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Repercussions of the Ukraine Crisis for Moldova

Senior research fellow of the IWP Leonid Litra “Moldova: A Sinuous Road to Europe”Moldova, a neighbor of Ukraine and home to one of the frozen conflicts nurtured by Russia (in Transnistria) is one of the smaller countries in which the crisis in Ukraine has had substantial effects. Decision-makers in Chisinau are seriously concerned about the potential threats the crisis may pose for Moldova, while at the same time keeping them from dominating the domestic agenda and public discussion. Their concern is to avoid further complications on the Transnistrian issue and in its relationship with Russia.\
Moldova’s relations with Russia were tenuous even before the crisis broke out in Ukraine. Over the past two years, Moscow became increasingly vocal about Moldova, most notably through the flamboyant statements of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who repeatedly indicated Moscow’s dislike of Moldova’s association with the EU. According to Rogozin, “Moldova’s train en route to Europe would lose its cars in Transnistria.”
He threatened that Moscow would recognize Transnistria’s independence, should Chisinau sign the Association Agreement with the EU, which had been negotiated for the past three years and was initialed in November 2013 at the Vilnius summit (and formally signed on June 27, 2014).In order to deflect Russian spin and propaganda on the effects of the Association Agreement and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) on the Transnistrian region, the government of Moldova astutely invited representatives of the Tiraspol de-facto administration, the secessionist administration in Transnistria, to take part in the negotiations over the Agreement. Their presence at the negotiations, however, did not change their attitudes toward Chisinau.

Effects of the Crisis

When the crisis in Ukraine erupted, Moldovan officials took a very prudent position. The parliament adopted a declaration on Euromaidan, which was quite balanced, only after a second attempt. Prime Minister Leanca’s government, a coalition of pro-European parties, openly condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which for many in Moldova had parallels with Transnistria. The Moldovan prime minister visited Kyiv on March 17, 2014, on the first days after the new Ukrainian government was invested, in order to reinvigorate Moldovan-Ukrainian cooperation and to coordinate action on European integration, namely the implementation of the countries’ respective Association Agreements. In addition, there is strong cooperation on Moldovan-Ukrainian border security, especially on the Transnistrian perimeter.

The pretext used by Russia to justify its actions in Ukraine, that of “defending” the Russian-speaking minority and its right to self-determination, was also used to refer to Moldova by the Russian media, extensively watched and listened to in Moldova. Separatist movements, allegedly supported by Russia, gained more momentum and intensified their claims to independence, as the Moldovan government proceeded with the association process with the EU. Despite the fact that these movements are marginal, their claims on the need to organize referendums on joining the Customs Union garnered support from pro-Russian media, which distorts the magnitude of these movements. In addition, some of the separatist movements deployed an active paid television campaign in favor of the Customs Union. On February 2, 2014, the Gagauz autonomous region held a referendum on membership in either the EU or the Eurasian Customs Union.

The region is inhabited by a Christian Orthodox, Turkic-speaking ethnic minority, representing about 4.5 percent of the population of Moldova. The referendum was declared illegal by Moldovan central authorities, as it was organized in violation of Moldovan laws. The results, however, merit attention, as 98 percent of Gagauzes voted for Moldova’s integration into the Russian-led Customs Union, and an equal percentage supported independence of Gagauzia, “should Moldova lose its sovereignty.” The leaders of the Gagauz autonomous region have interpreted “loss of sovereignty” as the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, and it was explained to the population in this way. Moldovan authorities are trying to explain that the signing of the Association Agreement will not result in any loss of sovereignty, but they face an uphill battle. Their message is less spectacular and their means are far less efficient than those of the Russian propaganda machine.

Moldova tried to de-escalate the conflict with the Gagauz authorities and did not prosecute any of those involved in the organization of the illegal referendum, despite the central government initiating criminal proceedings to avoid being portrayed as passive. Chisinau also demonstrated its openness to dialogue by creating a joint commission to discuss the issues standing between the central government and the Gagauz region. However, this commission should not raise high hopes of a solution, as the main aim of Gagauz authorities is to block Moldova’s EU association. At present, talks continue despite the threats of Gagauz leaders to hold a new referendum, this time one for independence. Russia is openly supportive of Gagauz actions. In March of this year, Russian authorities lifted the ban on wine companies located in the Gagauz region, in addition to offering a 35-50 percent discount in the price of gas supplied to the region. Once Moscow realized Transnistria did not hold enough significance to spoil Moldova’s Association Agreement, it resorted to using Gagauzia for this purpose.

Transnistria’s Response to the Ukraine Crisis In the first few months of the Ukraine crisis, Transnistrian leaders adopted a cautious and silent position. Then, on April 16, 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, they quickly claimed independence and announced their desire to join the Russian Federation. A declaration to this effect was adopted unanimously in the de facto parliament of Transnistria, motivated by the 2006 referendum in which 97 percent of voters in Transnistria voted to join Russia, which was actually put on hold by the Russian authorities themselves. Tiraspol authorities have since been obediently followed Russia’s lead and have clamored about the supposed blockade of Transnistria by Ukraine and Moldova, who, Russia claimed, denied entry to citizens from Transnistria holding Russian passports. In fact, the total number of Russian citizens denied entry in Ukraine on the Moldova-Ukraine border on Transnistrian perimeter during January-March 2014 was 62, while Moldovan authorities turned away only one Russian citizen during this time period.

This allegation proved to be just another attempt by Russia to artificially escalate tensions on the southwestern flank of Ukraine. Russia responded to the Transnistrian plea for annexation with indifference. Should Russia decide to follow course, annexation could be accomplished through a mere bureaucratic move, as Chisinau lacks any control over the region and Russian troops have been present in Transnistria for 23 years, albeit as so-called “peace-keeping forces.” However, Transnistrian annexation is not advantageous for Russia. Unlike Crimea, Transnistria does not have any natural resources or a physical connection with Russia. Rather, it is in Russia’s interests to maintain the current situation, as its presence in the region is useful as a means to control Chisinau’s actions, especially in regard to European integration. Moreover, according to the de facto speaker of the Transnistrian parliament, Russia’s financial support in the region reaches $1 billion every year, which includes grants, humanitarian aid, joint projects, and top-ups for pensioners, basically financing the region’s budget deficit, which is around 60 percent of GDP. From an economic point of view, it would be in Transnistria’s interests to accept the DCFTA, given that about 70 percent of goods produced in Transnistria go to the right bank of the Dniester River (Moldova) and onwards to the EU, while only about 18 percent go to Russia. In the same logic, Chisinau canceled taxes for companies from Transnistria that are registered in Chisinau, attempting to raise their interest in the free trade agreement with the EU. Yet politics in the region do not necessarily follow economic rationale.

The Ukrainian crisis has increased the polarization of the Moldovan society, heightening both pro- and anti-Russian sentiments. Thirty-nine percent of Moldovans condemn the Russian action in Crimea, while 40 percent consider the annexation a legitimate action. Only a slim majority in the Parliament has condemned Russian aggression, and there have been attempts by persons associated with Russia to overturn this majority through bribes to MPs in the governmental coalition. Moldovan officials, as well as the population at large, fear future similar attempts that would create serious problems in the process of ratification of the Association Agreement.

As things stand now, Russia does not need to take severe action in Moldova to derail its European course, as the Moldovan domestic situation serves Russian purposes well. A reversal from the AA is still possible in Moldova. According to the same poll quoted earlier, only 29 percent of Moldovans support the country’s full European integration, while an almost equal percentage supports the Customs Union. One-third of the population remains undecided.

With parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2014, there is a high risk that the Communist party, an advocate of membership into the Customs Union and supported by 30 percent of the population, may win. As they have already stated, once in office, they would negate or simply not implement the Association Agreement that was signed in Brussels on June 27, 2014. All Russia needs to do in order to maintain its interests of keeping Moldova in its orbit is to help the Communists and other emerging parties return to power. There is no need for military intervention or major actions. Russia’s infamous propaganda machinery will be very useful in this process. Moldovans are avid consumers of Russian media, which abounds with stories about the disadvantages of European integration and the benefits of the Customs Union. In addition to Transnistria and the Communist party, Russia has yet additional leverage over Moldova: Moldovan migrants in Russia. In a quid-pro-quo reaction to the visa-free regime extended to Moldova by the EU in April 2014, Russia threatened to introduce visas for Moldovan citizens. In practice, it would expel around 200,000 Moldovans who currently live and work in Russia.

For a country of 3.5 million, this is an enormous number to be reintegrated, and a serious hit for a large part of the Moldovan population, which relies on remits from Russia. In 2013, Russia imposed an embargo on Moldovan wines declaring that they did not meet Russian quality standards. Further testing of the wines, including tests performed by French laboratories, did not indicate deviations from international standards, yet the wine embargo remains in place. Compared to the 2006 wine embargo previously imposed by Russia, economic losses now are much smaller. While the 2006 embargo affected 75 percent of the Moldovan wine producers, this number dropped to 35 percent under the 2013 embargo, due to Moldova’s redirection of exports to Europe.

The wine embargo has had several effects. First, in reaction to Russia’s actions, the EU unilaterally liberalized the wine market for Moldovan producers. Second, given the new openness of the European market, Moldovan GDP, which had already grown by 8.9 percent in 2013, has increased in the first trimester of 2014 by 3.6 percent compared to the same period in 2013. Third, most of the producers who suffered in 2006 understood that they need markets free of political influence and started searching for them, making Russia lose another lever over Moldova.

What the EU Could Do
The EU, for its part, invested much hope in the new Moldovan government that took office on May 30, 2013 after a serious crisis within the governing alliance. Although several government actions are still inconsistent with the European agenda, the government of Iurie Leanca has taken
concrete steps in certain reforms, and has made important efforts to speed up the initialing and the signing of the Association Agreement, despite the EU’s continued warning that such logistical preparations require sufficient time. Only after the Armenian reversal and the Ukrainian refusal to sign the Agreement in November 2013 did the EU find faster and more efficient ways to achieve the signature of the agreement, achieved on June 27, 2014.
Ahead of the successful signing of Moldova’s Association Agreement on June 27, 2014, the EU and Moldova have worked together to prevent a diabolical scenario that would be illustrated by Moldova’s failure to sign or ratify the agreement, as well as to show the concrete results and benefits of their cooperation. One step in this direction is the visa-free regime that the EU extended to Moldova as of April 28, 2014. To Chisinau’s credit, this agreement was achieved after a set of painful reforms they bravely implemented. The EU is also visibly active in rebuilding Moldovan infrastructure, which has had direct impact on the population. Yet these efforts are not sufficient to counterbalance the strong influence exercised by the Russian media in Moldova, which spins all success stories presented by Moldova and the EU. At the same time, both the Moldovan government and the EU have been shy about selling their narrative to the Moldovan populace, and consequently risk losing the campaign for hearts and minds.

The United States has also shown a renewed interest in Moldova after the Ukrainian crisis, reiterating its support for the country’s European course and for a solution to the Transnistrian conflict. But beyond symbolic gestures and bold statements, which are of undeniable importance, more practical cooperation is needed, especially in the area of security sector reform. At this point, it will have to be outside the NATO framework, as the Moldovan constitution provides for its neutrality, and challenging this in the current context would only aggravate the situation in the region. Moldova may use the experiences of military cooperation between the Alliance and non-NATO countries such as Sweden, Austria, and Finland as models.

Moldovans were distressed to see their defense minister, Vitalie Marinuta, resign right at the peak of Ukraine crisis. Significantly, this post has remained vacant throughout the Russian operations in and annexation of Crimea. Moldovan decision-makers perceive the current crisis and Russian actions in the region as part of a game played above their league, one that is a problem to be resolved between Russia, the EU, and the United States. Therefore, they feel that the West should establish deterrence mechanisms to prevent Russia from taking further actions. Since the crisis is indeed wider and deeper than Ukraine and the region, the Moldovan government must take the Ukraine crisis more seriously, and it should be more vigilant to minimize its effects at home.

Fortunately, Moldova is not at imminent risk of a Ukrainian scenario, as the upcoming elections have moved Russian focus from hard to soft power, giving Moldova some time to pursue its European path and interests. Thus, the Moldovan government should use this time to work toward electing pro-European parties, while also preparing for an alternative post-election situation. There are two scenarios that would help to avoid instability after elections. In the first, Moldova would receive a very strong commitment from the EU, which the United States would back, just as it did with the Baltic states, standing up for them against Russia. This commitment should be a clear membership prospective for Moldova, beyond allusions to Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty and various statements meant to distract from such a commitment. While this scenario cannot be controlled by Chisinau, as it lies outside of its decision-making powers and gives the EU the lead in ensuring stability in the country, it may be the Moldovan government’s best choice. In the second scenario, within the powers of Chisinau, Moldova would obtain security guarantees from Russia that it would not be the next Ukraine. This possible outcome would come at a high cost for Moldova, most probably at the cost of federalization by reanimating and updating the “Kozak” plan, which implies a slowing of its relations with the EU, as well as a mechanism to block strategic decisions of Moldova.

Sooner or later, Russia will confront Moldova and the smaller country will have to deal with the issue of its own stability. The events in Ukraine have broken the status quo in the region and the consequences are still unfolding.

The article is a part of the publication “Regional repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis. Challenges for the Six Eastern Partnership Countries”. The full text of the publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications.

The publication was suppurted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)

Getmanchuk: Poroshenko was Elected as a Crisis Manager, not as a Diplomat

Director of the IWP Alyona Getmanchuk gave a comment to the New York TimesPutin Warns Again of Force as Ukraine Fighting SpreadsThe simmering standoff in eastern Ukraine exploded into warfare early Tuesday, pushing the conflict to a dangerous new phase and prompting President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia to warn again that he reserves the right to use force to defend Russian-speaking citizens.
Government forces unleashed ground assaults and air bombardments throughout the region, including heavy artillery shelling around the rebel-controlled city of Slovyansk and pitched battles for control of administrative buildings in Donetsk. The attacks began shortly after President Petro O. Poroshenko declared an end to a 10-day cease-fire and ordered government forces to renew their effort to quash a pro-Russian separatist insurrection in the east.
The recharged government offensive followed two days of conference calls with the leaders of Russia, France and Germany that failed to yield concrete steps toward a peace agreement, and came as Mr. Poroshenko accused Mr. Putin of talking about peace while arming and encouraging the separatists.

Ukraine has been in turmoil since last November, when President Viktor F. Yanukovych spurned a trade deal with the European Union in favor of a $15 billion loan and other concessions from Russia. Mr. Yanukovych was driven from office in the ensuing demonstrations, and after Mr. Putin seized Crimea in March, the separatist rebellion began brewing in the east, which has historically close ties with Russia.
While President Obama and European leaders have joined Ukraine in accusing Moscow of creating and sustaining the rebellion in eastern Ukraine, Mr. Putin blamed the West for the troubles there and talked broadly about protecting Russians outside the country’s borders.
“I would like to make it clear to all: This country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means — from political and economic to operations under international humanitarian law and the right of self-defense,” Mr. Putin said.
In the speech, the Russian president chastised Mr. Poroshenko for ending the cease-fire and urged renewed peace negotiations. But Mr. Putin also described the economic sanctions against Russia by the United States and its allies as “blackmail” and said the West had precipitated the conflict in Ukraine by blithely ignoring Russia’s interests for years.
At least 27 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed in clashes with rebels since Mr. Poroshenko announced the unilateral cease-fire on June 20, putting heavy political pressure on him to resume military action and cut off negotiations with the rebels, viewed as terrorists by many Ukrainians. Even some supporters of Mr. Poroshenko disapproved of his discussions with Mr. Putin, who is widely reviled after the invasion and annexation of Crimea this year.
European leaders issued an ultimatum to Russia last week, demanding it do more to end the violence caused by the separatists. But attacks on government forces had continued, and with a Monday deadline passing with no progress toward a peace deal and no indication that the Europeans were prepared to move ahead with new sanctions, Mr. Poroshenko decided to end the cease-fire.
There were reports of heavy shooting and bombardments all across eastern Ukraine on Tuesday, including civilian casualties. Gunfire cracked in the center of the regional capital of Donetsk, where rebels and government forces fought for control of the Interior Ministry headquarters and a police building came under attack by the separatists.
In the city of Kramatorsk, to the north, four people were killed when a minibus came under artillery fire, Ukrainian news agencies reported.
In a significant victory for the government, Ukrainian forces retook control of a checkpoint at Dolzhansky, in the Luhansk region, one of three important border crossings with Russia that had been seized by rebels. European leaders demanded on Friday that the crossings be surrendered to Ukrainian authorities.
Mr. Poroshenko issued a statement congratulating his troops for reclaiming the border checkpoint. Overnight, there were reports that two explosions damaged railroad lines in the east. A television tower serving the besieged city of Slovyansk was destroyed by artillery fire. Photographs posted on the Internet showed the metal lattice of the tower reduced to a tangled pile of rubble.
The resumption of military operations was cheered by many supporters of the Ukraine government. In Kiev, Alyona Getmanchuk, the director of the Institute of World Policy, a research organization, said that by engaging in protracted peace talks even as soldiers continued to be killed, Mr. Poroshenko had failed to live up to campaign promises that he would not negotiate with terrorists and that he would swiftly crush the insurrection.
“He was elected as a crisis manager, not as a diplomat, and even before elections he said that antiterror operations should last hours, not days or months or weeks,” Ms. Getmanchuk said in an interview. “People liked it and people thought he would be very decisive and he would resolve the problem within a couple of days, maximum weeks.”
Mr. Putin, in a speech to diplomats in Moscow on Tuesday, said that he and other leaders had sought to persuade Mr. Poroshenko to continue the cease-fire during the conference call on Monday, but that the Ukrainian leader had chosen war and would now bear personal responsibility for the outcome.
While Mr. Putin reiterated his pledge to defend Russian-speaking people wherever they live, he did not threaten any imminent military action or announce any redeployment of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border, as he has in other instances when tensions flared.

“Unfortunately, President Porosehnko has resolved to resume military action,” Mr. Putin said. “We failed — when I say ‘we,’ I mean my colleagues in Europe and myself — we failed to convince him that the road to a secure, stable and inviolable peace cannot lie through war.”
Mr. Putin added, “Now he has taken the full responsibility for this, and not only military responsibility, but also political.”
Secretary of State John Kerry told his Russian counterpart on Tuesday that the United States supported Ukraine’s right of self-defense and put the blame for the renewed fighting on the separatists.
In a telephone call with Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, Mr. Kerry, “expressed strong concern about the refusal of Russian-supported separatists to take the necessary steps” that “would have enabled an extension of the cease-fire,” the State Department said. Mr. Kerry also called on Russia to stop sending arms to the separatists.
Dmytro Tymchuk, a military analyst close to the Ukrainian government, praised Mr. Poroshenko’s decision to end the cease-fire, saying that the one-sided adherence to the truce by the Ukrainian military had only strengthened rebel forces, allowing them to rearm and regroup.
“Every day the truce, whatever its political significance, provided tangible reinforcement to the terrorists from a military point of view,” Mr. Tymchuk wrote on Facebook, adding, “A longer truce period would give terrorists a chance to drastically increase their combat readiness.”
The United States and its NATO allies have accused Russia of sending tanks, artillery and other weapons to the rebels, and of allowing fighters from Russia to cross the border to join rebel militias. Some rebel leaders had demanded a complete withdrawal of government troops from eastern Ukraine as a precondition for formal peace negotiations.
The Russian Foreign Ministry released a statement saying that peace negotiations should resume immediately and blamed the Ukrainian government for the failure of previous talks.
“We are convinced that the efforts to put the situation back on the negotiation track should be continued, including an urgent meeting of the contact group,” the ministry said. “We will assist this in every way.”

Getmanchuk: The Level of Impatience in Society is Very High

Director of the IWP Alyona Getmanchuk gave a comment to the Associated PressUkraine’s President Shakes Up Military Leadership\
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko shook up his faltering military Thursday, appointing a new defense minister and top general while speaking angrily about the years of decay and corruption that left the forces unable to deal effectively with the well-armed eastern insurgency.

His tougher tone, analysts say, reflects public pressure to continue the fight against the insurgents in the regions bordering Russia— even with a rickety military that’s had little success.

Poroshenko denounced the “complete collapse” of the government’s ability to supply the armed forces in a sometimes angry, finger-wagging speech in parliament.

He won quick approval for his choice of former top police official Valery Heletey as defense minister, replacing Mikhailo Koval. He also tapped Lt. Gen. Viktor Muzhenko as chief of the military’s general staff and Yury Kosyuk, an agriculture magnate and one of Ukraine’s richest men, to oversee defense issues in the presidential administration and to help “purge the army of thieves and grafters.” Accusations of corruption have been rife as Kiev’s operation against the rebels continues.

“Today the revival of the army is starting from scratch, an army which is capable of fighting and winning,” Poroshenko said in parliament.

Poroshenko’s shakeup underscores the complex job he faces of making peace overtures and at the same time suppressing the insurgency that threatens to tear his country apart or create a permanent twilight zone beyond government control.

Other pressures come from outside: Ukraine and the West say Russia is helping arm the rebels and letting its citizens cross the border to fight, while key allies France and Germany are pushing Poroshenko to pursue talks over attacks.

President Barack Obama consulted with German Chancellor Angela Merkel by phone Thursday about how to get peace talks back on track. The White House said they discussed diplomatic efforts to bring about a lasting ceasefire and agreed that the U.S. and Europe should levy further costs on Russia if it doesn’t de-escalate the situation quickly.

Poroshenko’s forceful words and demeanor Thursday contrasted with his emphasis on starting a peace process voiced in his inaugural address June 7. He declared a unilateral cease-fire for 10 days in hopes rebels would lay down their arms and join talks. But the cease-fire was repeatedly violated and ultimately expired. Foreign ministers from Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France are pushing to get talks going again by Saturday, with the aim of achieving a cease-fire honored by both sides.

Rebels in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, where more Russian speakers live, have declared independence and occupied government buildings. The insurrection, in which more than 400 people have died, started after pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych was driven from office by a protest movement among people wanting closer ties with the European Union instead of Russia. Russia called Yanukovych’s ouster a coup by radical nationalists and seized Ukraine’s Russian-speaking Crimea region.

Poroshenko was elected in a special election May 25 to replace Yanukovych and faces high expectations.

“The level of impatience in society is very high,” said Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Institute of World Policy research institute in Kiev. “They want to see results.”

Getmanchuk said Poroshenko is careful to meet with a wide range of people, a habit he cultivated when serving as foreign minister in an earlier government, and knows what people are thinking. News media and traffic on social media urge action.

The mood was underscored when members of volunteer battalions demonstrated in front of his office, demanding an end to the cease-fire.

Getmanchuk cautioned that much of the desire for action is based on fear of Russia and anger at the loss of life suffered already, and “doesn’t consist of serious analysis of possible consequences.”

In Donetsk many people just want the fighting to be over. The city center was the scene of a gunfight in broad daylight Tuesday when separatists from the self-described Donetsk People’s Republic attacked a police building,

“We are tired of war. Our only wish is for all of this to be over so we can work in peace,” said Anton Orlets, a 58-year-old businessman. He expressed “hope that the new appointments will help the Ukrainian army achieve success, which so far has not been terribly noticeable in Donbass.”

Nadezhda Grishko, a 32-year-old shop assistant, said she was “afraid that they will start bombing the east even harder to show their success in the operation to the Kiev government. But the harder they press us, the stronger the Donetsk People’s Republic will become.”

Vadim Karasev, director of the Institute for Global Strategies in Kiev, said that Poroshenko “is facing pressure from below. “

“Society is demanding results, a continuation of the revolution, completion of the anti-terrorist operation” – the official term for the battle against the separatists.

Heletey’s background in the police is significant, said Karasev, and Poroshenko “understands that a military official should not head the ministry, because the military is becoming stronger and seeking political influence.”

He said the task will be nothing less than to “to create a Ukrainian national army from scratch.”

Volodymyr Fesenko, director of the Penta Center of Applied Political Studies in Kiev, said that it was no accident that Poroshenko, who grew wealthy building a candy company, chose an official from the business world in Kosyuk. “One of the main problems with the anti-terrorist operation is lack of resources and chaos,” he said.

“Kosyuk has been a successful manager and may help fix the situation,” he said.

Associated Press

“Who is Our Friend in the EU?”

Institute of World Policy has released the results of expert survey “Who is our friend in the EU?”42 Ukrainian experts took part in the survey. They evaluated the level of support for Ukraine of each EU member state for Ukraine using a ten point scale. The survey was conducted from 12 to 19 June 2014.

Survey Results
1. Poland 392 (2 experts undecided)

2. Lithuania 376 (2 experts undecided)

3. Sweden 354 (1 undecided)

4. Latvia 316 (2 undecided

5. Britain 308

6. Estonia 298 (3 undecided)

7. Republic 283

8. 262 Germany

9. Slovakia 242 (1 undecided)

10. Finland 235 (4 undecided)

11. 217 France

12. Romania 216 (4 undecided)

13. Austria 215 (1 undecided)

14. Croatia 206 (6 undecided)

15. The Netherlands 202 (3 undecided)

16. Slovenia 193 (5 undecided)

17. Spain 185 (7 undecided)

18. Luxembourg 185 (10 undecided)

19. Hungary 182 (2 undecided)

20. Portugal 179 (7 undecided)

21. Denmark 175 (6 undecided)

22. Italy 167 (3 undecided)

23. Bulgaria 165 (2 undecided)

24. Belgium 163 (5 undecided)

25. Greece 139 (5 undecided)

26. Ireland 135 (12 undecided)

27. Malta 96 (13 undecided)

28. Cyprus 95 (10 undecided)

EXPERTS

1. Lyubov Akulenko, Director of the European Program, Centre UA
2. Vitaliy Bala, Director, Agency for Modeling Situations
3. Olena Bekrenyova, Director, Bohdan Havrylyshyn Charitable Foundation
4. Natalya Belitser, Expert, Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy
5. Volodymyr Dubovyk, director, Centre of International Studies, Odesa Mechnikov National University (Odesa)
6. Rostyslav Dzundza, Head of Public Social Forum, Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum
7. Volodymyr Horbach, Political Analyst, Institute for Euro-Atlantic cooperation
8. Larysa Ivshyna, Editor-in-Chief, Newspaper “The Day”
9. Igor Kogut, Chairman of the Board, Agency for Legislative Initiatives
10. Oleh Kokoshynskiy, Deputy Head, Ukraine-NATO Civic League
11. Ihor Koliushko, Head of the Board, Centre for political and legal reforms
12. Valeriy Kravchenko, Expert, Center of International Security
13. Valentyn Krasnoperov, Political Analyst; Aspirant, Donetsk National University
14. Ostap Kryvdyk, political scientist
15. Kostyantyn Kvurt, Head of Executive Board, “Internews – Ukraine”
16. Kateryna Levchenko, president, International Women’s rights center “La Strada – Ukraine”
17. Yulia Lymar, Editor-in-Chief, Information-Analytical Agency “Glavcom”
18. Anatoliy Martsynovskiy, Journalist, “Gazeta po-ukrainsky”
19. Vasyl Moysiyenko, Centre for European and Ero-atlantic Integration, National Bohdan Khmelnytsky University of Cherkasy (Cherkasy)
20. Taras Mykhalniuk, Director, Open Ukraine Foundation
21. Volodymyr Ohryzko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2007-2009)
22. Oleksandr Palii, Political Expert
23. Plotnikov Oleksiy, Doctor of Economics, Professor, Honored Economist of Ukraine
24. Potyekhin Oleksandr, Director, Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine
25. Kyryl Savin, Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation`s Office In Ukraine
26. Viktor Shlinchak, Chair of the Supervisory Board, Institute of World Policy
27. Dmytro Shulga, European Program Initiative Director, International Renaissance Foundation
28. Mykola Siruk, Head of International Section, Newspaper “The Day”
29. Bogdan Sokolovsky, Ukraine’s President’s Representative on International Energy Security (2008-2010); representative,
30. Serhiy Solodky, First Deputy Director, Institute of World Policy
31. Sergiy Sydorenko, Editor-in-Chief, “Europeis`ka Pravda” (European Trusth)
32. Ihor Todorov, professor, director, EU Information Centres under Donetsk National University
33. Vadym Tryuhan, expert on international and European law
34. Yaropolk Tymkiv, public policy expert, Pact in Ukraine, Uniter
35. Yulia Tyschenko, Head of Board, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research
36. Oleksandr Tytarchuk, research fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute
37. Alla Yevdokymova, director, Human Rights Centre “Tree of Life”
38. Volodymyr Yermolenko, Director of EU-Related Media, Internews-Ukraine
39. Viktor Zamiatin, Leading expert of Political and Legal Programmes, Razumkov Centre
40. Igor Zhdanov, President, Analytical Centre “Public Policy”
41. Pavlo Zhovnirenko, chairman of the Board, Center for Strategic Studies
42. Mariya Zolkina, Political Analyst, Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation.

The research was conducted within the “New European Policy” project supported by the “Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms” (UNITER) project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Pact.

Deshchytsia’s Heritage

Interview with the First Deputy Director of IWP Serhiy Solodky to “Radio Liberty”.Text is available only in Russian.

Tracing the origins of the Ukraine crisis: Should the EU share the blame?

Director of the IWP Alyona Getmanchuk for “Europe’s World”The European Union played a significant role in the Ukraine crisis long before the Euromaidan protests began late last November. Its involvement goes back to the moment in 2009 that the EU became an attractive development model for most Ukrainians. That was the year when, for the first time in Ukraine’s history, economic integration with Europe became equally attractive as closer integration with Russia, and when the number of people wanting integration with Europe caught up with those who favoured Russia.\
From the Ukrainian point of view, when the EU made it clear that it was willing to sign an Association Agreement with Ukraine, Brussels took at least partial responsibility for developments in our country. Responsibility is not of course the same as blame, and the EU can be blamed for only one thing; it overestimated the European aspirations of the Ukrainian government at that time, and underestimated the anti-European Russian authorities’ plans for Ukraine.

The EU has also underestimated the importance to so many Ukrainian people of the ‘European idea.’ When talking about the benefits of the Association Agreement, EU leaders were not fully aware that the agreement was more than just a document. It signalled the inevitability of change, and was widely perceived as a watershed making marking the end of post-Soviet reality, soaked with corruption, and the country’s bright future. The Association Agreement was also seen as a chance to finally say goodbye to Russia. Ukraine was relying on Europe as a guarantor to prevent a slide into dictatorship, as in Belarus or Russia itself. Its outlines had become more and more pronounced with every passing month of Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency.

“EU can be blamed for only one thing; it overestimated the European aspirations of the Ukrainian government at that time, and underestimated the anti-European Russian authorities’ plans for Ukraine”

All these inflated expectations among the pro-European section of Ukrainian society had a lot to do with the high level of paternalism in Ukraine, which had previously been manifested in expectations from the presidencies first of Yushchenko by Orange Revolution supporters, or of Yanukovych from his electoral base in eastern Ukraine. When confidence in those leaders proved to be misplaced, it was the EU that took their place.

As the internal conflict in Ukraine escalated, the perceptions of the EU and its role also changed. Some were disappointed when the EU linked the signing of the Association Agreement with the case of imprisoned ex-prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The majority of EU supporters in Ukraine were also disappointed when European heads of state and government proved reluctant to impose sanctions against Ukraine’s former leaders until the moment that blood began to be shed on the streets of Kiev. Their frustration is today being further compounded by the lack of determined EU sanctions against Russia. Ukrainians feel that they stood up to bullets and even died in support of European values, so introducing tougher sanctions should at the very least be the duty of the European Union.

But this is no reason for self-flagellation by the EU for being the cause of the protracted Ukrainian crisis. Had there never been an Association Agreement, people would not have taken to the streets in the first place to protest a system personified by President Yanukovych that was saturated with corruption and criminality. The agreement was only a detonator.

But, the indecisive – often inadequate – EU response to events in Ukraine has deprived Ukrainians of many illusions about Europe and has made their perceptions of the EU ​​more realistic. Yet the EU’s weak response hastily reduced the numbers of the EU’s supporters. A surge in support for EU membership and the Association Agreement was recorded right after the Euromaidan protest movement began, even though it has to be said that course Russia’s own military actions contributed substantially to this. A year ago, Ukrainians felt they had a choice between the European Union or a Customs Union with Russia, but the intervention in Crimea removed this choice; support for the Customs Union has simply collapsed with only 22% in favour according to recent polls. Support EU membership meanwhile stood in a record high in May at 52%.

“In Ukraine, the political will seems there, but the country’s political elite have yet to develop an immunity to the infectious large-scale corruption”

Support in Ukraine for the EU is more of a conscious decision now than it was a year ago because EU and Russian interests in Ukraine have in many people’s minds become mutually exclusive: europeanisation versus sovietisation, modernisation versus conservation, and stabilisation versus destabilisation.

What then, is most important for Ukraine today from an EU’s perceptive? First, it is now crucial that the EU should finally determine where it wants to see Ukraine in the long term: Within the European Union, or outside it? One the main problems contributing to this crisis is that Russia knows exactly what it wants from Ukraine, while Ukraine clearly knows what it wants from the EU; but the EU has no clear policy goal.

The EU must recognise that its Eastern Partnership initiative – the project to further its relations with the six post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – has not proved itself to be an adequate substitute for EU membership. Instead Brussels’ proposals within that framework, like the association agreements, were a destabilising rather than stabilising factor, because Russia was angered by the prospect of its former allies moving toward EU membership.

So a clean prospect of Ukrainian accession to the EU could remove a very serious counter-argument of the pro-Russian supporters in Ukraine that “no one waits for us in the EU.” The powerful anti-European lobby keeps pushing through its propaganda channels that the EU only sees Ukraine as “a market for low-quality products” and its citizens as “third class people”. And if the EU doesn’t see Ukraine joining its ranks, it has to make an alternative offer and suggest a relationship that makes it much clearer where implementation of the Association Agreement could lead.

“So a clean prospect of Ukrainian accession to the EU could remove a very serious counter-argument of the pro-Russian supporters in Ukraine that ‘no one waits for us in the EU’”

Second, Ukraine itself needs to adopt a similarly serious approach. There is strong internal pressure from civil society that is demanding the implementation by the government of reforms. But it won’t be possible in the context of the Association Agreement without pressure from the EU. That means there should be more thorough and professional of monitoring and supervision mechanisms on both sides. In Ukraine, the political will seems there, but the country’s political elite have yet to develop an immunity to the infectious large-scale corruption. The EU would have a lot to gain by supporting reform in this area because that would demonstrate that successful europeanisation of Eastern Partnership countries is possible even that there is no membership perspective.

Ukraine today has a government today, possibility for the first time, that finds more common ground with Europeans than Russians. That makes it doubly important that the EU should not repeat the mistakes it made in the case of Moldova, where it described the new government as “success story” and thereby deprived their government of the motivation for further reform, and so significantly increased support for the Moscow-backed “Eurasian Union”.

A more coherent EU position on Russia itself is imperative if Ukraine is to achieve peace and prosperity. It is essential for we Ukrainians that in another year’s time the EU will not find once again find itself in President Putin’s embrace, as if the occupation of the Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine had never happened. Any normalisation of relations with Russia should involve Russian concessions in its approach towards Ukraine. That assumes, of course, that the EU still runs on values – not money.


Original of the publication was posted on the “Europe’s World”