Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine – Slovak Republic

Discussion paper was written by Maryna Vorotnyuk, invited lecturer at the Comenius University in Bratislava (Slovak Republic).To download the full publication click here.

INTRODUCTION

Ukrainian-Slovak relations are hard to explain in black-and-white tones of world perception. Their history abounds in both positive examples of cooperation and more controversial and comples issues. At this moment of time, an analyst or an average Ukrainian citizen would find it hard to attach a straighforward label of “friend” or “opponent” in Europe to the Slovak Republic (SR). Our Slovak interlocutors acknowledge that Slovak society and political circles have a mixed approach to Ukraine. In turn, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a test which exposed the value contradictions in a society with its own post-Communist syndrom.

Ukraine is an unknown neighbour, which, in contrast to Hungary or Austria, is perceived as a distant periphery of Europe. And this is not only due to the fact that Bratislava, the epicentre of Slovak policy-making, geographically borders the afore-mentioned countries, whereas Ukraine lies on the extreme opposite border. It is also because the “iron curtain,” which in communist times separated the Central European countries not only from Western Europe, but also from their neighbours in the USSR, remained intact in its mental, rather than physical, form. The events in Ukraine drew attention to it but the problem of recognition for Ukraine and Ukrainians in Slovak Republic was not resolved. The existing information vacuum is further filled with distorted ideas and stereotypes.
The reason for the historical “coolness” of Slovaks to Ukraine is that they view it through the Russian prism. Slovak nationalism, in contrast to Ukrainian or Polish nationalism, has been traditionally pro-Russian. Slovaks have always been open to the ideas of Panslavism . According to Slovak expert Alexandr Duleba, “Taking the history of Slovak and Ukrainian nationalism together, it is hard to find examples of common interests and cooperation in the past. On the other hand, unlike Polish-Ukrainian relations, there are also no historical conflicts which could be a source of national animosity or conflict in the future. Rather, Slovaks and Ukrainians are historically indifferent to each other”.
«We have a common border with Ukraine but it looks like many have forgotten that beyond this border is Ukraine and not Russia». This is the way a Slovak MP described the situation with the Slovak position to Ukraine during a discussion on the ratification of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Russia is a separate cultural stratum in the Slovak collective conscience. The Prague spring oppression in Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not necessarily deal an identical trauma to the Czech and Slovak society, and opposing the Kremlin’s dictatorship did not become a part of the Slovak genetic code. As a result, opinion polls register a rather indifferent attitude towards the Russian aggression in Ukraine.
To the Slovak Republic as to many other countries, Russia is an heir to everything which represents the Russian (in a wide sense) culture, which is treated with respect by Slovaks. According to Eurostat, SR is fourth among the EU Member States in terms of school children who chose Russian as a second foreign language (after Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia), with 20,5% in 2013. So in the eyes of many Slovaks, a harder stance on the Russian aggression in Ukraine is tantamount to Russophobia, which plays into the hands of the Russian propaganda in the country.

Starting from the end of 2015, experts describe the Ukranian-Slovak relations as a “honeymoon period” — at least in regards to political dialogues. The bilateral meetings usually feature praise for Ukraine from the Slovak partners, who say that in the last two years Ukraine has made a breakthrough in reforms, unprecedented in the last two decades. The Ukrainian decision-makers appreciate the realization of the “small reverse” gas flow project as a “gesture of friendship” from Slovakia, which helped to diversify Ukraine’s energy supply and decrease the gas dependence on Russia. Both countries joined efforts in opposing the Russian project “Nord Stream-2”. In the European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2016 of the European Council on Foreign Relations Slovak Republic received the highest “leader” grade on the issue “Support to Ukraine” (alongside Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, Poland and Lithuania), which is mainly due to the gas reverse. In 2014, the Ukranian expert community included Slovakia in the top-10 according to the results of the expert opinion poll «Who is Ukraine’s friend in the EU?», mainly because of the gas reverse project.

The intensity of bilateral contacts lately is spectacular: Slovak foreign policy observers refer to Ukraine as a top destination for Sloval policy-makers. The Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Miroslav Lajčák, paid several visits to Ukraine, meeting the President, the Prime Minister, the Head of the Verkhovna Rada and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The key points for discussion was the support for large scale reforms in Ukraine, visa liberalization for Ukraine, and functioning of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. These discussions were especially important given the Slovak Presidency in the EU Council of Ministers in July-December of 2016.
However, Slovakia’s position can also be described as controversial, given some messages that Ukraine and the international community received from the Slovak government. Despite the fact that the Slovak Republic traditionally follows the common EU foreign policy course, the Slovak government — and especially Prime Minister Robert Fico is famous for its statements on not being willing to accept Muslim refugees. Fico also claimed that sanctions against Russia were counterproductive. However, it is important to underline that Slovakia never officially questioned sanctions in Brussels — in contrast to the issue of the EU migrant quotas against which the Slovak government filed a lawsuit.
Currently, the interests of Ukraine and the Slovak Republic match in a number of spheres.
The interests of Ukraine towards Slovakia lie in the following realms:
1) political, which means primarily studying the Slovak experience of reforms and democratic transition as well as securing Slovak support for Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations;
2) security, which means using the Slovak experience of accession to NATO, reaching compatibility with NATO standards, as well as participation in regional security initiatives;
3) economic, making use of the advantages provided by the neighbouring location of two countries, strengthening the economic ties between the border regions, boosting the economic cooperation through EU-Ukraine DCFTA;
4) energy, continuation and intensification of natural gas reverse flow from the Slovak Republic to Ukraine, joint energy efficiency projects and implementing Slovak best practices on the matter;
5) humanitarian, which is connected to Slovak humanitarian aid, the issue of Ukranian minority of Slovakia, cross-border cooperation, etc.

The interests of the Slovak Republic to Ukraine lie in:
1) supporting stabilization of the political and security situation in Ukraine as an element of Central Europe security architecture;
2) guaranteeing stability on the Slovak-Ukrainian border, which is its only border with a non-Schengen zone country and hence crucial from the point of view of countering illegal migration and organized crime;
3) using the potential of economic cooperation more efficiently, especially in border regions, as a way of boosting economic growth in Slovak Eastern regions;
4) securing a reliable partnership with Ukraine on Russian gas transit to Europe, applying joint efforts to obstruct the projects which bypass the two countries (e.g. “Nord Stream-2”).

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund of the USA, the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) and the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Italy

The discussion paper was prepared by Kateryna Zarembo, Deputy Director, Institute of World Policy.To download the full report click here.

INTRODUCTION
Ukraine and Italy have never been among the top foreign policy priorities for each other. Italy has traditionally been focused on the Mediterranean region, and Russia remains its strategic partner in Eastern Europe. Before the Revolution of Dignity and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Italy’s key interests towards Ukraine were associated with trade and investments.
As for Ukraine, it has traditionally been interested primarily in the economic dimension and achieving Italian support..
Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian-Italian relations have been affected by an additional aspect. The traditional economic partnership was supplemented by the security policy issue over which Italy had a problem in its relations with Russia. Therefore, official Rome is now primarily interested in stabilizing the situation in Ukraine.
At the same time, Italy does not share the Cold War discourse of isolating Moscow and maintains a pragmatic attitude to the situation Russia will remain a powerful player at the regional and global level and needs to be taken into account. Many Italian politicians continue to believe it necessary to revert to Italy’s experience when Italy had perhaps the best relations with Russia among all Western countries at the peak of the Cold War while being a NATO member and a U.S. ally in Europe. Meanwhile, owing to a number of factors (change of governments in Italy and Ukraine, Russian aggression in Ukraine) the Italian-Ukrainian relations gained a new dynamic. The objective of the Ukrainian government at this stage is to support the dynamics and transformation of political agreements into specific mutually interesting economic projects.
Nowadays, both sides see each other as “connecting links”. For Ukraine, Italian support at the international level, including the EU, NATO and the G7, is vital. Italy considers Ukraine in context with Russia as a country that theoretically could influence internal development of Russia, link it with the EU, or at least act as a “bridge” (approach presented by Romano Prodi several years ago) giving the EU a safe distance for continuing dialogue with Russia. At the same time Italy is only beginning to discover Ukraine as a full partner.
The strategic priorities of Ukraine towards Italy are as follows:
1) development of a separate bilateral political track, supported by the mutual realization of inherent worth by both partners;
2) Italian support of Ukraine’s European integration aspirations;
3) Italian support of cohesion in the EU regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine in the context of resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in eastern Ukraine and de-occupation of Crimea;
4) implementation of interests in the energy sector in order to maintain Ukraine’s role as a European energy hub;
5) realization of the interests of the Ukrainian community in Italy;
6) changing the Italian “mental map” of Ukraine; dispelling the myth, deeply entrenched in Italian mentality, about Ukraine’s political and cultural affiliation to the “Russian World”.
The implementation of these interests has great potential, as the interests of Italy towards Ukraine are as follows:
1) increasing the amount of Italian companies and investments in Ukrainian market;
2) restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine;
3) preservation and development of gas transport routes across southern Europe, where Ukraine has a key role due to its geographical location.
The objective of this paper is to identify the intersection points of mutual interests for Ukraine and Italy and possible ways of their effective implementation.

To download the full report click here.

The research was prepared within the IWP’s project “New European Policy: Filling the Awareness Gap”. This project is carried out within the National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) project, supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine. The IWP also would like to thank the Black Sea Trust for regional cooperation – a project of the German Marshall Fund.

Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Romania

The discussion paper was written by Sergiy Solodkyy, first deputy director at the IWP, and Ileana Racheru, expert of the Romanian Diplomatic Institute.To download the publication, please, click here.

The research was prepared within the IWP’s project “New European Policy: Filling the Awareness Gap”. This project is carried out within the National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) project, supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine. The IWP also would like to thank the Black Sea Trust for regional cooperation – a project of the German Marshall Fund.

Ten Fears of the Europeans: Why the EU Should Not Postpone the Introduction of the Visa-Free Regime with Ukraine

Communication Memo of the Institute of World PolicyOn December 18, 2015, the European Commission approved the report on the implementation of the Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP) by Ukraine, and in April it recommended that the EU Council granted us a visa-free regime.

However, the discussion of the ‘visa-free issue’ is still ongoing in the European Union. Some EU member-states fear the negative consequences that might be caused by the visa-free regime with Ukraine.

This report will be useful for those who communicate with European politicians and should be ready to discuss this issue with them. Among them – Ukrainian MPs, high-ranking officials, diplomats, and activists.

The visa-free regime is a very sensitive issue for the Ukrainians, which is quite understandable: we have implemented all the requirements and now expect a response. However, statements of some European politicians imply double standards and the desire to back out of their own commitments.

Still, we recommend that Ukrainian officials, politicians, and public activists should not accuse the EU (even if their accusations are valid), but rather clarify the Ukraine’s position.

The latter approach is much more effective if we aim to achieve a visa-free regime, and not merely proving that ‘the EU is not right.’ We would like to stress that it does not mean that we have to comply with all the demands of the Europeans. On the contrary, positions of European politicians could and should be opposed.

But it should be done with the facts and figures in hand.
And one more piece of advice, based on the personal experience.
It is no use discussing whether visas for Ukrainians will be abolished or not. You will hear that it is not a problem and that they will be abolished by a resolution. And that is certainly true. The question is when they will be abolished. And it is a real problem, as even a short-term delay might be extended, including with the ‘help’ of Ukraine.
To this end, the Institute of World Policy, in cooperation with Europe Without Barriers, the Anticorruption Action Center, and Europeiska Pravda, has prepared counterarguments which prove that most European fears are unsubstantiated.
We hope that our communication memo will come in handy.
Contents: List of Fears Concerning the Visa-Free Regime with Ukraine
1. Labor migration – myths and reality
2. Might there be a new wave of migrants from Ukraine?
3. Ukrainian migrants will lead to rise in crime.
4. Visa-free regime with Ukraine will irritate Russia
5. Ukraine is a corrupt country that failed to fulfill its commitments
6. We need a new mechanism of suspending the visa-free regime first
7. By abolishing visas, EU will no longer be able to influence the reforms
8. There is a risk of smuggling and human trafficking through Ukraine to EU
9. Visa-free regime is not important to the majority of Ukrainians
10. Ukraine has been implementing reforms not for the sake of a visa-free regime, while now it does not understand the importance of changes and is dependent on external influence
Counterarguments to the Stereotypes Popular in the EU
Myth No. 1:

“There is a risk that the labor market of the European Union will be flooded by the Ukrainian workforce”
Actually, visa liberalization for Ukraine applies only to short-term visas (for stay in the Schengen area for up to 90 days) and does not give the right to work.

At the same time, the problem of illegal migration is becoming less acute. Last year, GfK’s research commissioned by the International Migration Organization found that the number of illegally employed citizens of Ukraine abroad decreased: from 328 000 in 2006 to 209 000 in 2015. According to the same research, the experience of visa-free regime between the EU and Moldova shows that since the introduction of visa-free regime, the problem of illegal employment abroad has dropped to almost zero.
The issue of legal migration will continue to be the responsibility of each individual EU member state. Some states keep the labor market closed, others open it to the Ukrainians because of the positive experience. For example, the Czech Republic encourages the arrival of Ukrainian labor migrants and simplifies the procedures for obtaining permits for highly qualified workers from Ukraine. Cezary Kaźmierczak, head of the Polish Union of Entrepreneurs and Workers, said in early 2016, “Ukrainians are ‘high-class migrants’ who do not need to be taught the language or professional skills and do not have to be provided with accommodation, because they perfectly manage all this by themselves.”
Myth No.2:
“Visa-free regime with Ukraine is a threat due to the migration crisis in Europe and the war in Ukraine.”
First of all, Ukraine is not on the list of countries generating large flows of migrants. Thus, in 2015, the largest number of asylum requests were received from migrants coming from Syria (363 thousand), Afghanistan (178 thousand), and Iraq (121 thousand).
Only 21 thousand citizens, or a mere 0.046% of the citizens of Ukraine – the country where the war is still raging– have asked for asylum status. For comparison, 67 thousand citizens of Kosovo, or 3.6% of the total population, requested asylum in the EU last year, which is 72 times (!) more than the percentage of asylum seekers from Ukraine.

More importantly, the Ukrainians have a slim chance of getting asylum in the EU.

In 2015, only 415 Ukrainian were granted a refugee status in the EU. This is only 2% of all asylum seekers from Ukraine. For comparison, over the same period, the EU granted refugee status to 2,458 Russian citizens (6 times more).

The main reason for refusing Ukrainians asylum status is “an alternative of internal migration” to the peaceful part of Ukraine. Despite the continued shelling in Donbas, the security situation in most parts of Ukraine remains peaceful and stable, so there is no reason to expect a massive influx of Ukrainian refugees now – in the third year of confrontation. The Minsk process, despite all its flaws and limitations, provides a fragile truce and creates the basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

Even during the period with the most significant hostilities in Donbas, major destinations for migrants from the conflict-affected areas were not in the EU, but other regions of Ukraine and, if we consider foreign countries, Russia and Belarus. The explanation is simple: the residents of Eastern Ukraine left to the regions where they had family ties and where they thought they would have better chances for successful social integration, taking into account common cultural and linguistic space.

According to the UN, about 387 thousand Ukrainians in the Russian Federation requested temporary asylum and a refugee status. 1.8 million citizens of Ukraine became internal migrants and found new homes and jobs in other regions of the country.

Any parallels between Ukraine and other hot spots (especially Syria) are extremely questionable, given the different nature of conflicts and their course, but above all – the overall humanitarian and economic situation in the countries.
Myth No. 3:
“Migrants from Ukraine bear the threat of increasing the rate of crime in the EU member states.”
To disprove the stereotype of Ukrainians as criminals one should look at countries with large Ukrainian communities. One of them is Italy, which has the largest Ukrainian community in Western Europe, formed as a result of the migration waves in the 1990s. The Ukrainian community in Italy is the fourth-largest foreign community in the country, after Moroccan, Albanian and Chinese. However, Ukrainians do not appear on the list of nations whose representatives are often detained because of suspicion of a crime (representatives of the Roma, Moroccan, Albanian, Tunisian and Nigerian communities rank the highest).
Both the Italian government and Italian citizens call Ukrainians one of the most integrated minorities. Ukrainians in Italy have proven themselves as decent, hard-working, linguistically and culturally integrated citizens. A recent tragedy in the Italian city of Naples drew the attention of the national media, when a Ukrainian citizen tried to stop robbers at a supermarket and was killed. The city named a street in his honor.
While migration is a serious issue in Italy, there is a support both at the governmental and public level for visa liberalization for Ukraine. Italy has no fears related to the Ukrainian migrants, as it is aware of the Ukrainian mentality and character (most Italians personally know at least one Ukrainian).
In Germany, where immigration rates are among the highest among EU member states, crimes committed by migrants in 2015 have been attributed to the citizens of Syria (24%), Albania (17%), Kosovo (14%), Serbia (11%) Afghanistan (11%), Iraq (9%), Eritrea (4%), Macedonia (4%), Pakistan (4%) and Nigeria (2%) (according to the Gatestone Institute research). According to this research, Ukrainians were not placed on the list of the nationalities most prone to crime.
Moreover, in the framework of VLAP implementation, Ukraine has significantly strengthened its capacity of stopping criminals and potential terrorists at border crossings. Ukraine has connected 39 border crossings to Interpol databases and has established close cooperation on border control with the neighboring countries. There are cases when international criminals have been detained while crossing the border of Ukraine.
Myth No.4:
“Visa-free regime with Ukraine will irritate Russia”
The EU strategy of maximum consideration for Russia’s ‘feelings’ in decisions regarding other states has not produced any positive results. On the contrary, the attempts of Brussels and other capitals to avoid irritiating the Kremlin have only increased its appetite.

The agenda of the Russia-Ukraine-EU triangle includes many other issues which are more important to the Kremlin than the right of the Ukrainians to travel freely to the EU.

Instead, the opposite EU decision – to delay granting Ukraine a visa-free regime – will give the Kremlin a powerful argument for its anti-European propaganda both in Russia and across the former Soviet Union. This includes Ukraine, where pro-Russian political forces and social movements are still active. If such a decision is adopted, the image of the EU as a reliable partner who promptly fulfills its own obligations will be disrupted in the eyes of the citizens of all the Eastern Partnership countries.

Given the sensitivity of this issue, the EU risks losing the battle for the hearts of not only Ukrainians and Georgians, but also their neighbors.

It is also worth noting that the visa-free regime between Ukraine and the EU meets the interests of Russia itself. Moscow seeks to restore the visa dialogue and depoliticize this issue. If the EU delays the visa-free regime with Ukraine for political reasons, despite the implementation of its Action Plan, it will seriously jeopardize the possible resumption of dialogue between Russia and the EU. This will mean that the abolition of visas has become a political issue, when decisions are made under the influence of situational factors and are not results of technical criteria implementation.
Myth No. 5.
“Ukraine is a corrupt country; the Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP) has not been fully implemented”

Over the past year Ukraine has done more to fight corruption than during its 25 years of independence. If there was no serious progress in this area, the issue of visa-free regime between Ukraine and the EU would not have been raised.

The European Commission confirmed that Ukraine has implemented all the VLAP requirements related to combating corruption. In particular, Ukraine has established special independent bodies for the prevention of corruption and investigation of corruption crimes (National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption, the National Anticorruption Bureau, the Special Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office); the Agency for asset recovery and launch of electronic declaration of assets of public officials is being established.

These bodies have been set up not only formally – they have started to work de facto. In a period of only four months, as of April 2016, the National Anticorruption Bureau has opened 120 criminal proceedings in cases of corruption involving Ukrainian officials, transferred to court nine cases of 12 suspects, delivered 25 charge sheets, and seized 220 million UAH.

Still, it is necessary to realize that the fight against corruption is a long-lasting process: even some EU member states cannot boast of an ideal state of affairs in this area. Of course, this does not excuse Ukraine, but it shows that anticorruption activity takes time. Visa-free regime offers a chance for successful continuation of this struggle. If the visa regime is delayed, politicians might use the inconsistency of the EU as a pretext to roll back the anticorruption initiatives.

Civil society will continue to put pressure on the Ukrainian authorities to respect its commitments in combating corruption. Apart from the VLAP, the EU has a number of levers of influence on the Ukrainian politicians, should they try to stop anticorruption efforts. The mere risk of reduction of political contacts between Ukraine and the EU could serve as a serious lever that would force the Ukrainian government to act more responsibly, not only in the field of anticorruption, but in regards to the continuation of all of its current reforms.
It should be noted that while implementing the VLAP, Ukraine has not only established and launched new anticorruption agencies, but has also made significant progress on reforms in other areas – particularly in the matter of issuing new secure documents (travel passports and ID-cards), migration management, and integrated border management.
Myth No. 6:
“The abolition of visas for Ukrainians must be tied to the introduction of a new, more stringent mechanism of suspending visa-free regime.”
The European Union has the right to introduce any new rules, including a more stringent mechanism for suspending visa-free regime, and we understand the political importance of such changes.
The current mechanism also allows the EU to restore the visa regime in case of serious migration risks. Today, simplify simplification of this procedure has been proposed. However, new rules will also apply to the states that have been granted the visa-free regime before. Thus, there is no need to postpone the decision on Ukraine just because a new mechanism is being prepared.
Meanwhile, the migration crisis proves that no visa barrier is an obstacle for the mass inflow of migrants. At the same time, the visa regime presupposes strict responsibility of the third countries and helps to combat illegal migration and its consequences.
Back in 2008, the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement was enacted, which envisages the return of migrants to Ukraine.The European Union has not yet complained about the way Ukraine has implemented this agreement. In 2010-2015, under this agreement, the Ukrainian side admitted 3,081 people from the EU, including 1,869 citizens of Ukraine (61%), 626 citizens of CIS member states (20%), and 586 citizens of other countries (19%). 353 people have been transferred to the EU in 5 years.
According to Frontex (European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union), out of all existing migration routes, the EU gets the smallest number of illegal immigrants across its eastern borders. For comparison, only 213 illegal border crossings to EU countries across the eastern border have been registered in the first three months of 2016; during the same period, 157,019 people have penetrated the EU through the Eastern Mediterranean route, and another 112,477 people – across the Western Balkans. That is, 740 and 528 times more, respectively!
Myth No. 7:
“Liberalization of the visa regime will negatively affect Ukraine itself, because the main lever of influence on the government concerning reform implementation will disappear.”
This statement is incorrect. On the contrary, failure or even a delay in granting a visa-free regime to Ukraine might reduce the leverage of the EU on the implementation of reforms. If the EU postpones the decision on visa liberalization for Ukraine, it will lead to a loss of credibility of the EU as a responsible partner.

Some political groups will use this as a pretext to suspend further implementation of reforms initiated within the VLAP. As a result of the crisis of confidence, politicians will lose their interest in further EU recommendations. Refusal of quick visa liberalization is particularly dangerous for the ongoing anticorruption reforms. Currently, under the pressure of the EU, Ukraine is introducing a system of electronic declaration of assets of public officials. The forces opposed to these reforms might use the inconsistency of the EU to postpone the introduction for an indefinite period of time.

The statement concerning the loss of leverage is also incorrect, as the EU Council has already announced its intention to introduce a mechanism of post-monitoring and control over the observance of the VLAP requirements by Ukraine after the liberalization of the visa regime. It should encompass several levels of the EU response in case Ukraine violates the already-fulfilled requirements of the VLAP – from a political warning up to the suspension of the visa-free regime. However, development of the post-monitoring mechanism should not be a reason for delaying the visa-free regime, because this will cause the negative effects described above (loss of confidence).

Other levers of influence on Ukraine with regard to reforms implementation include: the risk of reducing political contacts that are important for the Ukrainian elite and the image of Ukraine, given a complicated security situation in the region, and financial support programs tied to specific reform progress (European Investment Bank loans, macro-financial aid, technical assistance, etc.).

Finally, the aim of the EU is not to monitor the progress of reforms in Ukraine permanently, but to develop an influential and capable civil society. The institutes of civil society will continue to monitor the Ukrainian authorities to prevent any rollback of the reforms. The public sector is also counting on further support of such initiatives by the EU: this tandem has already demonstrated its effectiveness over the past two years. Granting a visa-free regime will become a symbol of recognition of reformists’ efforts to change Ukraine.

Myth No. 8.
“Ukraine does not control a part of its territory, so there is a risk of smuggling and human trafficking through Ukraine to the EU.”

The areas beyond control of the Ukrainian government (parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Crimean Autonomous Republic) make up only 7% of the territory of Ukraine. In the two years after the Revolution of Dignity and the beginning of the Russian aggression, Ukraine has significantly increased its military potential and reformed the police and the Border Guard Service to ensure security and reliability of its borders.

Indeed, human trafficking was one of the key challenges facing Ukraine, but measures taken to increase public awareness, improve the effectiveness of law enforcement bodies, and increased assistance to victims has led to a radical decrease in its scope. In recent years, the number of registered crimes pertaining to human trafficking has fallen sharply, while the number of sentences has increased. This demonstrates the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies towards combating human trafficking.
The European Commission reports show that the EU also highly appreciates the efforts of the Ukrainian government to combat this phenomenon.
Myth No. 9:
“Too few Ukrainians have biometric passports. Therefore, we can say that visa-free regime is not that important to most Ukrainians.”

This myth contradicts other fears of the EU citizens. After all, if few Ukrainians have biometric passports, the influx of migrants is not to be expected. In fact, the number of Ukrainians with biometric passports is gradually increasing. The issue of the new type of passports started only in early 2015. As of April 2016, 2,26 million passports were issued, of which 1,05 million are biometric.

The results of the latest opinion polls in Ukraine show that the visa-free regime is important to 57% of Ukrainians. This is a position of the absolute majority of the residents in the western (80%) and central (64%) regions of Ukraine. If the visa-free regime with the EU is introduced in 2016, from 18% of the citizens (residents of Donbas) to 45% (in the Western regions) will be ready to use it for short-term travel to the Schengen countries. A large number of Ukrainians use long-term Schengen visas obtained in recent years, so they have no urgent need to apply for new passports. It is noteworthy that over the last year, only 1,23 million of Ukrainian citizens applied for Schengen visas. This figure actually matches the number of citizens with biometric passports.

It should also be taken into account that some Ukrainians do not hurry to apply for biometric passports for a simple reason: why spend money on biometrics, if it is not clear when the EU will allow visa-free travel?

Meanwhile, the visa-free regime is important not only from a practical point of view (to facilitate travel), but also from a political one – for many citizens and politicians, it is a symbol of the desire (or unwillingness) of the EU to deepen cooperation with Ukraine and the readiness of the EU to fulfill its obligations, as has already been mentioned.
Myth No. 10.
“Ukraine has not been implementing reforms for the sake of a visa-free regime, while now it does not understand the importance of changes and is dependent on external influence”
Ukrainians do understand the importance of reforms and the role of their own efforts. One of the latest IWP opinion polls showed a responsible attitude of the citizens of Ukraine to the reforms. When asked “What should the government do if the EU does not give Ukraine the prospect of membership?”, the largest group of respondents – 46% – chose the option “First reforms, then talking about the EU.”

However, in the times of foreign aggression and economic crisis it is important for the Ukrainians to see signals of support which will further inspire them to work. The more quickly the reforms are implemented in Ukraine, the more stable the entire European continent will become. Ukraine is already turning into a reform success story, but with external support, these changes would be implemented more quickly and efficiently.

Unfortunately, there are some politicians and political groups in Ukraine opposed to the changes that threaten their wealth and income. Ignoring public support of reforms, they will use every opportunity to campaign for the rollback of these reforms. Therefore, both the general public and pro-European politicians need the support of the EU to effectively counter populist appeals.

Authors of the communication recommendations: Institute of World Policy in cooperation with the Europe Without Barriers, the Anticorruption Action Center, the Europeiska Pravda, and the independent experts.

Carmen Claudin (Spain), Steven Blockmans (Belgium), Richard Youngs (Belgium), Olga Burlyuk (Belgium), Georgi Gotev (Belgium), Petr Kolar (Czech Republic), Martin Malek (Austria), Michael Freund (Austria), Susan Stewart (Germany), Steffen Dobbert (Germany), Andrej Matisak (Slovak Republic), Marco di Liddo (Italy), Stefania Schipani (Italy), Jos Boonstra (the Netherlands) provided their responses to the expert survey.

Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-France

The discussion paper was written by Leonid Litra, Florent Parmentier, Cyrille Bret, and Anastasiya ShapochkinaTo download the publication, please, click here.

The research was prepared within the IWP’s project “New European Policy: Filling the Awareness Gap”. This project is carried out within the National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) project, supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine. The IWP also would like to thank the Black Sea Trust for regional cooperation – a project of the German Marshall Fund.