on public transparency and corruption fighting, to the measures on the reform of state bureaucracies and on the modernization of the economic sector. Particularly appreciated is the law on the equalization of Nazism and Communism as criminal ideologies and the purging of the symbols linked to the old Soviet regime. This law is considered essential by the Europhile front to shake off the communist and Russian dross from Ukrainian history and politics and, at last, encourage a process of cultural Westernization of the country.
In contrast, the Eurosceptical and Russophile demonstrate a general indifference, or even a fierce criticism against the program of Ukrainian reforms. In addition, these movements and parties strongly oppose the project of euro-Atlantic integration of Kyiv, because they consider Ukraine as an integral part of the Russian-Slavic world and do not want to provoke the Kremlin with a political operation considered as a form of euro-imperialism. The pro-Russian sentiment, which therefore rejects the political aspirations of Ukraine, is particularly strong among Communists nostalgic of the Soviet Union, Eurasists, the conservative, traditionalist and nationalist right, in love with Putinism. However, even on the left, both moderate and radical, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, there are Russophile sympathizers and indifferent to the Ukrainian issue. In their case, the myth of the strong man and the decisiveness of the Putin political system are the driving forces.
According to the euro-sceptical and Russophile groups, Euromaidan was a coup directed by Washington and Brussels by creating and supporting an artificial Revolution. As a result, the Ukrainian government is considered ultra-nationalist and barely fascist, pro-European only for convenience and political survival of the elites; prostrate to American geopolitical necessity. The path of reforms is viewed with suspicion, and judged as a clean-up needed by the new government forces to settle and crystallize their power. In this sense, the law on the equalisation of Nazism to Communism and the purge of Soviet symbols are designed as assertive measures, aimed at silencing the genuine feeling of unity and the common tradition among the Russian people and the Ukrainian people.
The fear, or perhaps the unmentionable hope, by Russophile Eurosceptic groups is that the exhaustion of the revolutionary enthusiasm and the rising social costs of the policy of austerity will force the Yatseniuk government and the Poroshenko Presidency to confront a growing wave of popular discontent, leading to a kind of crisis of rejection for pro-European reform. Ultimately, these groups believe in repetition of what happened 10 years ago, with the failure of the Orange Revolution, the fall of Julia Tymoshenko and the coming to power of Yanucovich. In addition, the pro-Russian sectors of Italian society and politics believe that a new wave of popular dissent would open the door to the growth and the rise to power of Ukrainian fascist movements.
The unique aspect of the Italian situation lies in the fact that the division between supporters and detractors of the Ukrainian agenda for reform actually crosses the political scene and the civil society. This prevents a net siding of Italy in one field or another. However, this duality should not always be seen as a restricting condition for the foreign policy of Rome. Quite the contrary, if you tried to overcome the rigid frame of mind in which the political situation in Ukraine has so far been classified, along the scheme “with Russia or against Russia”, it would be possible to explore new possibilities. Crushed in the Moscow-Brussels dichotomy, policymakers often have stalled in conceiving the Ukrainian issue only through its geo-political implications, without focusing on the needs of the population and its real aspirations. If it were possible to put at the centre of the debate the Ukrainian people and not the Moscow-Brussels-Washington relationship, maybe you would find that there are many more points of contact that points of friction between Russians and Ukrainians, despite the seriousness of the war in Donbass. So, instead of continuing to pull the Ukrainian rope westward or eastward, you might think of an alternative model in which a sovereign and independent Ukraine, aware of its geography, history and of the will of its people, could become a bridge of contact, dialogue and exchange between Russia and Europe instead of a battlefield.

The initiative was implemented due to the support:

“Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms” (UNITER) project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine;

Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine;

“Initiative on the think tanks development in Ukraine”, operated by International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

Sorry, this entry is only available in Ukrainian.