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The Institute of World Policy presented the seventh annual ranking of Top-10 Promoters of Ukraine.To certain extent, the rating of 2014, which is traditionally based on survey conducted among Ukrainian and foreign experts, is unique. Eight out of ten names present in this year’s top ten, have appeared there for the first time; (only two have remained in the list since the last rating – Dalia Grybauskaite and Carl Bildt).
The regular winners of our rating – Klitschko brothers, Aleksander Kwasniewski, Victor Pinchuk, and Stefan Fule were not included into this year’s top ten.
Though, the formal evaluation criteria remained unchanged:
● continuous involvement in the Ukraine related issues on the international level;
● promotion of Ukraine from international rostrum: at international conferences, on the pages of the foreign press, etc;
● constant promotion of European integration of Ukraine.
However, due to the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s war against Ukraine at Donbas, another informal criterion has emerged: public assertion of Ukraine’s position on the international arena in the diplomatic, information and intellectual war initiated by Russia. This very criterion has become a deciding one in expert poll held traditionally in the form of assessment on a 1 to 10 point scale. According to the results of voting by 45 experts,the winner is the President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite, who, perhaps, has been declaring her position in a most clear and loud way.
This year’s rating is unique, as it does not include any representative of Poland, a traditional lobbyist of Ukraine, for the first time. Instead, it introduces several representatives of the United States and, in particular, two senators – John McCain and Robert Menendez. In our opinion, presence of the German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel in the rating is also clear.
Quite surprising, on the other hand, is the debut of the Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper. Symptomatically, the only citizen of Ukraine in the rating is the President Petro Poroshenko. Interestingly, the majority of voices in his favor came from the foreign experts interviewed by the IWP. Also, for the first time, our rating features George Soros and Timothy Snyder who has been setting the pace in the confrontation with Russia on the international intellectual front.
It is important to note that virtually all the winners of this year’s rating are not rewarded for advocating and promoting the interests of Ukraine. That is why we call them promoters of Ukraine, not lobbyists in the English version of the rating. In Ukrainian version, we could logically refer to them as to the “free lobbyists” of Ukraine. Fortunately, the list of international Ukrainophiles consistently advocating Ukraine’s interests and rightful place among the European community is not limited by this list of ten winners; in general, the experts named 93 persons, who should be undoubtedly included into the Ukraine’s “International Hundred.”
It is also important to note that our rating is based on appraising the specific individuals. It is likely that if we allowed voting not only for certain persons, the winner would be the conscious Ukrainian sacrificing his or her well-being, comfort and even life in order to do everything possible to break the world’s perception of Ukraine as “a small Russia” and win the leading part in determining the country’s future for Ukrainian people.

The complete text of the publication in PDFis available here.

1 – Dalia Grybauskaite, the President of Lithuania, 275 points
2 – Carl Bildt, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (2006-2014), a member of the Supervisory Board of the Institute of World Policy, 255 points
3 – John McCain, the U.S. Senator, ex-presidential candidate for the Republican party, 216 points
4 – Timothy Snyder, the Professor of History at Yale University, 165 points
5 – Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine, 157 points
6 – Angela Merkel, the Federal Chancellor of Germany, 154 points
7 – George Soros, the founder of the Open Society Foundation, international philanthropist, 150 points
8 – Joe Biden, Vice President of the US, 129 points
9 – Robert Menendez, the US Senator, member of the Democratic Partу, 123 points
10 – Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada, 107 points

1 – Dalia Grybauskaite, the President of Lithuania, 275 points
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While the Euromaidan has become a symbol of the Ukrainians’ fight for their dignity within their country, Dalia Grybauskaite has become a symbol of advocating their dignity on the international level. There is a huge difference between the global community cutting down Russia to its size and tiny Lithuania doing the same. Thanks to Ms. Grybauskaite, Lithuania showed that the dependence on Russian gas is not a geopolitical sentence; neither are the established trading relations with Russia, despite the fact that according to some estimates, Lithuania shall be considered the most affected per capita by the anti-Russian sanctions among all members of the EU. Dalia Grybauskaite is a symbiosis of a European politician and so-called “strong hand;” a very attractive symbiosis in Ukrainians’ view. Surprisingly, her statements always correspond with what the Ukrainians expect to hear. The EU sanctions? Important, but late and inadequate. Military and technical assistance? Lithuania is ready to provide it. Russian air force flying around the Baltic states? This is a demonstration of stupidity, not power. The meeting with Putin? There is nothing to talk with him about, until Russia changes its policy, as currently they behave like terrorists.

2 – Carl Bildt, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (2006-2014), a member of the Supervisory Board of the Institute of World Policy, 255 points
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It is not the first appearance of Carl Bildt in the Top 10 of Ukraine’s promoters rating; the experts had been appreciating his efforts in supporting Ukraine for a long time. However, he never reached as high as this year’s second place. Eight years of Bildt’s leadership in the Swedish Foreign Office were marked by dramatic increase of Stockholm’s attention to Ukrainian issues. To large extent, the shift in Swedish elite’s priorities towards Ukraine could be explained primarily by Mr.Bildt’s personal influence and his personal concern in supporting official Kyiv. Due to his efforts, Sweden is considered one of the three traditional allies of Ukraine, alongside with Poland and Lithuania. Bildt is a vivid personality, quite frank for a diplomat, what could be explained by his political background. Besides, Bildt is a real star of digital diplomacy; he was the one who sent the first high-level email to the US President Bill Clinton, and later he had become the most popular minister on Twitter. His tweets on Ukraine containing only 140 symbols had broader public resonance than the longest “deeply concerned” statements on behalf of the whole European Union. Although Mr. Bildt had left the government last year, Ukraine will remain in his sight, this time due to the Institute of World Policy; in December 2014 the former minister has become a member of Supervisory Board of our research center

3 – John McCain, the U.S. Senator, ex-presidential candidate for the Republican party, 216 points
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The Euromaidan events have become the second wind for the US Senator John McCain’s struggle for freedom and democracy in the region. After Saakashvili’s removal from power in Georgia and Yanukovych’s ascension to power in Ukraine, McCain has noticeably lost his drive and interest in the region. However, McCain’s fatigue and frustration about Kyiv’s policy could be traced in his conversations with the IWP experts much earlier, during the last years of Yushchenko’s presidency, when the conflicts between the President and the Prime Minister have become chronic and devalued all Washington’s hopes for success of the post-Orange “young democracy.” Still, it is clear that during the years of frustration McCain had accumulated energy for his triumphant return to the affairs of the region; the third place in our rating vividly illustrates that fact. Taking into account the indistinct position of the White House Democratic administration, John McCain embodies the role model of the US’s attitude towards Ukraine, unconditional towards any talks with Putin. It does not matter that John McCain’s level of responsibility is much lower than that of Barack Obama. Moreover, it does not matter that the Senator’s certain actions (e.g. his speech on the Euromaidan) might be questionable in terms of the most effective ways of supporting Ukraine, taking into account the fact of demonization of the USA in the context of Ukrainian conflict in many countries all over the world. In addition to visits, statements and lobbying the relevant legislation in the US Congress, McCain is known for quite witty and extremely popular reflections on certain Russia’s decisions. Think, for instance, of his tweet on his regrets about lost opportunity to spend his vacation in Siberia due to his status of persona non grata in Russia, or of his reference to Russia as a gas station masquerading as a country. The personality of John McCain had major impact on development of the stereotype that only the Republicans are capable of defending Ukraine’s interests and punishing Russia.However, the very presence of the Democrat Senator Robert Menendez in our rating demonstrates the inadequacy of that approach.

4- Timothy Snyder, the Professor of History at Yale University, 165 points
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The appearance of the Yale University Professor and famous historian Timothy Snyder in the top five of our rating is a pleasant surprise. Only a year ago, Professor Snyder, the author of several works on Ukrainian history, was mainly known within a narrow circle of historians and fans of historical literature. Meanwhile, his books and lectures were the major source of knowledge on Ukraine and Ukrainian history for lots of people in the West. With his outstanding narrator gift, Professor Snyder had helped the Western public to discover the “new Ukraine,” a great country with a long and tragic history. In his view, Ukrainian history is an integral part of European one and Ukrainians are a typical European nation. His latest book, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, mainly devoted to Ukraine, has become a bestseller and has been translated into 12 languages. Many foreign ministers and politicians have referred to this book when reflecting on certain processes in Ukrainian history during their conversations with the IWP experts. The events of 2014 have displayed that Professor Snyder views Ukraine not only as a subject of his academic interests. He was among the first Western intellectuals who started an active campaign in support of Ukraine. Having deep knowledge of Ukraine’s internal affairs, Snyder has published a number of articles in New York Times, following the Russian annexation of Crimea, revealing the Russian propaganda and urging the world to unite in order to protect democratic Ukraine. Later in May, Professor Snyder proceeded to action and initiated a large-scale conference “Ukraine: Thinking Together” in Kyiv attended by more than 30 major intellectuals from Ukraine, Russia, the USA, France, Germany, Poland and other countries. That ambitious summit held amid the threat of a full-scale Russian aggression proved the existence of a strong intellectual coalition ready to support the Ukrainians in their struggle for independence and European future. Professor Snyder remains an established voice of Ukraine in the West and does not let the Western observers forget about Ukrainian people as a powerful agent in this geopolitical confrontation. Moreover, he was the first to make it clear that today’s war is not only for survival of Ukraine, but also for survival of the European Union; and it is quite unfortunate, that it is still not recognized widely in the EU itself.

5 – Petro Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine, 157 points
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In 2014 Ukraine has been determining the global agenda. Logically, the President has been in the focus of the world’s attention. The presence of the President in the rating, even if his place is near its “equator,” shows that the observers estimate Poroshenko’s efforts highly enough, as Ukrainian politicians had rarely made their way to the previous promoters ratings. It is important, however, to note that the President received the highest scores mainly from the foreign experts. The Western observers seem to be more impressed with Poroshenko’s rational and calm approach, than Ukrainians, who seek resolve and sometimes even radicalism. It is obvious that the President feels quite comfortable in the field of foreign policy; seems that of all the government positions that he had previously held, the chair of the Foreign Minister suited him the most. The informed sources confirm that this is the reason why the President is accumulating all activities related to the foreign policy within his administration, reducing the role of the Foreign Ministry to information support of the President and the informal curator of the “Minsk peace” process. Off the record, the President likes to emphasize his relations with the most influential foreign leaders; for instance, he refers to the German Chancellor in a friendly manner, as to just “Angela.” He willingly basks in the glory receiving attention of global establishment and speaking from the world’s most influential rostrums, as it was during his speech at the US Congress (it should be noted that the Americans are really very selective in allowing the foreigners to speak at their legislative house). Even the Russian leaders display their ironical and theatrical sympathy to Poroshenko in their statements, which is clearly the Kremlin’s deliberate disservice towards the President of Ukraine. The President really has a decent knowledge of the international relations, perhaps the best among all presidents of Ukraine; his English skills allow him to communicate freely with the colleagues from other countries. Fair intuition, ability to adapt to the situation and negotiate seem to have served him well consistently at the times when he earned his first million. However, this ambition to be loved everywhere might play a cruel joke with him, leading to some kind of “Gorbachev effect:”the former President of the USSR is still respected in the West, but despised in his homeland. Therefore, it is important for him not to focus on communication with global leaders at the expense of communication with his fellow citizens, especially in eastern Ukraine.

6 – Angela Merkel, the Federal Chancellor of Germany, 154 points
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Angela Merkel is one of the most controversial international personalities in Ukraine. The stereotype of Merkel as a representative of Putin’s interests in Europe has taken its hold not only in Ukraine’s public opinion, but also among the experts and politicians. Subsequently, the latters are still reluctant to admit that after the annexation of Crimea and destabilization of the situation in Donbas, Ukraine has to deal with completely different Merkel. The events around Ukraine became a catalyst for the German Chancellor’s discontent and frustration regarding the Russian government’s internal and external policies. The very fact of Merkel’s inclusion into the top 10 of our rating illustrates the reassessment of her role in the Ukrainian crisis. However, this reassessment has only started, which is the reason why Merkel is only sixth. After all, virtually no other European leader worked that hard in order to bring the EU’s sanctions against Russia into action. Furthermore, virtually no one could do that much to maintain those sanctions after March 2015, when the EU leaders should decide their fate. Moreover, virtually none of our international partners is able to inflict a harder strike against Putin than Germany and Angela Merkel in person. Finally, we should admit that there is no other European leader capable of convincing Ukrainian President and Prime Minister that their unanimity and immediate reforms are vital. Despite all the speculations on Germany’s willingness to deal with Russia behind Ukraine’s back and painfully insulting “Frau von Ribbentrop” reference, improperly widespread six month before by the Ukrainians who focused mainly on the Chancellor’s statements, often detached from the context or mistranslated, Merkel had made it clear that she was not going to bargain with Russia. During her visit to Australia, she admitted that the world should prepare for a protracted conflict. While it sounds pessimistic in terms of rapid and sustainable peace, it is still optimistic in the light of the fact that any geopolitical bargain behind Ukraine’s back in modern Molotov-Ribbentrop style is impossible.

7 – George Soros, the founder of the Open Society Foundation, international philanthropist, 150 points
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George Soros has been standing for Ukraine for a long time; still, it is his first appearance in our rating. That could be explained by the fact that our rating has been published for only seven years, while the peak of the famous philanthropist’s activities aimed at supporting our country has occurred in the turbulent 1990s. Without a doubt, Mr. Soros would have been our promoters rating’s perennial leader, if it had existed twenty years before. He started supporting Ukrainian civil society in times when that term was still unknown in Ukraine, in distant 1989, when he had established the International Renaissance Foundation, one of the most active organizations nowadays. In his 84, his energy is envied by his youngest counterparts. During the last year, Mr. Soros visited Ukraine four times. His last voyage has lasted almost a week – the philanthropist has admitted that he had never stayed that long in any country hosting his foundation offices. Only few foreigners believed that Ukraine would remain a sustainable project for a long time in the early 1990s. George Soros not only believed in that, but also did his best for the success of new, European Ukraine. In the mid-1990s he explained his efforts by the statement, which became popular at that time: “I understood the importance of independent and democratic Ukraine. With thriving Ukraine, imperialist Russia is impossible.” Two decades later, this phrase sounds even more urgent. And now Ukraine’s famous friend stresses out that “Russia “defies Europe” with its actions in Ukraine.” His article “Wake up, Europe,” published by the world’s prominent media, claims to be the starting point of a new era in relations between Ukraine and the EU, provided that the EU has enough figures of this rating participants’ level eager to listen to George Soros.

8 – Joe Biden, Vice President of the US, 129 points
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During this year, the Vice President of the United States has been serving as a messenger between Washington and Kyiv, actually taking over the key communications with the Ukrainian goverment. This year, Biden has visited Ukraine three times, despite the fact that transatlantic flight is not the most pleasant activity for him. In addition, he had numerous telephone negotiations with Ukrainian leaders. His first visit has occurred in April, when many observers questioned the legitimacy of the post-revolutionary government in the light of the absence of the president, and Biden’s visit could be perceived as both legitimization of new authorities and a preventive warning that the reforms had to be started immediately despite the war. Next time Ukrainians have seen Biden in the government box of the Verkhovna Rada during the inauguration of Petro Poroshenko. Biden’s involvement into the resolution of Ukraine-Russia conflict did not only have a symbolic meaning. His negotiation skills, which have consistently saved the White House in talks with the Congress, and his classic elective politician’s ability to establish contact with the people, have made the Vice President Barack Obama’s “crisis manager”.In Kyiv, the Vice President had to set the records straight in the US-Ukraine relations and dispel certain excessive expectations concerning the US’s aid, especially the military and technical assistance and obtaining the status of the non-NATO ally of the United States.During last year, Ukrainians were more dissatisfied than satisfied with Obama Administration’s position carefully avoiding such terms as “aggression” or “invasion,”and Joe Biden’s delicate approach has played a significant role in smoothing the differences between Kyiv and Washington. 2015 will be extremely important for Joe Biden, who admitted recently that he could not rule out the possibility to compete with Hillary Clinton for the Democratic Party’s nomination in the 2016 presidential elections. In that scenario, the competition between the two politicians will definitely reach the international level, and Ukrainian factor might become a decent bonus at certain point.

9 -Robert Menendez, the US Senator, member of the Democratic Partу, 123 points
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Senator Menendez is new not only to our list, but also to Ukrainian public discourse.As a Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs,Robert Menendez had to take on Ukrainian issues seriously at the beginning of 2014.In fact, his acquaintance with Ukraine started from a blank sheet, as New Jersey Senator had no previous experience of working with that region.Perhaps,it was this unbiasedness that helped him understand the situation rapidly and accurately. We should also note the significant role of Ukrainian community in New Jersey in this process, as the Senator had numerous meetings with its representatives. Having finally arrived in Kyiv, the Democratic Senator displayed tangibly stronger rhetoric compared to the White House’s statements. Menendez urged to strengthen the sanctions against Russia and to provide Ukraine with armaments; furthermore, he clearly named the Russia’s actions in Ukraine as “invasion.” His refusal to employ the White House’s euphemisms regarding the events in Ukraine has earned him respect in the camp of his political opponents, the Republicans; however, thanks to Menendez, the Democrats have elegantly reclaimed the Republicans’ ace in the hole and deprived them of both monopoly to “punish” Russia and the status of Ukraine’s truly strategic partners. Menendez’s argument is really simple: if Russian aggression remains unpunished, what would deter other states from seizing their neighbors’ territories? Menendez was the author of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act adopted on December 11, 2014 by the US Senate. Although Obama has finally signed the amended edition of the document (in particular, the provision on providing Ukraine with the non-NATO allied status has been removed), the adoption of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act was a real victory of the pro-Ukrainian lobby in the USA. Now the struggle for its implementation begins, and Senator Menendez’s recent statements indicate that he intends to maintain the momentum.

10 – Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada, 107 points
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Perhaps, Stephen Harper would not support Ukraine that actively, if Canada did not have the world’s largest Ukrainian community. Moreover, that community had slowly, but effectively forced official Ottawa to respect its interests as an important electoral factor. Therefore, for Harper, supporting Ukraine is a matter of not only foreign policy, but also the internal affairs. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Ottawa belongs to the vanguard of the states providing Ukrainians with extensive support. Canada was among the first states to suspend their cooperation with Russia in military field; moreover, Canada has been more decisive in implying sanctions against the Russian establishment for their aggression against Ukraine than the Americans and the Europeans; finally, the extent of Canadian aid for Ukraine is also exemplary. The frankness of Stephen Harper’s communication with the Russian President might be rivaled only by the remarks of the American diplomat Victoria Nuland addressed to the EU; while shaking hands with Putin at G20 summit in Australia, Harper personally asked the Russian President to “get out of Ukraine.” Perhaps,the government of Canada has decided to redeem themselves for insufficient cooperation with Ukraine for the last decade.Obviously, the latter could be explained by the so called “post-Orange syndrome” and Yanukovych’s coming to power.However, many Ukrainians.

Experts list
1. Bonner Brian, Chief editor, Kyiv Post
2. Borzylo Inna, Executive director, NGO “Center UA”
3. Fesenko Volodymyr, Chairman of the Board, Center for Political Studies “Penta”
4. Filipchuk Vasyl, Chairman, International Center for Policy Study
5. Getmanchuk Alyona, Director, Institute of World Policy
6. Gonchar Mychael, Expert, Centre for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”
7. Haszczyńsk Jerzy, Editor-in-Chief, Polish daily “Rzeczpospolita”
8. Hladkova Yulia, International projects Coordinator, Viktor Pinchuk Foundation
9. Humenyuk Natalya, Journalist, Hromadske TV
10. Karasyov Vadym, Director, Institute of Global Strategy
11. Karatnycky Adrian, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council (Washington)
12. Koliushko Ihor, Head of the Board, Centre for Political and Law Reforms
13. Konończuk Wojciech, Head of department, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) (Warsaw)
14. Kuleba Dmytro, Ambassador at large, MFA of Ukraine
15. Lazarevа Alla, Correspondent, “Ukrainian Week” in Paris
16. Lutsenko Anatoliy, Director, GMT Group
17. Makarychev Andrey, Visiting Professor, University of Tartu
18. Marynovych Myroslav, Vice Headmaster, Ukrainian catholic university
19. Melnyk Oleksiy, Director of the programs on foreign policy and international security, Razumkov Centre
20. Minakov Mykhailo, President, Foundation for Good Politics
21. Miroshnichenko Vasiliy, Partner, CFC Consulting Company
22. Mykhal’nyuk Taras, Director, Open Ukraine Foundatoin
23. Oktysyuk Anatoliy, Analyst, International center for Policy Study
24. Palii Oleksandr, Political expert
25. Pidluska Inna, Deputy Executive Director, International Renaissance Foundation
26. Piekło Jan, Director, PAUCI Foundation (Warsaw)
27. Portnikov Vitaliy, Journalist, Political Analyst
28. Portnow Andrew, Professor, Humboldt-university of Berlin (Berlin)
29. Pushnova Tetyana, Executive Producer, Ukraine Today
30. Reichardt Adam, Editor-in-Chief, New Eastern Europe (Krakow)
31. Savin Kyrylo, Director of the regoenal office in Ukraine Heinrich-Boll Foundation
32. Shandra Alya, Managing Editor, EuroMaidan Press
33. Shlinchak Viktor, Chair of the Board, Institute of World Politics
34. Solodkyy Sergiy, First deputy director, Institute of World Policy
35. Sydorenko Serhiy, Editor, European pavda
36. Szeptycki Andrzej, Associate professor, University of Warsaw (Warsaw)
37. Todorov Ihor, professor, Uzhhorod National University
38. Torop Oksana, Correspondent on international issues, “Interfax-Ukraine”
39. Tryukhan Vadym, Expert on EU integration and international law
40. Weihe Thomas, Head of the Board, Victor Pinchuk Foundation
41. Voznyak Taras, chief edito, Journal «Ї»
42. Yermolenko Volodymyr, Director of EU – related Media Projects, Internews Ukraine
43. Zakharova Olena, Head of the Fpreing Policy Department,International Centre for Policy Studies
44. Zamyatin Viktor, Leading Expert of Political and Legal Programes, Razumkov centre
45. Zhovnirenko Pavlo, Chairman of the Board, Center for Strategic Studies

Leonid Litra, senior research fellow of the Institute of World PolicyDownload PDF-version of the policy brief
Executive summary

Russia’s aggression following the Euromaidan and its results brought about difficult times for Ukraine in terms of its territorial integrity and economy, but also a broad consensus – confirmed by parliamentary election results – that Ukraine’s future development path is that of European integration. However, in contrast to broader Ukrainian society, some EU countries have adopted an ambiguous attitude towards the events and results of the “revolution of dignity” that has happened in Ukraine. The misunderstanding – if not ignorance – of certain Ukrainian realities, combined with other existent disputes among the key actors in European politics, has created an ambiguous approach on the Ukrainian revolution and therefore tacit agreement with the “legitimacy” of Russia’s intervention. The countries with an ambivalent attitude on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict have conventionally been called “Russia’s understanders”; among others, France, Italy and Spain are countries suspected of indulgence toward Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine. The position of Madrid, Paris and Rome is very important for a coherent EU policy towards Russia, and therefore it is of paramount importance to understand the extent to which these suspicions can be confirmed and how to change these attitudes.

Introduction
When looking from Kyiv to south-western Europe, based solely on official statements, one would cautiously name France, Italy and Spain as true friends of Ukraine. The reasons to question this friendship, however, emanate from various sources and events that have happened over the last year. In the case of Italy, doubts appeared with the allegations that Rome is opposed to sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. With regards to France, the Mistral deal seems to be the issue generating a lot of anger in Kyiv and beyond. Meanwhile on the part of Spain, an initial unwillingness to punish Russia and the fighting of several Spanish citizens on the side of the
Russian-backed rebels have come to Ukraine’s attention. But in order to understand the causes of some attitudes coming out of Madrid, Paris and Rome, one must invert the roles and look from a different angle, which broadly suggests the existence of four important dimensions – historical legacies, legitimate interests, anti-Americanism and finances – that influence the above countries’ narratives on Ukraine.

The origins of a friendly policy towards Russia

Historical legacies
Historical ties have traditionally played an important role in developing the relationship between Europe and Moscow. Unlike Ukraine, which used to be incorporated into the Soviet Union, Russia, as the center of the Soviet empire, was for decades the only interlocutor in the region. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, very few considered the other former Soviet republics to be actual independent states, despite several of those countries previously having had their own statehood, not to mention Kievan Rus – the proto-state of Ukraine – having existed long before Russia itself.

The traditional relations between the Italian Savoia royal family and the Romanov imperial family cemented a good cooperative relationship between the two countries, which was later continued by the special relationship between the USSR and the Italian Communist Party, at that time the biggest communist party in Europe. For Spain, which doesn’t have a historical precedent of conflict with Russia, the living memory of Russia’s support for the legitimate government against the Franco regime provides an argument for friendly relations with Moscow. Compared to Rome and Madrid, Paris has an especially rich history of relations with Moscow, including a long history of alliances over the last several centuries. In the recent past, the friendship between Vladimir Putin and Silvio Berlusconi, as well as Nicolas Sarkozy and King Juan Carlos’ sympathy towards him, have also influenced those governments to perceive the Kremlin in a quite different manner than Russia’s neighbours.

Beyond that, geography has played an important role in establishing the current state of relations, due to the lack of competition in projecting interests over different regions and especially over Eastern Europe. Thus, the historical legacy of Russia’s relations with Italy, Spain and France is one compelling explanation for the inability of these countries to look at the new independent states as something more than a sometimes annoying and historically accidental appendix of Russia.

«Legitimate interests»
Russia’s overwhelming control of the former Soviet republics over the last two centuries fed the perception of its owning “legitimate interests” in those regions, and succeeded in convincing many Western European capitals of the same. France has traditionally had geopolitical priorities based in southern Europe, the countries of the Maghreb, Africa and the Middle East, towards which its main diplomatic power and strategic planning is concentrated. Spain – after a period of isolation during the Francoist period – always focused on Latin America and Northern Africa, while Italy has had a more modest foreign policy with interests concentrated in the Mediterranean and Middle East. In addition, none of these three European countries has perceived a direct or significant threat to its interests, national security or territorial integrity from Russia. Therefore, the lack of interests and connections with the former Soviet territories on the part of Paris, Madrid and Rome has led to a paucity or even absence of knowledge on the region. This is true even in the case of France, in spite of its long tradition of Russian scholarship.

Moreover, events in former Soviet countries – with the exception of the Baltic States and Madrid’s relative intimacy with Kazakhstan – are typically analysed through the Russian prism. Consequently, in Paris, Madrid and Rome there is a general endorsement of Russia’s perception of the former Soviet space as its rightful sphere of influence. The illegal annexation of Crimea, which allegedly also falls under this “legitimate interest”, was broadly accepted in these countries through the Kremlin’s argument that Russians have always been living there, overriding the fact that Crimean inhabitants were citizens of Ukraine and largely ignoring that, in Ukraine, to be a Russian speaker does not equate to being pro-Moscow. It is not that the political establishment in these three EU countries supported annexation, especially considering the negative reaction from Madrid for domestic reasons (as in the case of Kosovo), nor is it a question of open support. Rather, it is about approval by default. This perception of “legitimate interests” has been strengthened by the argument of an alleged informal agreement between the West and Mikhail Gorbachev on the non-enlargement of NATO in Eastern Europe; thus, with NATO’s expansion to the Russian border, this “promise” was broken.

The narrative of the NATO non-enlargement promise and the appeal to the 1990 Paris Charter are regularly recalled by the Russian leadership – and often echoed in the EU – in order to portray the West’s inability to honour its promises and justify Russia’s more assertive policy in the region, as if a legal document or agreement had been signed and infringed. But the declassified American, German and Soviet records do not provide evidence of Putin’s narrative5, and Gorbachev has confirmed that no promise was broken because no promise was given6. This is not to mention the fact that Russia never asked itself why Eastern European countries were willing to join NATO in the first place. In the end, one has to consider that the small states possess their own will, which does not converge with Russia’s “legitimate interest”. The most recent examples of the acceptance of the Russian “legitimate interest” doctrine in Ukraine were the non-bloc status that Ukraine adopted in 2010 and the lease of the Sevastopol port to the Russian Black Sea fleet. A neutral Ukraine for Russia means a Ukraine de facto aligned with Moscow, and Ukraine’s non-bloc policy bought time for Russia to annex Crimea. The active phase of this process started on 20 February 2014, while Viktor Yanukovych was still in office, but preparations started in 2004.

Anti-Americanism

Ukraine’s discovery by the societies of Italy, Spain and France is recent; it started partially with the Orange Revolution and deepened with the Russian-Ukrainian war. The same process was initiated in regards to Georgia in 2008 on the occasion of the Russian-Georgian war, but it did not last because of the relatively short military operations, the size of the country and its location. Considering the limited knowledge about former Soviet countries in these three EU states, the subject of Ukraine doesn’t arise as a serious issue of internal politics. Therefore is not able to influence the public debate as much as an issue related to Algeria would in France, or the issue of a Latin American country would in Spain. There is, however, a strong anti-American sentiment in these countries generated by different reasons. In Italy and France, the strong leftist tradition and newer far-right political parties such as the Northern League and the National Front create a significant anti-American opinion, while in Spain, for instance, the loss of Cuba to the US in the 19th century is still well remembered.

Aside from the anti-Americanism nurtured by messengers loyal to Russia in these countries, the strong anti-American feeling has at its basis a desire to get rid of US unipolarity and influence and put an end to the disorder caused by the US. The debate has substance, especially in light of US operations in Iraq; however, it has been artificially coupled with the issue of Ukraine. It is quite often that, due to Russia’s anti-American narrative, opposition to the US becomes associated with supporting Russia’s actions. The logic of accepting Russia’s behaviour because it is opposed to the US, to the detriment of Ukraine, is difficult to understand. The belief that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is evident, but what it shows is the inability of some Western European elites to view Euromaidan as a genuinely independent response on the part of Ukrainian society. Moreover, along with anti-Americanism, the success of far-right and leftist parties can also be explained by Euro-scepticism, ultra-conservative attitudes (from far-right parties) and a lack of leadership by politicians against the strong and sharp leadership of Putin. European far-right parties’ sympathy for Putin’s conservative message (anti-gay, nationalism, etc.) and the leftist parties’ fascination with the anti-American narrative and the centrality and superiority of their state is basically creating a supportive base of approval for Russia’s policies, even if not directly connected with Ukraine.

Finances
The money issue is very important for the EU countries, which are also suffering from the sanctions imposed on Russia. Although the losses are difficult to calculate, preliminary estimates are in the billions of euros, with the heaviest burden falling on Germany in absolute terms and on Lithuania in per capita terms. Therefore, the desire of some states in the EU to agree on terms for lifting the sanctions is understandable. France and Italy (and, to a lesser extent, Spain) are important economic partners for Russia and vice versa. In addition, special commercial arrangements are influencing the debate. The French agreement to sell two Mistral class ships to Russia is a profitable business deal, but at the same time has caused anxiety for Ukraine and some NATO allies, particularly the US. The French leadership has postponed the delivery of the first Mistral, and it is not clear whether this step
could lead to the cancellation of the contract and subsequent sale to some other state such as Canada. However, for now, the prospects of cancellation seem unlikely.8 Avoiding the moral side of the argument, the motivation to honour the contract is mostly about money, but not necessarily Russian money. A still-unsigned contract with India to sell 126 Rafale fighter jets worth up to $20 billion to the Indian Air Force, and potential participation in the modernisation of the Polish army (worth about $45 billion), are serious issues to be considered as these could trigger unpredicted effects.
Moreover, the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports reads that “Member States will not issue an export license if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim”. The Russian aggression in Ukraine is precisely the kind of risk described above. Of course, the argument that Mistrals are transport ships is interesting, but it is very unlikely that Russia will use these for transporting people, as clearly confirmed by Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, who said that “had Russia possessed such warships in 2008, it would have won its war against Georgia in 40 minutes instead of 26 hours”. Another case that is not yet publicly confirmed is that, in recent months, Gazprom offered Italy a 10% discount on gas supplies and cancelled the principle of “take or pay”.
Business with Russia has yet another dimension. The links between Russia and such political parties as the National Front in France, Forza Italia and the Northern League in Italy and the United Left and “Podemos” (“We can”) in Spain are also playing an important role, given the increasing influence of these parties in their home countries and their ability to lobby for Russian interests. The recent scandal of the National Front borrowing $11 million from the First Czech Russian bank and the allegations

that Salvini’s Northern League might have also borrowed Russian money are raising questions about these parties’ aims. In addition, concerns are being raised about some of the media writing on the Russia-Ukraine war. Despite the fact that in France, Spain and Italy experts report relatively impartial information on Ukraine, quite often leading newspapers, especially in Italy, take information mainly from such Russian news agencies as TASS and RIA Novosti, which follow the Kremlin line. On top of this, the Western media’s usual rule to provide at least two different opinions often results in offering a “second” one which has little in common with what is happening on the ground. Overall, suspicious media outlets and experts exist in limited amounts, but because they promote a very alternative view, they stand out against the background of the rest of the media.

Questions on Ukraine
Public opinion in Spain, Italy and France offers a credit of sympathy to Ukraine, in spite of better knowledge of Russia. The latest Transatlantic Trends Survey14 shows that France, Italy and Spain are in favour of providing economic and political support to Ukraine even if it causes conflict with Russia (France 58% Yes vs. 38% No; Italy 52% vs. 39% and Spain 48% vs. 43%). Regardless of this positive attitude on Ukraine, public opinion in the three EU countries posed two important questions about Ukraine’s events: the procedure of ousting Yanukovych and the far-right parties/movements.

It may seem that Yanukovych was removed in violation of the law, but facts do not support this view. The parliament “passed a resolution that established that Yanukovych had removed himself from fulfilling his constitutional duties. The resolution stated that due to the fact that Yanukovych had unconstitutionally stopped fulfilling his presidential duties, the Rada was calling early presidential elections as is their right under Article 85/7”15. There is no regulation in Ukraine that would prohibit the parliament from adopting such a resolution. Furthermore, the fact that Yanukovych fled the country (to Russia) and the Kremlin started the operation of annexing Crimea before Yanukovych was legally removed raises more questions than the procedure passed in the Rada.

Far-right parties do exist in Ukraine; however, their influence is minor, which is not to say nonexistent. The Right Sector, which was heavily used by Russia to project its propaganda-type information abroad, gained only 1.8% in the parliamentary elections and did not get into the parliament (falling below the 5% threshold). Compared to the results of the National Front in France or other similar parties in the EU, the performance of the Right Sector is insignificant. Failure to enter the parliament is also the case of the Svoboda party, that had a more moderate message, and the Communist party, for the first time since the implosion of the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

The revolution of dignity in Ukraine, the subsequent illegal annexation of Crimea by the Kremlin and the Russia-Ukraine war have naturally created dividing lines throughout the world. The situation these days is that all countries, especially in the EU, need to take sides. Unfortunately, some countries began to understand the seriousness of the events in Ukraine only after such dramatic developments as the downing of the MH17 flight.

The challenge for the EU – for Spain, France and Italy, not to mention Germany – is to work on settling the conflict and rolling back Russian aggression. The task is not an easy one, given the financial dimension in times of crisis, but the current conflict touches the very base of EU principles. Therefore, the most important thing that Rome, Paris and Madrid could do to help Ukraine is to keep its policy within the framework agreed upon in Brussels. Second, they should have a joint assessment of and vision for what must happen for sanctions to be lifted. Is cease-fire enough, or is full implementation of the Minsk agreement, including the effective control of Ukrainian constitutional authorities on Ukraine’s border with Russia, required? Third, Ukraine desperately needs help from the EU MS. It is not only about financial support, it is about assistance in implementing reforms and putting pressure on Ukrainian authorities to fight corruption and reform the justice sector. Fourth, the three countries should consider reputational sanctions for Russian players supporting the aggressive behaviour of Putin. An example could be the withdrawal of the Chevalier of the Legion d’Honneur order from Gennady Timchenko, who was awarded with it in 2013.

In its turn, Ukraine must boost its separate communications, both formal and informal, with Rome, Paris and Madrid in areas of common interest. Furthermore, Kyiv should intelligently challenge Paris, Rome and Madrid; for instance, by considering involving those three countries in the modernisation of its army through providing contracts to companies originating from those countries, as well as extension of participation in NATO trust funds.

Ukraine’s fight is important for the other former Soviet countries, but also for stability at the border of the EU. The path of Ukraine should be viewed much more broadly, much like the French Revolution, which went through long and painful reforms and blurry times in order to modernise. The chance for success for Ukraine is there, and if accomplished, will represent a positive step for the entire Eastern Partnership and beyond, including Russia.

1. Italy accused of blocking tougher sanctions on Russia, July 13, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ad743cae-0a8a-11e4- be06-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Kf3nt8XN 4
2. France defends sale of Mistral assault ships to Russia, June 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27729578
3. Divisions in Europe on sanctions mean Russia need not change Ukraine aims, April 28, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/ world/2014/apr/28/divisions-europe-sanctions-russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin
4. Spanish civil war nostalgics join fight alongside Ukrainian rebels, August 8, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/08/ us-ukraine-crisis-spaniards-idUSKBN0G81VX20140808
5. Steven Pifer, Did NATO Promise Not to Enlarge? Gorbachev Says “No”, Brookings, 6 November 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/06-nato-no-promise-enlarge Mikhail Gorbachev: I am against all walls, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 16 October 2014, http://rbth.co.uk/international/2014/10/16/mikhail_gorbachev_i_am_against_all_walls_40673.html -gorbachev-pifer
6. Mikhail Gorbachev: I am against all walls, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 16 October 2014, http://rbth.co.uk/international/2014/10/16/mikhail_gorbachev_i_am_against_all_walls_40673.html -gorbachev-pifer
7. Спікер» парламенту Севастополя Чалий зізнався у підготовці анексії Криму ще з 2004 року, 19 december 2014, http://www.unian.ua/politics/1023718-spiker-parlamentu-sevastopolya-chaliy-ziznavsya-u-pidgotovtsi-aneksiji-krimu-sche-z-2004-roku.html
8. Jim Dorschner, A Mistral for Canada, 19 September 2014,http://news.usni.org/2014/09/19/opinion-mistral-canada
9.Dimitri Halby, Sale of Mistrals to Putin May Cost France €11.3 Billion, 21 August 2014, http://oneeurope.info/by-selling-mistral-warships-to-putin-france-will-gain-12-billion-but-may-lose-upto-113-billion
10. European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/08675r2en8.pdf
11. Mistral Blows, The Economist, 17 May 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21602291-why-france-insists-going-ahead-sellingwarships-russia-mistral-blows
12. Alyona Getmanchuk, Про що питають італійці? http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/hetmanchuk/5497f9ae7c4c8/
13. French Far-Right Party Took Loan From Russian Bank, Radio Free Europe, 24 November 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-france-national-front-loan-le-pen/26707339.html
14. Transatlantic Trends 2014, German Marshal Fund of the United States, http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/
15. Maria Popova, Was Yanukovych removal constitutional?, PONARS, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/was-yanukovych’s-removal-constitutional

This paper was produced as part of the Ilko Kucheriv Democracy Fellowship Programme, a project of the Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS). The project is made possible with support from the National Endowment for Democracy.

The author would like to thank Carmen Claudín for coordination, interview and review of the text and Nathalie Tocci, Andrey Makarychev, Tatiana Kastoueva-Jean, Nicu Popescu, Marco di Liddio, Eleonora Trivigno and Olena Nazarenko for interviews.

The Institute of World Policy has made a publication according to the results of a Forum «Euro-Atlantic Partnership Day: Results of the NATO Summit in Wales», which has held on September 10 in Kyiv.This booklet contains the key messages of speeches of ukrainian and foreign officials, experts and diplomats, who took part in the Forum.
Alyona GETMANCHUK,
Director, Institute of World Policy
For the first time in the history of Ukraine security issue has become the first priority of the society. Moreover, it in the priority that is now consolidating different regions of Ukraine. We also observe a significant change in attitude towards Ukraine’s membership in NATO. For the first time in the history of independent Ukraine the number of the Alliance membership supporters is greater than the number of its opponents. Ukraine’s non-aligned status has not become in insurance policy capable of preventing war with Russia. On the contrary, Russia attacked the state that had once waived its claims for the NATO in order to avoid being attacked by Russia. The question, however, remains whether the war with Russia brought Ukraine closer to the NATO membership. We should be realistic and admit that it in highly unlikely, as Ukraine’s intent to integrate into the NATO has to be supported by the Alliance’s willingness and understanding of timeliness of that decision. There is also another question, whether we have To build our relations with the NATO on the «all or nothing» principle. Or, perhaps, we might make the maximum use of all opportunities provided by the partnership with the NATO, instead of membership (particularly, concerning the security sector reforms)? The history of relations between Ukraine and NATO remembers lots of bold statements, but very little action. Today, obviously, there is a strong need for moving away from populist declarations and appeals and focusing on practical cooperation.
Natalia NEMYLIWSKA,
Director, NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Ukraine
The Wales Summit was a turning point for the Euro Atlantic security system. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has altered the vision of the whole free and peaceful Europe dramatically. The instability spreading from the Middle East to the North Africa, as well as from the transnational and multidimensional threats, is also a security challenge. In these turbulent times, the NATO should be ready to deliver a wide range of missions, and the NATO has already started certain steps in that direction. It is mostly important for us today To hear the unanimous support of Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and the right to protection. The NATO member states have strongly condemned the illegal and illegitimate annexation of the Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine. At the same time, the Allies support the efforts of the Ukrainian people, including Ukraine’s Peace Plan to find a political solution of the conflict. All 28 member states enhance their support in order to make sure that Ukraine could sustain itself and protect its own security.

Valeriy CHALY,
Deputy Head, Presidential Administration
Such issues as new responses, new approaches To the global security are addressed in Ukraine today. The global community does not know yet how to respond to the hybrid war, but soon we will see how the NATO states are going to answer the new threats. The summit has illustrated consolidation of the Euro Atlantic partnership. That was probably the best signal To all those who intent to destroy the whole world, to those who seeks to impose the new rules on the world. The NATO member states’ recognition of occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by Russia and Russian military intervention is a clear position with far-reaching consequences for both Ukraine and the future of the European security system. Perhaps, Ukraine needs not the membership itself, but rather all benefits of the membership without actual membership. The priorities are as follows: strengthening the Armed Forces of Ukraine; finding the most effective security system for this part of the world and for the whole globe; and specific actions and specific achievements instead of mere status. It is obvious, that the Ukrainian people have chosen their way, and now the issue of the European integration is closely linked to the issue of future integration into the NATO.

The full text of publication is available here.

The publication was made within the project of the Institute of World Policy with the support of the NATO Centre of Information and Documentation of Ukraine.