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Adrian Karatnycky, Member of the IWP’s Supervisory Board, for NewsweekUkraine and its allies hope this month’s cease-fire deal with Russia and Russian-backed rebels brings relative calm to southeastern Ukraine. But the Minsk agreement is deeply flawed, and there is every chance it may yet unravel, even if it holds for the short term.\
The accord’s greatest flaw is in letting Russia maintain unsupervised control of Ukraine’s border in the Donbass region until the end of the year. This will mean Russia can freely continue supplying weapons and equipment to locally controlled “people’s militias,” armed formations that will now expressly be permitted under the agreement.

Moreover, while the accord calls for the withdrawal of “foreign armed formations, military equipment and mercenaries,” it creates no effective regime for enforcing a pullout of those Russian military assets from the Kremlin-engineered separatist enclave in the Donbass.

Despite these flaws, the Minsk agreement buys desperately needed time for the United States and other allies of Ukraine to lay essential groundwork to help Ukraine survive Russia’s assault. At a minimum, this will mean helping Ukraine to stabilize its reeling economy, absorb and assist more than 1.6 million people uprooted by the war, and rebuild its defense forces.

Last month’s multifront offensive in Donbass by Russia and its well-armed proxy forces showed their superiority. It helped European leaders recognize that, despite improved training, cohesiveness and equipment, Ukraine’s army is no match for the superior growing arsenal of the aggressor and must be modernized. Still, in the main, most European leaders are nervous about growing support in the U.S. Congress and in the Obama administration for sending lethal defensive weapons.

However, European military support for Ukraine could involve the politically easier step of sending essential components (including dual-use technologies) to help it develop its own weapons systems. But that will not be enough. Ukraine urgently needs anti-tank and other defensive weapons, surveillance drones, advanced counter-battery radar systems and anti-aircraft systems that would raise the costs to the separatists and Russia of new attacks.

U.S. Should Arm Ukrainians

President Barack Obama, therefore, should approve the rapid transfer of weapons to enhance exactly that Ukrainian deterrent capability. At a minimum, he should agree to send such aid quickly in the event all-out warfare resumes. Ukrainian soldiers could be given training in the key weapons systems to be ready to immediately use them.

Crucially, no announcements should be made until weapons are in place and trained Ukrainians are ready to deploy them. A public announcement, coupled with piecemeal delivery of too few weapons, would dangerously fuel Russian propaganda without delivering deterrent firepower.

Western critics of supplying weapons have protested that this would be insufficient to let Ukraine defeat an all-out Russian invasion. That is obvious, but it misunderstands the purpose of such arms: to let Ukraine increase the costs to Russia of a new offensive. Such an improved defense, combined with heavy economic sanctions and Russia’s stalling economy, could be enough over time to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to a lasting peace.

Obama’s decision will rest on whether he concludes that weapons supplies would lead Putin to a disproportionate escalation of Russia’s current war-by-proxy, or even a conventional invasion by regular Russian forces. Escalation is possible; Russia already has escalated its proxy war—in the absence of any Western military aid—by providing heavy weapons, Russian mercenaries, finance and training.

The Limits of Russian Action

The tougher question is whether military aid to Ukraine would trigger a direct invasion. The record of Russia’s engagement in the Donbass war suggests it would not.

According to Ukraine’s armed forces chief, General Viktor Muzhenko, thousands of Russian forces are in southeastern Ukraine but are mostly not engaged in direct combat. Their role is mainly command and training of the separatist militias, intelligence gathering, the operation of long-range artillery and targeting of Ukrainian forces. Russia has only once deployed large military units in direct combat—at Ilovaysk in August, to beat back a Ukrainian offensive that threatened to defeat the proxy forces, which then were weaker and more lightly armed.

Yet even under these rules of engagement, there have been significant Russian casualties, and Putin’s government has taken extreme measures to hide this fact—and the massive Russian military presence in Ukraine—from the Russian people. The Kremlin has kept secret its burials of paratroopers and tank drivers killed in Ukraine; has sent thugs to beat reporters and dissidents who have documented Russian troops’ presence in the war; and has warned dead soldiers’ families not to discuss their losses in public.

The Financial Times reported last month that Putin agreed to an initial cease-fire in September only after Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko threatened to make Russia’s casualties a domestic political issue for Putin. Poroshenko threatened to reveal hundreds of Russian military dog tags that Ukraine’s forces had collected during combat, and to directly inform the mothers of these dead Russian soldiers. (Russia’s “soldiers’ mothers committees” are a potential source of opposition to Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine war.)

Russian Opinion Polls

Repeated Russian opinion polls have underscored the good reason for Putin’s caution. While Russians support a right to independence for Donbass and Russian military help to the proxy “people’s republics” in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, a November 2014 survey found 58 percent of respondents firmly opposed to direct military intervention in Ukraine. Asked whether they would support the participation of family members in combat, 68 percent said no. [See details on Russian polling data below.]

Putin shapes his foreign policies to maintain his domestic support. Amid Russia’s deepening economic decline, he would be loath to ignite a new source of opposition sentiment. Thus Russia is most likely to rely on its recruitment, arming, and financing of proxy forces in Donbass. But with casualties high, the pool from which it can keep sending mercenaries—including its own soldiers “on holiday,” army veterans, ultranationalists and criminals—is not without limit.

No one, of course, can offer absolute guarantees about Putin’s actions, but the overwhelming preponderance of evidence suggests there are limits to Russia’s capacity for escalation. So the quiet provision of weapons and strong financial support to Ukraine—plus tough economic sanctions on Russia—are the best way to establish the greater strategic equilibrium required to push Moscow to a durable peace with Ukraine.

Russian Opinion Polling – A Sample:

Here are a few of the recent findings by prominent Russian public opinion pollsters, as published in Russian media, with links to their sources.

By 58 percent to 23 percent, Russians surveyed opposed a direct role for Russian forces in the Ukraine war (November 2014).

Of Russians surveyed, only 13 percent would support sending their own children to fight in support of the Kremlin-backed separatists in Ukraine (November 2014).

Only 25 percent of Russians believe that their country’s own troops are fighting in Donbass (November 2014).

Deputy Director of the IWP Kateryna Zarembo for EUObserverWhen Euromaidan started over a year ago, there where three main reasons which took the people to the street: brutal violence of the authorities against peaceful demonstrators, Viktor Yanukovytch’s decline to sign the Association Agreement and the demand for change in Ukraine.\
Out of these three public demands only one has been fulfilled. The Association Agreement has been signed by Ukraine’s authorities in two steps: on March 21 and June 27 2014. The Association Agreement was then ratified by Ukraine and the European Parliament on September 16 2014.

It would seem that this step should be trumpeted by Ukraine’s authorities, applauded by the EU and perceived as the triumph of justice by the democratic societies.

It is not.

One reason for this is the war. Putting the Russian aggression to an end and liberating Ukraine’s territories has occupied hearts and minds of people.

The second reason is the joint actions of the EU and Russia, which applied concerted effort to make sure the value and meaning of the Association Agreement is downplayed as much as possible for the Ukrainian people.

DCFTA as a bargaining chip

Let us briefly recall the events accompanying the AA ratification. To begin with, its most important part (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and adaptation of Ukraine’s economy to the European standards) was suspended until 1 January 2016 upon Russia’s insistence. This measure was a direct consequence of the Russian aggression on Ukraine’s territory. The joint statement of EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Klimkin and Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Ulyukayev says that this measure was taken «to be able to fully support the stabilisation of Ukraine» and that «this ongoing process needs to be part and parcel of a comprehensive peace process in Ukraine». Meanwhile, the parties agree «to address concern raised by Russia».

De facto this means that the provisional application of DCFTA is conditional on the establishment of peace in Ukraine, which, in its turn, is dependent on whatever is going on in Vladimir Putin’s head. There is no guarantee that the DCFTA application could not be postponed even further upon Russia’s insistence.

In addition, Kremlin pledged that, in case Kyiv starts the adaptation of Ukraine’s economy to the European standards before January 1, 2016, legislatively or in practice, it would exempt Ukraine from the preferential trade regime with the Customs Union.

Meanwhile, only 14 EU Member States out of 28 have ratified the Agreement. The ratification of each Member State is necessary for the Agreement to come into force. Until then, the Agreement is considered to be partially applied in those areas which pertain to the competence of the European Union (i.e. selected titles and articles). Thus, the EU isn’t even monitoring the AA implementation yet: according to Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Dmytro Shymkiv, «the reform monitoring project» is only being designed in cooperation with the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine.

To sum up, Kyiv, notorious for its reform imitations, has its hands free not to implement their significant part.

Under-carpet reforms

Did Kyiv grab this chance? Not quite.

Immediately after the ratification of the Association Agreement in the Ukrainian Parliament the Implementation Plan for 2014-2017 was approved by the government. Being made up of 488 points, it addresses each clause of the Association Agreement without any exemptions.

Has there been some practical progress? Indeed. It took place even in the economic adaptation sphere, most dreaded by Russia. In particular, three basic laws on technical regulations have been adopted alongside two laws on sanitary and phytosanitary barriers. Importantly, some of these laws were adopted even before the Association Agreement was ratified. The adoption procedure was even faster than it usually takes in Ukraine. Of course, the role of civil society pressure cannot be underestimated in this.

Implementation is the next challenge. The Government Action Plan, adopted in December 2014, is based upon the Association Agreement with the EU alongside the Coalition Agreement. Each minister has a deputy responsible for the European integration of the sector he/she is in charge of. However, no position of the Deputy Prime Minister for European integration has been introduced, thus leaving no executive wholly responsible for the European integration process.

Association Agreement as a security tool

Examining the 488-point Implementation Plan, one more observation comes to mind. 14% of the implementation points pertain to Chapters «Political dialogue and reforms» and «Justice, freedom and security» which hardly make 1% of the Agreement. These include military cooperation, combating terrorism and, ultimately, stressing Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This means that Ukraine sees the Association Agreement as a security, and not only trade and reforming tool.

The question is whether the EU will take up the challenge or pretend it’s Kyiv’s business, as usual.

Carl Bildt, member of the IWP’s Board, Swedish Foreign Minister (2006-2014), for Project SyndicateIt has become something of a mantra among diplomats and other foreign-policy analysts that there is no military solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The only viable path to peace and stability, observers almost unanimously proclaim, is a diplomatic one. But, despite the recent ceasefire agreement announced in Minsk, ongoing violence – reflected in the violent expulsion of Ukrainian forces from the town of Debaltseve – strongly suggests that it is time to consider what is needed to block any Kremlin-imposed military solution.
Three influential American think tanks have already done so, and arrived at the conclusion that the United States should begin supplying Ukraine not only with more non-lethal aid – such as drones, armored Humvees, and medical equipment – but also with “lethal defensive military assistance,” in the form of light anti-armor missiles. European governments, however, remain unwilling to reconsider their position on supplying defensive equipment to Ukraine, and have instead reiterated that a diplomatic solution is the only option.

Of course, from Ukraine’s perspective, a one-on-one military confrontation with Russia is not a viable option. Last year, when separatist forces in the Donbas region appeared to be crumbling under the weight of Ukraine’s counter-offensive, it seemed possible that Ukraine would be able to reassert its sovereignty over the area. But the Kremlin quickly deployed battalion-size tactical groups from the Russian army to support the rebels. Ukraine’s relatively weak forces did not stand a chance.
The move exemplifies Russia’s commitment to do whatever it takes to prevent a military defeat of the separatist entities that it has incited and forged into fighting units – a determination that has endured, even as the conflict has placed considerable strain on its armed forces. Given this, the prospects for Ukraine to reassert control over the Donbas region militarily are so slim that even trying to do so would be foolish.
If one considers the strategic ambitions of the separatists and their Russian patrons, Ukraine’s prospects are even bleaker. Beyond supplying the separatist groups with heavy and advanced weapons, and deploying special units and forces to support them, Russia now appears to be sending in “volunteers” to train a separatist army that could ultimately go on the offensive.
Such an army, separatist leaders hope, will enable them – at the very least – to secure control over the Donbas region. They would then be positioned to secure a “Novorossiya” statelet extending along the entire Black Sea coast, up to and including Odessa. And, in all likelihood, some would even dream of an eventual march into Kyiv.
To prevent this scenario from unfolding, a robust political dialogue with the Kremlin is clearly vital, as are continued economic sanctions to make clear that Russia will pay a rising price for ongoing aggression. But trusting solely in a diplomatic dialogue and sanctions to bring about a lasting peace may be excessively optimistic.
A more comprehensive approach would focus on strengthening Ukraine in every respect. To this end, political and diplomatic support is essential. But perhaps even more important is backing for reforms aimed at eliminating corruption and promoting growth. The recent agreement with the International Monetary Fund is of immediate importance in this respect, and the agreement with the European Union on a Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area is crucial to the country’s long-term transformation.
But if separatist groups, with support from Russia, believe that they can control Donbas and the Black Sea coast, efforts to rebuild Ukraine’s society and economy will amount to little. That is why Ukraine’s external partners must also help to strengthen the country’s defensive capabilities.
In such a charged situation, there will always be hotheads, eager to pursue military options. But the greater concern is the behavior of pragmatists, who identify weaknesses that can be exploited. If the Russian-backed separatists view Ukraine’s defensive capacity as a serious weakness, there will be little to compel them not to push forward in pursuit of their ambitions. A political or diplomatic solution would be next to impossible.
Security experts should identify which actions powers like the US and Europe could take to improve Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. The requests for non-lethal equipment made by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the recent Munich Security Conference could provide some guidance.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and others are clearly right when they say that there is no purely military solution to the conflict in Ukraine. But a year of talks and failed agreements has demonstrated that there is no purely diplomatic solution either. Only by eliminating – or at least seriously diminishing – the potential for the separatists and their Russian backers to continue their military campaign can Ukraine and its partners hope for a lasting political solution.

Adrian Karatnycky, member of the IWP’s Board, for the New York TimesWith a major battle around the rail hub of Debaltseve ending with the withdrawal of Ukrainian government forces, it looks like the tenuous truce in eastern Ukraine may hold. After violence that has left more than 5,600 dead and displaced about 1.6 million people, world leaders hope the cease-fire can be sustained and Ukraine can start to rebuild — even though the Minsk agreement, concluded last week after talks between Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany, is regarded skeptically by many, including some of its European Union architects.Ukraine’s leaders, however, point to one crucial gain: The Minsk agreement treats the Donbass, the eastern region that includes the Donetsk and Luhansk areas declared “people’s republics” by separatist rebels, as an integral part of Ukraine. Officials note that the declaration recognizing their country’s territorial integrity even appears on the Kremlin’s website. Moreover, they say, the agreement makes no reference to the Donetsk and Luhansk republics and speaks of the rebel regions as subjects of Ukrainian law.
The Ukrainian leaders’ guarded optimism may, however, be misplaced. This is not mainly because Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, has shown himself, time and again, to be a deceitful interlocutor, nor because he already has routinely violated Russia’s treaty obligations to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
In this instance, Mr. Putin may be earnest. Russia has been hit hard by Western sanctions, and the growing sentiment for arming Ukraine within the American leadership has raised the prospect of an even higher price for direct intervention. Moreover, unlike other Russia-engineered breakaway statelets like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in Georgia, and Transnistria, in Moldova, the Donbass has suffered severe protracted war, a ruined infrastructure, economic devastation and social dislocation, making Russia’s support for the enclave costly.
Russia has strong reasons to declare a formal respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine minus Crimea, because as a participant in Ukraine’s political institutions, a largely autonomous Donbass may impede the country’s integration into the West.
In a Jan. 27 article in the newspaper Izvestia, Sergei A. Markov, the director of Moscow’s Institute of Political Studies and a reliable guide to the Kremlin’s thinking, called for “a new politics in Ukraine.” Russia, he wrote, “should not be pressing for the autonomy of the Donbass, but for full democracy for all of Ukraine,” in which “state authority in Ukraine should be returned to the entire Ukrainian people.” He laid out a strategy that challenges the legitimacy of Ukraine’s leadership and demands new parliamentary and presidential elections.
A closer look at the Minsk agreement suggests that it contains mechanisms helpful for Russia to resume its pursuit of the bigger quarry: Ukraine itself. First, the accord places immense economic burdens on Ukraine, which is to resume pension payments to the inhabitants of the Russia-backed region. Kiev also takes on the burden of rebuilding the war-ravaged region.
Second, the agreement establishes the right of the Donbass breakaway areas to establish their own people’s militias. Third, the agreement speaks of the withdrawal of foreign fighters, illegal formations and their weapons, but what would prevent these munitions from emerging in the hands of the new militias?
Currently, the separatist eastern enclaves — with a post-conflict population of about three million — are like a modern-day Sparta, armed with prodigious amounts of artillery and more than 500 Russian tanks, many of them far superior to those of Ukraine. That number is greater than the tank arsenals of Germany, Britain or France — and may grow before the Russia-Ukraine border is sealed at the end of 2015, which is the target under the agreement.
Fourth, the agreement creates a powerful fifth column inside Ukraine as the Donbass will have the right to be represented in Ukraine’s legislature. Already, rebel leaders are demanding that Ukraine’s parliament return to the country’s non-bloc status, which is code for renouncing NATO membership aspirations. Pro-Russia voices will be given a platform in the Ukrainian legislature, the Verkhovna Rada, and will participate in the national debate.
This will enable the Kremlin to use the Donbass to resurrect Russian “soft power” in the context of Ukraine’s post-conflict economic crisis. And if deadly clashes, an impasse over constitutional changes or misread intentions undermine the Minsk deal, Mr. Putin seems to believe that adversity and mounting casualties will eventually lead to a collapse of support for Ukraine’s current leaders. He is poised to take political advantage of any reshuffling of the deck.
In short, Mr. Putin’s Minsk gambit is to create a frozen conflict, but unlike those in Georgia or Moldova. Instead of backing proxy statelets, the strategy is to embed the conflict and his fifth column within the Ukrainian state, allowing him to pursue his aims while seeking to lift the costly Western sanctions.
Unappetizing as it may be, this possible return to soft-power struggle, coordinated with the Donbass leaders he helped install, is still a vast improvement over deadly conflict. The West and Ukraine’s leaders should embrace Mr. Putin’s challenge and respond appropriately.
That means maintaining tough economic sanctions while pressing for the withdrawal of the massive Russian military arsenal in eastern Ukraine. If, as the Minsk agreement may allow, a powerful Russian-sponsored military force in eastern Ukraine will soon be granted legitimacy under Ukrainian law, then removing the bulk of weapons will prove difficult. In this case, the West must quietly rebuild and modernize Ukraine’s military capability. This will involve providing direct lethal defensive military aid and training, if necessary by clandestine means. The West must also insist on Ukraine’s right to modernize its military.
The United States and Europe should assist Ukraine’s economic recovery with aid that encourages reform. And the West should organize a donors’ conference to restore the Donbass — and press Russia to bear some of the costs.
It is also up to the European Union and the United States to ensure that any constitutional changes mandated by the Minsk agreement do not block Ukraine’s possible integration into the European Union. At the same time, Ukraine could grant the Donbass decentralized authority that would permit it to enjoy free-trade status with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.
This new Minsk agreement is deeply flawed. It may well break down into a new spiral of deadly warfare, but it is all we have to avert further death and destruction. The West has no choice but to respond intelligently and assertively to Mr. Putin’s new strategy.

Post in blog on “Ukrainska Pravda” by Alyona Getmanchuk, Director of the Institute of World PolicyThis publication is available only in Ukrainian.

Post in blog on “Ukrainska Pravda” by Alyona Getmanchuk, Director of the Institute of World PolicyThis publication is available only in Ukrainian.

Leonid Litra, Senior Research Fellow of the IWP, for “Mirror of the Week”In the Ukrainian society the issue of Transnistria echoes quite often lately. First, the discussion about Transnistria was in the context of Russia’s offensive in Ukraine that might reach the self-proclaimed republic by occupying the southeastern Ukraine. Second, by comparisons about how likely is for occupied Donbas to become a sort of Transnistria. Now, the debate about Transnistria is evolving more towards a possible threat for Ukraine and the potential opening of a second front.

Tiraspol administration and “dughinists” always portrayed Transnistria as a strategic military outpost of the Russian Federation. Yet, the outpost found itself in a difficult situation. As in the case of Donbas in 2014, in the early 1990s Transnistria was promised by their leaders to become a Switzerland, but the reality appeared to be closer to Somalia. The Russian aggression in Ukraine has eroded the status quo in the region and the tension is felt more than ever. The economic situation in Transnistria with about ~70% deficit of GDP is precarious. Out of 700 thousands in the early 1990s the region was depopulated by at least half and the number of pensioners out of those left is about 60%. The economic problems are looming as the social benefits and payments are cut off, the free travel for pensioners in public transport is canceled and most state employees are working on a part-time salary. Most of payments are carried out by Russia that sponsors the region with gas that is not paid, direct funds top-ups for pensions and social allowances and other assistance. Overall, Russia spends at least about 1 billions dollars every year in Transnistria. Now imagine Russia paying the bill for the occupied territory in Donbass which population is about 10 times bigger. Ten billions dollars would be required to keep some very basic living standards, not speaking about how much would be needed to develop the region.

On the background of the rising economic and geopolitical tensions in the region, the Tiraspol administration takes more restrictive measures. The so-called president of Transnistria Evghenii Shevchuk, under the label of fighting the extremism adopted a decision that is directed to oppress any opposition and concentrate the power in his hands. Also, lately he signed a decree that leads to isolation of the region, according to which the citizens of other countries will be entitled to enter the region only by invitation and the entrance will be for fee (however, the so-called MFA of Transnistria specified that the regime of entrance for Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens will remain the same). Russian business also leaves the region. The latest important move is the withdrawal of the Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov who sold to Transitria the Moldovan Metallurgic Factory and sells other business in region.

About a week ago, a Russian media outlet close to Kremlin published an article that says that the Russian refused to offer Transnistria $100 million. Allegedly the reason is that the Russia is not happy with how the money are spend – highlighting the charter flights of Shevchuk to EU – but also refer to economic problems in Russia. It is not the first time when Russia is declining financial support to the region. At least in public there were 2 other cases involving former leader Igor Smirnov.

In Transnistria understand that the Ukrainian factor and the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will be decisive for their existence. Today, the region and the political class are dependent on Ukraine and Moldova. Since Ukraine closed the access for Transnistrian leaders to its territory, these have only one gate to the world that is Chisinau airport.

Currently, Transnistrian authorities are replicating Russian messages and disinformation on the events in Ukraine is widespread. In Transnistria Ukraine is portrayed as threat and potential aggressor, while peace in the region is kept thanks to Russian military presence. The argument of Ukraine as an enemy is boosted by what Transnistrians call (read Russians) a blockade to the region that causes severe economic problems. However, this seem to be cheap political PR aimed at projecting negative image for Ukraine and Moldova, given that the so-called Transnistrian Customs in 2014 regularly reports increase in exports and should a blockade be in place, this would be impossible.

On the other side, many in Ukraine, especially in Odessa, are reflecting on how possible and probable is an attack of Transnistria on Ukraine, having in mind that some 1500 Russian soldiers and up to twelve thousands local soldiers that could be gathered from army and law-enforcement agencies might be used by Russia against Ukraine. The question is indeed serious and one noticed that it is taken as such by Ukraine given the recent deployment of soldiers on the Transnistrian perimeter of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. However, in the current context and form of the conflict an attack form Transnistria is unlikely, given that it would mean a big trouble for the existence of the self-proclaimed republic. Apparently, the only situation when Transnistria will be militarily used – hopefully such as situation will not occur – is an overt large-scale war of Russia against Ukraine. Also, there are serious doubts that the de-facto authorities would like to engage in any military operations, since they see the terrible footage from Donbas and they better spend their time resting in Europe or Maldives than get into any kind of active conflict. However, who pays orders the music, therefore, if Russia will order then no choice is left. Noteworthy that for those who had nothing to loose and are in still in Russian service like Vladimir Antiufeev and Alexader Caraman have participated the project “Novorossia”.

Having little ground to consider seriously a military confrontation between Transnistria and Ukraine one has to pay more attention to the economic puzzle. Despite the aggressive advocacy of Transnistria to become member of the Eurasian Economic Union, the exports of the region are not matching the political purpose. Transnistrian exports are roughly directed to Moldova (right bank – 40%), EU (35%) and Russia (15%), therefore from economic rationale the drift towards Russia-led union is not understandable. The situation might worsen since the new economic environment will take shape beginning with 2016. Moldova already provisionally implements the deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU, while Ukraine is programmed also to start implementation as of 1 January 2016. Transnistria was invited and assisted to the negotiations of the DCFTA between Moldova and the EU. Tiraspol’s proposal to have a separate agreement with the EU was declined for obvious reason, but the concession of the EU was that the Autonomous Trade Preferences were prolonged until the end of 2015. If Transnistria decides not to join under the conditions of EU-Moldova Association Agreement, then it will lose the economic preferences with the EU which will hit even harder the region. The new economic-trade reality combined with efforts of Ukraine, Moldova and the EUBAM to counter smuggling to and from Transnistria will significantly change the viability of the region to withstand to economic hardships.

The Tiraspol’s regime unhappiness over the new realities is increasing. The public opinion in Transnistria is divided, but the level of discontent is growing because of worse economic conditions but also disinformation on issues such as “Moldova and Ukraine are preparing to occupy Transnistria” is widespread. Chisinau public opinion is divided as well regarding the region. Moldova’s authorities seem cautious and moderate, as they understand that soon there might be the case of a rapprochement between the two. Moscow also sent some signals that are weakening Transnistria’s position. First, minister Lavrov mentioned in October 2014 that if Moldova loses its sovereignty or changes its status from neutral to bloc status then Transnistria has the right to take a decision about their future independently, which in fact means that the self-determination does not depend on Transnistria as Tiraspol tries to explain, but depends on factors that are not related to the self-proclaimed republic, therefore, confirming that Transnistria is just a tool for Moscow to hold Moldova tight as intended to create the same from Donbas to hold Ukraine. More recently, the deputy minster of Russian MFA Grigory Karasin declared that Transnistria has to become a rayon with a special status within a unitary Moldova.
In principle the statements are not new, but in the current situation these generate different fears and ideas. First which comes to mind is the possible trade-off between the West and Russia on Western recognition of Crimea as a part of Russia in exchange for reintegration of Transnistria with Moldova. The idea is not fresh, given that in 2008 after the Russian-Georgian war Moscow demonstrated propensity to cooperate with the West on Transnistria and between Germany and Russia even a memorandum (Meseberg) was signed. However, West was right to deny trade-offs and ask Russia to present deeds not words, since from the Budapest Memorandum we know how much a document means for Russia. Therefore the idea of a trade-off Crimea – Transnistria is unlikely.
What seems more realistic is the reintegration of Moldova for the sake of getting under control of Russia the entire Moldova. The balance of pro-European and pro-Russian is almost even and there is a growing discontent of the population with the ruling coalition in Chisinau that is highly corrupted. But because the coalition calls itself pro-European and people’s association of them with the EU, the support for European integration is decreasing. Thus, in a reintegrated country, a serious support of Russia combined with a support of citizens from Transnistrian region will lead to control of Moldova and why no (theoretically) a integration into the Eurasian Union, which would certainly be another constrain for Ukraine.
Kyiv should keep always an eye on the developments in the Transnistrian region and maintain a close cooperation with the authorities in Chisinau that are very supportive of Ukraine. The joint cooperation should have as central elements the trade cooperation / implementation of DCFTA, the reform of the peacekeeping mission into a civilian mission with an international mandate and fighting smuggling across the Transnistrian perimeter, because in the mid term the solution is there and it has to be peaceful.

An interview by Member of the IWP Supervisory Board – former Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt to the EuropeanThe European: Mr. Bildt, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is one of the severest confrontations on European soil since the fall of the Berlin wall. Do you think that a peaceful end is within reach?
Bildt: We are not yet at this stage. The crisis is still at a stage where you don’t know how it will eventually play out. Right now, it’s still a struggle between ideas and interests and we are not yet in a position to tell when or how this conflict is coming to an end.

The European: While it might be difficult to predict what the outcome will be, many commentators argue that the origins of the conflict can be traced back to the EU’s enlargement towards the East in 2004. What is your take on that?
Bildt: I don’t agree because Russia doesn’t have any rights over other sovereign countries. The nations that joined the EU in 2004 did so because they wanted to become a part of that political family. Many of them also decided to join NATO, and those countries that are still considering joining. Finland, for example, should be free to do so without outside interference. Russia doesn’t have the right to limit the sovereignty of other nations. Just like Germany doesn’t have the right to mingle in the internal affairs of its neighboring countries.

The European: These nations had every right to join but the question is: was it a smart move on behalf of the EU? Clearly, one was aware that Russia would consider it an act of aggression.
Bildt: It is also often argued that the prospect of Georgia joining NATO was one of the things that triggered the Russo-Georgian war. But in my opinion, NATO membership for Georgia was never really on the table. The Georgians wanted it and still want it but I don’t think anybody really sees that as a realistic prospect. Bear in mind that the Georgian War played a significant role in what happened subsequently. I think and have heard from many Russian friends that the fairly mild Western reaction to the Georgian War made it possible for people in Moscow to think that their actions in Ukraine would be met with equally mild reactions. But that was a clear miscalculation. The big lesson that the EU drew from the Georgian conflict is that we have to be more engaged in our neighborhood. In the same year – 2008 – the Mediterranean Union was being discussed as an option to engage in that region. The Eastern Partnership came into being, designed as a more forward-leaning policy framework. Prior to this, our policy was almost exclusively centered on Russia. We focused on meeting with the Russians but neglected the countries closer to us. That, we realized, we needed to change.

The European: Are we now making up for it?
Bildt: Our focus has shifted and there is much more engagement with the countries in question. But the situation in Ukraine was a bit different. After the Orange Revolution in 2004, the country was too preoccupied with internal squabbles and wasn’t ready for the sort of cooperation that could have restructured its economy. Europe could be helpful in that respect.

“We have a bandwidth problem”

The European: You previously criticized the West for having been too preoccupied with other conflicts, notably Syria, while neglecting the situation Ukraine. Does that still hold true and are we leaving Putin with too much room to maneuver?
Bildt: I hope not! But it is important to understand that we have a bandwidth problem. The global situation is exceedingly complicated – also in Europe’s direct neighborhood. The question is: do we have the capacity and the willingness to deal with all these problems simultaneously and with equal resolution? I don’t have an answer for that question but I know that we must develop this capacity. These conflicts are happening and they are affecting us. But it is true that when Russia started to exert increasing pressure on Ukraine, the focus of the West lay on Syria and the Iranian nuclear arms issue. We shouldn’t neglect these issues but we need to be able to address more than one or two issues at the same time.

The European: The problem is that the West needs Russia to address certain conflicts together – while at the same time it needs to confront Russia itself.
Bildt: As a member of the Security Council, Russia clearly has a lot of leverage. So progress to some extent depends on Russia’s willingness to cooperate. But we must not forget that Russia’s policies – at least in its neighboring countries – aren’t always benevolent, to put it mildly.

The European: Is progress even possible under these circumstances?
Bildt: I think it is. Look at the Iran nuclear talks: Russia is eager to demonstrate that there are other areas in which it is more willing to cooperate. It’s not easy to learn to deal with Russia. We are confronted with a revisionist, reactionary Russia that is trying to do things in Europe that clash with our values and interests. But Russia is not the only powerful state we have to find ways to get along with. We are not in love with the Chinese government – to put it mildly – but we need to cooperate with them if we want progress.

The European: Aren’t you afraid that the world will again be split into two blocs: The West on the one side and Russia, China and other states that side with them on the other one?
Bildt: There is a rupture between Russia and the West but we are not to blame for this. Russia follows its interests and they often run counter to ours. To answer your question: I am not afraid of the prospect of Russia and China cooperating because it is a natural thing to look towards the East. Everybody is doing it, everybody is talking about the pivot towards the East.

The European: Last summer, “Foreign Affairs” published an article arguing that the NATO should be dissolved and a new security treaty that would include Russia set up. That way, the piece argues, we can effectively combat global problems like militant Islamism. What’s your take on this?
Bildt: That would be highly destabilizing. One of the aims of NATO expansion was to make the former Soviet satellite states feel comfortable and secure about their future. These states have a troubled relationship with Russia and NATO’ s security guarantee made it possible for these countries to start developing a normal relationship with Russia. The events of the last year have been a huge blow in this respect, especially for the three Baltic countries. Without NATO’s security guarantee, these small countries would feel threatened by Russian aggression. Dissolving NATO now would be seen as a concession to Moscow – and would destabilize the whole region between Germany and Russia.

The European: Is Russia even interested in solving global problems like militant Islamism?
Bildt: I would go even further and argue that fighting militant Islamism is more of a concern to Russia than it is to us. We forget that there is an armed conflict going on in Chechnya and that Russia has often been the victim of terrorist attacks. If I were a security planner in the Kremlin, that would be my focus – not Ukraine. It’s not rational to focus on the Western borders when the country’s Eastern and Central borders are so insecure.

“Russia would like the EU to vanish”

The European: Many pundits say that Germany or Angela Merkel is Europe’s best bet when it comes to negotiating with Putin. Do you agree?
Bildt: That has certainly developed to be the case, I agree. Many would desire an institution like the EU to lead the way but, that is not the case. We must not overlook the fact that we have a German chancellor who speaks Russian and a Russian president who speaks German.

The European: We recently interviewed journalist Anne Applebaum, who argued that the prospect of Germany and Russia negotiating the future of Europe evokes a sense of unease in many European countries.
Bildt: I agree – but I don’t think that the German government gains any advantages from its negotiation. Somebody has to take the lead and Germany is well positioned to do so. Russia would like the EU to vanish from the political map and make a deal with Germany. Putin recently said that the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” wasn’t a very bad idea – that’s a frightening statement.

The European: The West has already taken a number of measures to push Putin into giving in. So far, nothing seems to work. What is the next step that needs to be taken?
Bildt: We need to help Ukraine, that must be our prime objective. Of all the former Soviet satellite states, it is the one that the West has neglected the most. We now see that the country is changing. I visited the Maidan a couple of times and the young people that protested there are the first post-Soviet generation. They are extremely well educated and they are the driving force behind the change the country so badly needs. These are the people that we need to support.

The European: Is an EU membership foreseeable for the country?
Bildt: Of course it is. The EU is open to everybody – even Russia. But of course, any state that wants to join needs to meet certain criteria and that might still take a long time before Ukraine is strong enough to meet all of these. Closing the door on Ukraine would be extremely counterproductive and dangerous.

The European: Have you met with Putin in person?
Bildt: Yes, several times but never in this context.

The European: What is your impression of him?
Bildt: He is a determined leader. He has a different background than most Western leaders and that is noticeable.

The European: Would you call him a European?
Bildt: Yes, because I think that all Russians are. Russia is a large country but it is a European country – no doubt about that. Russia is a special case because it is so vast and has a lot of problems with its borders…

The European: So does Germany..
Bildt: But that’s different! There is a telling story to this: I knew Helmut Kohl quite well and remember an occasion where the two of us had dinner with Jean-Claude Juncker. And Kohl, who is an expert when it comes to European history, told us about the atrocities the Germans did to Luxembourg during the Second World War. Things worse than what they did in Poland, much worse. Not even Juncker knew about this and he is very well read on this topic. The lesson of the story was that Germany must never be so strong that the smallest of its neighbors has to be fearful. The same goes for Russia as well.

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