Archives: Публікації

Absorb and conquer: An EU approach to Russian and Chinese integration in Eurasia

An extensive report of ECFR on the Eurasian integration initiatives and the EU response to it. A Chapter on Ukraine was written by Leonid Litra, Senior Research Fellow at the IWP.In recent years Russia and China have both embarked on ambitious projects to integrate the Eurasian landmass. Russia has established the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in hopes of creating a Russian-dominated geopolitical bloc. In a very different approach, China has promoted the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR, or New Silk Road) initiative that aims to use Chinese financial power to physically and economically integrate Eurasia, with China at its core. So far, Europe has treated these projects as unwelcome competition, and kept its distance. The ECFR paper argues that this is a mistake and sets out how Europe can turn Eurasian integration to its advantage.

The publication is available on the ECFR web-site. To see it, please, click here.

Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Belarus

The discussion paper was written by Olena Betliy, research fellow at the Institute of World Policy, and Yauheni Preiherman, Chairman of Board of the Discussion and Analytical Society Liberal Club (Minsk)To download the publication, please, click here.

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit” with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund of the USA and Pact Belarus, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Also IWP expresses its gratitude to the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF), the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and the Embassy of Sweden (SIDA).

Ukraine and the Ukrainian Crisis as Viewed from Greece

Iannis Carras, International Hellenic University, Thessaloniki.The basis for any sense of understanding of the way Greeks relate to Ukraine is to realise that Greeks know very little about Ukraine.
This is true in general, Ukraine is a secondary foreign policy issue for Greeks. But it is even more true for the period between 2010 and 2016. From the outset of the financial crisis at the time of the government of George Papandreou to the current set of crises under Alexis Tsipras, the Greek people have turned their gaze almost completely inward. The events of the last years in Ukraine do not constitute an exception.
There is data that points to a correlation between Greeks’ view of the European Union and Greeks’ view of Russia, however. Even after six years of economic crisis most Greeks still evaluate their participation in the EU positively (69% in April 2015 falling to 60% in November 2015 at the height of the crisis, Dianeosis). Negative views towards the EU correlate closely with a support for “privileged relations” or an “alliance” with Russia. Of those who had a positive view of the EU only 13% thought Greece should be allied to Russia, of those who had a negative view of the EU though 58% thought Greece should be allied to Russia.
Those under twenty-four who have only lived through economic crisis have a far more negative view of the EU. By extension, they are more likely to think Greece should be allied to Russia. The crucial variable, however, is not Russia per-se. It is not even a left-right divide. It is the degree to which the respondent has a positive or negative view of the EU.
In order to attain a fuller understanding of Greeks’ view of Ukraine it is necessary to go beyond this summary provided by opinion polls. Ukraine with its Black Sea littoral is part of Greece’s perceived neighbourhood, and through the role of historic Greek communities on Crimea, around the Sea of Azov, in Nezhin and Lviv and above all in Odessa, plays a role in collective representations of Greece’s past, especially its pre-national past.
The role of migrants both Greeks from Ukraine and Ukrainians in Greece in mediating the relationship between the two countries should not be underestimated. Ukrainians in Greece (and there are some forty thousand of them) have appeared in the Greek media over the last years, and have organised themselves around the website Greeks for Ukraine. Many Greeks from Ukraine are Pontic Greeks (estimates of their nos. vary, but they are about 150.000 from Ukraine, Georgia and Russia in Greece today). They tend to define themselves with reference to the genocide of Eastern Christians that took place in the Ottoman Empire of the early 20th century. They are increasingly visible in Greek public life, including this year’s Greek entry to Eurovision which is about refugees and is in Pontic Greek. Many view the Russian Empire as their haven, even if they were later deported by Stalin. This and the policies of the Georgian state at the time of transition to independence mean that they look on events in Ukraine over the last two years with anxiety.
The role of religion in mediating the relationship between Greece and Ukraine is, if anything, even more important. Religion is important to Greeks (65% see religion as important in their lives, November 2015, Dianeosis). Greek religious news sites focus on Ukraine more than the media at large. When Greeks read about Ukraine today, they focus on religious subjects. The Archbishop and Soviet dissident, St. Luke the Doctor, from Kerch in Crimea who lived parts of his life in Kiev, serves as an example. A biography of St Luke’s life by Nektarios Antonopoulos, now Metropolitan of Argos, is one of Greece’s best sellers over the last years, having sold more than 100,000 copies. A very popular cult of St. Luke has now developed in Greece, and his name is associated with miracles.
Another of Antonopoulos’ books, this time with a much smaller tirage, is the novel Two Bullets for Donetsk whose subject is the conflict in Ukraine today. The book portrays two kind, intelligent young men, Ukrainians and friends, who end up killing one another because they find themselves on different sides of an ideological divide. The underlying premise is that Ukraine is separated by two different nationalisms.
In the case of religion, a further source of conflict stems from the fact that the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Moscow have been seen as rivals for leadership of the Orthodox world. This conflict played out throughout most of second half the 19th century up until the Russian Revolution, when Greek foreign policy was broadly pro-British and anti-Russian. Constantinople cannot afford to break up the Orthodox union by unilaterally recognising the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (Kiev Patriarchate, Philaret) as a canonical church. At the same time, there have been indications that it would view a union of the Churches in Ukraine positively.
Perhaps the closest connection between Greeks and Ukraine however stems from the similarity of their situations vis-à-vis the Empires of which they previously constituted a part. The resulting cultural hybridity that is typical of a post-colonial situations helps Greeks understand and sympathise with Ukraine’s predicament. Greeks have both opposed and are bearers of the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire in which they sometimes played a leading role. This hybridity also explains the difficulty even educated Greeks feel in distinguishing between Ukrainian and Russian historical figures (examples mentioned in interviews conducted by the author include Leon Trotsky, Kasimir Malevich and St. Paisy Velichkovsky). Further, as constant violations by the Turkish airforce of Greece’s airspace in recent months and days serve to remind us, in both Turkey and Russia we are confronted with militarist imperial or post-imperial powers which are uncomfortable with their current status.
The place where this similarity with Ukraine may most clearly be seen is Cyprus. In Cyprus in 1974 as with Ukraine today, we were/are discussing great power rivalry, the fragility of a newly independent state, invasion by a former imperial power, fatalities and refugees, the constitutionality of a change in government, and sanctions. And in Ukraine, as with Cyprus, the West’s response to foreign aggression has been limited. Greek foreign policy circles are very much aware of the parallels between Cyprus and Ukraine.
So what then are the reasons why the Cyprus question is being ignored as a precedent for Ukraine today? Due to Greece’s historical competition with Turkey, also a member of NATO, Greece has never felt secure within the Western security framework. This resulted in a geopolitical view of the USSR as a stabilizing factor in global affairs. This view has been carried over to Russia, and, as such, has been a constant from the days of the elder Constantine Karamanlis up until the current government of Alexis Tsipras. Karamanlis was the first to triangulate Greece’s foreign policy with his famous visit to Moscow in 1979.
From the point of view of Ukraine, a comparison with the Cyprus issue may also seem unwelcome, because proposed Western solutions to overcome the division of the island, such as the Kofi Annan plan (Annan V and Referendum held in 2004), go far beyond Russian demands for the occupied territories of Ukraine, except of course for the Crimea. And also perhaps because such comparisons fit uncomfortably with recent moves to increase Ukrainian-Turkish economic and military cooperation.
All in all, however, Greece is rooted in NATO and the EU. This is even clearer today than when SYRIZA came to power. As a result, Greece will not take a lead in ending sanctions on Russia except following France or Germany.
Though it has not yet been reunited, the precedent set by Cyprus offers reasons for hope for Ukraine. The work of building a functioning modern Cypriot state has been successful. Where the UN’s secret diplomacy has failed, Cypriots own public diplomacy continues. Turkish and Greek Cypriots have been reaching out to one another in an ongoing effort to build trust and cooperation on issues that affect their common home. Last but not least, Cyprus has become a member of the EU, with all the benefits and obligations associated with that organisation.

The visit of Ioannis Karras was organized within the project “Study Visits of Foreign Experts to Kyiv to Dispel the Myths about Ukraine in the European Union.”

This initiative is conducted within the “Initiative for Development of Ukrainian Think Tanks” project, implemented by International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in cooperation with the Think Tank Fund (TTF), with the financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Austria

The discussion paper was written by Daria Gaidai, research fellow at the Institute of World Policy.To download the publication, please, click here.

1. INTRODUCTION
“Are you aware that Vienna is closer to Ukraine than to the Austrian border with Switzerland?” Almost every discussion on Ukrainian-Austrian relations begins with this phrase. Then the interlocutors mention that only a century ago the Western regions of modern Ukraine were a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, in reality, multiple cultural, political and economic ties, that united the two nations in the past, now are almost forgotten both in Ukraine and in Austria. Until 2014, the Austrians, as, indeed, a large part of EU citizens, often confused Ukraine and Russia, because they knew almost nothing about the former.
The memory of belonging of some Ukrainian regions to the Austro-Hungarian Empire was only an interesting fact in the bilateral relations, but not their foundation. And, unfortunately, it was sometimes even used as a pretext for neo-imperial jokes. For example, in 2014 the President of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, Christoph Leitl, during a visit of President Vladimir Putin called Ukraine an area of common interests and said that “in 1914, Ukraine was a part of Austria, and now, one hundred years later, Ukraine ….” “I am afraid of what you are going to say”, — Putin stopped him. The friendly exchange of jokes on dividing Ukraine in less than four months after the annexation of the Crimea did not cause any adverse reactions of Austrian businessmen who attended the meeting. Not to mention that according to the Russian propaganda it is the Austrian General Staff who “invented” Ukraine in order to confront Russia.
Austrian delegations often visited Ukraine after independence and with interest and enthusiasm they re-discovered Ukraine’s Austrian patrimony. Unfortunately, Ukrainian authorities could not or did not want to make full use of this interest. Let us assume that one of the reasons is that the memory of the Austrian past is limited to Western regions of Ukraine (Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia). For Kyiv and other Ukrainian regions Vienna was the capital of a successful but faraway central European country.
In all fairness it should be noted that such historical amnesia has also affected the Austrian society, for which after the Second World War the imperial past became rather a vivid myth, a fairy tale, but not a foreign policy guide. Eventually, the interest of Austrian citizens in Ukrainian topics of Austrian history, not being fed from the political side (as in the case of the Western Balkans), has faded even more, especially for the younger generation. Today Ukraine for Austria is a region which is close geographically, but is quite distant politically.
Meanwhile, Austria has become a favourite holiday and, even, settlement destination for dozens of Ukrainian politicians and businessmen. A part of the service sector in Vienna has long been adapted for such “successful people” from the former Soviet Union by hiring Russian-speaking staff. Most paradoxically, those who have taken root in Vienna are representatives of the so-called Ukrainian elites that are critical of Ukraine’s European integration, of the Euromaidan etc. (Olexiy Azarov, son of former prime minister, Dmytro Firtash, a known oligarch who is under investigation by the FBI, Serhiy and Andriy Klyuyev). However, it is worth mentioning that they were perceived not as Ukrainians, but as Russians, with whom they maintained close ties and spoke the same language. The level of integration of Ukrainian politicians and their families in the Austrian environment has become even more evident when shortly after the Revolution of Dignity the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Austria to facilitate the return of funds, smuggled by former officials. Austria was the first country in the EU that decided to freeze the accounts of Ukrainians suspected of corruption .
This analysis aimes to determine main interests of the parties and points of contact, besides giving a general assessment of Ukrainian-Austrian bilateral relations over the last decade. Currently, Austria, with its close ties with Russia, is considered mainly as a barrier to Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU. But there is “another” Austria that saw and sees Ukraine’s considerable economic potential, wants to be a mediator between East and West and that is not afraid of difficulties of doing business in post-Soviet realities. This brief is an attempt to slightly change the angle and look at Austria as a valuable partner for Ukraine, as another “door” through which our state can enter into the common European economic and cultural space.
In the short- and mid-term perspective, Ukraine’s interests regarding Austria are centered around two things: sanctions and investments. Today, Ukraine’s key interest is in preserving the unity of the European Union in its support for Ukraine and the continuation of sanctions against Russia until clear progress is achieved in the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. Ukraine’s second key interest is increasing Austrian investments in the Ukrainian economy. It is these interests that Ukrainian representatives mention most often, while difficulties arise with defining other priority areas of cooperation. This is attributed to both a lack of understanding of Austria’s interest regarding Ukraine and a lack of strategic vision of Ukraine’s interests.
Among other Ukraine’s important interests regarding Austria, the following stand out: joint fight against economic crimes, particularly money laundering and tax evasion; adopting successful Austrian experience in public health, energy efficiency, alternative energy, environment protection, and tourism.
Austria’s interests regarding Ukraine are closely linked to its economic interests in the region in general. In general, Vienna’s interests can be formulated as follows:
forming a general free-trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok, i.e., promotion of close economic cooperation between the EU member states and the members of the Eurasian Economic Community;
the soonest possible restoration of peace and stability in the region;
reducing tensions in the region by establishing multilateral security dialogue;
strengthening economic cooperation with Ukraine by getting new opportunities for Austrian investors;
expanding economic and cultural ties with Ukraine’s Western regions which used to be part of the Habsburg Monarchy.

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund (BST GMF) and Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) program, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact Inc.

Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Hungary

The discussion paper was written by Ivan Medynskyi, research fellow at the Institute of World Policy, and Bence Kapcsos, invited Hungarian expert.To download the publication, please, click here.

1. Introduction

The cooperation trends set in the early 1990s have largely determined the dynamics of the Ukraine-Hungary bilateral relations for the past 25 years. In December 1991, Prime Minister of Hungary József Antall and President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk signed the Ukrainian-Hungarian bilateral treaty in Kyiv that became the foundation for bilateral relations. It was a fundamental document that outlined the most important commitments of both parties: absence of territorial claims between both countries and guarantees of the mutual protection of minority rights. In fact, the signing of this agreement was a symbolic act for both sides: Budapest demonstrated to the international community that it envisioned relations with its neighbors based on the principles of friendship and respect, whereas Kyiv effectively addressed the question regarding one of its most sizeable ethnic minorities hoping to set an example for Crimea and Bukovyna.

In retrospect, Ukraine and Hungary have followed quite similar historical and geopolitical trajectories as both countries cast away the burden of the past, shared Euro-Atlantic aspirations (although Ukraine occasionally deviated from this path), and positioned themselves as a bridge between the East and the West. Kyiv and Budapest enjoy rather unmarred common history in comparison to the tumultuous periods that each country had with their neighbors. In a sense, there are more things that unite rather than divide the two nations.
At the current stage, however, the bilateral relations are based increasingly on the common interests rather than common history, geographic proximity or aspirations. This trend has become evident in the light of the complex geopolitical situation that followed Russia’s decision to annex Crimea and force a conflict in eastern Ukraine. Not only Ukraine but also Hungary faced a conundrum of how to restructure their economic and energy ties with Russia. While Kyiv pursued the only possible course of action by limiting its dependence on Russian imports and natural resources, Budapest faced a hard choice between the external challenge of a unified EU position on Russia and the internal challenge of securing low gas prices and economic ties. Finding itself between the hammer and the anvil, Hungary opted for a mediatory role between the EU and Russia. Despite the salience of Russian factor in Budapest’s foreign policy, Ukraine will remain a key partner of Hungary as it seeks to strike a balance between two centers of power. Rather than pursuing a normative approach toward Budapest, Kyiv has to work consistently toward ameliorating contentious issues while creating incentives for the support of its own core interests.

For Ukraine, these interests are:
a unified position of the European Union on the Donbas and Crimea-related sanctions on Russia;
reverse gas flows;
improvement of cross-border infrastructure;
adapting the best practices in the spheres of security, democratic transition, small and medium enterprises, energy, and decentralization through the Visegrad Group.

Hungary’s interests toward Ukraine in the modern period can be deciphered through the prism of the well-being of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, support of its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, and the Eastern Opening policy aimed at finding new markets for Hungarian products.
By and large, the core interests of Ukraine and Hungary are not mutually exclusive, but rather complimentary as both countries are benefiting from the transit and reverse flow of natural gas, improvement of infrastructure and economy of Transcarpathia, visa liberalization and free trade initiative within the EU framework. In fact, cooperation extends to security (Ukraine and Hungary hold joint exercises in the Visegrad Battlegroup) and energy trade with Hungary being the largest importer of Ukrainian electricity. Hungarian businesses have a significant interest in the Ukrainian market, and there are cultural and educational programs that bring both countries closer together.
At the same time, divisive issues appear to be dominating the dialogue of the two countries. Over the past few years, bilateral relations have been tarnished by episodes that could have been avoided by improving communication and intensifying strategic dialogue. Currently, the following areas remain sensitive and, if mismanaged, could negatively affect the bilateral relations.
Sanctions on Russia. Hungary’s rapprochement with Moscow and its (at least in communication) opposing stance on sanctions on Russia endangers Ukraine’s strategic interest to maintain EU unity on this question.
Transcarpathia. It is a top priority for the Hungarian government to support and protect Hungarian communities outside of the country. Ukraine perceives Hungarian intentions (granting citizenship, calls to guarantee minority rights and economic assistance) as a possible threat to its sovereignty.
Lack of mutual understanding between the two nations. There is a shortage of knowledge on both sides about each other’s history, culture, language and national motivations. At the societal level, two nations remain terra incognita for each other in part due to a lack of interest and awareness of issues outside Transcarpathia.
In sum, the bilateral agenda is dominated by issues that are more aligned with Hungary rather than Ukraine. Although such objectives as developing cross-border infrastructure and improving trade balance resonate well with Kyiv, Hungary is taking the lead in shaping the dynamics and direction of their bilateral relations. In a sense, our inquiry reflects the current state of affairs where Hungary has more interests in Ukraine than Ukraine in Hungary. Thus, the primary objective of this paper is to identify elements and opportunities that could pave the way for more balanced relations and deeper and more fruitful cooperation in economy, energy, security and, last but not least, culture. Our aim is to analyze areas that may connect rather than separate the two nations.

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund and Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) program, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact Inc.
The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily reflect the views of GMF, USAID, Pact Inc., and the United States Government.

IWP Prepared a Memo for the Visit of President to Romania

The Institute of World Policy prepared a memo ahead of the visit of the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko to Romania on the signals worth sending to the Romanian decision-makers and society.During his visit to Romania President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko should:
– Appreciate Romania’s firm support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, including non-recognition of illegal annexation of Crimea, and European choice in international fora (in the EU, OSCE, UN, etc).
– Express gratitude to Romania for being first to ratify the Association Agreement Ukraine – EU
– Underline that Ukraine is interested in a strong, prosperous and influent Romania, a solid and coherent partner of Ukraine in the West;
– Express interest in Romania’s lessons learnt in the fight against corruption. Underline that Ukraine is committed to fighting corruption, especially high-level corruption, as the prime condition for a strong state, and nothing, even an ongoing war, will prevent it
– Ukraine’s new government is committed to implementing reforms in various areas: from rule of law, anticorruption, professionalisation of armed forces, police reform, to child protection system and national minorities. Meeting expectations of international partners (IMF, etc) will be the absolute priority of the new government, as well as consolidating the country’s credibility and creating a healthy environment for international support to come in and produce the best results
– Express interest in the energy sector’s cooperation with Romania. Examine the possibility for reverse gas supply, even symbolically
– Interest in working ever closer with Central-Eastern Europe countries, especially Romania and Poland perhaps, which have met with the same hurdles, challenges, delays and have successfully overcome them. Their success is in itself the most powerful incentive for Ukraine to do the same, especially in what regards the implementation of the Association Agreement
– start a dialogue on organizing a Ukraine-Romania business forum in Bucharest.

On security:
– Express shared concern about security in the Black Sea region and willingness to cooperate in order to counter the Russian threat. Stress the inviolability of fundamental principles of the UN and of international law as the instrumental principle of engagement with Russia
– Underline Ukraine’s common position with Romania regarding reconfirmation of NATO commitment to increased security in the region at the Warsaw NATO Summit
– The militarization of the Black Sea and of the entire region is an imminent threat to the security of the region. It is important for the two Presidents to continue to keep this issue on the international radar and ask for a serious deterrence to this threat. It is important for the two presidents to follow up on the initiative of a Black Sea Fleet that would include one Ukrainian vessel. Maritime security in the Black Sea it is of paramount importance, and more concrete measures, such as this one, are needed to deter Russia. The initiative needs to be designed together with Turkey and, ideally, Georgia, and be advocated for at the Warsaw summit. In preparation for the summit, an advocacy effort that involves all four countries would be needed.
– Express the interest that Ukraine joins or initiates military exercises on countering hybrid war and covert external threats. The exercise could be joined by NATO member states such as US, Poland, Lithuania, Norway, Estonia, Latvia but also non-NATO states such as Georgia and Republic of Moldova. This initiative might be useful especially in light of NATO Warsaw summit discussion on strategic adaptation of the Alliance and the developments in NATO’s strategies to counter hybrid war
– thank Romania for treating Ukrainian soldiers, recent non-lethal military transfers, and leading NATO’s trust fund on cybersecurity for Ukraine
On the issue of national minorities:
– Underline that the Ukrainian minority in Romania and the Romanian minority in Ukraine are precious assets for closer ties and fruitful cooperation between the two countries; Ukraine appreciates the fact that the representatives of the Romanian minority in Ukraine fight shoulder to shoulder in Donbas, together with Ukrainians
– express commitment for equal rights for and protection of minorities, including the Romanian minorities living in Ukraine

On the Republic of Moldova:

– Underline that, as neighbours and friends of the Republic of Moldova, both Ukraine and Romania are firmly committed to support further progress of that country along the path of European integration;
– Emphasize Ukraine’s commitment to the political resolution of the Transnistrian conflict with full respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova; Ukraine is also interested in the implementation of the DCFTA in the Trasnistrian area.

The President should be ready to the questions about:
– Yatseniuk’s resignation, composition of the new government, influence of oligarchs on the political process and its capacity to implement reforms;
– the situation in Donbas and Crimea (also, underline that the conflict in Donbas is still ongoing since many average Romanians are unaware of this)
– a possible failure of the Minsk process.
– Ukraine’s perception of the Dutch referendum results
– the rights of Romanian minority who lives in Ukraine (in particular the Ukrainian citizenship law, the law on regional languages, the drop in numbers of Romanian schools in Ukraine, etc.).

In order to maximize the effect of his messages the President should:
– address the Romanian public in Romanian language;
– hold an open discussion/debate, which would be open to the media;
– ask the media to take the Russian propaganda threat very seriously and double-check the information they use;
– ask the media to pay more attention to what happens in Ukraine

This memo was prepared by IWP experts Alyona Getmanchuk, Kateryna Zarembo, Leonid Litra.

The Institute of World Policy is grateful to Ileana Racheru, Alina Inayeh, Sergiu Celac, Bogdan Nedea, Iulian Chifu. Oana Popescu, Sergiu Panainte, Stanislav Secrieru, Armand Gosu, Alina Matis for their contributions to this memo.