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The report prepared jointly by the Institute of World Policy, Vox Ukraine, Democratic Initiatives Foundation, and the Donetsk Institute of Information.Contents

1. Introduction
2. The Minsk agreements: the art of the negotiable by Kateryna Zarembo and Leonid Litra, Institute of World Politics
3. The cost of the conflict: paying for guns and butter by Ilona Sologoub, Tymofiy Mylovanov, and Oleksandr Zholud, Vox Ukraine
4. The swinging pendulum: public opinion on the occupation in the East by Maria Zolkina, Democratic Initiatives Foundation
5. Unvarnished realities: the conflict on the ground by Vitaliy Syzov and Mykola Zamikula, Donetsk Institute of Information
6. The sum of its parts by Vlad Galushko, Open Society Initiative for Europe
7. Conclusions

To read the publication click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
When spontaneous demonstrations in winter 2013-2014 culminated in the popular uprising known as the Revolution of Dignity, few could have predicted they would trigger a major international crisis and the biggest challenge to Ukraine’s survival since the end of the Cold War. Two and a half years later, the conflict in eastern Ukraine that followed on the heels of the revolution continues to simmer.
Born out of a desperate attempt to halt escalating warfare, the Minsk agreements stanched the casualties and destruction in eastern Ukraine, but failed to stop sporadic fighting and achieve a durable ceasefire. The agreements left each side with too much room to interpret the sequence of steps to end the conflict. Ukraine believes establishing secure conditions in the separatist areas should come before any political steps, while Russia insists on the reverse order. Although they side with Ukraine’s position, the country’s Western partners would like it to proceed with any feasible political steps. Though all the parties appear frustrated with the Minsk framework, none is ready to drop it. The conflict in the East has exacted a heavy toll on the Ukrainian economy due to the loss of major industrial centers and fertile agricultural land. With an already dire economic crisis deepening, the government has had to reallocate scarce public resources to support the hronically underfunded military and internally displaced persons. The conflict remains a key obstacle to foreign investment, and it has muddied the waters around economic ties with the occupied areas, where opportunities for corruption and smuggling threaten to undo the progress Ukraine has made against the country’s oligarchs.
Given these circumstances, the Ukrainian public is critical of the Minsk agreements, blaming them for the failure to achieve peace and for one-sided political concessions. Most Ukrainians believe the occupied territories should be returned, but differ on how to approach this. The majority prefers a variety of selective concessions to Russia and the self-proclaimed republics to a full-scale military assault, but does not want to see a total surrender to Russian and separatist demands.
Meanwhile, diverging realities are emerging in the occupied and newly liberated territories. In the occupied areas, the education and healthcare systems are aphazardly adopting Russian standards. Citizens there are subject to fierce separatist and Russian propaganda and have limited access to Ukrainian media. Travel restrictions often cement their negative perception of Ukraine as an unwelcoming homeland. In Ukraine’s newly liberated districts, pre-war shortcomings in the social sector are exacerbated by a post-war reality in which a simmering conflict can instantly boil up. The government is struggling to remedy the damage of the occupation without a public consensus on how to interact with these areas.
Moving forward will require examining a number of options and settling on a mix that would ensure the ultimate goal of re-integrating these areas into Ukraine. In foreign policy, the dilemma is whether to stick with the Minsk agreements despite their deficiencies, or to abandon them in hope of a better deal. At present, the advantages of working within the Minsk framework outweigh the negatives, as Ukraine is able to keep its Western partners engaged and achieve incremental progress. In domestic policy, the choices are far more varied, from pursuing complete or limited isolation of the occupied areas,to engaging in partial normalization or their limited re-integration. Each scenario carries advantages and drawbacks.
Putting all the different options on the table for public debate would not only help consolidate public opinion around possible concessions and “red lines,” but also prepare Ukraine for the even more difficult task ahead: bringing the country together to build a truly democratic and European state, which was the original promise of Euromaidan.

This report was produced under the Ukrainian Think Tank Development Initiative (TTDI), which is implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE) and the Ukrainian Think Tanks Liaison Office in Brussels. TTDI is funded by the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine. The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the Government of Sweden, IRF and OSIFE.

This text is an annex to “Keeping up appearances: How Europe is supporting Ukraine’s transformation” by Gustav Gressel, Senior Policy Fellow at the ECFR, and has been compiled by national researchers in each of the EU member states.The full publication with detailed explanations is available at the ECFR website

On October 6, the report was launched in Kyiv with the support of the Institute of World Policy

Leaders are member states that contribute to the EU’s efforts to assist Ukraine and politically facilitate the European support effort to help Ukraine and counter Russian aggression. Leaders are pro-active and engaged in the reform process. For their foreign ministries Ukraine reforms are a priority. The leaders on Ukraine reforms are, in order, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria.

Fence-sitters are member states that either fail to contribute significantly to the EU’s efforts or fail to facilitate them. Fence-sitters are member states that have to balance their economic or political interests in the EU and vis-à-vis Ukraine with interests in other fields. These member states do not hinder the EU’s efforts, but are not always proactive in pushing them forward. The fencesitters on Ukraine reforms are, in order, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Croatia, Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus.

None of the slackers have openly sabotaged reform efforts or have rolled-back sanctions, but they have attempted to confine the EU’s Ukraine policy to an absolute minimum and their stance on Ukraine is largely determined by their desire to preserve positive relations with Moscow. The slackers on Ukraine reforms are, in order, Greece, Austria, and Italy.
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Opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and compilers of this publication.

A discussion paper was prepared by Andriy Goncharuk, Eugenia Hobova, Viktor Kiktenko, Oleksiy Koval, Serhiy Koshovy for the Institute of World PolicyFull text of the report is available here

CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Ukraine’s interest towards China and China’s interests towards Ukraine
2.1. Chinese vision of the world order
2.2. Stages of the Ukraine-China relations
2.3. China as a strategic partner of Ukraine
2.4. The current state and prospects of Ukraine-China cooperation
2.5. Ukraine’s place in China’s One Belt, One Road project
2.6. Regional level of China’s cooperation in the 16 + 1 format: lessons for Ukraine
3. Existing and potential risks and conflicts
3.1. Further deterioration of Ukraine-Russia
relations and the escalating conflict in the Donbas and Crimea
3.2. Political instability in Ukraine
3.3. The problem of corruption in relations with China
3.4. Competition of geo-economic projects in Ukraine
4. Who is who? Interest groups in Ukraine and China
5. Recommendations

1. INTRODUCTION
The Ukraine-China relations are facing certain challenges at the current stage. In the years of Ukraine’s independence, these relations have generally followed an upward trend and reached a peak in December 2013 when the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed. Currently, political changes in Ukraine, China’s vague response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military aggression against Ukraine put a question mark in the bilateral relations.
The reserved position of the Chinese leadership on the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine can reasonably be attributed to China’s cautious attitude to any radical social and political change. The fact that the Chinese leadership distanced itself from the condemnation of Russian aggression in 2014 is due to the desire to complete contracts for the supply of Russian state-of-the-art weapons in accordance with agreements reached by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in March 2013. Another strong argument for Beijing was the wish to take maximum advantage of Russia’s international isolation in signing a package of oil and gas deals in May 2014 on conditions most favorable for China.
Unfortunately, Ukrainian political circles have a certain bias regarding “communist” China and a lack of understanding of the way power functions in the Confucian world. As a result, despite an appropriate legal foundation and a high level of strategic partnership with the PRC, Ukraine is not using opportunities for cooperation with the world’s largest exporter and second biggest economy, a country that has the world’s largest gold reserves and virtually unlimited investment opportunities.
Geopolitically, China is a conscious supporter of Ukraine’s European integration and has always defined Ukraine as “an important country in Europe”. China’s leadership welcomed the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and has certain strategic plans to involve Ukraine in the Great Silk Road project, which is a personal initiative of China’s leader Xi Jinping. In the case of the successful implementation of this ambitious plan (which bypasses Russia and gives China direct access to Europe through Central Asia and the Caucasus), Ukraine will have a fundamentally new geopolitical place of “the first European country on the Silk Road”.
It should be noted that Europe is quite sympathetic to Chinese plans and, given the currently limited financial resources of the European Union, it does not oppose possible Chinese economic activity regarding Ukraine. Moreover, the EU is directly interested in modernizing Ukraine using Chinese money.
Thus, Ukraine has a unique opportunity to become the focus of the development of the Great Silk Road in the Black Sea-Baltic region, involving the Baltic states, Visegrad Four, Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, and Georgia.
An important practical step taken by China towards the imple¬mentation of the Great Silk Road was the recently created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which has already aroused intense interest around the world.
China’s interest in cooperation with Ukraine is also linked to the decision of the Chinese leadership to create “foreign food bases”. In particular, it includes the use of Ukraine’s agricultural opportunities combined with China’s investment and technological capacities.
Military-technical cooperation and cooperation in the aerospace industry may become an important factor in the bilateral relations. China is still interested in the scientific and technical resources of the Ukrainian defense industry. Aircraft and engine construction can become a real area of Ukraine-China cooperation provided that there is a proper responsible attitude of the Ukrainian side.
In the current conditions, the Chinese side is eyeing the option of replacing Russia and becoming Ukraine’s leading military-technical partner. It is clear that this decision must be coordinated with Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic partners. However, it should be noted that, unlike European integration, Ukraine’s accession to NATO raises certain concerns in China. However, all parties will follow their own national interests, which, thus, gives Ukraine free rein.
The main obstacle to the development of Ukraine-China strategic partnership from the Chinese side is the unconscious perception of Ukraine as part of the post-Soviet space to which Russia allegedly has some rights. On the other hand, Ukraine has a certain prejudice to “communist” China. Removing artificial barriers to the development of bilateral cooperation is the main task of the current stage of Ukraine-China cooperation.

Full text of the report is available here

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit” with the support of the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.
The contents do not necessarily reflect the views of the Swedish Government, the International Renaissance Foundation, Think Tank Fund. No part of this research may be reproduced or transferred in any form or by any means, graphic, electronic, or including photocopying or by any information storage retrieval system, without the proper reference to the original source.

IWP initiated and prepared together with other Ukrainian think tanks a memo for Ukrainian authorities regarding the “red lines,” i.e. the limits for compromise in the areas of political dialogue, security, and humanitarian issues that should not be crossed by Ukraine within the framework of the Minsk Agreements implementation.On ceasefire:

• complete and sustainable ceasefire should be maintained according to clause 1 of the “Package of Measures” during disarmament and withdrawal of troops (clause 2 and 3 of the “Package of Measures”) and until the full restoration of control of the border by Ukraine;
• ceasefire should be observed by the OSCE Monitoring Mission and the Joint Control and Coordination Centre, established within the Trilateral Contact Group.

On disarmament:

• if until the elections military equipment and armaments are kept on Ukraine’s territory in special security storages, those storages should be guarded by the representatives of an international mission with a military component. Only armed observers are able to ensure compliance and not only monitoring of the implementation of security obligations by the parties

On restoration of border control:

• permanent control over the border should be restored before the elections in the occupied territories. As an option, acceptable to the conflict parties, border control should be executed by the OSCE Special monitoring mission (SMM) or to the OSCE mission on the Russian border at “Gukovo” and “Donetsk” checkpoints, following the extension of the latter’s mandate to cover all of the Ukraine-Russia border.

On elections:

• the elections to local government institutions in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions should be held only within a completely demilitarized territory (after Russian military forces and mercenaries are withdrawn from the territory of Ukraine, and military equipment and armaments are, at a minimum, kept in secured storages on the territory of Ukraine and are in the process of withdrawal from the temporary occupied territories);
• the election date may be cancelled in case of ceasefire violation;
• the elections should be held only after the exchange of prisoners and illegal detainees is completed;
• the elections should be held according to Ukrainian legislation, according to a law adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
• the law on the elections should not define the election date, but should contain a list of preconditions for the elections, both political (general preconditions for elections defined in the OSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990) and technical (development of an electronic voter register to ensure maximum voting for the internally displaced persons (IDPs), duration and conditions of the election campaign, etc.). The elections should be held only after implementation of the preconditions defined by this law. The political preconditions are the restoration of the basic principles of democratic process; in particular, international observers should confirm freedom of political activity, including freedom of political campaigning and the free functioning of political parties registered in Ukraine (according to the law of Ukraine “On Political Parties”) and non-governmental organizations within the region. Preconditions for the elections should be assessed and approved by a specially established independent election commission including the representatives of the OSCE;
• the right to vote should be granted only to the citizens of Ukraine with appropriate residence registration in Donetsk and Luhansk regions as of April 1, 2014;
• conditions should be created to guarantee the maximum possibility for the internally displaced persons to realize their voting rights;
• running in the elections should be denied to the persons who have committed grave crimes;
• full access to Ukrainian media should be restored at least 2 months before and during the election campaign;
• results of the elections should be determined by the Central Election Commission in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine;
• security during the elections, including along the administrative boundary line, should be provided by an international police force, established with the OSCE participation and under its supervision and control.

On amnesty:

• the law on amnesty for persons connected with the events that occurred in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions should not contradict the Ukrainian legislation and should not apply to the crimes against humanity and war crimes. Furthermore, the law on amnesty should contain a defined term of validity and the conditions under which the persons that have been already pardoned can be held accountable for other crimes (e.g. in cases of crimes committed outside the time period to which the law on amnesty applies).

On decentralization:

• the implementation of the law on special arrangements of local self-government in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions should not contradict the constitutional distribution of powers (e.g. law enforcement agencies, judiciary system, etc.)

This list is not intended to be exhaustive and may be expanded in accordance with the political situation.

Signatories:

Institute of World Policy
Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research
Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
Donetsk Institute of Information
School for Policy Analysis at NaUKMA (National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy)

A discussion paper was prepared by Daria Gaidai, Research Fellow at the Institute of World Policy.To download pdf-version of the paper click here.
INTRODUCTION
Arriving in Tbilisi, everyone sees the “Georgia is the associate member of the EU” banner at the airport. Some perceive this slogan skeptically, others — as an expression of “positive thinking” (or national branding), and those who are not interested in politics could even think they are in the European Union. Orientation toward Europe is not a new trend in Georgian politics. The idea that Georgia is part of Europe, i.e. part of the Christian world, has always been an important element of Georgian identity. Over the last two decades, Georgia has been desperate to get rid of its post-Soviet identity and association with unstable and dangerous Caucasus region. Tbilisi’s efforts aimed at escaping from the troubled region and becoming part of the European and Euro-Atlantic space, which have been critically perceived by many observers, meet less and less resistance from the Western partners today.
Aside from security motives, an important role in shaping Georgia’s pro-Western course belongs to economic considerations. Its nearest neighbors, stuck in a period of transition, had little to offer Georgia in terms of modernization and economic development. For Georgia, the path to Europe lies through the restoration and consolidation of its Black Sea identity, i.e., through strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea countries, including Ukraine. Therefore, partnership with Ukraine is a component of Georgia’s broader strategy of repositioning itself in the world to consolidate its integration with the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. But there is more to it.
Given the difference in potentials, the absence of a common border, and other factors, the partnership between Ukraine and Georgia has always been motivated politically rather than economically. The two countries were attracted by their geopolitical considerations and mutual desire to counter Russian influence and achieve closer cooperation with European countries. Georgia remembers the aid provided by Ukraine during the war in Abkhazia, as well as the support during the five-day war with Russia in 2008. However, values should not be underestimated as a factor, because the period of greatest rapprochement between Georgia and Ukraine came after democratic revolutions (2003 in Georgia and 2004 in Ukraine), which created some sense of ideological affinity between the two post-Soviet countries. Also, religion is important for Georgia. Located next to the powerful Muslim states, Georgia has always sought a Christian ally (the so-called Suliko ), a friendly state, which would help it maintain independence, identity, and relations with Europe. For a long time, this role was filled by Russia, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, amid worsening relations between Tbilisi and Moscow, Ukraine took the place of Suliko in Georgian politics . Although Kyiv and Tbilisi do have not many interests in common today, as noted by Georgian analysts, Georgia is more closely connected with Ukraine than with other countries of the region in terms of practical dimension and values.
Ukraine’s interests toward Georgia and Georgia’s interests toward Ukraine are the same on the top level: support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each other and unconditional support for the implementation of the European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of each other.
Other interests emphasized by Kyiv and Tbilisi include the following:
Ukraine’s interests toward Georgia:
• security and military cooperation to counter the aggressive policies of Russia;
• strengthening economic cooperation, including increasing Ukrainian investments in Georgia;
• expanding the soft power of Ukraine in Georgia;
• use of Georgia’s transit potential;
• learning from the Georgian experience of reforms, of policy on occupied territories and finding solutions to the issue of internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Georgia’s interests toward Ukraine:
• mutual support and coordination of activities at the international forums;
• Ukraine’s active participation in ensuring stability and security in the Black Sea region;
• increasing trade turnover and tourist flow between the two countries;
• Ukraine’s assistance in the development of Georgia’s transit potential.
The areas of cooperation of mutual interest are maritime security, transport, energy, agriculture, vocational technical education, and certain specialties in higher education.

To read the full version of the paper click here.

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund of the USA, and the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.
The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Marshall Fund of the USA, the Swedish Government, the International Renaissance Foundation, Think Tank Fund. No part of this research may be reproduced or transferred in any form or by any means, graphic, electronic, or including photocopying or by any information storage retrieval system, without the proper reference to the original source.

A discussion paper was written by Olesya Yakhno, invited expert of the Institute of World PolicyTo download a pdf-version

The relations between Ukraine and Russia have always been an important factor influencing the situation at both regional and global levels. Regional leadership allowed Russia to position itself as an influential geopolitical power, which added weight in various negotiations with global leaders. Subsequently, any “separation” of Ukraine from political, economic, or social “standards” of Russia had been painfully perceived by the Kremlin.
Despite the first signs of Russia’s further direction, such as the “Munich speech” by Vladimir Putin in February 2007 and the war with Georgia in August 2008, the West had underestimated the possible scale of Russia’s turn in the future. Likewise, Ukraine’s citizens and political elites had never seriously assumed any real military threat from Russia. It was only in 2014, when Ukrainians understood the real meaning of the thesis that “Ukraine is not Russia.”
Vladimir Putin’s third term has been marked by the turn from the West. Russian elite, which was integrating into the Western realia and actively participated in different negotiating formats during the presidential terms of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008) and Dmitriy Medvedev (2008-2012), broke its informal pact with the West in 2014, while being dependent on the latter in many ways.
Russia’s turn toward the military logic lies not in the realm of foreign policy. The Kremlin’s course toward the so-called “progressive isolationism” is the answer to the inevitable economic gap between Russia and major geopolitical actors. The crossroads in Russia’s fate has been caused not by Ukrainian events of 2013-2014, but by the internal developments of 2010-2012, on the background of protests on Bolotnaya square and Sakharov avenue. At that moment, Russian leadership had a choice between two options:
1) the “catch-up strategy” or 2) the “break strategy.”
The first option was focused on the inside, and offered reforms, real modernization of the economy, and building the modern post-Soviet state. The second one was oriented outwards, and offered not only preservation and expansion of Russia’s influence (which is unrealistic without a strong economy), but rather breaking the global balance of power and influence to destabilize the situation, weaken the positions of other geopolitical actors in the wake of chaos, and as a result revise the legacy of the Cold War. Russia has chosen the second option; hence, the “Russian spring” (the term created in multinational Russian Federation), the occupation of Crimea and Donbas, and subsequent fascistization of Russian society.
Until 2014, the Kremlin had been implementing two conceptual and equally exploited approaches to the foreign policy in the post-Soviet space. The first one was aimed at restoration of Russia’s leadership in the post-Soviet space and with its help, restoration of the status of a power centre within the multipolar world. The second one stated that the only important objective of any policies in the post-Soviet space is financial profit and building a protective mechanism for the “colour revolutions” virus. Russia’s course towards the CIS states has been always reinforced by strong media support: for a long time, Russian media had been forming negative images of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as countries with allegedly hostile policies toward Russia.
The post-Soviet world, formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, no longer exists. There is no return to the status quo within it, even if we imagine that Russia recognizes its position toward Ukraine over the past two years as a mistake. In addition to military aggression, political pressure and media war, Ukraine has faced the problem of the need to overcome its dependence on Russian energy resources and the need to replace Russian market for Ukrainian exports. If we add to that ruined Donbas, responsible for numerous export goods, it appears that Ukraine is actually forced to rebuild and re-orient its economy almost from scratch. Therefore, it was Russia that destroyed and keeps destroying the close regional ties; it should be noted, that for Kremlin those ties were the best guarantee of Ukraine remaining within the zone of Russian influence, as well as the interdependence of the two countries. The Customs Union has proven to be non-functional and limited to the following formula: the union of Russia as a resource empire and other states without an economy, brought together by situational, not strategic interests. Today, all Customs Union member states are offered to bear joint responsibility for the policies and actions of the Kremlin. It turned out that the Customs Union has been designed for war and restrictions, not for peace and opportunities. After implementation of the DCFTA agreement between Ukraine and the EU, introduction of new taxes for Ukrainian products by Russia, and continued free trade between Ukraine and Russia’s partners within the CIS, it turned out that neither Customs Union, nor CIS do actually exist, as the uniform rules no longer function. Ukraine as a consolidation centre for the western part of the Eurasian “Heartland” and the source of European values for this part of the post-imperial or post-Soviet territory is the new geopolitical reality of the post-Soviet space. As time passes, Russia will keep turning towards isolationism, building “walls” to protect itself from all countries that actually or potentially associate themselves with the Western world. The post-Soviet countries aligning themselves with Europe are viewed by Russia as the “Westerners.” Ukraine is the heart of those countries within the post-Soviet space. In fact, Russia has actualized the perennial internal Russian historical dispute between “the Westerners” and “the traditionalists” across the whole post-Soviet space.
Before the events of 2014, Ukraine and Russia as two post-Soviet states experienced largely similar processes. Today, Ukraine has no choice but to implement reforms, fight corruption, diversify energy sources, find replacement for Russian market, enhance defence capability, realize unification doctrines, and build a responsible political class, i.e. ensure survival and development of the state, transform Ukraine into a modern European country, and restore the territorial integrity as of 1991. Russia – voluntarily and on their own initiative rejects itself in terms of the economy in the XIX century. Russia, on the other hand, is deliberately and on its own accord putting its economy back in 19th century. Moreover, Russia has discredited its attractive geopolitical position and achievements inherited from the Soviet Union, such as the permanent status in the UN Security Council, or the perception of Russia as a winner in the Second World War. It turned out that Vladimir Putin, relatively speaking, is finishing the “Stalin-Churchill-Roosevelt” party, where Russia had numerous winning positions as the successor to the USSR.
Within the “political” dimension, there had been more separating than uniting things between Ukraine and Russia (unlike economic plane, where both countries remained on the “primitive” stage of development) since the beginning of the bilateral relations. First, both countries have fundamentally different state models and political systems, and different ways of their evolution: while Russia moves toward consolidation of the authoritarian model, Ukraine tends to a polycentric one (the parliamentary-presidential form of government). Second, both states have different ideological vectors of national identity. Ukraine has been building a national project of the state, while Russian project is a project of the empire, following the principle of inertia of the post-Soviet legitimacy. Third, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia have come to power through different mechanisms, which means that they have different resources of legitimation as the state leaders. The President of Ukraine relies on the people’s choice, while the president of Russia relies primarily on the elite consensus.
Overall, we could state the incompatibility of mutual demands of Russia and Ukraine towards each other. The list of Russia’s demands towards Ukraine, compiled through the analysis of statements made by various Russian officials, includes the following positions:
1. Ukraine does not try to reclaim Crimea.
2. Ukraine does not join the NATO within the medium term, and stops European integration process at the level of the Association Agreement with the EU (instead of membership).
3. Ukraine does not force the initiative to establish the united Local Orthodox Church.
4. Ukraine shifts to the federal government system, allowing Russia to deepen and exploit the mental differences between various regions.
5. Ukraine recognizes the leadership of Russia on the post-Soviet space and does not challenge this status.
On the other hand, Ukraine never clearly articulated any position regarding the way in which Russia as a neighbour would meet its interests, but rather reacted to certain steps of the Kremlin, such as gas and trade wars, blackmail on accession to the Customs Union, etc. In general, the approaches that would allow Ukraine to be satisfied with Russia could be formulated as follows:
1. Russia is not an empire, but a modern state preoccupied, above all, with its internal issues.
2. Russia understands its place in the modern world adequately and clearly. It is a large and rich country with significant natural resources and human potential, but not a global or even regional power.
3. Russia treats the borders of Ukraine, as well as any other post-Soviet country, as they were agreed in 1991. Russia adheres to the existing bilateral framework between Ukraine and Russia, as well as its obligations under the international law.
4. Russia does not speculate on culture and history, does not exploit historical symbols, events, or memory as disruption tools.
5. Russia is a partner that thinks in terms of concrete mutually beneficial projects in any sphere of economy or culture, and not in terms of exploitation of economic resources or the “soft power” (language or religion) for political pressure and blackmailing aimed at Ukraine or other post-Soviet states.
The politics between Russia and Ukraine had been often utilizing stereotypes and clichés, in particular, in terms of understanding Russian elites and processes; subsequently, misunderstanding of the real processes had led to the incorrect risk assessments. One of the most common and incorrect clichés is the anticipated division of Russian political class into two groups: “the siloviks” (security and military related officials) and “the liberals.” Another conventional classification of Russian political class (“the Muscovites,” “the Petersburgers,” and “the provincials”) is even more eloquent. This classification, despite the regional titles, is not connected to the territoriality of those groups. These regional markers only simplify the systemization of elites when other criteria (e.g. ideology, morality, etc.) are irrelevant. In this case, the division is based primarily on the means of assets formation, values, and way of life.
The risks associated with Russia could be classified as follows:
1) risks associated with the external pressure from Russia (military, political, economic, information);
2) risks associated with attempts of the Kremlin to undermine the situation in Ukraine from inside through various influence groups in different areas and possible sabotage activities;
3) risks associated with unpredictability of Russia and its internal processes able to affect Ukraine.
Furthermore, risk groups could be divided into two categories by relevance/efficiency term: short or medium, and long term. Among the relevant risks, we could identify the following ones: the risk of permanent intensification of hostilities as kind of military blackmail; the risk of discrediting Ukraine; the risk of Russia’s disruptive actions in Ukraine; the risk of Russia’s intentions to “hybridize” Europe; the risk of escalation around Crimea; the risk of Russia’s unpredictability.
As Ukraine and Russia are in a state of a “hybrid” war and will most likely distance themselves from each other, all forecasts and recommendations regarding bilateral relations include, above all, minimization of existing risks and responding to existing challenges. We could highlight the following recommendations to Ukraine.
1. To study Russia-related issues in-depth and comprehensively.
2. To provide more attention to relations with the CIS member states.
3. To formulate Ukraine’s vision of future relations with Russia for the post-war period or the period of reaching a definitive peace, after Russia’s return to the logic of international law.
4. To enhance the information component of Ukraine’s foreign policy.
5. To address the issue of security guarantees in the regional and global dimensions.

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund of the USA (GMF).
The views expressed in this publication reflect the author’s personal position and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute of World Policy (IWP) and the views of the German Marshall Fund of the USA (GMF).