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New European Policy

Director of the IWP Alyona Getmanchuk and First Deputy Director of the IWP Serhiy Solodky for newspaper “Day” (available in Ukrainian only).

Ukraine-EU: A Chance to Restore Historical Justice

Deputy Director of the IWP Kateryna Zarembo for EuobserverDuring the Euromaidan’s events the EU’s normative power declared itself fully — Ukrainians were ready not only to massively defend a new European quality of internal development, they gave their lives for it. In time of its own existential crisis, the EU has received a chance to look at itself from the outside, to feel its attractiveness and historical necessity.\
However, in three months of protests an enormous re-estimation of the EU, as an international player in Ukraine, took place. The EU suffered serious reputational losses because they had not answered the main expectations raised by the Euromaidan’s participants and supporters in Ukraine — the EU had not imposed targeted sanctions against members of the Ukrainian leadership before blood was spilled. In general, the European Union’s contribution in resolving the Ukrainian crisis can be defined as «too late and too little».

This is a serious threat for the EU policy in the neighbourhood. Losing its credibility in the region could lead to a serious – if not fatal – damage to its ‘soft power’, the only kind of transformative power the EU actually possesses. EU policy makers should take into account that for many Ukrainians the concept of the EU and the concept of democracy are identical, so the disappointment in the EU can strike pro-democracy forces in the country.

Preventing this from happening is easy.

Firstly, the EU should sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine. In full, not in parts.

Indeed, it is not clear why the document should be divided in two parts now. In the first place, the transformative capacity of the Agreement lies in its DCFTA part and not in the political part. Moreover, if the EU was ready to sign it with the authorities whose genuine ambition to implement it was very doubtful, it is unclear why it cannot do the same with the government which is significantly more likely to take its implementation seriously.

The EU owes this to Ukraine. Not to the government – to the people. Even in the third month of protests, when more than a hundred people died and hundreds were injured, the Ukrainian government’s reluctance to sign the Association Agreement with the EU remained one of the key motivations for people to stay on the Maidan. In addition, after the failure to sign the Agreement in Vilnius, Ukrainians became more interested in European integration: the unprecendented figure of 60% of respondents consider the focus on the EU to be the key condition for improving the situation in the country.

The Ukrainian people voiced their will eloquently. So, signing the Association Agreement now seems a logical response from the EU – keeping its word about the AA «being on the table» for Ukraine.

But the effect of the membership perspective will be even stronger, especially if you consider that post-revolutionary politics came to power using pro-European slogans. The policy of conditionality has proved its effectiveness in Central Europe, and therefore it has a great chance to be effective in the Ukrainian case.

The membership perspective may give an even bigger chance to establish trust. Today, 50% of Ukrainians support Ukraine’s accession to the EU, while 13% are undecided.

Let’s face it: there would be no reputational costs for the EU. The surveys conducted in six largest EU countries show that the majority of the population there are in favour of Ukraine’s accession. Besides, accession is a long-term process and the EU would have plenty of time to prepare against ‘enlargement fatigue’. Meanwhile, in Ukraine it would bear an unprecedented symbolic value, an incentive for qualitative change not only for the state structures but also for ordinary citizens.

Last but not least, the membership perspective for Ukraine would put an end to Russia’s attempts to force on European countries an agenda and competition spirit of the Cold War era.

If the EU denies the historic chance of the ‘return to Europe’ to Ukraine, it will only admit its own power limits and put an end to its own ambition of global influence. If the EU supports Ukraine now, it will receive an unprecedented ‘success story’, a luminous justification of its raison d’être and unique European mission.

Policy Brief: “A Call for the EU — Time to Step in”

IWP has published an analytical paper “A Call for the EU — Time to Step in. Ukraine’s Expectations from the European Union”The official presentation of the analytical paper was held at the discussion “Window of opportunity: What does the EU expect from Ukraine and Ukraine from the EU?” on March, 12th.

This publication is an attempt to summarize the main expectations of Ukrainian civil society from the EU in the most critical period of Ukraine’s history.

In general, expectations of Ukrainians from the EU can be divided into four categories: the most prompt signing of the Association Agreement, lifting visa regime, financial aid and provision of a clear membership perspective. The Euromaidan’s events and the Russian intervention in Ukraine added to this list one more important expectation: introducing focused sanctions by the EU – at first against the Ukrainian leadership, and, since the beginning of the Russian aggression, also against the Russian establishment. Implementation of, at least, a part of them is considered in the Ukrainian public discourse as a kind of the EU’s moral obligation to millions of Ukrainians who took to the streets to make European values in Ukraine real.
The EU’s indecision and vagueness of statements in the past have already led to a strong disappointment and an increase of isolationist sentiments in the Ukrainian society. To overcome them not only positive signals (as the signing of the political part of the Agreement) are required, but also a better established communication from the EU’s side with the Ukrainian society.

This policy paper was conducted by IWP as part of its project New European Policy implemented under Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) program, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact Inc. The current report is also part of the project ”Romania — Ukraine Civic Forum” — implemented together by the IWP in Kyiv and the Romanian Center for European Policies in Bucharest with the support of UNDP and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania.

The full text of the Policy Brief in Ukrainian and English is here.

The contents do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, Pact Inc. or the United States Government.

Putin’s Nightmare

Fisrt Deputy Director of the IWP Serhiy Solodky for “Day” (in Ukrainian only)

Ukraine: the End of Post-Sovietness

Deputy Director of the IWP Kateryna Zarembo for EuobserverWhat is happening now in Ukraine is not a full victory yet. However, it is the end of Ukraine post-sovietica and the birth of a truly independent Ukraine.\
In 1991 Ukraine became officially independent but remainded deeply post-Soviet inside. The ex-Soviet nomenklatura kept the power. These people were neither reform-minded nor patriotic and only cared about personal enrichment. In their turn, the population tolerated the situation because Ukraine seemed safer and more peaceful than other post-Soviet states and because they also believed they would be better off financially in independent Ukraine. As a result, for the last 23 years Ukraine stewed in a murky post-Sovietness which basically stalled the institution and nation-building processes (without completion of which no democracy and market economy can be built).

It took exactly this time for a new nationally minded patriotic generation to grow up. Unlike their predecessors 23 years ago they knew they wanted their Ukraine to be independent and free – not only geopolitically but also internally. They wanted to leave the post-Soviet heritage of corruption, legal opacity, unprofessionalism, selective justice and repressions behind in order to start building a democratic European Ukraine. They were ready to die for it and some did.

The battle against post-Sovietness is present at all levels, starting with the «elite» which was brought up under the conditions of «decaying socialism» and ending with symbols such as Lenin statues and squares. The latter were demolished or severely damaged in over 40 Ukrainian cities and towns. As a matter of fact, Ukraine’s post-Soviet legacy is vividly illustrated by the fact that up until now there were 176 Lenin statues against 46 Ukraine’s national leader Taras Shevchenko statues in Kyiv region alone.

The Euromaidan also contributed to the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. It is true that in Ukraine’s East and South 43% of the population didn’t support Euromaidan. However, about one fifth of the Maidan population is represented by the Southern and Eastern Ukrainians. Thus, Euromaidan and the end of the Yanukovych regime is a common achievement for all Ukrainians, the first of the kind in the history of independent Ukraine. It is also a common grief. Noone will ever be entitled to claim that the glorious slogan «Slava Ukraini!» – «Heroiam Slava!» is an ultranationalist greeting. Not only has it united Ukrainians from the very start of the Euromaidan, but also from now on it will bear a very specific reference to Maidan’s heroes. Called «the Heaven 100», the people who died in defence of their rights and freedoms came from all parts of Ukraine: from its Western, Central, Eastern and Southern parts alike.

Likewise, the Euromaidan has proved that language is not a dividing issue in Ukraine, bringing together both Ukrainian and Russian speakers.

This is just the beginning, of course. A lot of work is still ahead. In the first place, those responsible for the deaths, beating and torture of the innocent civilians have the face the strictest punishment, starting with Viktor Yanukovych. This will not only be the triumph of justice but also serve as a warning and a precedent for the future Ukrainian political leaders. Drastic measures should also be taken to sustain Ukrainian shattered economy.

Ukraine’s political future is uncertain, too. The actions of the opposition leaders during the Euromaidan have not added to their popularity among the voters at best. Besides, the majority of incumbent politicians enjoy limited trust among the population (level of trust towards politicians in Ukraine is one of the lowest in Europe). It will take time for new strong ideology-based parties to establish themselves. Besides, Ukraine’s ‘big politics’ has to resist the temptation of putting personal ambitions above the welfare of the state. Even the Euromaidan saw the appearance of numerous internal groups with their own vision of its aims and means.

It is important that a qualitative generation change takes place not only in the top tiers of power but also locally. Otherwise we will have a deja vu of 90-ies when inert and passive civil servants resisted any potential change.

Last but not least, Russian imperialistic ambitions are here to stay. Kremlin will not stop trying to weaken the Ukrainian statehood.

It is important to remember that no change will take place instantly and to have no false expectations from the future political process. However, in contrast to the Orange revolution, I don’t think this could be the case now. The Euromaidan didn’t have a single leader, let alone a political one, from the very beginning. Each of us knew that the success depended on him or her personally. This new skill of taking individual responsibility for the future of the country was one of the Euromaidan lessons to Ukrainians. The next skill to be developed is to make it a routine daily practice.

This entry’s data partially comes from the policy study ‘How to Get Rid of Post-Sovietness’, published by the Institute of World Policy (Kyiv, Ukraine) in 2012.

The Euromaidan statistical data comes from the opinion polls conducted by ‘Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation’.

The views expressed in this entry do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy.