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To the people of the Netherlands/ Aan het volk van Nederland

An appeal from Ukrainian civil society to the Dutch people The text is available in English and Dutch

The Ukrainians are commemorating the events which took place in Kyiv exactly two years ago: the pinnacle of the Revolution of Dignity (also known as Euromaidan), bloodshed and deaths of more than a hundred of peaceful protesters.
People in Ukraine first came out onto the streets when it became public that then-President Viktor Yanukovych failed to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. A week later, after a violent crackdown on protesters, the uprising spread nationwide. Real Revolution of Dignity started when fundamental rights to assembly and freedom of expression were violated by the regime of former President.
If you ask an average Ukrainian what Euromaidan was about, they would say it was about human rights, fighting corruption, and accountability of the government. It was not about the membership in the European Union. It was about Ukraine’s European dream, if by «European» you mean democracy and rule of law.
Revolution of Dignity might seem to be a thing of the past, yet the struggle continues not on the streets but in governmental institutions. Ukrainians desperately need the Association agreement that will provide a crucial roadmap for implementation of high standards of public policy. This is what so many Ukrainians sacrificed their lives for. Ukraine is able to fight corruption, defend human rights and modernize economy without the Association Agreement, but with it the transformation of Ukrainian economy and society will go faster and much more effectively.
Association Agreement was signed not because it was imposed by Brussels and European Union. It was signed because Ukrainian people had the courage to go onto the streets and defend their demands for three long months of winter.
On April 6, 2016 the Netherlands will hold the referendum on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. For the Association Agreement to come in force, there is just one step left – voting «Yes» at the referendum in the Netherlands.
Allow us our future.

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director, Think Tank “Institute of World Policy”
Iryna Bekeshkina, Director, Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiative Foundation
Ihor Koliushko, Head of the Board, Centre of Policy and Legal Reform
Oleh Rybachuk , Head, NGO “Centre UA”
Oleksii Khmara, Executive Director, Transparency International Ukraine
Yevhen Fedchenko, Co-Founder and Director, StopFake
Sergiy Sydorenko, Editor, NGO “European Pravda”
Bogdan Globa, Executive Director, LGBT organization “Tochka Opory” | Fulcrum
Alya Shandra, Managing Editor, Euromaidan Press
Oleksandra Matviychuk, Head of the Board, Center for Civil Liberties
Anna Golubovska-Onisimova, Chair of the Board, Ukrainian Environmental Non-governmental Organization “MAMA-86”
Oleksiy Matsuka, Head of the Board, NGO “Donetsk Institute of Information”
Andriy Kulakov, Program Director, Internews-Ukraine
Oleksandr Sushko, Research Director, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
Tetiana Pushnova, CEO, UKRAINE TODAY
Hennadiy Maksak, Head Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
Oleksiy Melnyk, Director, Foreign Relations and International Security
Programmes, Razumkov Centre
Dmytro Levus, Director, Center for Social Research “Ukrainian Meridian”
Oleksii Turhan, Vice Director for Social Research “Ukrainian Meridian”
Oleh Lysniy, Vice-president Analytical center “Politics”
Lyudmyla Kozlovska, President, Open Dialog Foundation
Oleksii Pogorelov, General director, Ukrainian Association of Press Publishers (UAPP)
Lada Roslycky, Director of Strategic Communications Ukraine Today
Nataliya Popovych, co-founder, Ukraine Crisis Media Center

De Oekraïners herdenken de gebeurtenissen die precies twee jaar geleden in Kiev plaatsvonden: het hoogtepunt van de Revolutie van de Waardigheid (ook bekend als Euromaidan), wat bloedvergieten en de dood van meer dan honderd vreedzame betogers tot gevolg had.
In Oekraïne gingen er voor het eerst mensen de straat op toen bekend werd dat de toenmalige president Viktor Janoekovitsj besloten had de associatieovereenkomst tussen de EU en Oekraïne niet te tekenen. Een week later, na een gewelddadige repressie van de protestmarsen, breidde de opstand zich verder uit over het land. Een ware Revolutie van de Waardigheid brak uit toen de grondrechten en vrijheid van meningsuiting werden geschonden door het regime van de voormalige president.
Als je een gemiddelde Oekraïener vraagt waar Euromaidan om ging, zouden ze je zeggen dat het ging om mensenrechten, corruptiebestrijding en de verantwoordingsplicht van de regering. Het ging niet om het lidmaatschap van de Europese Unie. Maar het betrof wel de Europese droom, als je onder “Europees” democratie en rechtsstaat verstaat.
De Revolutie van de Waardigheid lijkt misschien iets uit het verleden, maar de strijd gaat nog steeds door, zij het niet op straat dan toch wel in de overheidsinstellingen. Oekraïne heeft de associatieovereenkomst hard nodig, want het biedt het land een cruciaal stappenplan om een regeringsbeleid van hoog niveau in te voeren. Dit is waar zo veel Oekraïners hun leven voor hebben gegeven. Ook zonder de associatieovereenkomst kan Oekraïne de corruptie bestrijden, de mensenrechten verdedigen en de economie moderniseren, maar mét dit verdrag kan de omslag van de Oekraïense economie en samenleving veel sneller en effectiever plaatsvinden.
De associatieovereenkomst is niet ondertekend omdat dit door Brussel en de Europese Unie is opgelegd. Het werd ondertekend omdat de Oekraïense bevolking gedurende drie lange wintermaanden de moed had om de straat op te gaan om hun eisen kracht bij te zetten.
Op 6 april 2016 houdt Nederland het referendum over de associatieovereenkomst tussen de EU en Oekraïne. Om de associatieovereenkomst in werking te stellen, hoeft er nog slechts één stap gezet te worden: ‘Ja’ stemmen tijdens het referendum in Nederland.
Help ons een betere toekomst te hebben.

Aljona Getmantsjoek, directeur van de denktank “Institute of World Policy”
Irina Bekesjkina, directrice van het Instituut voor Democratisering Ilko Koetsjeriv
Ihor Kolioesjko, bestuursvoorzitter van het Centre of Policy and Legal Reform
Oleh Rybatsjoek, voorzitter van de ngo “Centre UA”
Oleksij Chmara, uitvoerend directeur van Transparency International Oekraïne
Jevhen Fedsjenko, medeoprichter en directeur van StopFake
Sergei Sidorenko, redacteur van de ngo “Europese Pravda”
Bogdan Globa, uitvoerend directeur van LHBT-organisatie “Totsjka Opory” | Fulcrum
Alya Shandra, hoofdredacteur van Euromaidan Press
Oleksandra Matvijtsjoek, directeur van het Centre for Civil Liberties
Anna Goloebovska-Onisimova, voorzitter van de Oekraïense milieu-ngo “MAMA-86”
Oleksij Matsoeka, directeur van de ngo “Donetsk Institute of Information”
Andrij Kulakov, Directeur van het Programma Internews-Oekraïne
Oleksandr Susjko, onderzoeksdirecteur, het Instituut voor Euro-Atlantische samenwerking
Tetiana Pusjnova, de bestuursvoorzitter van UKRAINE TODAY
Gennadij Maksak, Hoofd in het Raad van Buitenlandse Beleid “Oekraïense
Prism”
Oleksij Melnyk, directeur voor de buitenlandse betrekkingen en
programma’s van internationale veiligheid, Razoemkov Center
Dmytro Levus, directeur voor de Centrum Sociaal Onderzoek “Oekraïense
Meridiaan”
Oleksij Turhan, vice-directeur voor de Centrum van Sociaal Onderzoek
“Oekraïense Meridiaan”
Oleg Lysnij, vice-president voor de Analytische center “Politiek”
Ljudmyla Kozlovska, President voor de Fonds Open Dialoog
Oleksij Pogorelov, de algemeen directeur van de Oekraïense Vereniging van de Persdienst Uitgeverijen (UAPP)
Lada Roslycky, directeur aan de Strategische Communicatie van “Ukraine Today”
Natalija Popovytsj, de mede-oprichter, het Crisis Mediacenter van Oekraïne

How to explain EU-Ukraine Association Agreement?

Talking points for communication in the Netherlands on the EU-Ukraine Association AgreementKey theses on the Association Agreement (AA):

• The AA means development of trade, elimination of corruption, stability, protection of human rights in Ukraine and cooperation with the EU, which means the support and expertise of the EU applied to reforms in the aforesaid areas;
• The AA DOES NOT mean granting Ukraine the prospect of EU membership;
• Voting against the AA does not mean voting against the EU;
• The objective of the AA is to transform Ukraine into a stable and prosperous democracy with effective economy, attractive to the business;
• Through the AA, EU entrepreneurs would get better access to the 45 million people market;
• Ukrainian migrants are not a threat to the EU, as Ukraine has already invested significant re-sources into strengthening security on its borders with the member states;
• The EU already has cooperation agreements with over 25 countries around the world, such as Israel, Lebanon, several Central American and South American states. Those agreements have al-ready proved their worth;
• The President, the Parliament and the Government of Ukraine are taking the implementation of the Agreement seriously, as Ukraine has already adopted a number of laws required to start the process of implementation of the AA.

Do:

• Emphasize that the AA does not provide the EU membership perspective for Ukraine. Kyiv knows well that the country is not yet ready for accession to the EU. Application for membership is not a part of Ukraine’s agenda;
• Emphasize that the AA between Ukraine and the EU is first of all a democratic choice of the citizens of Ukraine;
• Emphasize that the AA is primarily aimed at internal reforms in Ukraine targeting development of trade, fighting corruption, stability, protection of human rights and cooperation with the EU;
• Emphasize that through the AA Ukraine would establish effective mechanisms of counteracting discrimination, including sexual orientation;
• Be realistic about the reform process; admit that the AA would not solve all problems of Ukraine immediately. Ukraine still has a lot to do, and this agreement would be helpful.
• Explain what adopting “European values” means: more democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc.
• Stress that Ukraine is a sovereign state and does not accept interference of other countries into internal affairs.
• Steer discussion away from broader debates back to the key issues of the AA.

Frequently asked questions to be ready for:

• Which specific reforms cannot be implemented in Ukraine without the Association Agreement?
Suggested answer: The Agreement is an internationally binding document, and its implementation is mandatory for Ukraine. As part of the Agreement, Ukraine undertakes to implement a number of reforms that will not only change the current legislation of Ukraine in such fields as trade, envi-ronmental standards, and social security (working conditions, etc.), but also will bring it as close as possible to the EU standards reflected in the laws of the European Union (acquis communautaire).
• How exactly would the Association Agreement help to fight corruption in Ukraine?
Suggested answer: The Association Agreement obliges Ukraine to implement reforms aimed at fighting corruption in a number of sectors, including improving the business climate. Moreover, the Agreement lists rule of law and fighting corruption among the “key elements of strengthening the cooperation between the parties.” Some articles of the Agreement (e.g., articles 20 and 22) are di-rectly targeting combat not only against corruption, but also against offshore business, money laundering, and illegal business. Through changes in legislative, judicial and administrative systems of Ukraine according to the European model, money laundering via the EU member states will become impossible in Ukraine.
• Can you guarantee that Ukraine will not apply for membership in the EU tomorrow?
Suggested answer: The Association Agreement does not imply the EU membership perspective for Ukraine. Kyiv knows well that the country is not yet ready for accession to the EU. Application for the membership is not a part of Ukraine’s current agenda. There is no clause on membership in the AA, unlike the Agreements that were made with e.g. Croatia, Bulgaria, or Romania. In addi-tion, each of the EU member states, including the Netherlands, has a veto right on accession of new members and can use it when necessary.
• You claim that there are ongoing reforms in Ukraine, and their successful implementation re-quires assistance from the EU. However, the opinion polls show that the citizens of Ukraine do not feel any changes. Isn’t it paradoxical?
Suggested answer: It is true that Ukrainian government is not perfect and sometimes imitates re-forms rather than actually implements them. The Association Agreement is not only an internation-ally binding document that holds Ukraine responsible for its implementation, but also an additional instrument of pressure on the Ukrainian authorities available for the civil society. Public opinion polls measure public attitudes compared to the expectations, and we know these are extremely high.
• Ukraine belongs to the sphere of Russian influence. It has been agreed between Russia/NATO/EU after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Suggested answer: Ukraine is a sovereign state and is free to choose its own perspective on strate-gic cooperation with its neighbors. There is no agreement on spheres of influence. For its part, Ukraine has always sought to build good relations with both Russia and the EU on a partnership basis.
• Would the free trade zone with Ukraine provide opportunities for “normal” EU businesses, and not only for Ukrainian oligarchs and multinational corporations?
Suggested answer: The FTA aims at standardization of commercial laws and removing restrictions; therefore, any EU company would have the same access to Ukrainian market and partners as to the market and partners in Belgium or Poland.
• Do Ukrainians themselves support the Association Agreement?
Suggested answer: According to several opinion polls conducted over recent years, a clear majority of Ukrainians are in favour of adopting European values and standards.
• There is war in Ukraine. Is it safe to sign the Association Agreement with a country at war?
Suggested answer: The global practice shows that war is not an obstacle for reforms. Israel and Georgia, which, despite the war with Russia in 2008, continued its course of reforms and has shown impressive results in combating corruption, are the most vivid examples. Please note that the Association Agreements have been also signed with Moldova and Georgia that both have parts of their territories under “frozen conflicts.” Back in the day, an unresolved conflict has not pre-vented the Republic of Cyprus to even become a member of the EU. In addition, any conflicts tend to be resolved, sooner or later, while the Association Agreement is far-reaching and strategic document that would help achieve stability, growth and prosperity. Finallly it should be noted that the war only affects a very small part of the country. Most of the country is stable and peaceful.
• What would be the cost of the AA for the EU?
Suggested answer: A number of articles of the AA (453-459) do imply financial assistance to be provided through the IMF in the form of loans, but not grants, in a clear interdependence with the implementation of reforms; those loans will be subject to strict control by the EU. Unlike the states that are preparing to join the EU, the Agreement does not provide massive financial aid to Ukraine. The European Union has been continuously providing assistance to Ukraine within the framework of cooperation and development; nevertheless, that aid is not tied to the Association Agreement.
On the other hand, benefits from the AA for EU businesses could be illustrated with specific fig-ures.

Issue of Ukraine in the U.S. Presidential Race: Positions of Main Candidates

Article by Ivan Medynskyi, IWP research fellowCurrent leadership in the White House has a mixed record of addressing security challenges emanating from Russia, Middle East, and beyond. Obama’s administration has less than a year in office and little is expected to change in its position toward Europe and Ukraine. Thus, all the glances are turned toward the presidential hopefuls from both Republican and Democratic camps. For them, Russian aggression in Ukraine is a real test of the foreign policy aptitude. From Ukrainian perspective, not all candidates have passed.
Although the frequency with which Ukraine is discussed during the debates has receded, it is not a sign of diminishing saliency but is indicative of “maturation” of Republican and Democratic candidates’ positions toward Ukraine and Russia. By and large, the front-runners condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine, but propose different solutions to the crisis. Hillary Clinton promised to stand up to Putin, support Ukraine both economically and militarily. She is likely to support stronger ties between NATO and Ukraine. In contrast, Bernie Sanders sees NATO expansion as a provocation against Russia. He will continue Obama’s strategy toward Ukraine that is characterized by a combination of diplomatic efforts and sanctions. Both Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio opined that it is imperative to provide defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine, strengthen Ukrainian economy, and boost trade relations. Both candidates advocate for stronger sanctions against Russia that, according to Ted Cruz, should be accompanied by installation of missile defense system in Europe and diversification of energy supply. In contrast to other Republican hopefuls, Donald Trump insisted on “getting along” with Russia to deal with ISIS and letting European leaders handle conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
A year from now when the forty-fifth President will enter the White House, a variety of factors might alter the calculations of today. The possibility of major powers clash in Syria, Russian further expansion in the Eastern Europe or Baltic region, refugee crisis as well as the leadership style of the new president are just a few considerations that should be taken into account. Moreover, once in position of power the newly elected President might not follow up on his campaign promises, not just because there is the lack of will, but increasingly because of the lack of consensus between branches of power. Political gridlock in Congress that haunted Obama’s administration throughout his tenure is unlikely to wither away in near future. Another dimension that has to be taken into account is the American public opinion that according to Pew Research Center supports sending economic aid to Ukraine (62%) and its membership in the Alliance (62%).
Taking into account positions of the candidates and abovementioned trends, the worst strategy that Ukraine can expect from a new American president will include continuation of economic aid, but decrease in military assistance, gradual lifting of sanctions and rapprochement between Russia and the U.S. at the expense of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The best course of action might include boosting the U.S.-Ukraine trade relations, diversification of energy sources, intensification of partnership with NATO, and continuation of pressure on Russia via sanctions and other measures until all annexed and occupied territories will return to Ukraine. To understand where each candidate fits within this spectrum, it is imperative to analyze their background, campaign promises and arguments during the debates. Below is breakdown of Democratic and Republican front-runners’ positions regarding military and economic aid to Ukraine, expansion of NATO, annexation of Crimea, and sanctions on Russia.
{1}
Hillary Clinton (49.2% polling average)
Data on February 22, FiveThirtyEight project
Former Secretary of State and U.S. Senator, Hillary Clinton undeniably has more practical experience in foreign policy domain than other candidates and was very vocal about it during the debates. She emphasized her achievements in the capacity of the head of State Department during the “Reset” of relations with Russia such as a New START aimed at reducing the nuclear arsenal of two countries. At the same time, Clinton unequivocally stressed that she is ready to stand up to Putin through decreasing dependence on oil in Europe and deterring Russian aggression. In regards to sanctions against Russia, Clinton insisted that European countries have to be more willing to commit.
Hillary Clinton is ready to increase financial support to Ukraine, yet she argues that the aid should come with strings to hold Ukrainian government accountable. She believes Ukraine deserves more military equipment and training, because Ukrainian army and civilians have proven that they are worthy of greater support. Clinton believes that Putin sees the world as a zero-sum game and annexing Crimea can be viewed through such lenses. In 2008, she co-sponsored a Senate resolution that expressed strong support for NATO to enter into Membership Action Plan with Ukraine and Georgia. After former president Yanukovych announced that Ukraine is a not going to join NATO, Clinton nevertheless stated that the doors to Alliance remain open. She remains a strong supporter for continuation of the NATO’s open door policy.

Bernie Sanders (39.2% polling average)
Bernie Sanders, who had extensive career in the U.S. Congress, built his campaign around the principles of democratic socialism and dissatisfaction with the current political establishment. While his domestic platform implies changing the status quo, in dealing with Russia and Ukraine, Bernie Sanders is supportive of the President Obama’s current approach. He pledged to continue the policy of putting pressure on Russia through freezing all Russian assets around the world and discouraging investment in Russia. Yet, he consistently opposed the expansion of NATO calling it a waste of money and unnecessary provocation of Russia. Moreover, Sanders does not consider Russia a top security priority for the U.S., putting ISIS and North Korea a rank above.
In contrast to other candidates, Bernie Sanders has not been explicit about if or how he will be supporting Ukraine. Given the fact that he believes Obama’s approach to be the best course of action, it seems unlikely that there will be a new impetus for addressing Russian aggression in Ukraine.
{3}
Donald Trump (34.7% polling average)
The success of Donald Trump in the polls and early primaries is a sign that Republican voters are tired of the existing state of affairs in the GOP. Trump is not afraid to voice his opinion about the most controversial issues and tap into the dissatisfaction with perceived U.S. economic and political decline. Although lacking foreign policy experience, Donald Trump is far from shy when it comes to criticizing Obama’s strategy towards Moscow and how he, if elected, would manage U.S.-Russia relations. Thus, he notably promised to “get along” with Putin. The latter welcomed the potential rapprochement calling Trump “an obvious leader of the Presidential race.”
While it seems clear whom Moscow favors in the U.S. Presidential race, Trump’s statements that sanctions on Russia will be lifted only if it behaves and that he is impartial regarding the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO are likely to leave leaders in Kremlin puzzled. Indeed, Donald Trump’s strategy on Ukraine lacks consistency and is ambiguous, to say the least. On one hand, he wants European countries, especially Germany, to provide more financial aid to Ukraine as well as to be more active on the issue of Crimea. On the other, the chemistry between Russian president and Donald Trump suggests that not only Ukraine, but also the broader Europe may fall victim to his “business as usual” approach.
{2}
Ted Cruz (19.4% polling average)
A senator from Texas, Ted Cruz, has somewhat unexpectedly won in the first caucus in Iowa bringing an intrigue into the Republican presidential race. In contrast to Trump, Cruz believes that the United States should have stood up to Russia immediately after its aggression in Ukraine through installing anti-ballistic missiles in Poland and Czech Republic and exporting liquid natural gas to Europe. He criticized Obama on the way he handled annexation of Crimea and called on vigorous sanctions against Russian energy and financial sectors. Cruz also believes in closer cooperation with NATO allies to counter violent extremism.
Senator Ted Cruz was one of the co-sponsors of the Ukraine Support Act, a bill that authorized financial aid and loan guarantees in the wake of Russian aggression. His economic strategy on Ukraine focuses on expanding trade relations and reducing dependence on natural resources. Militarily, Cruz believes that the U.S. should provide defensive arms to follow up on the treaty obligations with Ukraine.

Marco Rubio (15.3% polling average)
Marco Rubio’s plan “Defend and Restore Ukrainian Sovereignty” aims at reestablishing Ukraine’s control over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. It advocates for the assistance with modernization of Ukrainian economy, provision of lethal military aid and training, Russian assets freeze and expansion of sanctions.
Rubio has called Russian president a gangster, “an organized crime figure that runs a country, controls a $2 trillion economy … using to build up his military in a rapid way despite the fact his economy is a disaster.” To defend Europe from the Russian threat, he plans to make the U.S. presence in Europe permanent, boost the capabilities of NATO allies and increase assistance to Georgia and Moldova. Finally, Rubio intends to keep membership in the Alliance open to the states that meet the conditions, while excluding the possibility of Russian say in this process.

Conflict Settlement Practices around the World. Lessons for Ukraine

The Institute of World Policy has presented a research titled “Conflict Settlement Practices around the World. Lessons for Ukraine”.IWP has studied the international experience in settling conflicts, and developed concrete recommendations to facilitate the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

To download the full text of the research.

The research was prepared within the project “Ukrainian Think Tank Development Initiative”, operated by the International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

Ukraine-Germany: How to Turn Situational Partnership into Priority One

The Institute of World Policy has presented an analytical paper “Ukraine-Germany Relations: How to Turn Situational Partnership into Priority One”.The analysis is a part of IWP new ambitious initiative “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit” that will cover Ukraine’s relations with its strategic partners. As a result, IWP will prepare concrete recommendations to revised Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Strategy.

Authors:

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director of the World Policy Institute
Sergiy Solodkyy, Deputy Director of the IWP

Introduction
Relations between Ukraine and Germany have been on some sort of probation: over the last two years, the two countries have discovered many opportunities to bring the bilateral relations to a new level. However, there are even more obstacles able to hinder the formation of totally different kind of relations. During this time, Ukraine has to demonstrate the very things that the Germans appreciate in partnership with other countries: ability to adhere to clear rules and ability to fulfill its obligations.
It is still unknown whether it is possible to turn the situational partnership, established between Kyiv and Berlin, into priority one and at least bring it closer to strategic one. That requires efforts from both sides. The action plan for Ukrainian issues, developed by the German Government and coordinated by Federal Foreign Office of Germany, as well as the position paper developed by the foreign policy wing of the ruling CDU/CSU party, are the first steps towards developing a future strategy for dealing with Ukraine, and Kyiv should be totally interested in confirmation and implementation of both of them.
In order to influence this process, Ukraine requires a proactive stance with elements of strategic vision, as today Berlin does not fully understand whether Kyiv is seriously interested in investing in their relations with Germany, and not just using the latter tactically to counter Russian aggression.
Currently, on the credit side of cooperation between Ukraine and Germany are the fact that Ukrainian dossier remains among the top priorities of the Federal Chancellor’s office and intensive political dialogue, which was made possible by the involvement of Berlin in cessation of hostilities and conflict resolution in Eastern Ukraine. However, the level of trust between the leaders of both countries currently depends on the level of Ukraine’s readiness to fulfill their commitments within the framework of the Minsk process.
Whether the new German policy towards Ukraine will follow a separate track and won’t be subordinate to Germany’s policy towards Russia, depends in no small part on Ukraine itself. The “Russia first” policy has been seriously questioned recently; however, given the cooperative and not confrontational nature of German foreign policy, the chances of its revival are still strong.
Germany still shows consensus regarding the fact that German foreign policy is actually European policy. Berlin will not be able to act only according to their own preferences; in order to avoid further self-blocking within the EU, they will have to take into account the positions of other member states, especially France.
Kyiv formulates the key general interest of Ukraine in Germany as follows: to do everything possible in order to ensure that in the medium term, Ukrainian political dossier remains among Berlin’s priorities and eventually acquires the economic dimension through arrival and solidification of strategic German investors in various sectors of Ukrainian economy1. Among other interests are Germany’s role in ensuring European unity on the critical issues related to Ukraine and support (including financial) for reforms in Ukraine.
Generally speaking, Germany’s interests in Ukraine articulated by our German partners are as follows:
1) deterring the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, as it could undermine the stability of other regions of Ukraine;
2) prevention of destabilizing and disintegrating processes in Ukraine, as well as a dramatic deterioration of the socio-economic conditions;
3) consolidation of Ukraine, both politically and through reforms, as Ukraine’s future depends on its internal transformations;
4) supporting Ukraine’s European integration as the most powerful tool of transformation of the country

Symptomatically, while Ukraine’s interests in Germany are clearly dominated by economic factor, the interests of Germany are not, despite the traditionally strong geo-economic emphasis in German policies towards other countries. German strategies towards many countries around the world have been built around economic, not security interests for years.
At the same time, there is a clear convergence of interests in terms of the transformation of Ukraine in the process of European integration. After signing and ratification of the Association Agreement and entry into force of the Free Trade Area with the EU, the process of European integration has become inevitable for Ukraine. However, the European capitals, particularly Berlin, still question the irreversibility of this process. For the Germans, unlike many Ukrainians, European integration vector is not a geopolitical, but modernization project. Some levels of government show lack of awareness on the fact that Ukraine will have to be dealt with not on ad hoc basis, but on a regular one. It is obvious that development of a Ukrainian version of “Partnership for modernization” (the policy that has failed on Russia) would make sense.
The new opportunities also lie in the fact that Ukraine has emerged from the so-called blind zone for both German politicians and the whole German society. Before the Euromaidan, German elites viewed Ukraine as just another post-Soviet poor country with a penchant for authoritarianism, unclear priorities, catastrophically corrupt political elites and the dominance of oligarchs. The Euromaidan has been successful in convincing at least a part of the German establishment that Ukrainians are eager to change the situation. German leaders seek to support Ukrainian efforts; the question is, how far is Berlin willing to go with that support?
The opportunities are also accompanied by risks. Germany is increasingly distracted by internal problems (especially by the refugee crisis). However, Berlin devotes even more attention to the issues related to efficient functioning of the whole European Union (primarily the Greek crisis, but soon the referendum on UK’s exit from the EU might divert even more attention). Very soon, all German politicians will immerse into the election process, which would push Ukrainian issues into background: first, due to the important elections in five German states in 2016, and then, in view of the parliamentary elections in 2017. Moreover, one should not underestimate the strong Russian lobby in Germany, and the pressure from a part of German business willing to restore the status quo in relations with Russia.
In the medium term, the interest towards Ukraine in Germany could be maintained at a high level with two conditions. The first is a pessimistic one: if the security situation in the region deteriorates, and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia escalates. Without a doubt, under such conditions, Ukraine would become at least one of the three priorities of German foreign policy. Obviously, such a scenario is not desirable for both Kyiv and Berlin. The second one is an optimistic one: Ukraine demonstrates sheer miracle of reforms and fighting corruption, and German politicians use the example of Ukraine as their own achievement, a kind of master card. There are also alternative scenarios: according to them, Ukraine is expected to return into the category of important, but not priority Eastern periphery of Europe. Allowing such a development is against the interests of Ukraine.
The major irritant in relations between Kyiv and Berlin is the issue of Ukraine’s integration into the NATO. In Germany, there is a consensus that Ukraine’s integration into the NATO would be a destructive policy. Moreover, that attitude is shared by German citizens: German public opinion beats all possible negative records, compared to other NATO member states. For instance, 57% of the Germans oppose Ukraine’s accession into the Alliance, while even in France, 55% of respondents support that step.
Obviously, there is a need for a new level of dialogue in the security and defense sector. Currently, Ukraine and Germany are both focused on strengthening their own security and are implementing intensive reforms in their armed forces. Exchanging experience in this context could, on the one hand, be useful for the transformation efforts in Ukraine, and would also create the foundation for increase in the level of mutual understanding in the security sector.
Today, Germany lacks influential politicians or opinion leaders able to reasonably explain their citizens the importance of such a step. In this context, the situation has only worsened compared to that of the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, when Ukraine and Georgia were denied the NATO Membership Action Plan. Any further claims regarding Germany’s short sight in this matter, will not force Berlin to change its position.
The objective of this policy brief is to examine the real situation in relations between Ukraine and Germany in the key areas of partnership: political, security, trade, and economic. However, the main objective is to analyze the ways of rapprochement between the two countries, the “anchors” that could bring them closer to each other; it is actually about the reconfiguration of Germany’s old foreign policy doctrine (the New Eastern Policy, or Neue Ostpolitik) into a new foreign policy program with a parallel track for Ukraine.

The full text of the paper is available here.

Also you may use this link.

The research was prepared within the IWP’s project “New European Policy: Filling the Awareness Gap”. This project is carried out within the National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) project, supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine. The “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit” project is conducted with the support of Black Sea Trust for regional cooperation – a project of the German Marshall Fund.