Publication

An article written by Marco DI Liddo, analyst at the Centro Studi Internazionali (Rome), based on the results of European thought leaders’ visit to Ukraine which was organized by the Institute of World Policy in partnership with CIDOB.The shorter version of this article was published on “Evropeiska Pravda” (in Ukrainian).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy

In such a context like the today European one, where the political developments in Ukraine and the war in Donbass have become topics of polarization and conflict between both parliamentary forces and civil society organizations, Italy has shown a marked prudence towards the evolution of relations between Brussels, Washington, Kyiv, Donetsk and Moscow.
The reasons for this moderation are somewhat different.
At first, as for domestic policy, the Italian political forces, which live in a perpetual state of campaigning, have never considered international relations as an effective theme to affect popular support. Of course, such an approach comes from the attitude of the Italian middle voter, generally inattentive to what is happening in the world beyond the Alps.
The second reason is mainly cultural. Indeed, in principle, Italian people and political class have not a thorough knowledge of the history and traditions of Ukraine. On many occasions, Kyiv is simplistically viewed alongside the Russian-Moscow. It is not perceived a sense of diversity between Ukraine and Russia. In this sense, the Ukrainian historical and cultural peculiarity are largely ignored by the majority of the Italian population.
Finally, the third reason relates to the Italian international posture. Until the war of sanctions between European Union and Russia, Rome was the second largest trading partner of Russia, only behind Germany, with common strategic interests in all sectors of economy and finance, first of all the energy field. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the perception of Russian military threat and policy towards Italy has gradually waned. Based on these considerations, it is clear that, for the Italian entrepreneurial and political class is very difficult to give up the benefits of a peaceful relationship with the Kremlin, especially because of the Italian partial dependence on Russian gas and in a time when the global economic crisis burdens on the Italian production system.
However, despite the Italian general lack of attention towards the Ukrainian internal affairs, there is a political, academic and civil society narrow niche focused on the path of reforms undertaken by Ukraine.
In this case, it is possible to identify two main groups: the first, composed by those who support the Yatseniuk government’s reforms and hope in the realization of the project of European integration of Ukraine; the second, composed by those who are indifferent to the Ukrainian reform path and oppose Kyiv’s European integration. Leaving aside the entire ideological, cultural and political spectrum who orient sympathy or indifference to the Ukrainian cause, the reasons that fuel the belonging to a group or to another can be summarized in two main categories: the attitude towards the European Union and the attitude to Russia.
In principle, Europhiles and Russophobes are the biggest supporters of the reform process in Ukraine and hope that Ukraine will soon become a member of the European Union, because it is fully part of the European family. According to their vision, Euromaidan (I use this term to distinguish it from the term used by Ukrainians, ie Revolution for Dignity) was an innovative and revolutionary phenomenon, a demonstration of how the Ukrainian people have been willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their freedom and their European aspiration. These who expresses solidarity with Kyiv are primarily the anti-Russians, including more radical wing of euro-Atlantic movements, eager to deprive the Kremlin of a strategic ally and to rescue from Russia’s orbit a country so symbolically and culturally vital for Moscow. To Europhiles and Russophobes, the Ukrainian government has taken the only right way for modernization of the country. In particular, the greatest praise is directed to the laws on public transparency and corruption fighting, to the measures on the reform of state bureaucracies and on the modernization of the economic sector. Particularly appreciated is the law on the equalization of Nazism and Communism as criminal ideologies and the purging of the symbols linked to the old Soviet regime. This law is considered essential by the Europhile front to shake off the communist and Russian dross from Ukrainian history and politics and, at last, encourage a process of cultural Westernization of the country.
In contrast, the Eurosceptical and Russophile demonstrate a general indifference, or even a fierce criticism against the program of Ukrainian reforms. In addition, these movements and parties strongly oppose the project of euro-Atlantic integration of Kyiv, because they consider Ukraine as an integral part of the Russian-Slavic world and do not want to provoke the Kremlin with a political operation considered as a form of euro-imperialism. The pro-Russian sentiment, which therefore rejects the political aspirations of Ukraine, is particularly strong among Communists nostalgic of the Soviet Union, Eurasists, the conservative, traditionalist and nationalist right, in love with Putinism. However, even on the left, both moderate and radical, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary, there are Russophile sympathizers and indifferent to the Ukrainian issue. In their case, the myth of the strong man and the decisiveness of the Putin political system are the driving forces.
According to the euro-sceptical and Russophile groups, Euromaidan was a coup directed by Washington and Brussels by creating and supporting an artificial Revolution. As a result, the Ukrainian government is considered ultra-nationalist and barely fascist, pro-European only for convenience and political survival of the elites; prostrate to American geopolitical necessity. The path of reforms is viewed with suspicion, and judged as a clean-up needed by the new government forces to settle and crystallize their power. In this sense, the law on the equalisation of Nazism to Communism and the purge of Soviet symbols are designed as assertive measures, aimed at silencing the genuine feeling of unity and the common tradition among the Russian people and the Ukrainian people.
The fear, or perhaps the unmentionable hope, by Russophile Eurosceptic groups is that the exhaustion of the revolutionary enthusiasm and the rising social costs of the policy of austerity will force the Yatseniuk government and the Poroshenko Presidency to confront a growing wave of popular discontent, leading to a kind of crisis of rejection for pro-European reform. Ultimately, these groups believe in repetition of what happened 10 years ago, with the failure of the Orange Revolution, the fall of Julia Tymoshenko and the coming to power of Yanucovich. In addition, the pro-Russian sectors of Italian society and politics believe that a new wave of popular dissent would open the door to the growth and the rise to power of Ukrainian fascist movements.
The unique aspect of the Italian situation lies in the fact that the division between supporters and detractors of the Ukrainian agenda for reform actually crosses the political scene and the civil society. This prevents a net siding of Italy in one field or another. However, this duality should not always be seen as a restricting condition for the foreign policy of Rome. Quite the contrary, if you tried to overcome the rigid frame of mind in which the political situation in Ukraine has so far been classified, along the scheme “with Russia or against Russia”, it would be possible to explore new possibilities. Crushed in the Moscow-Brussels dichotomy, policymakers often have stalled in conceiving the Ukrainian issue only through its geo-political implications, without focusing on the needs of the population and its real aspirations. If it were possible to put at the centre of the debate the Ukrainian people and not the Moscow-Brussels-Washington relationship, maybe you would find that there are many more points of contact that points of friction between Russians and Ukrainians, despite the seriousness of the war in Donbass. So, instead of continuing to pull the Ukrainian rope westward or eastward, you might think of an alternative model in which a sovereign and independent Ukraine, aware of its geography, history and of the will of its people, could become a bridge of contact, dialogue and exchange between Russia and Europe instead of a battlefield.

The initiative was implemented due to the support:

“Initiative on the think tanks development in Ukraine”, operated by International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).