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Memo by the Institute of World PolicyIn December 2016 on the anniversary of Budapest Memorandum signature, the Institute of World Policy presented its study «Security in Transition. How to Counter Aggression with Limited Resources». Armed neutrality is one of the security models analyzed in the paper. In view of the recurrent interest to the potential adoption of neutral status by Ukraine, IWP presents the main conclusions about the outcomes in case of the adoption of this security model.
1. There is no guarantee that Russia would observe the neutrality of Ukraine.
Given numerous violations of bilateral and multilateral commitments to Ukraine by Russia, it is highly probable that hypothetic proclamation of neutrality would repeat the fate of the Budapest Memorandum. Neutral status of Ukraine will allow Russia to avoid responsibility for aggression, return access to Western resources, decrease attention of the West to Ukraine-related issues, and so will create all conditions for the resumption of aggression in different forms.
2. Adoption of neutral status has no wide-spread support among Ukrainians.
Surveys indicate that option of neutrality/non-alignment of Ukraine is supported by 25% of respondents. That’s why adoption of neutrality policy by Ukrainian authorities can instigate not only divisions in society, but domestic political crisis. This, in turn, will cause the deterioration of security situation in Ukraine, rather than improvement.
3. Non-alignment (hybrid status that implies restrictions inherent to neutrality but at the same time doesn’t provide security guarantees associated with it) didn’t prevent Russian aggression.
In 2010-2014 Ukraine conducted the policy of non-alignment – unilaterally surrendered the right to freely choose political-military alliances (as was required by Kremlin) without receiving guarantees inherent to neutrality from regional and global powers. Moreover, Kremlin preserved legitimized leverages of influence on Ukraine in the form of prolonged stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea (an impossible scenario in case of Ukraine’s neutrality, which would have required the withdrawal of all foreign military units from its territory). Taken together, all these factors did not prevent Russian aggression, but created more favorable conditions for it.
That’s why idea that neutral status and giving up on Euro-Atlantic integration by Ukraine would satisfy Russia and result in cessation of hostilities against Ukraine is the wrong interpretation of causes and effects of Russian aggression against Ukraine.
4. Adoption of neutral status would not result in the end of Russian aggression and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Russia wants to achieve not only guaranteed non-participation of Ukraine in the military-political organizations, but first of all have a certain level of control over the processes related to Ukraine. Kremlin is interested primarily in real mechanisms to guarantee this status – namely, preservation of de facto or de jure control over the occupied Crimea and some parts of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts, and through them over the rest of Ukraine. Therefore, the scenario “territorial integrity in exchange for a neutral status” (following the example of Austrian Declaration of Neutrality 1955) is highly unlikely.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that in February 2014 Kremlin exhausted all the available non-military instruments of influence on official Kyiv and resorted to aggression as the form of preservation of control over Ukraine. In such circumstances, further militarization of Russian foreign policy is progressing, which is proved by the creation of military infrastructure in 2014-2017 all along border with Ukraine together with further militarization of the Crimea and occupied parts of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. As a result, Kremlin has no other options than to rely on the threat or employment of military force as the major tool of influence on Ukraine.
Besides, the example of Moldova proves that permanent neutrality can neither prevent nor help to cope with consequences of the Russian aggression. Moldova unilaterally not only declared its neutrality but introduced this provision to its Constitution in order to make Russia withdraw its forces and armaments from occupied Transnistria. Kremlin, however, continues to violate the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Moldova.
5. Neutral status means the inability to receive external support for defense needs.
For example, Ukraine is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid for the defense purposes from the United States. During the first two years since the start of Russian aggression Ukraine received 760 million US dollars for security and defense programs. Adoption of the neutral status by Ukraine would block the possibility to get any assistance and weapons from partners.
6. Historical experience proves inefficiency of neutral status as a means of avoiding external aggression.
Adoption of neutral status by such countries as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, and Norway during the Second World War did not help them to avoid aggression. However, even Sweden and Switzerland have been forced to modify their foreign policy according to the interests of the Third Reich.
Moreover, with the end of the Cold War policy of departure from strict compliance with this status and enhancement of cooperation with NATO/EU has been gaining popularity among the neutral countries of Europe in order to deal with new security challenges. In the aftermath of Russian aggression against Ukraine, countries such as Sweden and Finland have significantly intensified cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States, including through the signing of new cooperation agreements and expanding areas of cooperation.
7. Neutrality as a guarantee of non-aggression works only if the neutral state is not in the interests of a revisionist state.
This assertion is confirmed by the experience of Sweden and Switzerland during World War II, and countries such as Finland, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland during the Cold War. At the same time Ukraine has been and remains a priority №1 of Russian foreign policy.
Until Russia continues to view Ukraine as a country within its “sphere of influence”, adoption of the armed-neutrality security model by Ukraine would lead not to normalization of relations with Russia, but to the loss of Ukraine’s international subjectivity.

All conclusions and recommendations expressed in the publication are based on the analysis of bilateral relations between Ukraine and 17 countries, on the stakeholder surveys, and nationwide public survey.INTRODUCTION

At the time of the 25th anniversary since the independence of the Ukrainian state and after almost three years of military conflict with Russia, Ukraine is still implementing its foreign policy under the principle of ad hoc diplomacy. At present, the strategy of foreign policy to guide all relevant public institutions and officials in advocating Ukraine’s national interests is still missing.
Meanwhile, the world is entering a turbulence zone. The growing popularity of populist and right-wing forces in the EU and the United States, the protracted conflict in the East of Ukraine, the weakening of the EU as a union and its focus on internal processes, the information war waged by Russia – the list of challenges that Ukraine must be ready to face is far from exhaustive.
Moreover, foreign experts interviewed by the Institute of World Policy have warned that Ukraine cannot count on the West’s unconditional support. Today, Ukraine is already no longer a natural partner for many political forces in the West. As for other world regions, in these 25 years they never came into the focus of Ukraine’s concerted policy. Ukraine would have to learn to work with many states, from scratch – with some of them, or anew – with the others.
Thus, as of 2017, the existence of Ukraine’s foreign policy strategy and its proactive implementation are key to its survival as a state, while ‘Nobody but us!’ – the slogan of the 2014-2016 volunteer movement in Ukraine – acquires quite an international, rather than local, sense.
Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit, a project by the Institute of World Policy, is perhaps the most ambitious analytical attempt to fill in this strategic gap over the past two and a half decades. It is primarily distinguished by its complexity and inclusiveness: the project covers not only the reviews of bilateral relations, but also a number of interviews taken with key stakeholders. Thus, the Institute of World Policy invited those who conduct professional research of Ukraine’s foreign policy – Ukrainian and foreign experts; those who directly implement it – Ukrainian top diplomats; as well as those whose interests it is intended to represent – Ukrainian citizens – to share their vision. The overall number of those who contributed to the survey as an author, reviewer, interviewee, participant of the expert and diplomatic surveys as well as public opinion survey exceeds 1300 people.
In particular, the following activities were carried out under the project:
– Analysis of Ukraine’s relations with key Western powers (USA and Germany), influential EU partners (France, Italy, Austria, Lithuania), all its neighbours (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Belarus, the Russian Federation), the Black Sea region countries (Georgia and Turkey), and key partners in the Asia-Pacific Region (China and Japan) – a total of 17 studies of bilateral relations;
– A survey among Ukrainian and foreign experts on the issues, achievements and challenges in Ukraine’s foreign policy;
– A survey among Ukrainian ambassadors abroad;
– A public opinion poll carried out by TNS Ukraine at the request of the Institute of World Policy.

When developing recommendations, in addition to the results of the analysis and advice by experts and diplomats, we also looked into the successful practices of foreign policy ministries in other countries (Americas – USA and Canada; Europe – UK, Germany, France, Austria, Poland; the Far East – Japan; as well as countries with post-Soviet legacy, such as Lithuania and Georgia).
The results and recommendations contained in this publication are certainly not exhaustive. The Institute of World Policy will continue its work under the Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit project by including into its continuing analysis additional regional and multilateral aspects of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, even intermediate results allow for the most poignant problems of Ukrainian foreign policy to be identified and the ways for overcoming them to be suggested as well.
Thanking everyone who contributed to this research as authors, consultants, reviewers, or speakers at the project events would require an additional section. We express our gratitude to everyone who helped this project realize and hope that its results and recommendations would become a valuable contribution to the implementation of a successful and proactive foreign policy by Ukraine.

Alyona Getmanchuk, Director, Institute of World Policy

CONTENTS
WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY BE?
EXPERT ASSESSMENT: VIEWS FROM UKRAINE AND FROM ABROAD
UKRAINE’S AMBASSADORS TALK: WHAT SHOULD BE CHANGED IN UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY
PUBLIC OPINION: ECONOMY MUST COME FIRST
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY
APPENDIX

To download the full publication as a single file, click here.

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit”. This project is implemented with the support of the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of German Marshall Fund of the USA, and the “Think Tank Support Initiative” implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with Think Tank Fund (TTF) with the financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.
The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily reflect the views of the German Marshall Fund of the USA, the Swedish Government, the International Renaissance Foundation, Think Tank Fund. No part of this research may be reproduced or transferred in any form or by any means, graphic, electronic, or including photocopying or by any information storage retrieval system, without the proper reference to the original source.

A discussion paper was prepared by Mykola Bielieskov, research fellow at the Institute of World PolicyFull text of the report is available here

CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Ukraine’s interests toward Japan and Japan’s interests toward Ukraine
2.1. The political dimension of interaction
• Democratic Ukraine with market economy as a reliable partner for Japan
• Relations with Ukraine as an opportunity for Japan to implement its own approaches to international security and foreign policy
• Japan’s support in countering Russian aggression against Ukraine
2.2. Economic and technical dimension of interaction
• Japan as a source of modernization resources for Ukraine
• Mutual trade and investments
2.3. Nuclear safety in Ukraine-Japan relations
3. Who is who? Interest groups and groups of influence
• The dialogue at the highest level
• Ukrainian community in Japan
• The Committee for Economic Cooperation with Ukraine at the Japan Business Federation Keidanren
• Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
• Interparliamentary cooperation
4. Existing and potential conflicts and risks in bilateral relations
5. Recommendations

A discussion paper was prepared by Olena Betliy, Research Fellow at the Institute of World PolicyFull text of the report is available here

CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. Interests of Ukraine toward Lithuania and Interests of Lithuania toward Ukraine
2.1. Back to the Past: the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a Space of Common Historical Heritage
2.2. The EU as a Landmark for the Bilateral Cooperation: Reforms, Investments, Energy Independence
2.3. The Development of Security and Defense Cooperation
3. Who Is Who? Interest Groups and Groups of Influence
4. Existing Risks and Potential Challenges
5. Recommendations

This report was conducted within the project of the Institute of World Policy “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Audit” with financial support of the Embassy of the Lithuanian Republic in Ukraine.
The contents are those of the Institute of World Policy and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Lithuanian Government.

The report by Gustav Gressel was presented in Kyiv on October 6 with the support of the Institute of World PolicyFull text is available on ECFR web-site

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Don’t let the Minsk process detract from reform efforts. The Minsk process focuses too much effort on transforming the war in the Donbas from a full-scale armoured manoeuvre war into a sitting-war. The Minsk format is still useful to deal with practical issues on the front line, and to keep up dialogue between the warring parties, but the Minsk agreement does not provide a proper roadmap to peace nor is progress on implementation a precondition for military de-escalation. However, particularly France and Germany, but also the US and the EU, have invested a lot of diplomatic leverage and pressure to push the political agenda (elections, special-status law) of Minsk. If the same effort had been devoted to pushing Ukraine on reforms – especially on reforming the judiciary as described above – there would have been much more progress in Ukraine by now, and the Donbas would be in more or less the same situation.
Communicate Minsk progress with the Ukrainian public. The Minsk II implementation process was diplomatically well-coordinated, but represented a communication failure of the first order – both on the part of the West (above all by France and Germany, but also the US to some extent) and that of the Ukrainian government, particularly President Petro Poroshenko. The West failed to explain the agreement to a wider audience in Ukraine – particularly lawmakers and reformers – or to engage with those who shape public opinion about its merits and shortfalls. The discrepancy between public statements from the French and German foreign ministers, and contradictions between their respective negotiation teams in the Minsk implementation groups, has created unnecessary confusion. If Europe wants to pressure Ukraine on Minsk, it first needs to reassure Ukrainian society – not just diplomats – that the separatists will neither gain influence in Kyiv, nor be able to use the process to gain military advantage. Without this, there will be no public support for the agreement.
Focus on reform of the judiciary. All other reforms on domestic issues, including the fight against corruption, will be unsustainable if the judiciary remains in its current state. The top priorities should be abolishing the influence of political affiliation on promotions within the judiciary, removing the strict hierarchical structure of the judiciary, paying competitive salaries, and introducing independent disciplinary commissions to deal with complaints of corruption against judges.
Push harder for specialised reform-implementation bodies in each Ukrainian ministry. Deputy-ministers and high-level officials in the ministries are too busy with their other duties to effectively dedicate time to pushing through reforms. Instead, there should be special bodies focusing on this task – particularly on core reforms such as reform of the judiciary, decentralisation, and administrative reform. The EU and the EBRD are negotiating the installation of specific programme coordination officers in each ministry. This would be an important step forward; however, the current deadlock over financial oversight of the programme needs to be overcome.
Embed European diplomats and experts into Ukrainian administrative structures. Embedding European experts into Ukraine’s state structures would give the EU insight into the process of implementing reforms, shorten feedback loops, and assist the Ukrainian bureaucracy in its transition to European standards and procedures. On the expert-level, EU-Twinning – sending administrative personnel to a partner country to assists the practical implementation of EU laws and regulation – is a first step. For the time being, such experts are only provided by a handful of member states, but this should be a much more common phenomenon.
Continue to support rural development. In the wake of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement and decentralisation-reform, Ukraine’s rural areas will undergo an enormous transformation. Public services and administrative structures will be closed as decentralisation reform gets underway, and the new business regulations and product certification procedures – particularly European food-safety standards for agriculture-products – will be more difficult for small- and medium-sized farms and enterprises to implement. Hence, programmes for rural development are crucial to support the transition of businesses in these regions and to keep up public support for the reform process. This is especially true for Ukraine’s eastern regions, which are hit hard by Russia’s economic sanctions. The programmes on rural development and agricultural transition that the EU currently has in place are one of the unsung success stories of EU support for Ukraine, and the expansion and reinforcement of these efforts should be encouraged.
Support small and medium enterprises. To aid Ukraine’s economic transition and the process of de-oligarchisation, support for SMEs is essential. In a time of financial uncertainty, loan-guarantee funds are one measure that the EU could easily and effectively implement. Supporting SMEs is a way that donors could provide assistance without becoming involved in Ukrainian politics.
Step up efforts to reform the Ukrainian armed forces. The Ukrainian armed forces have already been the subject of reform, and progress made in this field exceeds that of all other state-agencies. Still, there are areas that need improvement and the country is still at war. There is room for improvement in operational and tactical planning, leadership-techniques, tactical training, and CIMIC. There are also shortfalls in equipment and technology, particularly on safe communication, electronic warfare, C² systems, anti-tank defence, and artillery tracking technology. Contrary to the opinion held in Europe, Minsk is not the guarantee of relative peace in Ukraine: deterrence through a more effective Ukrainian army is.
Be open to lethal aid, if conditions are met. The EU should deliver lethal aid, on the condition that certain reforms are made in Ukraine’s defence sector — particularly reforms of logistical structures, procurement, control, oversight and disciplinary processes, and reform of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) — rather than “geopolitical” considerations vis-à-vis Moscow.
Stick to commitments. If the EU agrees to deliver Ukraine certain benefits in exchange for progress on reforms, it must stick to its promises once Ukraine fulfils the relevant criteria. The postponement of the visa liberalisation process due to difficulties in Europe such as the refugee crisis, Brexit, and the rise of populism, despite the fact that Ukraine had met the requirements, was one of the biggest blunders the EU has made since Maidan. The EU’s stalling on visa liberalisation did great harm to the credibility of both the Union and the reformists themselves.
Be blunt about the shortcomings of Ukraine’s reforms. European diplomats should take Ambassador Jan Tombinski as their example and be as straightforward as possible when pointing the finger at those responsible for delaying reforms. Only by doing this can real progress can be made.