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Based on our report “Security in Transition. How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources,” the Institute of World Policy has prepared 10 recommendations that will improve Ukraine’s security if carried out.All 10 are based on a medium-term timeframe of 3-5 years. The Institute remains confident that Euro-Atlantic integration is the only direction for Ukraine to develop.
Nevertheless, without decisive reforms in every area, not the least in defense, this ambition will remain as one-sided as it currently is. Ukraine’s partnership with NATO should not be based on the cry “Membership or Bust!” that simply reflects Ukraine’s inability to take advantages of the available opportunities. Ukraine should instead consider moving to the “deeper, not wider” phase and intensify its cooperation in already established areas, rather than wasting resources in search of new instruments.

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1. Asymmetrical security. In a situation where traditional models are not working for Ukraine or are unable to provide the necessary level of security, it makes sense to devise some contemporary adapted models that will be ale to respond to the most important security challenges. Such models need to be outside of outdated canons and their main criteria must be viability and effectiveness. Given the real state of affairs internally and externally in Ukraine, the asymmetrical security model is capable, both short- and medium-term, of providing the necessary response to most security challenges facing the country. One of its key features should be the capacity to respond effectively to a stronger adversary despite limited resources and to break the opponent’s will to engage in aggression.
2. Smart defense and diplomacy. In shoring up conventional military capacities, the accent should be on developing a “smart defense” system and the appropriate new generation army by taking elements from the examples of the armies of Switzerland, Israel and Sweden. Particular attention should be paid to work with the civilian population, so that it sees a direct link between itself and its army and security system. For any security model to be successful, smart, pro-active diplomacy will play a critical role for Ukraine. This should be done by working with national elites and business in key countries, engaging in systematic efforts with all key partners, establishing the necessary networks and coalitions, and direct actions, thereby fostering the transformation of Ukraine into an important continental hub that will prove too costly to attack… This means that supporting smart reforms of Ukraine’s diplomacy and allocating the necessary resources, no matter how difficult it might be, must be one of a select handful of top priorities for the state in the medium term.
3. Results-based Euro-Atlantic integration. The coordination of reform of Euro-Atlantic integration must be strengthened with both human and financial resources. One thing that is needed is a document regulating reforms that will bring Ukraine closer to NATO standards, containing clear objectives and benchmarks, and focusing on results-based management. NATO specialists should be involved in drafting a National Annual Plan with clear objectives, benchmarks and timeframes, in addition to a clear plan for monitoring and evaluating the execution of the NAP. The non-government sector should have opportunities to influence both the content of this document and its evaluation.
4. Countering corruption as a cornerstone of security. In its efforts to combat corruption in the defense sector, Ukraine must demonstrate serious results in the shortest time possible. Countering corruption would be the first, most obvious, and most basic sign that Ukraine is determined to change. At the least, this does not require outside funding but, on the contrary, will save public funds. Punishments for those engaged in corrupt activities should be more severe in the defense sector than in the civilian sector. The law must provide for very serious consequences against companies that have presented corrupt proposals to entities in the defense and national security sectors.
5. Deeper, not wider. Ukraine cannot afford to have the attitude, “Membership or Bust!” in working with NATO but should instead take maximum advantage of all the available opportunities for partnership with the Alliance. There are no fundamentally new formats for cooperating with NATO that Ukraine has not made use of so far. However, Ukraine is not currently taking full advantage of those mechanisms on offer. Ukraine’s partnership with NATO is unique and the level of support it has garnered from partner countries is unprecedented. This does not mean that the scale of assistance cannot be increased, but the Alliance has made one thing quite clear: Kyiv must first demonstrate the capacity to absorb existing levels of assistance effectively. Right now, Ukraine’s absorption capacity is simply not there. Critically, Kyiv must not dither in making those decisions that don’t require much time but have a major impact on the country’s reputation, such as appointing the Ukrainian Mission Head to NATO.
6. Establishing a new narrative among partners. The Government of Ukraine should actively cooperate with the non-government sector, both in Ukraine and in NATO member countries, to formulate a new, positive image of Ukraine as both a country that contributes to the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region and as a state that has unique experience in resisting and combating hybrid warfare. Ukraine must establish effective lines of communication, not just with the Alliance itself but, first and foremost, with its member countries, and to invest not only in communication at the intergovernmental and interparliamentary levels, known as Track 1 diplomacy, but also in Track 2 diplomacy between Government and civil society, and Track III diplomacy within civil society itself. Notably, Ukraine’s non-government sector is far more progressive in engaging in these various tracks of diplomacy.
7. Maximum integration into EU and NATO security structures. To strengthen Ukraine’s positions in the post-soviet region and diminish Russia’s influence there, Kyiv needs to actively develop bilateral and multilateral security and defense and sector cooperation with EU and NATO countries in the many available formats: the Three Seas Initiative, NORDEFCO, EU battlegroups, LITPOLUKRBRIG, peacekeeping operations, and so on. Together with the Defense Ministry, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry should set up a working group to analyze formats for tighter military cooperation with various configurations of NATO and EU countries. Among others, Ukraine should consider participating in a number of projects: in NORDEFCO, moving from observer status and participation in exercises and training to cooperation in the Military Industrial Complex; in the Bucharest Nine, cooperating with members of NATO’s eastern flank; and in military cooperation with the Visegrad group, such as further participation in V4 EU BG, joint exercises and the development of operational plans. The purpose of this kind of cooperation would be to maximally integrate into the military and security spaces of the EU and NATO without waiting for membership in NATO in the short and medium terms.
8. New knowledge. Instituting NATO standards and reorienting towards the European security region means immediate changes in approaches to the teaching curricula of Ukraine’s military academies and to military training in general. Military training, exercises, and a modern military education are a mandatory component for establishing regional cooperation in existing and ongoing defense projects. This means that Ukraine must not only study European practice but also put effort into establishing a common educational environment for Ukrainian and European service personnel. Among others, Kyiv can submit a proposal to establish a NATO training center in Ukraine that would, in the immediate term, begin as simulation training centers. Or a proposal to set up a regional military academy along the lines of the Estonian one in Tartu. Negotiations on this kind of project can even be raised within the Visegrad group, which anticipated setting up a similar post-secondary institution as part of its own defense cooperation plans.
9. Making use of opportunities at the OSCE and UN. To strengthen Ukraine’s regional security, another major component would be to actively make use of opportunities offered by the OSCE and UN. Supporting the reform of the UN Security Council and pushing for updated OSCE arms control agreements are at least two existing initiatives in which Kyiv’s voice should be stronger. The goal of Ukraine’s own diplomats should be to get information to the world community about Russia’s destructive role in regulating conflicts and to continue to expose its aggression against Ukraine and other countries in the region.
10. Deeper partnership with the US. Kyiv needs to work towards maintaining and increasing cooperation with Washington. Ukraine should promote the idea of increasing the US and NATO presence in the Balkans and in the Black Sea basin. One argument in favor of this is that, right now, RF groupings in occupied Crimea show, both qualitatively and quantitatively, far more new weaponry than what the Kremlin has placed in the Kaliningrad enclave. Ukraine should also steadily expand cooperation with the US by looking for additional common interests in the military arena. In the medium term, developing relations step-by-step and enshrining them in agreements should go hand-in-hand with upgrading Ukraine’s military capacity. The new agreement should, in legal terms, be higher than the current Charter, and eventually lead to either a Strategic Framework Agreement or a Defense Cooperation Agreement. The priority areas for such an agreement should include:
• holding joint exercises;
• cooperating in developing weaponry;
• getting consultative and material assistance in reforming the defense sector;
• collaborating in cyber security as an important link in cooperation with the US, given that Russia’s hacker attacks have been used against the US as well as against critical infrastructure in Ukraine;
• joining forces to support international peace and security, which would strengthen Ukraine’s role as a strategic country for the US. This kind of cooperation needs to have substance and avoid being declarative;
• joint research and analysis of the ways and means of hybrid warfare;
• cooperating in the intelligence sphere.

This report was conducted within the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with fi nancial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine. The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy.

IWP report analyzes security options for Ukraine based on five models: cooperation with NATO, regional security pacts, armed neutrality, bilateral security instruments, and the asymmetrical model.Authors:

Sergiy Solodkyy, Oleksiy Semeniy, Leonid Litra, Olena Betliy, Mykola Bielieskov, Olga Lymar, Yana Sayenko, Yaroslav Lytvynenko, Zachary A. Reeves

To read full text of the report

CONTENTS
Foreword
1. Asymmetric Security model
2. A security model based on a bilateral US-UA pact
3. The Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. Deeper but not Wider
4. Regional Security
5. Neutrality

Foreword
The Russian threat, inconsistent public policy, lack of political consolidation, institutional incapacity- the Institute of World Policy examined these dangers facing Ukraine back in 2013 in a paper called “Ukraine: Diagnostics of national (in)security.” The report was published just a few months before Russia’s aggression began in earnest. In many ways, that three-year-old study has remained very current even today—and the list of threats has only grown. The Rating Group’s latest survey, in October 2016, showed that most Ukrainians consider the conflict in Donbas the biggest issue facing Ukraine now.
Our current report, “Security in Transition,” serves to respond to this enormous list of threats. Our main goal here has been to analyze security options based on five models: cooperation with NATO, regional security pacts, armed neutrality, bilateral security instruments, and the asymmetrical model. Each of the five parts of this report is dedicated to one of these security options and analyzes each option according to these five aspects:
1) an assessment the current status of the model, especially in relation to Ukraine;
2) best examples of the application of the model worldwide;
3) the model’s drawbacks;
4) how well the model might work to restrain Russia’s aggression;
5) how probably the model might be implemented in the short (1-3 years), medium (3-5 years) and longer (5 and more years) terms;
6) recommendations.
Each section also contains a table summarizing the pros and cons of the analyzed model.
In any case, the Institute of World Policy has no doubt that Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration is inevitable. Still, as analysts, we were obligated to consider other security formats, especially to be able to assess the pros and cons of each of the options during a transition period. For instance, an analysis of recent trends in the modified neutral model could be of interest both to other researchers and, in particular, for decision-makers. Indeed, the Institute’s research shows that neutral states are gradually becoming less and less neutral in the traditional sense of this model: such countries are aware of their vulnerability before a number of different threats, whether that be terrorism for neutral Turkmenistan or hybrid or even traditional war for neutral Finland and Sweden.
The asymmetrical model is a transitional model that fully permits the use of elements from any of the other security options analyzed in this report. It in no case stands in the way of Euro-Atlantic integration but, on the contrary, could prove to be an additional advantage through which Ukraine might become more interesting and valuable to the Alliance. As to Euro-Atlantic integration itself, Ukraine needs to stop looking for new formats and focus on implementing those programs that are currently on offer through its partnership with NATO. Deeper, not broader, integration must become the main motto for all those involved in carrying out the reform plans intended to move Ukraine towards the Alliance. For instance, Ukraine’s current Administration is insisting that the country be included in NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Program, which currently includes Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden. Neither NATO itself, nor the countries participating in the program, can clearly explain how this format might be important for Ukraine. Nor is there any obvious evidence that this program might somehow bring Ukraine closer to the Alliance.
The Institute of World Policy is aware that the risk of a “grand bargain” among global players is always there, but it is not inevitable. In recent years, responses to Russia’s aggression were accompanied by countless ‘revelations’ about how international partners will or did cut deals with the Kremlin that were against Ukraine’s interests. But three years of growing military strength in Ukraine, the dedicated voluntarism of Ukrainians in support of their own army, and Ukraine’s active political and diplomatic engagement have ensured that this kind of conspiratorial scenario did not materialize. For Ukraine, a successful security model is, above all, the further reformation of its Armed Forces, but not only. It also means combating corruption, including in the defense sector, attracting investment to the economy, gaining the trust of ordinary citizens in their government, and establishing a government that is accountable before its citizenry.

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director, Institute of World Policy

This report was prepared within the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine. The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy.

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Institute of World Policy prepared a memo on the signals that are to be sent to the Polish decision-makers and public by President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko during his visit to Poland.In the course of the visit to Warsaw President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko should:
– note that Ukrainian-Polish relations are of strategic character and of strategic priority to Ukraine;
– express gratitude for the consistent support provided by Poland to European and Euroatlantic integration of Ukraine, visa-free regime for Ukraine and upholding of EU sanctions against Russia;
– thank Poland for comprehensive aid in realization of the reforms in Ukraine; underline that Ukraine carefully studies Polish experience of transformation and eurointegration and is grateful to Polish advisers for assistance in the implementation of the Association Agreement with European Union;
– emphasize that Ukraine is interested in development of Poland as strong, successful and influential country, that continues to be reliable partner of Ukraine in the region and in the EU, NATO, OSCE, UN etc.;
– underscore interest of Ukraine to be involved in the realization of ABC initiative (cooperation of Central and Eastern European countries), and, inter alia, suggest to Poland a joint preparation for the next summit that will take place in Wroclaw in June 2017 within the framework of this initiative.
On the issues of security:
– express gratitude for Polish support of NATO «open door policy» with regards to Ukraine and lobbying of Ukrainian issue as the part of the agenda of Warsaw NATO summit;
– thank for Polish assistance in confronting of Russian aggression (inter alia training of Ukrainian instructors by Polish servicemen, provision of humanitarian assistance, treatment and rehabilitation of injured in the ATO, etc.);
– underscore successes attained within the framework of training of LITPOLUKRBRIG and welcome involvement of personnel and materials of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the operational service within the framework of the newly established tactical Visegrad Four (V4) Battlegroup;
– emphasize the readiness of Ukraine to share experience in countering of hybrid warfare, inter alia in the development of Polish territorial defense forces;
– suggest to President of Poland to initiate joint declaration of the leaders of Central and Eastern European countries to President-elect Donald Trump. This joint declaration shall provide clear-cut arguments why this region is important for US interests and transatlantic security and explain the dangers which hybrid warfare constitutes for this region;
– emphasize the importance of regional cooperation in ensuring energy security, inter alia, creation of interconnectors within Eastern European gas hub between Ukraine, V4 counties and Romania;
– emphasize the strategic importance of Ukraine and Poland for the security of NATO/EU Eastern border; underscore that Ukraine has removed all obstacles for the use of Polish 100 million euro credit for construction of access roads and joint check-points at Ukraine-Polish border and express hope that the upgrade of the border management infrastructure will become common Ukrainian-Polish success story, including through combating of illegal migration.
On the issues of history:
– emphasize the constructive development of Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on history, inter alia through adoption of Declaration of Memory and Solidarity by Ukrainian and Polish Parliaments;
– propose an Action Plan on historical dialogue between Ukraine and Poland to show the readiness of Ukraine for such a dialogue and the vision on how this dialogue could be conducted;
– underline that the study of tragic pages of Ukrainian-Polish past should be the subject of the research by historians; any employment of history for political purposes is unacceptable and should be recognized as such that inflicts irreparable damage to the present good-neighborly relations;
– welcome the development of cooperation between historians of Ukraine and Poland within the framework of Ukrainian-Polish Forum of Historians, encourage the implementation of other initiatives aimed at depolitization and constructive study of the common past.
On Ukrainian community in Poland:
– thank activists of the Ukrainian community for their activities as promoters of Ukrainian national interests and conductors of Ukrainian public diplomacy;
– emphasize the importance of Ukrainians migrant workers in the development of Polish and Ukrainian economies;
– express concern on the increased occurrences of acts of aggressive behavior against Ukrainians in Poland and vandalization of Ukrainian graves and monuments; urge the Polish government to publicly condemn such acts, investigate them and bring those responsible to justice;
– urge the Ukrainian graduates of Polish higher educational institutions to return to Ukraine and contribute to the development of the Ukrainian state;
– initiate the year of Ukrainian culture in Poland.
President should be ready for the following questions:
– current situation as to the fighting in Eastern Ukraine, observation of ceasefire, the status of the Minsk agreements implementation, etc., as well as on the situation in Crimea;
– Ukraine’s stance on the possible involvement of Poland in negotiation format of the settlement of Ukrainian-Russian conflict;
– real situation concerning the reform implementation in Ukraine, the implementation of the Association Agreement and the fight against corruption;
– problem of VAT refund to Polish entrepreneurs;
– resignation of Saakashvili and his role in the political processes in Ukraine;
– appointment to the Ukrainian government of former Polish officials, who have a mixed reputation in Poland, evaluation of their work;
– policy of Ukraine in the realm of history, including the expected adoption of amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the legal status and commemoration of fighters for independence of Ukraine in the XX century” that the status of the fighters for Ukraine’s independence does not apply to people whose actions qualify as a crime against humanity;
– questions raised by the recently published book by Polish journalists Zbigniew Parafianowicz and Michael Potocki «Crystal piano. Betrayals and victories of Petro Poroshenko».
In order to maximize the effect of his messages the President should:
– address the Polish people in Polish language;
– conduct an open discussion/debate involving the media, as well as hold a meeting with the representatives of Polish civil society;
– thank Polish journalists and experts for constant attention to the events in Ukraine.

A discussion paper was prepared by Kateryna Zarembo, deputy director of the Institute of World PolicyFull text of the report is available here
CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Interests of Ukraine toward Poland and interests of Poland toward Ukraine: the meeting points
2.1. Political dialogue: the past chasing the present
2.2. Security interests of Ukraine and Poland: multidimensional implementation
2.3. Reforms and the economy: The opportunity for a common success story
3. Who’s Who? Interested Parties and Groups of Influence
3.1. Political players: Who influences Polish policy towards Ukraine?
3.2. Public sentiments toward Ukraine in Poland and toward Poland in Ukraine
4. Existing and Potential Risks and Conflicts
4.1. Growing problems in relations between Ukraine and Poland through persistent confrontational historical rhetoric.
4.2. Poland’s weakening position in the EU and hence worsening relations with Ukraine
4.3. Loss of Polish support for lack of substantial progress in reforms
4.4. Worsening attitudes and discrimination against Ukrainians in Poland
5. Recommendations

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund of the USA, and the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.

The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Marshall Fund of the USA, the Swedish Government, the International Renaissance Foundation, Think Tank Fund.

IWP has developed 15 recommendations for the Ukrainian goverment in order to maintain its close relations with the US. The document was written by IWP analysts in the cooperation with former US Ambassadors to Ukraine John Herbst and Steven Pifer.· To accept Donald Trump’s victory as a common fact in course of regular U.S. presidential elections and remain reserved and detached.
· To start negotiations with Donald Trump’s team concerning Ukraine’s and America’s prospects of bilateral relations, fulfillment of Minsk agreements, sanctions imposed against Russia, and internal reforms in Ukraine via official and unofficial channels.
· To initiate dialogue with Vice President- Michael Pence, who keeps to traditional views of the Republican Party on international relations (necessity to carry out active U.S. policy on the global stage , support of strengthening democracy, and counteractions to Russia’s aggressive policy). To suggest the possibility of including Ukrainian issues into new. Vice President’s portfolio in course of negotiations with new administration representatives.
· To establish contacts with main candidates for the position of U.S. Secretary of State (Newt Gingrich, Robert Corker, John Bolton), Minister of Defense (Jefferson Sessions) and National Security Advisor (Michael Flynn).
· To initiate top-level invitation of Donald Trump to Ukraine or discuss the possibility of arranging a meeting in the USA at the highest level before the Inauguration Day occurs. In particular, to suggest the possibility of conducting regular high-level telephone conversations for exchanging ideas.
· To emphasize the fact that Ukraine spends 5% of its GDP on national security and defense without even being a member of NATO- thus, Ukraine is not a “freeloader” in security issues and as a result encourages strengthening of security in the Euroatlantic region.
· In a dialogue with the US concerning security issues, to emphasize the development of human and institutional capacity and at a lesser extent to raise an issue on lethal armaments transfer. (ATMS, MANPADS). At the same time, to consider the possibility of putting forward a proposal to the US government regarding the acquisition of required military equipment in sufficient quantity, in such a way demonstrating Ukraine’s readiness to pay for its own security.
· To put a special emphasis on cooperation with newly-elected Senate and House of Representatives. In such a manner to make use of existing two-party consensus in the US Congress concerning comprehensive support for Ukraine in terms of Russian aggression and the process of reforms implementation.
· To facilitate Senate’s approval of a bill №5094, “On stability and democracy in Ukraine” (STAND for Ukraine Act) by carrying out active interparliamentary activities. This bill anticipates US refusal to recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia, as well as the necessity to renew Ukraine’s border control as a requirement for lifting the sanctions.
· To develop and agree with the newly-elected U.S. presidential administration a clearly defined set of indicators for implementation of reforms in key areas s in order to prevent speculations on “Ukraine fatigue.”
· During the next two months special attention is to be focused on making tangible progress in fight against corruption. Ukraine, currently having one of the best legislative frameworks to fight corruption, must demonstrate successful results that can be presented to the new presidential administration as a strong indicator of readiness for further implementation of reforms and effective application of American assistance.
· To initiate top-level discussions concerning the possibility to implement common Ukrainian-American business projects. Within this context, it is important to hold negotiations on the possibility of engaging American companies into the process of privatization.
· With active participation of representatives of Ukrainian embassy in USA, to set up a center where all the governmental and non-governmental lobbyists of Ukrainian national interests in Washington could be gathered. Explore the possibility of developing a professional lobbyist structure that would facilitate upholding of Ukraine’s national interests and creating its positive image in the U.S.
· To initiate address of Ukrainian community in the U.S. to the new president and Congress urging to continue active support for Ukraine as a country meeting America’s national interests.
· It is important to establish contacts with a maximum number of influential U.S. think-tanks without focusing on cooperation with solely one or two of them.