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Donald Trump’s win shakes Ukraine

Alyona Getmanchuk’s comment for PoliticoDonald Trump’s victory leaves Ukraine alone and afraid.

The fear is that the new U.S. president-elect will choose warm ties with Moscow over the exasperation of supporting Ukraine, a country he described during the campaign as a “mess.”

“Biggest loser in the world tonight — Ukraine,” tweeted Michael McFaul, the former U.S. ambassador to Russia. “Your only hope is to get really serious about reform and keep Euros supportive.”

But the EU’s consumed by its own internal problems like Brexit and the rise of its own Trump-like populists, stirring anxiety in Kiev that the bloc is no place to lend a hand.

Ukraine needed to be prepared to go it alone, said Alyona Getmanchuk, director of the Institute of World Policy in Kiev. “Donald Trump’s election is a strong signal that Ukraine should be ready to carry out reforms and resist Russian aggression without U.S. and Western support,” Getmanchuk said. “We’re not in the condition to do this yet, but we need to be ready.”

Trump has a tangled history with Ukraine. His campaign manager, Paul Manafort, was a close associate of Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s deposed pro-Russian president — a link that become so controversial that Manafort was removed from the campaign. Another advisor, Carter Page, has ties to Russian energy giant Gazprom.

Trump was also much less stalwart in Ukraine’s defense than the outgoing administration of President Barack Obama. During a campaign television interview, he equivocated on whether Russia was right to annex Crimea in 2014. “The people of Crimea, from what I’ve heard, would rather be with Russia than where they were,” he said.

During the Republican National Convention, Trump activists were instrumental in changing the party’s platform on Crimea to a position more favorable to Moscow.
Hoping for the best

Faced with the reality of a Trump presidency, Ukrainians clung to the hope that his campaign statements won’t become policy in power.

Kyiv worries Trump’s apparent warmth toward Russian President Vladimir Putin will be misinterpreted by Moscow. A low-level war against Russian-supported rebels in Ukraine’s east continues to chew up lives and bodies, but the Kremlin has avoided an all-out offensive. That could change if Moscow senses that the threat of tougher U.S. sanctions is receding.

“At the very least, Vladimir Putin will test the situation, the same as he tested President Obama,” said Getmanchuk. “And when he thinks he received carte blanche, he will act even further.”

Read full article here.

Trump’s victory as a chance for Ukraine: what Kyiv’s strategy has to be

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director of the Institute of World PolicyDonald Trump’s victory in the US elections can, in fact, become a chance for Ukraine.
This is a good chance for Ukraine to get rid of foreign paternalism, this time – American paternalism.

It’s not natural that the effectiveness of the Ukrainian president or Ukrainian government be measured solely by the level of Western support, particularly Washington’s. The speed and quality of Ukraine’s reforms should not depend on whether or not a figurative Uncle Joe calls and threatens the Ukrainian president with cutting off the money flow.

We in Ukraine knew different manifestations of Trump.
We knew Trump as a potential candidate for the Republicans who did not skimp on words of support for Ukraine. We knew Trump as an official candidate who balanced on the edge of the unacceptable in his statements concerning Crimea and Russian presence in Ukraine.

However, we do not know what kind of president Trump will be for America, the World, and especially for Ukraine. Moreover, I do not exclude the possibility that he himself does not yet know. We also do not know (although we hope) whether the fine-tuned American system has the ability to mold the new President, or if, vice versa, the new President can tame the Washington political machine.

We do not know if he will make even minimal alterations in his world view after the first American intelligence briefings, which traditionally are conducted for the newly-elected president. We do not know whether he will listen to his advisors. Or maybe, his advisors will find themselves in a situation where they will say what Trump wants to hear in order to secure their positions in his administration. We do not know whether or not Trump will continue to praise Putin after their first meeting and the first disagreements with the Russian president.

We do not know whether the Congress, where Republicans maintained their hold on both chambers, will be a mobilizing or deterring factor for Trump.

However, there are things which we can foresee or assume, relying on analysis.

Americans as a whole and Trump, in particular, do not like perpetual losers.
A Ukrainian success story does not automatically guarantee attention and support from Washington, but a story of failure will guarantee that under the new President Ukraine will be written-off of the foreign policy and security agenda for the US.

In contrast to Hillary Clinton, Trump is considerably less informed about the situation in Ukraine, having only sporadic contacts with certain Ukrainian oligarchs.

However, regardless of how paradoxical this may sound, this could be a plus. The complex of information regarding Ukraine that many members of Washington’s establishment have is quite often that “Ukraine= corruption.” The current view that Trump has of Ukraine is still forming, and thus we have an opportunity and a need to make sure that this view does not develop solely under the influence of Putin’s lectures to the new President that “Ukraine is not even a country.”

For this, it is necessary to avoid Kyiv’s traditional mistakes.
One of the mistakes which Ukraine has made for a long with America is to attempt to oblige the USA to help us. Such an approach with the new President will most likely not lead to success.

It is unlikely that Trump will pay much attention to agreements reached between Ukraine and his predecessors, especially those reached by Hillary Clinton’s husband, in particular, the Budapest Memorandum – even if these agreements are politically binding for Washington. However, this does not mean that old ideas and achievements have to be discarded.

We need to make Trump interested in Ukraine.

Until the new administration in the US will be interested in Ukraine – either because of our contribution to Euro-Atlantic security, or a reform miracle, or the presence of strategic American investors here – the US and Ukraine will have a strategic relationship only on paper.

To interest and not oblige must be the new slogan of Ukrainian diplomacy for America.

Of course, this work will not be easy, but we have no way around it. We shouldn’t consider it as just another regrettable international misunderstanding.

The results of the US elections are worth considering as one more signal that the international state of affairs for Ukraine is becoming more and more unfavorable. Concerning Russian aggression, at the moment we are left with one serious political ally capable of having at least some influence on the situation around Ukraine – Germany, in the person of Chancellor Merkel.

And even then, the certainty of having her support will last only until September 2017, when elections will take place also in Germany.

Unfortunately, the birth of a new Ukraine coincided with the birth of a new America and a new Europe. For them, a new Ukraine is of considerably less importance than for the old America and old Europe.

And it is necessary to accept as a fact.

Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Moldova

A discussion paper was prepared by Olena Betliy, Research Fellow at the Institute of World PolicyFull text of the report is available here.
CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Ukraine’s interests toward Moldova and Moldova’s interests toward Ukraine
2.1. No problems, just questions: package agreements
2.2. Economic cooperation: protectionism or free trade?
2.3. Battle for the Dniester
2.4. Ethnic minorities: problem of self-identification
2.5. Integrated border management and cross-border cooperation. Transnistria
2.6. Transnistria: political issues
3. Who is who? Interest groups and power groups
4. Existing risks and potential conflicts
5. Recommendations

1. INTRODUCTION
Petro Mohyla (1596-1647) is a symbolic and uniting figure for the Ukraine-Moldova relations primarily as a reminder of the common European space in Eastern Europe. Born in a family of Moldovan hospodars, Mohyla was a noble and well-educated voivode and the metropolitan of Kyiv. He faced no lesser challenges than modern ones and was able to lead his flock through them by implementing a series of measures to raise a new, educated generation and by relying on the ancient Christian Rus’ identity. We would call someone like Mohyla a successful reformer, while his contemporaries referred to him as a defender of Rus’ rights, one who brought peace to Rus’ and “did and fixed everything well”. .
By choosing “European integration as a strategic goal of both states”, Ukraine and Moldova are again building their bilateral relations in the common European space. The strengthening of their statehood also depends on successful reforms and the restoration of political identity. Moreover, European integration can be viewed as a stimulus to enhancing bilateral cooperation through joint project implementation and the common experience of Europeanization.
The European choice of Ukraine and Moldova is also underscored by the symbolic political gestures of the leadership of the two countries. Prime Minister of Moldova Iurie Leancă made a working visit to Kyiv and met with Arsenii Yatseniuk, who had just assumed the premier’s office, on 17 March 2014, at a difficult time when Ukraine faced Russian aggression in the Crimea. This visit was an expression of Chişinău’s pro-Ukrainian policy, showing that it needed a democratic European neighbor. The visit of President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and President of Poland Bronisław Komorowski to Chişinău on 20 November 2014, on the eve of the parliamentary elections, was perceived as a gesture of support for pro-European forces in Moldova. “There will be no alternative to the European path of Moldova’s development,” Poroshenko said during the visit. The importance of further mutual support of pro-European forces and European aspirations continued to be emphasized. In another symbolic political gesture, Moldova’s Minister of Defense was present at a parade to mark the 25th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence in Kyiv, and his Ukrainian counterpart returned the favor by attending a similar parade in Chişinău. Interparliamentary cooperation is also well-established, largely thanks to MP Pavlo Unhurian, who has thorough knowledge of the situation in Moldova and the development of the Ukraine-Moldova relations and heads the group for interparliamentary relations with the Republic of Moldova. Cooperation between Ukraine’s and Moldova’s delegations in PACE permits using this platform to protect the territorial integrity of the two countries.
At present, cooperation between Ukraine and Moldova can be described as active and intensive. When the office of Ukraine’s ambassador to Moldova was vacant (November 2014 – September 2015), the resolution of certain issues was slowed down. Moreover, certain “stagnation” in the bilateral relations has always been linked to Russian aggression. However, 2016 is a breakthrough year marked by intensified dialogue at the top level and the preparation of a series of bilateral events: President Poroshenko met with Prime Minister of Moldova Pavel Filip in Odesa Oblast on 7 October 2016. First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development and Trade Stepan Kubiv is scheduled to meet with Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Octavian Calmîc in Chişinău in 2016 to resume the activities of the commission. (The two ministers co-chair an intergovernmental commission.) Moreover, prime ministers Volodymyr Hroisman and Filip will open the Bronnytsia-Unguri bridge with customs checkpoints by the end of 2016. No less active is dialogue between the defense, environment, infrastructure ministries and the border guard and customs services. Cooperation has the form of package deals following the principle “nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon”, so the success of these agreements largely depends on the effective coordinating role of the ministries of foreign affairs of Ukraine and Moldova.
Thus, both sides now demonstrate the will to fulfill previously reached agreements and move on to the next stage in their relations. In particular, each side proposes focusing on dialogue as the best format for fulfilling package agreements, treating the respective areas of bilateral cooperation not as problems but as issues already being addressed. Correspondingly, there is a reason for tentative optimism that four groups of problems in the Ukraine-Moldova relations previously identified by experts (border demarcation, mutual claims to property, conditions for the operation of the Dniester Hydroelectric Station (Dniester HES-1), and environmental issues) will be resolved.
Apart from the effective and rapid fulfillment of package agreements and the successful implementation of the AA and DCFTA with the EU, which are in the interests of the two states, the following interests can be singled out:
Ukraine’s interests toward Moldova:
– control over the state border between Ukraine and Moldova, especially along the Dniester, which is a security factor for Ukraine;
– resistance to Russian propaganda and increasing the impact of Ukraine’s soft power in Moldova;
– expansion of economic cooperation and Chişinău’s friendly economic policy, which will make it impossible – to use the tool of trade wars in the future;
– multilateral cooperation with the Ukrainian diaspora in Moldova;
– settling the conflict in Transnistria.
Moldova’s interests toward Ukraine:
– international security and the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity;
– development of infrastructural projects as a platform for more extensive cooperation and tourism;
– environmental situation;
– control over the border between the two states;
– development of economic relations;
– cooperation with the regions of Ukraine;
– support for the Moldovan minority in Ukraine;
– settlement of the Transnistria conflict.

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund of the USA, and the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.
The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Marshall Fund of the USA, the Swedish Government, the International Renaissance Foundation, Think Tank Fund.

The Index of Relations with the USA, EU, Russia, and China. Special Theme.

The Institute of World Politics along with the agency of strategic communications, the Truman Agency, prepared its first release of the «Index of Relations» under the project «Foreign Policy Audit».Authors: Alyona Getmanchuk, Sergiy Solodkyy, Leonid Litra, Daria Gaidai, Andriy Goncharuk.

From now on, on a quarterly basis the experts of IWP will evaluate the dynamic of of relations on key points of foreign policy concerning the EU, USA, Russia, and China. In addition, a special theme concerning a certain issue will also be published every time.

Read the publication here.

Aside from a qualitative analysis, the researchers prepared a quantitative analysis, evaluating every action on a scale from 0 to 10 with a plus or minus sign.

For the time period between June and September of this year the most positive tendencies were noted in relations between the Ukraine and the EU: these relations were evaluated at +30 points. Second place, with a minor interruption, was relations with the USA, with +17 points. Third place was taken by China (+13). The champion for negative relations was relations with Russia (-39 points).

The special theme of this release was the situation in and around Transnistria- «Is Transnistria changing the rules of the game in the region?»

The methodology of the research:

Events which were evaluated: discussions; agreements; signing of documents; the start of implimentations; any allocation of funding; political support; public resonance; partial fulfilmment of agreements; new initiatives; complete fulfillment of agreements. In the case of a negative influence, the evaluation is accompanied with a minus.

The general evaluation of a trend comes in the form of the sum of points which characterize this particular trend during the course of the stated period. The expert group used BISS’s methodology as its foundation, which developed a clear scale of evaluation of events in foreign policy.