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An article written by Anton Bendarzsevszkij, Head of the Geopolitical Institute of Russia and Central-Asia (Hungary), based on the results of European thought leaders’ visit to Ukraine which was organized by the Institute of World Policy in partnership with CIDOB.The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy

It was not easy to imagine a strong, strategic alliance of Poland and Romania before 2014 – especially bounded to and around Ukraine. However, this became a geopolitical reality in nearly one and half year fueled by the events in Ukraine. Occupation of the Crimea and the Russian aggression in Ukraine made much more for uniting the NATO alliance and reshaping the relations in the region than any conferences, meetings and summits in the years before.
Forming alliance in Central-Eastern Europe
Bilateral relations of Poland and Romania were not too active before 2014: priorities were different. Romania focused more on its internal affairs and the region around Moldova, and for Poland the Visegrad partnership was the main regional alliance which they were building. Accordingly, the president of Poland, Bronislaw Komorowski has visited Romania only once before 2014, while he came to Hungary four times. For Poland Visegrad Partnership was the priority, and Romania was placed out of the Hungary – Slovakia – Czech Republic – Poland axis.
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VISEGRAD PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES AND ROMANIA
The situation has rapidly changed after the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014. Poland has found itself into new geopolitical realities, facing threats they were not expecting before. The rest of the Visegrad countries however were thinking differently than Poland, and it became clear that Romania was almost the only country in the region, which shares the concerns and views of Poland. Preferences started to change.
For Romania the strategic direction was out of question: Crimea is just 230 km away from the Romanian border, and Transnistria is just 100 km from Romania. The destabilization of the region is a potential threat for Romania. Russian expansion around its borders is a potential threat, and increasing military activity of Moscow in the Black sea is also considered as major threat to Bucharest.
Poland was looking with suspicion towards Russia in the last decade, and started the modernization of its army already back in 2001. As Bronislaw Komorowski said in June 2015 on the GlobSec panel related to European Security: Poland was never so naive about Russia as the rest of Europeans were. Their experience was based on the centuries’ long historic experience, and as Komorowski formulated, “they have learned the lesson”. Poland feels Russia coming closer and closer and is also concerned about the deployment of the Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.
Based on all that, it was not so surprising, that Warsaw and Bucharest became the main advocates of the military expansion of NATO in the region, building up a defence system on the European periphery. Poland is planning to spend 9,3 billion EUR this year for its defence budget, which makes 2,1% of its GDP, while Romania has also declared that it will increase the defence spending from the current 1,33% of GDP (1,78 billion EUR) to 2% by 2017.
Triangle of Poland, Romania and Ukraine
Romania shares a longer border with Ukraine, than Poland – 530 km against 420 km, but the Ukrainian and Romanian relationship was not cloudless before 2014. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the two countries have serious disputes regarding the borders at the Black Sea, Romanian minority living in Ukraine and the “bistriy canal” connecting the Black sea and the Danube River on the Ukrainian territory. Kiev and Bucharest were looking at each other with caution trying to figure out if there is a potential threat coming from the other party.
Regime change in Ukraine and the pro-European forces coming to power in Ukraine fundamentally changed these relations and opened a new chapter. Ukraine and Romania have now much more in common than they were expecting: they have common threat coming from Russia, they have common goals and common strategic interests. Poland, which has closer relationship with Ukraine than Romania, can be a pacifier, bringing together the two countries.
The demand for restarted relationship was common both in Kyiv and Bucharest, and the 17 March 2015 president of Romania, Klaus Iohannis visited Kyiv to meet with president Petro Poroshenko – the first visit of a Romanian president to Ukraine in the last seven years. According to Poroshenko, a new chapter was opened in the bilateral relations, and they were able to discuss and find solutions to problems, which were unsolved for many years. The two leaders discussed cooperation in trade, energy, environment, transport, infrastructure and other sectors. Poroshenko has also highlighted, that Romania was the first country to have ratified the Association Agreement of EU and Ukraine.
During the March meeting of the two presidents it was also agreed to work on the unfreezing of the situation in Transnistria, and to strengthen the security of the Black-sea region. What is probably more important: new regional cooperation was outlined on the meeting, drawing a triangle between Poland, Ukraine and Romania.
“We must increase regional cooperation between Ukraine, Poland and Romania, and create a certain group of solidarity” – told Mr. Iohannis on the meeting.
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TRIANGLE OF POLAND – ROMANIA AND UKRAINE
Few days before Mr. Iohannis’ visit to Kyiv, the Romanian president also met with his Polish colleague, Bronislaw Komorowski on 12 March 2015, which also fitted into the new strategic outline. The two signed an agreement in the energetic cooperation and agreed to provide a concrete European perspective to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – countries of the Eastern Partnership, which signed the association agreement with EU.
Winning of Andrzej Duda on the Polish presidential elections in May can also play in favor for Poland and Romania: Duda was criticizing Komorowski for not doing enough against the Russian aggression. Duda was also speaking against the “Normandy format” dealing with the situation in Ukraine, and was advocating for including the neighbours, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania into the negotiation process. His victory in the polish presidential elections may move forward the Poland-Romania-Ukraine cooperation even faster.
NATO expansion in Central-Eastern Europe
The deployment of the European missile defense system was already on NATO’s agenda since 2002, however, because of the mixed reception in EU and the restart of US-Russia relations after 2008 the deployment was halted. In the phase 1 the Aegis ballistic missile defense system was deployed on a US warship, USS Monterey, which was sent to the Mediterranean and later to the Black sea area in 2011.
Officially, the deployment plans were never canceled and a roadmap was created introducing three phases of European missile system deployment. However, Russian actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have definitely accelerated the process and made the participating states much more willing to cooperate. So far Russia had a very strong voice against NATO expansion in Europe, but with its recent actions Moscow has lost all the credibility, and provided the legitimacy for defensive actions from NATO’s side. In phase 2 the Aegis Ashore missile defence system will be deployed to Romania in 2015 to provide coverage for Southern Europe, and in phase 3 the second Aegis Ashore facility will be deployed to Poland until 2018, to provide coverage for Northern Europe.
In the last months, the US made it clear that Romania and Poland are its most important allies in the region. Since the beginning of the year Romania was already visited by several high ranked US and NATO representatives, including Jens Stoltenberg (NATO Secretary-General), Victoria Nuland (US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs), General Philip M. Breedlove (NATO Supreme Allied Commander – Europe) and Frank A. Rose (US Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, verification and compliance).
Poland and Romania also seem to be the least dependent countries in the region from Russian energy resources and economic sector. Romania’s consumption of the Russian gas is just 20% of its total gas consumption. Poland’s use of Russian gas is worth of 60% its total consumption of gas, but this year Poland also opens a new liquefied gas terminal at Swinoujscie, which will definitely decrease this number.
Base for regional cooperation
Russia was also not idle in the last years: several sources point out that Moscow has deployed Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile system in Kaliningrad area, and according to Rostec, they are planning to deploy 120 new systems by 2020. Iskander missile systems, originally developed in the Soviet Union and modernized recently, have a 400 km strike radius. The facts that Warsaw is just 275 km away from Kaliningrad (or Bucharest 383 km away from Tiraspol) definitely make the European leaders to feel nervous. Moscow has also upgraded its radar capabilities in Kaliningrad, according to the deputy defense minister, Yuri Borisov. The Voronezh-DM class radar is in par with foreign counterparts, and can track up to 500 targets simultaneously within 6000 km range.
Signals are clear: the Russian aggression started in 2014 against Ukraine means a very direct threat and challenge to European security order, and thus a threat to European prosperity and development. The remilitarization of the Black Sea, military campaign in Eastern-Ukraine, the deployment of Iskander missiles, the rise of regional nationalism supported by Kremlin and the destabilization of Ukraine, Moldova and Transnistria are all threats which we are facing right now. All these threats can only be dealt effectively together, with a regional cooperation. A Triangle, outlined by Poland, Romania and Ukraine, aimed on defending Europe’s borders and helping Ukraine to deal with Russian aggression, can be a good base for it. A well working, successful cooperation should also attract the neighbours into this strategic alliance on the later stages: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.

The initiative was implemented due to the support:

“Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms” (UNITER) project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine;

Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine;

“Initiative on the think tanks development in Ukraine”, operated by International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

An article written by Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs for IWP’s study “Ukraine-NATO: Diagnosing the Partnership”The full publication “Ukraine-NATO: Diagnosing the Partnership” is available here.

There are several hypotheses in public discourse regarding the possible security format for Ukraine if its full membership in NATO is not a realistic prospect. Among those versions, we should mention frequent claims on reasonability of the Finnish model, which means membership in the EU without a full integration into NATO. Meanwhile, after Russia’s aggression, the perception of Euro-Atlantic integration has changed in Finland, and debates on the country’s possible membership in the Alliance have been revived.

The finnish model. What is that?

Finland’s foreign and security policies are marked by official continuity interrupted by significant changes, yet, behind the scenes, relationships with actors that are important to Finland are continuously changing. The end of the cold war and the abrogation of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, and entry into the European Union are two such significant changes. Through this time, Finland has maintained a broad view of security and continues to focus on national defense, relying on a military based on conscription and a large reserve. Annually more than twenty-thousand men and between three and four hundred volunteer women are trained by the Finnish Defense Forces (FDF), which during peacetime consists of more than eight thousand soldiers (8000) and five thousand (5000) civilians. The fully mobilized wartime force is around two hundred and thirty thousand (230,000+) soldiers. The annual defense budget of around 2 700 million Euros (1.28% of GDP) used to have a better balance between procurement, operations and salaries but for 2014 about 17 % went to procurement, 68 % for general operational costs and the remainder for salaries. Only around 1.5% of the defense budget is used for international peacekeeping or crisis management operations. As a whole, it is clear that Finland continues to focus on national territorial defense, while contributing around five hundred soldiers to diverse international operations. Experiences from international operations make it clear that in terms of professionalism and capability, Finnish reservists perform well compared to all-volunteer forces, and interoperability between Finnish army, navy and air-force units and NATO-member forces is exceptionally high.

Clearly Finland’s relationship with NATO has evolved significantly since 1994, when it first joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. These two decades long period of increased and deepened cooperation has been enabled the step-by-step building of trust on both sides. Fundamentally this has had to do with Finland repeatedly showing that it can be relied on to deliver what it has promised, whether in crisis management operations, exercises or other forms of cooperation, and NATO for its part including Finland in many types of activities that had previously been reserved only for members.

The most visible part of the relationship has been Finland’s participation in various NATO-led crisis management operations. Starting in 1995, Finland contributed a battalion to the IFOR and subsequent SFOR (starting in 1996) crisis management operations in the Balkans. When the KFOR operation in Kosovo was launched in 1999, Finland contributed a large battalion consisting mainly of reservists. Of particular note is that Finland was the first non-NATO country to be given operational command of a NATO brigade (Multinational Brigade – Center). Finland joined the ISAF operation in Afghanistan January 2002 contributing anywhere from fifty to over two-hundred soldiers at any given time, while contributions to the follow-on mission Resolute Support is around eighty soldiers.

Finland has also actively participated in the work of the various security related groupings and committees gathered under the auspices of NATO. In 1997 Finland became a member of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), started actively participating in the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) work, including earmarking fourteen experts for its eight sub-committees. In 1998 Finland began contributing to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), a Russian initiative.

Starting during the 1990s but systematically increasing during the past decade, Finland has participated in defense materiel cooperation, sought to increase interoperability by adopting NATO standards and has used the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and its Partnership Goals (PG) to develop its own national defense. For example Finland participates in the Strategic Airlift Capability project, and has participated in NATO Response Force (NRF) since 2008, partially to gain more access to NATO standards and procedures, and has since the 1990s ensured that all procured materiel fulfils NATO standards. In September 2014, Finland and Sweden signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NATO on Host Nation Support, and became a part of the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership program (EOP) enabling further cooperation.

It is noteworthy that this substantial increase in both breadth and depth of cooperation has been supported by Finnish politicians from a wide range of political backgrounds; it is not the project of just a few parties. This has enabled long-range and stable planning by the various governmental agencies and ministries involved in cooperation with NATO.

Politically ever deeper cooperation with NATO has also required Finland to adopt different concepts regarding its position in the realm of security politics. European Union membership in 1995 is seen as a fundamental foreign, security and economic choice by Finland, and with EU membership the language of neutrality faded from official usage. It has been replaced at first by statements about Finland ‘not being militarily allied’ to more recently (post EU Lisbon treaty) Finland ‘not being a member of a military alliance’.

How does the finnish society perceive integration into NATO?

Opinions on whether or not Finland should seek to become a member of NATO divide both Finnish popular opinion and politicians. The specific polls vary, but in general during the past decade 60 to 70% of the population has opposed Finnish NATO membership, while between 20 and 30% of the population supports it, with around 10% not having an opinion. This contrasts with polls conducted of officers in Finland, where around half of all officers support membership, and around 70% of colonels and above ranks support membership.

The main reasons the general population at large gives for being against Finnish NATO membership have to do with Russia and its proximity, and that NATO is not seen to increase Finnish security. Those who favour NATO membership give as their main reasons that membership would generally increase Finnish security and specifically address threats emanating from Russia. This is one of the aspects which make the situation difficult for politicians; both sides of the argument use the same reasons to argue for their position.

Of the political parties represented in the Finnish parliament, only the conservative National Coalition and Swedish People’s Party (liberal) openly favour Finnish NATO membership. The Finns, Social Democratic, Center and Green parties all remain open to Finnish NATO membership but do not think it is necessary at the moment. The Left Alliance is ideologically opposed to Finnish NATO membership.

Overall, opinions regarding Finnish membership in NATO are relatively stable, though the recent negative changes and general instability in the regional security situation has moderately increased support for Finnish membership. However, this increase in support for cooperation applies to all types of military cooperation, with bilateral Swedish (94%), Nordic (94%) and EU (86%) cooperation receiving support from the great majority of the population; support for cooperation with NATO is notably less at 56% of the population. In parallel with increased support for Finnish NATO membership, polls show that more Finns think defense policy has been handled badly or very badly, with a quarter of the population now feeling this way compared to less than 20% in 2011.

Looking at a diverse range of polls and questions, the view among the population seems to be that while there are concerns regarding Finnish defense and security policy, the general approach is approved by a significant majority of the population. In practice this means there is no real political pressure to radically alter the pillars of Finland’s defense: focus on national territorial defense, conscription and a large reserve based military, and continuing military cooperation with other countries but not belonging to a military alliance.

Despite this seeming stability, Finnish NATO membership is a constant part of security and defense policy discussions in Finland. To understand the debate, it is necessary to be aware of a few things which influence it. First, the discussion is dominated by a labeling of people as either NATO hawks or Finlandized cold warriors. This means that debates are frequently based on myths, false information or specific views regarding national identity and what enabled Finland’s success during the cold war.

Finnish fears and myths

Perhaps the strongest myth, that the Finnish people can never rely on assistance from other countries relates to national identity and an incomplete understanding of history. During independence (since 1917) Finland has in fact been given assistance when an assistance/defense pact existed. Without German assistance Russia would likely have succeeded in its attempt to break Finnish defenses and occupy Finland in the fall of 1944. This view about the unreliability of outside assistance is in the case of NATO compounded by two remnants from the cold war: (1) that the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and NATO were given equal billing as dangerous military alliances and tools that their largest members used for their own benefit; and, (2) that Finland’s policy of neutrality kept it out of superpower confrontations during the cold war, and that NATO membership would draw it into such confrontations. Finland’s EU membership has through the enactment of multiple rounds of economic and political sanctions made it obvious that it already cannot hope to stay outside of power politics. Moreover, on a purely military level, it is unclear how Finland as a EU member and close partner with NATO could, for example, imagine staying out of a conflict or crisis in the Baltic Sea region.

Information, and its purported lack regarding the impacts of Finnish membership in NATO is often used as a reason why real debate is not possible and political decisions are not made. This is completely untrue. There are multiple official and academic studies on the military, political, and legal impacts of membership. In addition to this, there are dozens of papers and various high quality books published on the subject. Despite this, debate is frequently hobbled by patently false charges, such as Finnish NATO membership resulting in NATO nuclear weapons being placed in Finland (NATO has no nuclear weapons, some of its members do, and Nordic members of NATO have a peacetime opt-out on this), that as a member Finland would then be required to participate in American imperial wars or be required to give up its reservist based national defense system. Compounding these specific understandings of national history and incorrect information is a somewhat aged understanding of what modern warfare is like, and what it demands in terms of capabilities. This has an impact on the expectations about what kind of assistance Finland could expect if it was a NATO member.

The above suggests that while the new government led by Prime Minister Sipilä (Center Party) has returned to the position that Finland retains the option to seek NATO membership during the four year mandate period, it is unlikely that Finland will join – absent a Swedish decision to seek membership. Sweden’s decision to join is frequently cited as one of two situations when Finland would seek membership. The other is if the political elite (president, government and all large parties) jointly decided to seek membership, thereby turning public opinion in favour of membership. Polling suggests such a turn in public opinion is possible, but there is little evidence that the political elite would come to such as consensus decision.

In the case that Finland and Sweden would decide to seek NATO membership, it would of course be up to the existing member states to decide if they accepted a particular state as a new member. Official and unofficial statements indicate that in the case of Finland and Sweden the membership negotiations process would be quick and accession would be successful. On the military technical level Finland’s level of interoperability is higher than for a number of existing members but, membership would require changes in Finnish law, including the constitution. It is likely that some NATO member states would communicate their concerns with taking two new members, especially since Finnish accession would approximately double the land border between Russia and NATO members but it is difficult to see how two stable democratic EU members with modern and NATO interoperable forces would be rejected as members.

Overall, while NATO membership is frequently a part of Finland’s security policy debates, it only forms a part of the overall Finnish understanding of security. Even the strongest supporters of Finnish NATO membership only see membership as one component of national security. Finnish security is certainly enhanced and improved by the close cooperation with NATO but its foundation is built on a broad or comprehensive societal security concept. Within this concept successive governments have identified seven vital functions of society, one of which is Finland’s defense capability. This broad concept of security is built on a societal ‘deep security’, which is based on universal literacy, economic equality, freedom of press, multi-party democracy and trusted rule of law, all of which provides a generally inhospitable environment for anyone seeking to use hybrid or non-linear warfare against Finland.

The above described relationship between NATO and Finland (and to a large extend Sweden) is quite unique, and would be difficult to replicate. Yet, few lessons or observations relevant to Ukraine can be extracted from it. A deep relationship with NATO can be very beneficial for supporting the long-term development of a robust national defense force, and even as a NATO member this national defense force must be kept strong. The relationship can best be built through continuous practical and pragmatic cooperation, showing both individual member states and NATO as an institution that one is willing to contribute to broader (cooperative, in NATO’s terminology) security while seeking to strengthen one’s own capabilities. This trust developing process takes time and is facilitated by strong bilateral relationships, with a NATO member country often being able to work as a ‘sponsor’ or introducing issues and areas of cooperation that are mutual beneficial to a partner country and NATO. In Finland’s case, it also made a habit of sending its best soldiers and civilians to postings, and being better prepared in many instances than some members, underlining the weight Finland put in the development of the relationship.

Finland’s relationship with NATO, where in the eyes of many observers Finland takes the risks of NATO membership without receiving collective defense guarantees, is partially dependent on membership in the European Union, like Sweden, and in Finland’s case also the Eurozone. These two provide both political and economic motives for other states (including many NATO members) to support deeper cooperation and potentially consider bilateral assistance during a crisis. On the other hand, the other partners in NATO’s most exclusive cooperative program, the EOP are not EU members (Jordan, Australia and Georgia).

At the rhetorical level Finland’s relationship with Russia is frequently cited as being better and stronger because Finland is not a NATO member, but pre-Ukrainian war NATO member Norway had good relations with Russia, even cooperating militarily in Arctic search and rescue capabilities; this is in contrast to Finland which has no military to military cooperation with Russia. This suggests that there is nothing inherent in NATO membership that prevents reasonable relations between a member and Russia, though Russian ideas about identity and history clearly impact which countries it deems can acceptably become NATO members. In Finland’s case Russia has made it clear that it thinks Finland should not join NATO, and that such a move would result in serious repercussions and actions by Russia. Most extremely, Kremlin’s ‘messenger’ Sergei Markov stated in an interview in Hufvudstadbladet in on June 8th, 2014 that if Finland wants to become a NATO member, it would decrease European security and ultimately that Finland should consider whether it wants to be the reason for the beginning of World War III. Ukraine has experienced far worse than threats for wanting to link its future with the European Union and NATO, but it suggests that membership in NATO is seen by Russia as far more dangerous than membership in the European Union.

The study was conducted within the project Strategic Discussion Club in the Regions, implemented by the Institute of World Policy in partnership with the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine and with the support of the Government of Norway.

Opinions expressed in this publication do not reflect the official positions of NATO and the Government of Norway.

An article written by Emmanuel Grynszpan, French journalist (La Tribune), based on the results of European thought leaders’ visit to Ukraine which was organized by the Institute of World Policy in partnership with CIDOB.The shorter version of this article was published on “Evropeiska Pravda” (in Ukrainian).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy

Even today, links between France and Ukraine are not sufficient. (…)

Ukraine’s voice is hardly perceptible in the French media coverage hubbub. Kremlin’s voice is far reaching, whereas Kyiv’s voice is not. The lack of information about Ukraine leads to the fact that we understand more easily the Russian-Ukrainian conflict through the point of view of the Kremlin. Putin wants to widen his territory, his influence. But we do not clearly identify Kyiv’s objective. To risk a war so that one may join the European Union? It is hard to believe. Similarly, the French public does not take seriously the argument brought forth by some Ukrainian leaders that Ukraine is protecting Europe in holding back the Russian aggression. Frenchs perceive the Islamic States, terrorism and the wave of immigration as threats.

Putin has at his disposal many influential relays in the French media environment: intellectuals, politicians, and personalities from the arts. Moreover, Frenchs still retain admiration for General De Gaulle, who was considered as the Man of Providence because he was restoring France as a Great Power (France lost its position as a Great Power in 1939). This spirit of revenge, less virulent than in Russia, is defined by a profound anti-Americanism. Politicians use this anti-Americanism to proclaim their understanding of Putin, self-proclaimed leader of the resistance against U.S. hegemony movement.

The idea of giving Putin his claims in order to “have peace (and gas)” has taken root. Former president Nicolas Sarkozy, and now candidate to the 2017-presidential elections, has already legitimized Crimea annexation; Crimea “has chosen Russia”. Moreover, right and left of the French political spectrum frequently use the Russian theory that NATO has provoked and humiliated Putin. (…) The leader of the far-right party Marine le Pen, whose party represents 40% of the French political electorate, show her total support to Putin.

However, French are far from being charmed by Putin, his image is globally negative. The Russian leader is perceived has an autocrat with violent methods. Those who set democratic values and human rights higher than will to power have a bad opinion of Putin and his actions. Many intellectual and influential journalists criticize Putin’s authoritarianism and they see in his governing a return to totalitarianism. (…)

Nonetheless, one should never under-estimate intellectual laziness. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is complex and his historical roots go back in time. The hybrid and undeclared war lead by Moscow, Donbas’ particularism – exploited by The Party of Region-, the rule of the Oligarchy over the policy; all these exotic elements make the conflict difficult for Western Europeans to understand.

However, Kremlin’ explanations easily simplify the conflict: Ukraine is oppressing the Russian-speaking minority, there is a resurgence of Ukrainian fascism opposing the counterattack of the heirs of the Red Army, the civil war is lead by the governmental troops against insurgent groups supported by the population, etc..
The propaganda is operating because it makes the reality more understandable. Russian public believes in it as its motherland is portrayed in a positive light, European public succumb to this logical and easy explanation of the events. Acquisition of knowledge requires efforts; therefore humans often prefer to believe. (…)
Nonetheless, an event is in favour of Ukraine: Maidan. (…) French identify themselves with protestors on Maidan. Russian propaganda, assimilating the revolution to US backed-up action, does not take roots in French minds. However, French press mixes up ethic nationalism and territorial nationalism, therefore Pravy sector was many times depicted as a neo-Nazi party, in compliance with Russian narrative.

On the other hand, it is clear for everybody that the Kremlin wants Kyiv back in its sphere of influence. Since there is no shelling anymore in Ukraine (at least in the media), the economic dimension of the conflict goes first. Ukraine appears as being more a problem than an opportunity. Because of the crisis, France has now two Mistral battleships pending. (…) Moreover, the EU has to face the debt crisis in Greece. Ukraine has to purify its economy first and engage in dolorous reforms, for the rest, we will see.

(…)

Kyiv cannot afford to wait to implement the reforms, which are politically risky and whose dividends will be visible only in medium-term. (…)
Meanwhile, a remodelling of Kyiv’s strategy towards the Donbas will improve Ukraine’s Western audience’s image. In fact many in France believe that Kyiv should cease to consider Donbas’s population as hostile and to engage direct dialogue with it on order to win the humanitarian envoys competition. Right now, Russia is ahead in the race, followed by Rinat Akhmetov, whereas Kyiv appears to be starving Donbas.

The initiative was implemented due to the support:

“Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms” (UNITER) project, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by the Pact in Ukraine;

Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine;

“Initiative on the think tanks development in Ukraine”, operated by International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Think Tank Fund (TTF) and funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine (SIDA).

Post in blog on “Ukrainska Pravda” by Alyona Getmanchuk, Director of the Institute of World PolicyThe articel is available only in Ukraininan

Sorry, this entry is only available in Ukrainian.

An article by James Sherr, member of the Institute of World Policy`s Supervisory Board and Associate Fellow at Chatham House (London) Providing critical military assistance to Ukraine would devalue Russia’s advantage in negotiations.

From the outset of the Ukraine crisis, the West has acted on the premise that economic sanctions would induce Russia to modify its actions. But while sanctions do constrain capacity, they do not constrain behaviour. Their immediate impact is bearable. Moreover, they do nothing to diminish Russia’s most usable and effective form of power: military force. Given the stakes, the case for strengthening Ukraine’s defences is compelling.

The Russian military offensive of August 2014 secured diplomatic concessions in Minsk that would not have been granted otherwise. An even more devastating offensive of January-February 2015, in blatant violation of the first Minsk agreement, produced a second Minsk accord even more flawed than the first. According to its terms, future election conditions, constitutional reform and the restoration of border control are subject to the agreement of the separatists, who have licence to withhold their consent indefinitely.

It is blindingly obvious to the Kremlin that the separatist enclaves are neither absorbable by Russia nor sustainable in the long term. They are useful solely as a bridgehead for securing Russia’s wider objectives in Ukraine: its ‘federalization’ (loss of sovereignty), ‘non-bloc status’ (enforced neutrality) and the abandonment of its European course. So far, military force has been the arbiter of this process.

But if Russia’s military card is devalued, so is the bridgehead. And there are good reasons to believe strengthening Kyiv’s military muscle would be effective.

Russia has underestimated Ukraine’s resilience. Ukrainian national sentiment and civil society have been strengthened by the war, especially in the east. It also has underestimated the capacity of Ukraine’s fighting forces. Despite 16 months of armed insurgency and two military offensives backed by regular Russian troops, Russia’s separatist allies control less than five percent of Ukraine’s mainland territory.

Russia’s military system is potent but under strain. Its battle groups are not occupation forces. They strike hard and withdraw. The maintenance of 40-50,000 troops in theatre have placed demands on ground forces units as far away as Kazakhstan and Vladivostok. There is reluctance to risk prolonged exposure of ethnic Russian servicemen to hostile Russian-speaking populations in eastern Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Ukraine’s armed forces lack the means to prevail in high-intensity combat against well-armed Russian troops. They are burdened by the hangover of a largely unreformed defence system, by distrust between volunteer units and higher command echelons, and by a deficit of competent command and staff officers above unit level. Yet they are also dangerously outmatched in hard capability. In the Debaltseve offensive, Russia brought into the field advanced weapons systems against which Ukraine had no countermeasures.

Kyiv needs capabilities that will protect its forces and slow down the battlefield. If opposition forces are likely to face effective resistance and protracted combat, they will be less likely to attack. And the equipment needed to achieve this — secure communications, electronic counter-measures and long-range passive counter-battery radar — are neither ‘lethal’ weapons nor politically high-profile. Yet, in their absence, even a well-trained and highly motivated force risks evisceration in battle.

Much has changed since President Obama first declined Ukraine’s request for non-lethal assistance, and NATO allies are now contributing to Ukraine’s defence in a variety of ways. The problem is that the contribution is unsystematic, uncoordinated and unevenly matched to Ukraine’s needs.

In many quarters, it is now axiomatic that a refocusing and enhancement of Western assistance will ‘provoke’ Putin into a dramatic escalation of the conflict. The risk exists. Yet there is nothing in Putin’s record to support this assumption. What has repeatedly provoked him however is weakness and bluff.

In a contest with high-risk players, there is no such thing as a risk-free policy. Failure to modify an ineffective policy invites at least as much danger as a more robust course. Today’s dangers are created by Russia’s political aims, its military actions and its increasingly febrile and conspiratorial view of the world. So far, within these ominous parameters, the Kremlin has behaved according to a rational calculus. In this calculus, no respect is shown to opponents who are stronger, but unwilling to use their strength.

Chatham House

Adrian Karatnycky, Member of the IWP’s Supervisory Board, for Kyiv PostPoland has elected a new president, Andrzej Duda, of the conservative – and at times, populist – Law and Justice party (PiS). He is to take office on Aug. 6. In October, it looks nearly certain that Poles will elect a government in which PiS is the dominant, if not ruling party.

Rocked by scandals and the appearance of misbehavior, and burdened by a colorless and lackluster standard bearer, Ewa Kopacz, the prime minister who succeeded Donald Tusk, Civic Platform (PO)– the party Ukraine’s leaders have dealt with for the last ten years– is likely to lose.

An average of the five latest public opinion samplings from July give the opposition nationalist PiS party 37 percent, the governing PO 24 percent and the new political formation of the rock star Pawel Kukiz, 13 percent.

While three months remain for the campaign, the reign of Civic Platform, the party that has ruled Poland for a decade, appears to be ending. All the more so since Pawel Kukiz has already indicated his party is willing to cooperate or perhaps enter into a coalition with PiS, but not with the Civic Platform.

After nearly a decade of relations with Poland’s governing Civic Platform, it’s time for Ukraine’s leaders to prepare for a new Polish leadership and to renew and deepen their ties with Poland’s conservatives.

For a Ukraine that is fighting Russian aggression, the transfer of power in Poland has important consequences. Under former foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland was Ukraine’s most important influential voice inside the European Union.

It is clear that from the point of view of its attitude to Russia, PiS is staunchly anti-Putin. Party leader Kaczynski is convinced that the death of his twin brother, the late Polish President Lech Kaczynski and scores of other Polish leaders in an airplane crash in April 2010, was intentionally orchestrated by the Russian state.

However, the new Polish leaderships antipathy to Putin and his regime will not necessarily lead to smoother relations between Ukraine and incoming President Duda or a future PiS-led government.

One major stumbling block will be recent Ukrainian legislation that designated the Organization Ukrainian Nationalist (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as formations that contributed to the cause of Ukrainian liberation.

For Poles such heroization rings hollow, as Poles, and a large constituency that votes for PiS remember the predations of the UPA North, which was culpable in the murder of 60,000 to 100,000 Polish civilian males between the ages of 15 and 60 in the Volyn region and Eastern Galicia in 1943.

There are other reasons why the political changes in Poland may not initially be helpful to Ukraine, especially in the European Union . As a socially conservative movement, the new Polish PiS government is likely to be regarded in Brussles as out of step with Europe’s reigning secular liberalism. It will also come tarnished with the image of pits past populism and euroskepsis.

Over time, that, however, is likely to change. Indeed, there are not a few signs that PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski is intent on moving away from his former populism and building a modern conservative party.

His government is likely to include market-oriented advocates of fiscal responsibility. One likely leader is Mateusz Moraweicki, who head Bank Zachodni, Poland’s third largest. Morawiecki is touted as the next Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister.

But even pragmatists like Morawiecki, who with his father, the legendary Polish opposition leader Kornel Morawiceki, was part of the Polish underground that eventually toppled Communist rule, has a hard time swallowing Kyiv’s recent fashion for the heroization of the OUN and the UPA.

In June, I spoke in Wroclaw with both Morawieckis, whom I have known for many years. They have historically been strong allies of Ukraine and were staunch advocates of Ukrainian independence in the 1980s. Both, however, are dismayed by both the recent headline grabbing of far-right movements in Ukraine and the heroization of the nationalist movements of the 1930s and 1940s.

There is a middle ground for Ukraine. That middle ground should be based on objective scholarly examination of the historical record, and acknowledgment that if not the UPA itself, units of the UPA, committed crimes that could be labeled as constituting genocide. An honest examination of the historical record would also show that some OUN and UPA leaders opposed the actions of UPA North and its notorious leader Klym Savur.

Should Ukrainian leaders successfully navigate the shoals of starkly different Polish and Ukrainian historical perspectives on the OUN and the UPA, they will strengthen their relationship strong Polish ally that will remain a reliable partner as Ukraine struggles to resist Russia’s aggression and occupation of Crimea and the Donbas.

Column written by Member of the IWP Supervisory Board – former Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt for Project SyndicateThe ongoing Greek drama may have transfixed Europe and the world, but the great crisis in Europe’s east has not gone away. Ukraine remains under partial occupation by Russian-backed separatists, with intermittent fighting still taking place, despite the Minsk II ceasefire agreement.
The on-and-off fighting in Ukraine’s Donbas region since the Minsk deal was signed in February has made one thing clear. If Russia is serious about seeking a solution to the conflict, it should be prepared to endorse the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission and force. Such a mission could begin the process of rehabilitating the region, allow those displaced by the violence to return, and facilitate the reintegration of the Donbas into Ukraine with appropriate safeguards and devolved powers.

A useful model for this approach is at hand. Two decades ago, the international community was entering the final phase of efforts to secure peace in Bosnia. But there were also lingering conflicts in Croatia, notably in the Eastern Slavonia region, adjacent to Serbia.
Croatian military offensives, first in early May 1995, and a second in early August, had taken back three of four United Nations-protected sectors from separatist Serb control. But the most important area, Sector East in Eastern Slavonia, remained under firm Serb control. And, much like Russian President Vladimir Putin on the Ukraine issue today, Serbia’s then-president, Slobodan Milošević, insisted that the issue could be resolved only by direct talks between the Serb separatists and the Croat government in Zagreb.
The reality, of course, was that the Serb separatists were entirely dependent on the political, military, and economic support of Milošević’s Serbia. And, in the end, Milošević agreed to the deployment of a UN mission and force, which was tasked with ensuring the region’s demilitarization and return to Croat sovereignty, after implementing the necessary safeguards for the Serbs living there.
Today, the UNTAES (United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium) mission is virtually forgotten – not because it failed, but because it succeeded. To be sure, not every issue in Eastern Slavonia was sorted out then or in the years since; but there is no longer a conflict, and Croatia and Serbia now enjoy constructive bilateral relations.
This could be a model for the separatist-controlled areas of Donbas if the political will is there to make such an arrangement work. But is the Kremlin serious about recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty in the Donbas and resuming normal relations with the West?
At the moment, I strongly doubt it. It is worth bearing in mind that Russia has driven every step toward escalation in this conflict – including the establishment of the separatist enclaves. Indeed, the Kremlin appears to be waiting for Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s government to fail and the West to split on the issue and stop taking an interest in its resolution. At that point, perhaps, Putin will be ready to move against Ukraine to secure his own desired long-term outcome.
But if Ukraine’s government and the West remain united, the Kremlin might see that its enclaves in Donbas represent a threat mainly to Russia itself. After all, the grim reality is that the separatist enclaves are in economic free-fall, with their societies becoming increasingly criminalized. Donbas risks becoming a tar baby for which no one wants to take responsibility. As this becomes apparent, Russia’s leaders could start to envisage a UNTAES-type solution for the region.
Absent any other arrangement, the Kremlin will have to do just that. Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s doctrine – if you break it, you own it – applies to Putin’s intervention in Ukraine as much as to George W. Bush’s misadventure in Iraq.
There certainly are very difficult issues that must be sorted out before a peacekeeping mission could go into Donbas, notably the composition and formal mandate of whatever force is deployed. But, again, if the will is there, these questions should not be intractable.
Such a mission could then ensure the real implementation of the political provisions of the Minsk II agreement. Genuinely free and fair local elections, with the participation of all displaced people and refugees, will never be possible without a substantial international presence.
Today, this idea is sure to be dead on arrival. So was UNTAES in the early discussions on Eastern Slavonia. The Milošević regime then sounded exactly like the Kremlin now. But tomorrow really is another day, and it is certainly not too early to start exploring options that promise not just to manage the conflict, but to resolve it.
Such an intervention might work – but only if and when both sides genuinely want a solution. We are not there yet. But if both Ukraine and the West stand firm and act to block further Russian efforts at destabilization, that day might come. We should be ready.

Director of the Institute of World Policy, Alyona Getmanchuk, summed up the poll “What Europeans think about Ukraine?” in an article for “Ukrainska Pravda” (Ukrainian Truth)After analysing results of our poll, conducted in the six most populated EU member states, I would like to draw attention to the following things:

1. The least amount of people, who consider Ukraine to be a part of Europe is in France and Italy – 21% and 24% respectively. In Germany and Spain, a lot more people view Ukraine as a part of Europe, not to mention, of course, in Poland.

2. Those that are most ready to take into account Russian opinion when adopting any decisions related to Ukraine’s association with the EU is in Italy.

3. The survey found that the biggest percentage of people who associate Ukraine with Russia is in France (nearly a third – 28%). In Poland, for example, such people only make up 7%.

4. The only country, where, among three key associations about Ukraine dominate “Nationalists and the UPA in Parliament” – is Poland. Only in Poland, people associate Ukraine with Lviv and not Kyiv, as in other EU countries. Thus, despite the success story of reconciliation, the historical legacy presses on the perception of the Poles about Ukraine.

5. Only in Italy Ukraine is being associated with workers. Moreover, the older the respondents, the more likely the association.

6. The most progressive country in the south of Europe for Ukraine – is Spain. For those accustomed and believe that Spain and Italy are very similar, I advise you to get acquainted with the results of our survey and recent surveys of Pew Research Center. The differences are staggering. And clearly in favor of Spain. Another issue is that the opinion of Spanish people is not always reflected at the level of decision-makers of the country.

7. 24% of Germans believe that Ukraine still has to prove its commitment to European values, to be worthy of a EU membership prospect. After Germans come French and, surprisingly also the Poles (respectively 23 and 22%). Those that have to be least convinced about Ukrainian commitment to European values are Spaniards and Britons.

8. Germany was marked by the fact that almost half of respondents (44%) believes that Ukraine’s path towards the EU is seriously hampered by corruption. Only in Germany in three key associations with Ukraine, respondents included specific personalities. It is not difficult to guess which personalities – Klitschko brothers.

9. The most indifferent to Ukraine in Europe are the British, half of the citizens of this country did not identify with any “pro” (46%) or with the arguments “against” (51%) Ukraine’s membership in the EU.

The most sceptical to Ukraine being part of Europe are the French, the most vulnerable to Russian opinion on the Ukrainian issues are the Italians, the most uncertain about Ukrainian commitment to European values – the Germans, most focused on the historical heritage – the Poles and most indifferent to Ukraine and its place in Europe – the British.

P.S. In the near future IWP will carry out a survey in another three EU countries.

The results from each country:
Poland
France
Spain
Italy
Great Britain
Germany

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